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ABSTRACT 
With a focus on South Africa, I employ the phenomenological approach from an African 
perspective to analyse strivings for constitution (to constitute an inclusive polity, and etymologically, 
constare ‘to stand together’) and belonging (affectively and materially). In this postcolony, these 
strivings can be discerned in perennial protests by impoverished black communities for an inclusive 
democracy and for social goods; in contestations around land redistribution and against institutionalised 
forms of social ‘invisibilisation;’ and in calls for the valorisation of life-worlds different from the 
western. I contend that these strivings should be understood from the perspective that settler colonial 
constitution-making processes presaged “death of the land” (ilizwe lifile); that is, the shattering of the 
socio-cultural worlds of indigenous peoples. The outcomes of this processes were ‘native’ pariahdom, 
homelessness and worldlessness. Accordingly, the original impulse of anti-colonial struggles was 
Mayibuye iAfrika (‘Return’/‘Re-member’/ ‘Resurrect’ Africa).  
 
My two-fold thesis is, firstly, that perennial protests by marginalised communities are impelled 
by the fact that post-1994 constitutional re-arrangements did not rise to the decolonisation challenge of 
re-membering the land/world. These re-arrangements have thus perpetuated homelessness, pariahdom 
and worldlessness. Secondly, I demonstrate that the cause of this failure is partially the fact that ruling 
party elites - who were beneficiaries of partial inclusion into the settler-constituted polity - failed to 
overcome their liminal-status induced conditions of double consciousness and racial melancholia. The 
result is that they elaborated terms of constitution and belonging whose eventual outcomes are, on the 
one hand, assimilation of ‘native’ elites into the white-dominated world, and on the other, continuing 
pariahdom and worldlessness for the majority.   
 
In Part I, I show that South African anti-colonial leaders based their vision of constitution and 
belonging on W.E.B. Du Bois seminal manifesto for how people of African descent could achieve 
liberation and world-reclamation. I argue that this manifesto leads to elite nationalism, a dearth of 
national consciousness and that it ultimately perpetuates the inherited world of apartness. The main 
insight from this Part is that quests for post-colonial constitution-making ought to be geared towards 
re-membering and (re)constituting the historically-colonised world on spiritual, social and material 
planes – the three realms of African belonging in the world. In Part II, I propose decolonising 
constitution-making processes centered on politics of Mayibuye understood here as creolising 
homemaking and re-membering of the world. I do this by advancing Es’kia Mphahlele, Steve Biko and 
Abahlali baseMjondolo’s interconnected praxes of Afrikan humanness, Black Consciousness and 
Abahlalism. I contend that these praxes are faithful to the Mayibuye exigency because they, respectively 
and together, propose ways of re-membering the triadic world and of (re)constituting an all-inclusive 
polity based on African humanness.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
We remain committed to a struggle for a world in which everyone counts 
[Abahlali baseMjondolo, 2014. My emphasis] 
 
 
Strivings for Constitution and Belonging in the “new” South Africa 
 
 
On 26 September 2009, dozens of heavily-armed men attacked a meeting of the Kennedy Road 
Development Committee (KRDC). The KRDC is a founding affiliate of Abahlali baseMjondolo 
(Abahlali), a social movement of shack-dwellers based in Durban, South Africa. A section of the 
marauding assailants set upon an all-night Abahlali Youth Camp while another made its way to shacks 
belonging to the president and deputy president of Abahlali. Kennedy Road Informal Settlement 
(Kennedy Road) resembled a war zone after the attacks: three people were dead, dozens of people were 
injured, over 1000 people were displaced, shacks belonging to Abahlali organisers were burnt down, 
and the invaders had occupied Abahlali’s headquarters. All of this, it was alleged, took place under 
police watch and complicity (Amnesty International, 2009: n.p.; Chance, 2010: 2). Witnesses further 
alleged that the attackers self-identified as members of the ruling party, the African National Congress 
(ANC). Police subsequently arrested twelve members of the KRDC; none of the assailants were ever 
arrested. The arrested members of the KRDC spent months in police custody. S’bu Zikode, the president 
of Abahlali, spent several years living ‘underground’ in safe houses, unable to return to his home.  
 
The attack on Abahlali marked a significant departure from the way the ruling party ordinarily engaged 
with social movements of impoverished black people. In the past, ANC and state-officials have dealt 
with these movements through a mixture of patronage, co-optation, vilification and by arresting 
organisers of protests. As many commentators recognised at the time, this was the first time the ANC, 
through its local groups, attempted to destroy an entire movement and autonomous community 
(Mgnxitama, 2009: n.p.; Friedman, 2009: n.p.). Tellingly, the day after the attack on and dislocation of 
Abahlali the Provincial Minster of Safety and Security declared Kennedy Road “liberated” (Tolsi, 2009: 
n.p.).  
 
I open with this vignette because it highlights conflicting interpretations and enactment of liberation in 
“post-Apartheid” South Africa. At a more profound level, this episode neatly captures the main premise 
of this dissertation. The premise of this dissertation is that black people’s strivings for liberation, 
constitution and belonging persist in the “post-Apartheid” era. By ‘constitution,’ I do not mean a legal 
instrument. Rather, I return to the etymology of this term (constare - ‘to stand together’) as well as the 
decolonisation imperative to constitute a post-segregationist society. As I show in chapter 1, this 
 9 
decolonisation impulse was motored by a nineteenth-century anti-colonial rallying cry, Mayibuye 
iAfrika (‘Return Africa’/‘Re-member Africa’). Proponents of the Mayibuye vision strove to implode the 
world constituted by colonists and to (re)constitute a world in which everyone will have a sense of 
belonging. By ‘constitution-making’ I, therefore, have in mind collective efforts aimed at establishing 
a substantially different kind of polity. As far as advocates for a decolonised world are concerned, such 
efforts are aimed at (re)establishing an all-inclusive and humane polity. Based on this understanding, 
this dissertation proposes that ongoing struggles of Abahlali and certain other movements of structurally 
‘invisibilised’ people ought to be understood as strivings for constitution and belonging.  
 
By strivings for ‘belonging,’ I do not have in mind struggles impelled by a yearning to identify with or 
to be accepted by a specific or particularised community or identity. To be clear, then, by ‘struggles or 
demands for belonging,’ I do not mean strivings impelled by a sense of South Africanness based on 
ideas of autochthony and nativism. On the contrary, the strivings for constitution and belonging that I 
am concerned with here are, to my mind, decolonising because they are based on explicit and active 
deconstruction of notions of autochthony and of fixed, exclusive and bounded identities. It is with this 
objective in mind that I have I opened this dissertation with the vision and praxis of constitution and 
belonging of Abahlali baseMjondolo (lit: ‘dwellers of shack-settlements’). This thirteen-year old 
movement of over 50 000 members is a multi-ethnic organisation that also admits into its ranks people 
from other parts of Africa. This movement’s central campaign for Umhlaba, Izindlu, neSithunzi (Land, 
Housing and Dignity) emerges out of the syncretic spaces that are shack-settlements and is based on an 
explicit rejection of the conjuncture of citizenship and nativism. This is to say that Abahlali reject the 
idea that citizenship rights should only be bestowed upon ‘sons and daughters of the soil’. Relatedly, 
Abahlali, and the kindred movements of constitution and belonging that I discuss in Part II, seek to 
deconstruct the notion of a pure and coherent African identity that is constituted by and constitutes an 
own world. Rather, for Abahlali and its allies, the post-1994 struggle for constitution and belonging 
involves collective efforts aimed at ending the persisting world of apartness and (re)constituting a world 
in which everyone will have sense of affective and material belongingness.  
 
Flowing from the above outline, the central claim of this dissertation is as follows: post-1994 struggles 
of Abahlali and its allies are decolonising praxes of constitution and belonging because they seek to re-
member and (re)constitute the world without the coordinates of autochthony and nativism. I contrast 
these strivings with the ANC’s vision of constitution and belonging. I argue that the ANC’s vision was 
not decolonising because it was driven by the contradictory impulses of nativism and integration into 
the settler-constituted world. The outcome of this paradoxical vision is a “post-Apartheid” world in 
which black elites have been assimilated into a historically white world while the majority of inhabitants 
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continue to suffer non-belongingness, homelessness and ultimately, worldlessness. Seen in this way, 
therefore, Abahlali’s campaign is part of black people’s historical striving against the fact that settler 
colonisation shattered the world and rendered conquered people pariahs of ‘South Africa,’ the settler-
constituted world. I will shortly explain my use of the concept of ‘world’. For now, I would like to 
indicate that phenomenology from an African perspective apprehends the world in a triadic manner 
comprised of spiritual, social and material realms. One of the original claims of this dissertation is the 
contention that fidelity to the decolonisation exigency of Mayibuye iAfrika (‘return Africa’/‘re-member 
Africa’/‘resurrect Africa’) would involve (re)making the world on all these three realms.  
 
This dissertation is divided into two Parts. In Part I, I analyse dominant black visions of constitution 
and belonging with the aim of showing that these visions are elitist visions that ultimately perpetuate a 
world of apartness. My main objective in Part II is to put forward what I consider to be black counter-
hegemonic visions of constitution and belonging with the aim of showing that these visions seek to re-
member the world to ensure plural co-existence.  Part I focuses on the following three aspects. First, I 
analyse the ANC’s vision through the lens of W.E.B. Du Bois’s concept of double consciousness read 
together with Sigmund Freud’s explication of melancholia. Second, I show that ANC leaders’ 
ambivalence (an outcome of double consciousness and melancholia) vis-à-vis the settler-constituted 
world accounts for their inability and/or unwillingness to stay faithful to what I show to be the original 
exigency of the anti-colonial struggle in South Africa, namely, the restoration, (re)constitution and re-
membering of the shattered worlds of historically conquered people (the Mayibuye iAfrika exigency). 
Finally, I locate the ANC’s vision in Du Bois’s seminal manifesto of constitution and belonging. I 
contend that Du Bois’s very influential manifesto leads to elitist nationalism, a dearth of national 
consciousness, and it eventually perpetuates the homelessness and worldlessness of non-elite people.  
 
My main contribution in Part II is also three-fold. First, I dip into the archive of ‘South African’ counter-
hegemonic visions to put forward Es’kia Mphahlele (born: 1919), Steve Biko (born: 1946) and 
Abahlali’s (founded: 2005) inter-connected praxes of constitution and belonging. I have selected these 
visions because they all seek to overcome the problematics of double consciousness and melancholia. 
I will show that these visions are united in their insistence that the route(s) towards constitution-
making/homemaking is via the psychic and spiritual homecoming(s) of historically conquered people. 
Second, I show that these decolonising visions are aimed at de-constituting and (re)constituting the 
world at spiritual, social and material levels - the three realms of African mode of belonging in the 
world. The most important insight here is that these interconnected praxes demonstrate that the 
Mayibuye/re-membering exigency is not an abstract imperative. Rather, this historical desideratum is a 
concrete and indispensable decolonisation imperative because it is directed towards a holistic re-
membering and (re)making of the world. The Mayibuye/re-membering exigency is a call to 
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(re)constitute the spiritual world devastated by the irruption of the world of colonisers leading to cosmic 
disharmony, psychic dislocation and cultural subjugation; the social world historically shaped by anti-
black racism and other institutionalised forms of discrimination; and the material world marked by 
economic inequality, landlessness and homelessness. Finally, I demonstrate that Mphahlele, Biko and 
Abahlali’s interconnected politics of Afrikan humanness, Black Consciousness and Abahlalism propose 
that a post-colonial constitution (‘foundational law’ in this case) should be undergirded by the 
philosophy of African humanness and that it is through African humanness that the collective task of 
ceaselessly (re)creating and re-membering the world could take place.  
 
This study diverts from two sets of analyses that have come to dominate interpretations of post-1994 
social movement struggles in South Africa. One set of analyses regards perennial protests of movements 
of impoverished people as revolts against economic neoliberalism and for a decommodified or socialist 
society (see in general, Zuern, 2011; Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012). A more recent set of analyses adopts a 
wider lens and reads these struggles as resistance against a dearth of democracy and for participatory 
forms of democracy (see in general, Hart, 2013). As I have already hinted above, this dissertation 
proposes to read post-1994 struggles of many, not all, social movements of impoverished people as 
historically-based strivings for constitution and belonging in the terms I have set out above.  
 
My diversion with the abovementioned lines of enquires is, however, not a wholesale repudiation of 
them. I merely wish to deepen these analytical frameworks. As I have outlined above, the constantly 
burgeoning literature on post-1994 social movement struggles focus mainly on economic and/or 
democratic causes. This focus is not inappropriate. Indeed, protests by impoverished people’s 
movements and communities have become an ubiquitous feature of the political landscape in South 
Africa. Protestors engage in disruptive, and often violent, marches and forms of direct action demanding 
inclusion in decision-making processes and basic services such as water, electricity, health care and 
housing. These organisations and disparate communities stage over 2 000 protests annually– one of the 
highest rates of social protests in the world (Alexander et al.: 2015: 5). 
 
At one level, it is correct to frame these protests as acts of resistance against the state’s overwhelmingly 
neo-liberal macro-economic framework. The implementation of this framework has aggravated the 
socio-economic legacy of Apartheid, resulting in massive social dislocation. A few statistics will suffice 
to make the point. A 2015 report by the Statistician-General showed that 55,5 percent of South Africans 
lived below the poverty line, while one in four people lived with chronic hunger (Frye, 2017: n.p.). The 
National Planning Commission (2011: n.p.) has also reported that income inequality remains endemic 
with the richest 20 percent of the population earning approximately 70 percent of the Gross Domestic 
Product. A poverty trends report by the Statistician-General also underscored high levels of racial 
inequality. This report indicated that in 2015 an average annual household income for a household 
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headed by a white person was five times more than that of a household headed by a black person (Frye, 
2017: n.p).  
 
The second aspect of the political context that provokes social protests is the lack of democracy at the 
local government level.  In order to enhance participatory governance at local government level, the 
Local Government: Municipal Structures Act of 1998 makes provision for the establishment of ward 
committees in metropolitan and local councils. The main functions of ward committees are to act as the 
interface between the community and the municipality, to provide advice to the councillor, and to make 
recommendations on any aspect of their ward. The way the system of local government works in 
practice hollows out participatory democracy.  Firstly, various studies have found that the agendas of 
ward committees are ‘colonised’ and ‘hijacked’ by political parties and intra-party factions (see in 
general, Piper and Deacon, 2008; Hicks and Buccus, 2007). Secondly, municipalities are not 
meaningfully engaging local communities when drafting medium-and long-term development plans, 
annual budgets and other priorities of municipalities (Mohamed, 2006: 43). The sphere of local 
government is thus characterised by non-responsiveness and the systemic marginalisation of the voices 
of the most impoverished sector of the society. Community protests and social movement-driven 
activities are thus impelled by impoverished people’s lived experiences of impoverishment, 
abandonment, and invisibility. Impoverished black people thus continue to be assailed by feelings of 
being pariahs subjected to, “permanent physical exclusion from society and its cities from the 
discussions that are taking place in society” (Zikode & Nsibande, 2010: n.p.). 
 
Abahlali has distinguished itself from other movements and organisations by declaring that although 
their short-to-medium term demands are for land, housing, and the upgrading of shack settlements; their 
long-term vision is that of a world, “where everyone counts” (Zikode, 2012: n.p.). Abahlali’s vision of 
constitution and belonging is thus in stark contrast to that of most impoverished people’s organisations. 
Two most important elements distinguish Abahlali from the latter organisations: (i) these organisations 
accept the discourse of post-Apartheid, and (ii) they thus mobilise their “poor” subjectivity (their being 
‘the poor of the poorest’ in popular lexicon) to demand basic services and integration into the “new” 
South Africa. The reason why the state sought to suppress and destroy Abahlali is that this movement’s 
praxis, as we shall shortly see, is predicted on a rejection of the discourses of “new” South Africa and 
“post-Apartheid”. This dissertation thus reads Abahlali’s strivings as strivings motivated by the idea 
that a post-Apartheid world is yet to come.  
 
At its boldest, my argument is that Abahlali and its allies are engaged in a struggle to realise the 
decolonisation imperative of Mayibuye iAfrika - the imperative to ‘resurrect’, ‘restore,’ ‘return,’ re-
member the world. In this regard, I will show that Abahlali is part of a long lineage of counter-
hegemonic visions of constitution and belonging stretching back to the chiefs and kings who first 
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resisted the colonial challenge in the eighteenth and nineteenth century and all the way to the Pan-
Africanist Congress of Azania in the 1950s, the Black Consciousness Movement of the late 1960s and 
1970s and “People’s Power” community organisations of the mid-1980s. I argue that these disparate 
movements and traditions can be brought under the banner of decolonisation because they did not 
struggle for desegregation, democratisation and thus the transformation of the settler-constituted world. 
Rather, they desired to end the settler-constituted world and to re-member their subjugated world(s).  
 
 
The Historical Imperative to Re-member the World 
 
Was my freedom not given to me then in order to build the world of the You? 
[Frantz Fanon, [1952] 2008] 
 
To re-emphasise, however, in my reading, these movements’ politics of homemaking and belonging 
jettisoned politics of nativism. This is what made their strivings decolonisation as opposed to simply 
being anti-colonial. I will explain the distinction between these two impulses in Part I. For now, it 
suffices to say that the visions that I have brought together in Part II are decolonising contra perpetual 
anti-colonial because they understand the imperative of ‘returning Africa’ to mean the twin imperative 
of (re)forging a syncretic national consciousness and of re-membering the African world(s) that is part 
of the world with other worlds. This unwieldly phrasing is my attempt at conveying my main thesis. 
The thesis defended in this dissertation is that ongoing struggles of Abahlali and its allies respond to 
the fact that post-1994 constitutional re-arrangements did not rise to the decolonising challenge of re-
membering the triadic world shattered by settler colonisation. Understood in this way, Abahlali’s 
struggle is a decolonising struggle aimed at re-membering and (re)constituting the world.  
 
The thesis advanced in this dissertation is two-fold. The first aspect of my main thesis (chapters 1-2) is 
the argument that settler constitution-making attempted to shatter the socio-cultural worlds of 
conquered people; hence ilizwe lifile! (‘the land is dead!’) lamented conquered people in the nineteenth 
century (Jordan, 1980: 102; Mostert, 1992: 854). The ‘land was dead’ in the sense that conquest and 
various other processes aimed at securing the being-belonging and being-becoming of settlers 
dismembered the onto-triadic community comprised of the living, the yet-to-be-born and the living 
dead/continuing persons. Indigenous people thus experienced settler constitution-making as 
metaphysically and existentially dislocating.  
 
This dissertation puts forward the argument that the most devastating and enduring consequences of 
colonisation and settler constitution-making are cosmic dislocation and thus worldlessness. To miss this 
insight - as critiques inspired by Marxist, neo-Marxist, liberal and critical race theory do - is to be an 
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unwitting accomplice to the continuation of the settler-constituted world as well as the subjugation of 
African lifeways and their worlds. The first aspect of my two-fold thesis thus implies the contention 
that post-1994 constitutional re-arrangements did not rise to the historical imperative of “resurrecting” 
the world(s). In this regard, I will show that the shattering of the world(s) of conquered people led to 
creation of an elite stratum of colonised people.1 These elites belonged neither to the hegemonic world 
of colonists nor to that of colonised people. The in-between positionality of these elites saddled them 
with double consciousness and melancholia. I argue that these conditions together with the resultant 
state of ambivalence account for these leaders’ failure and/or unwillingness to propose decolonising 
visions aimed at imploding the extant world and re-membering the world(s) of conquered people. 
Chapter 1 is devoted to an exposition of the history of ‘de-worlding’ and to a contextual explication of 
the concepts of liminality, double consciousness, melancholia and ambivalence. Chapter 2 applies these 
concepts to an exploration of dominant forms of black strivings for constitution and belonging.  
 
Having shown that the latter strivings perpetuate worldlessness, the second aspect of my main thesis 
(chapters 3-5) develops the argument that decolonising praxes of constitution-making seek to 
(re)constitute and re-member the world to enable historically conquered people to once again be part of 
the world with other worlds. A close reading of the praxes of Es’kia Mphahlele, Steve Biko and Abahlali 
serves to confirm this point. I contend that nativism is inimical to decolonising praxes because these 
praxes are based on the philosophy of Ubuntu/African humanness. I will demonstrate that this 
philosophy prescribes forms of being-belonging, being-becoming and constitution-making that are 
based on what Édouard Glissant (1999: 120) refers to as ‘poetics of the diverse’ and ‘poetics of relation’. 
Understood in this way, I argue that the Mayibuye imperative is the imperative to re-member worlds 
that were destroyed by European conquest in order for historically conquered people to regain world 
belongingness. This interpretation of reclamation of the world is inspired by Jean-Luc Nancy’s 
following description of ‘a world’ and ‘the world’: “a world is a multiplicity of worlds, the world is a 
multiplicity of worlds” (Nancy, 2007: 109).  
The praxes of redemptive returns, constitution-making and belonging that I promote here are thus 
contrary to the ones propagated by ‘return to Africa’ movements of the nineteenth century (Martin 
Delany, Edward Blyden, Alexander Crummel) and by Garviyism, the early Négritude movement and 
dominant forms of Pan-Africanism in Africa in the twentieth century. The latter visions insist that the 
route towards re-existence, rootedness and reclamation of the world is through “de-linking” from the 
hegemonic Euro-American world and (re)establishing an own autonomous world (‘The Indigenous 
World’/‘the Black World’/‘The Pan-African World’). Using the lens of African humanness, I contend 
                                                        
1 The following definition of ‘elites’ suffices for the purpose of this introductory chapter: “a stratum of the 
population which, for whatever reason, can claim a position of superiority and hence a corresponding measure of 
influence over the fate of the community” (Nadel cited in Crowder, 1968: 384).  
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that dominant black visions of constitution-making and belonging perpetuate death of the world. More 
importantly, I argue that these visions ultimately reprise colonialist discourse, the very source of death 
of the world.  
Put inelegantly, my argument is that dominant black visions of constitution and belonging are ultimately 
un-African. In chapter 2, I will mobilise studies that demonstrate that the African world is ‘traditionally’ 
a multiplicity of worlds that is part of the world because it assimilates edifying elements from other 
worlds. For example, Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff’s studies of the history of the colonisation of 
the Southern Tswanas are very useful for this argument. These studies show that evangelists and 
missionaries were the ones who sought to convert the acquisitive, eclectic and open world of the 
Tswanas into a self-contained world that is radically different to the (superior) world of Europeans 
(Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991: 246). This insight and those of Mogobe Ramose (2007) and Jean-Loup 
Amselle (1998) show that the African world and African identity were never based on notions of 
boundedness, purity and self-segregation. Based on these insights, I posit that it is not staging a “return” 
if such a gesture purports to return to a bounded up and perpetually antagonistic world vis-à-vis other 
worlds and the world. Such a “return” perpetuates the worldlessness of historically displaced and 
conquered people. On this score, I agree with critiques advanced by V.Y. Mudimbe (1988, 1994), 
Anthony Appiah (1992) and Achille Mbembe (2002). Where I part company with these post-
structuralist critics is when they reject the idea and the possibility of the existence of the African 
world(s). If we accept the notion that the world is made up of various worlds, it follows that we must 
also accept the idea that a person can only be part of the world from their own world. I will thus contend 
that critics who dismiss movements for the renascence and re-membering of the world(s) of Africans 
consolidate the colonialist project of rendering Africans worldless and homeless. Wole Soyinka 
summarises this point very well:  
Man exists….in a comprehensive world of myth, history and mores; in such a total context the African 
world, like any other ‘world’ is unique. It possesses, however, in common with other cultures, the virtues 
of complementarity. To ignore this simple route to a common humanity and pursue the alternative route 
of negation is, for whatever reason, an attempt to perpetuate the external subjugation of the black 
continent (Soyinka, 1990: xii. Emphasis mine). 
 
Following this line of argument, I contend that quests for ‘re-worlding’ are valid decolonisation quests, 
and accordingly that post-1994 struggles of Abahlali are historical strivings for the (re)constituting of 
home and thus the world. For a historically conquered people, the quest for a home is not simply a quest 
to recover the home that was destroyed by colonisation. Rather, home is a place where such people can 
(re)create spaces of homeliness (Freud’s heimlich) and rootedness to be able to chart routes towards 
world belonging. The following observation by Njabulo Ndebele gives a contextual explanation to this 
historical yearning for a home and a world: “there must be relatively few South Africans who can still 
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point to a home that they associate with rootedness” (Ndebele, 1996: 28). Ndebele made this 
observation upon returning to South Africa after twenty years in exile. He mourned the fact that he 
could not show his children the house he grew up in. The Apartheid government had demolished his 
parent’s township after it rezoned their area into an exclusively Coloured/“mixed race” people’s area. 
Ndebele and his children’s exilic and worldless condition thus persisted. As Ndebele notes above, 
uprooting, mass removals and de-homing were pervasive conditions of black people under colonialism 
and Apartheid. Today, many impoverished black people are still land hungry and homeless. They live 
under conditions of material and existential insecurity in “squatter camps” with the threat of violent 
evictions and uprooting constantly hanging over them (see in general, Centre on Housing Rights and 
Evictions, 2008). Therefore, the quest for home is an unyielding yearning because home for historically 
scattered and displaced peoples is, “(a) place(s), (a) space(s), feeling(s), practices, and/or an active state 
of being in the world” (Mallet, cited in Femke, 2010: 27). To have a home is thus to gain a sense of 
worldliness. In the preface to Belonging: A Culture of Place, bell hooks explains this longing via this 
personal reflection: “like many of my contemporaries, I have yearned to find a place in this world, to 
have a sense of homecoming, a sense of being wedded to a place….” (hooks, 2000: 2).  
However, does the search for home and for rootedness still make sense in today’s globalised world? 
Lewis Gordon (2000b: 379) is of the opinion that the search for ‘home’ in a world of multicultural and 
multifaceted belongings is ultimately a ‘hopeless ideal’. Writing in Perils of Belonging, Peter Geschiere 
(2009: ix) warns that struggles for belonging are dangerous nativist projects because they are impelled 
by discriminatory ideas about who is a ‘native’ and who is a ‘non-native’. Despite these cautions, 
yearnings for belonging and longings for home continue to predominate the consciousness and struggles 
of descendants of the transatlantic slave trade, European conquest, of economic and political refugees 
and of millions of impoverished people who do not have secure tenure in the countries of their birth. 
As Ndebele and hooks intimate above, for these people having a home is a prerequisite for regaining 
rootedness and for reclaiming world belongingness.  
In addition to these historical reasons, quests for homemaking are fundamental for Abahlali and other 
movements of historically marginalised people because home is a space where one belongs because 
one is able to actively participate in its never-ending construction. In a comprehensive study of 
belonging and politics of belonging, Nira Yuval-Davis (2012: 201) thus confirms that belonging 
extends beyond state citizenship to encompass participatory dimensions of membership in political 
communities. Moreover, as we will see in Part II, Mphahlele, Biko and Abahlali’s praxes of belonging 
demonstrate that quests for constitution and belonging do not necessarily have to lead to (unconscious) 
desires to assimilate into the dominant world or to succumb to fixed and dominant ideas about national 
identity. The motivation behind beginning and ending this dissertation with a focus on Abahlali is thus 
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to illustrate that struggles for constitution and belonging are precisely struggles for polyvocal, syncretic, 
multi-sector and ceaseless (re)constitution of home and world.  
 
Being Liminal in the “new” South Africa: Striving against UnFreedom 
 
Another reason I have, therefore, opened this dissertation with the vignette above is to highlight 
contradictions between elite and non-elite conceptions of and horizons of emancipation and 
constitution. On the one hand, post-1994 perpetual protests by impoverished black people are indexical 
of the notion that the formal end of Apartheid did not herald the era of emancipation, homecoming and 
inclusive nationhood for the majority of black South Africans. On the other hand, the state regards these 
challenges as treacherous because it deems them to be unwarranted and threatening the stability of the 
“new” polity. More pertinently, as the Provincial Minister suggests above (that the settlement has been 
liberated after the violent eviction of Abahlali), ruling elites consider the business of liberation and of 
constitution-making to be the exclusive purview of the state. In chapter 2, I will trace this elitist and 
salvationist posture to the Du Boisian manifesto of constitution and belonging.  
 
The Provincial Minister’s elitist stance is rooted in ruling party officials and other elites’ determination 
that 1994 represents freedom-time and thus the culmination of black strivings for liberation, constitution 
and belonging. Abahlali retort that the strivings of black people continue, and must continue, because 
liberatory processes of re-membering (Mayibuye), nation-becoming and transition towards a humane 
polity have, at best, stalled. Accordingly, Abahlali have termed the current political and constitutional 
dispensation a dispensation of “UnFreedom” (Abahlali, 2006b: n.p.). For Abahlali, UnFreedom is a 
liminal space and time between Apartheid and post-Apartheid. From this perspective, historically 
colonised people have undergone only two stages of rites de passage as classically elaborated by Arnold 
van Gennep: detachment (from settler domination and formal Apartheid) and then marginality (liminen) 
but are yet to reach the third stage of transition leading to rebirth (Turner, 1979: 235-236). If the first 
two central concepts of this dissertation are those of world/worldlessness and home/homelessness, the 
third pivotal concept is that of liminality.  
My contention that post-1994 black strivings for constitution-making/homemaking are dynamic 
strivings for re-membering, homecoming and worldliness is enabled by a reading that transcends the 
embrace of liminal positionality found in some post-modernist and/or post-colonial critiques. For 
instance, Stewart Motha (2012: 146) affirms the liminal space for being, “a space of traversal where the 
past is reinscribed and questioned thus opening the possibility of reinventing both the present and the 
future”. Motha suggests that it is in this space of in-betweenness where possibilities for post-Apartheid 
being-becoming and being-belonging can take place. Motha’s affirmation of the interstitial accords with 
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Homi Bhabha’s (2005: 54) acclamation of the space between the worlds and cultures of colonisers and 
the colonised. For Bhabha, this ‘Third Space of enunciation’ is a transformative space because it opens 
up possibilities for deconstructing fixed identities created and imposed by colonialist discourse. In this 
reading, homelessness positionality is a condition of possibility for subversive “becoming otherwise” 
(Motha, 2010: 287). Similarly, Edgar Pieterse and Frank Meintjies (2004: 3) hail interstitial identities 
and social processes for being harbingers of post-Apartheid living (see also in general, Viljoen & van 
der Merwe (eds.), 2007; Motha & van Marle, 2013). Lastly, writing in the context of the USA, Fred 
Moten (2013: 756) posits that blackness is a ‘fugitivity’ that refuses that which has been refused, 
namely, assimilation into hegemonic society. This, suggests Moten, is what makes blackness 
revolutionary. Abdul JanMohamed (1992: 218) also asserts that border-living or ‘homelessness-as-
home’ is a fecund space for black intellectuals to be in because this where counter-hegemonic visions 
of constitution and belonging can emerge from.  
This dissertation employs the concept of liminality in its classical anthropological sense. From this 
perspective, liminality is a debilitating state that merits only disavowal and resistance. As JanMohamed 
already pointed out in Manichean Aesthetics (1983: 254), this is because liminality is a state of 
involuntary marginality imposed by the Manicheanism of Apartheid. Expounding on the Invention of 
Africa (1988), Mudimbe also explains that the reason why the history of colonialism continues to 
exercise power over Africa is not only that colonialism produced Africa as a ‘Dark Continent’ - an 
unfathomable, self-contained, detached and discrete world. The enduring power of colonialism is that 
colonialism also transformed this continent into a marginal entity; an intermediate space between 
underdevelopment and development (represented by western modernity). More pertinently, the 
‘colonising structure’ had the effect of producing marginal societies, cultures and human beings 
(Mudimbe, 1988: 4). In this understanding, ‘post-independence’ liminality is emblematic of 
coloniality/neo-colonialism. 
 
It is on the basis of this understanding of the liminal being a debilitating and dehumanising space that 
Abahlali have organised to resist and overcome the dispensation of UnFreedom. Accordingly, every 
year on 27 April, South Africa’s official Freedom Day, Abahlali and its allies stage a “mourn 
UnFreedom Day” rally. Writing on the twentieth anniversary of the supposed denouement of Apartheid, 
Abahlali summed up their members’ experience of unFreedom, neo-Apartheid and the ongoing 
dehumanisation of impoverished black people as follows:  
Twenty years after apartheid we live like pigs in the mud, our children die of diarrhœa, we are forced 
into transit camps at gun point, the police beat and shoot us in the streets and the assassins kill us with 
impunity. If we stand up and demand that our humanity is recognised we are removed from the housing 
list and placed on the death list (Abahlali, 2014: n.p. My emphasis). 
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From this vantage point, to be rendered liminal is to be rendered anachronistic and thus non-existing 
and discardable. In this regard, the president of Abahlali implores marginalised people to resist 
UnFreedom because people who find themselves in this space and time are treated as if they are 
“beneath the law” (Zikode, 2011: n.p.). Another leader of Abahlali adds that a person trapped in the 
liminal is a humanoid whose, “life and voice does not count” (Figlan, 2012: n.p.). From the vantage 
point of members of Abahlali, then, the “post-Apartheid” positionality of involuntary marginality - a 
state of being interned in the “dark corners of society” (Zikode, 2011, n.p.) -  is a positionality of radical 
homelessness. By radical homelessness I am suggesting that liminal individuals and groups continue to 
be trapped in a zone that Fanon called a “zone of non-beings” (1963, 37-38). It is of no small 
significance that Abahlali consistently link the notion of having a voice with that of having a life. 
Abahlali is here bringing attention to the fact that marginalisation from structures of governance, 
exclusion from the realm of civil society and structural invisibility are markers of being thought of and 
treated as less than human. Abahlali, therefore, conclude that even under conditions of constitutionalism 
and the ubiquitous rights-talk, “…if you are poor and black you can be killed with impunity …” 
(Abahlali, 2016: n.p.).2 
 
Therefore, the stimuli behind Abahlali’s creation of autonomous and humane communities are their 
members’ lived experiences of persisting non-belongingness and thus dehumanisation. However, it is 
important to emphasise that denial of belongingness and even relegation to a ‘zone of non-beings’ never 
result in total exclusion or absolute invisibility. On this point, Mbembe (2004: 288) observes that the 
apartheid city could never totally exclude black people. In spite of, or because of, the totalising 
intentions of architects of colonial and apartheid cities, black people were always present on the margins 
and in shadows of the white city. Mbembe (ibid.) terms this situation a situation of ‘disjunctive 
inclusion’. This dissertation moves from the premise that in this current situation of UnFreedom, the 
majority of black people continue to be victims of disjunctive inclusion. Indeed, the endless 
mushrooming of “squatter camps,” “slums” and shantytowns on the edges and borders of cities is one 
obvious manifestation of disjunctive inclusion into the ‘new world’. The situation of a majority of black 
people is thus one of enervating spatial, temporal, and perhaps, ontological liminality. This dissertation 
employs the notions of ‘exile’ and ‘pariahdom’ to capture this positionality and to move away from 
Mbembe’s celebration of ‘disjunctive inclusion’ and of “underworld” living. I will shortly expound 
upon my usages of notions of ‘exile’ and ‘pariahdom’. For now, I want to postulate that disjunctively 
                                                        
2 Strictures of space prevent me from discussing Abahlali’s description of the various incidents that led them to 
draw this conclusion. Abahlali described their members’ lived experiences of being regarded as having 
ungrievable lives in a 2016 press statement entitled “The struggle for human dignity continues in the shadow of 
death”. This press statement together with Abahlali’s constant refrain that impoverished black people ‘do not 
count’ accords with Judith Butler’s description of an ungrievable life. Butler describes such a life as one, “…that 
cannot be mourned because it has never lived, that is, it has never counted as a life at all” (Butler, 2015: n.p.). 
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included persons continue to experience the South African world as an uncanny world, a world of 
homelessness, rootlessness and unhomeliness. However, and this is very important, just as I posit that 
it is a mistake to celebrate the liminal positionality of shack-dwellers, backyard dwellers and people 
who live in the shadows of central business districts.  I also contend that it is a fundamental misreading 
of Abahlali’s mission to conclude that Abahlali’s struggle against disjunctive inclusion is aimed at 
achieving full inclusion or integration into the dominant South African world. Rather, as I have already 
proposed,  Abahlali’s struggle should be understood as a decolonising struggle because it seeks to de-
constitute the extant world of apartness and to (re)constitute an inclusive world based on African 
humanness. This is the fullest import of the epigraph at the head of this chapter.  
 
Overview of Chapters and Objectives of the Study  
This dissertation seeks to achieve four objectives:  
(i) To propose an analysis that locates post-1994 struggles of Abahlali and certain other black 
social movements in the longue durée of settler colonisation and ‘de-worlding’; 
(ii) To put suggest a decolonising framework for constitution and belonging that seeks to 
realise a post-segregationist polity, a creolising national consciousness and a holistic, 
continual (re)constitution of the world;  
(iii) To explore the constitutional implications of the decolonisation injunction to ‘return’ and 
re-member the land/world (the Mayibuye exigency); and 
(iv) To apply the interconnected concepts of liminality, double consciousness, racial 
melancholia and ambivalence to the character and motivations of prospective constitution-
makers. 
Firstly, I aim to show that the struggles of Abahlali and its allies should be understood as responses to 
the fact that settler colonisation presaged the severance of the cosmic connection between the land, non-
human beings and the onto-triadic community. Settler constitution making, therefore, resulted in ‘death 
of the land’ (ilizwe lifile). As I will explain further on in the next chapter, I adopt a phenomenological 
approach from an African perspective to advance the thesis that ‘death of land’ signified death of the 
triadic world comprised of the spiritual, social and material realms. In this new anti-black world, 
conquered people found themselves not only interpellated as sub-humans with ungrievable lives; more 
profoundly, they found themselves worldless. Therefore, I aim to show that the gravest legacy of settler 
constitution-making is not simply ‘a world cut into two’, as Fanon (1963) 37-38) once proposed. Rather, 
the most insidious outcome of settler colonisation is a situation of no-world. To invoke Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s declamation in another context (2000: xiii), this is because the settler colonial world, “is a 
world that does not even manage to constitute a world; it is world lacking in world, and lacking in the 
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meaning of world”. The world here understood as, initially, the in-between space that arises whenever 
human beings are in each other’s presence:  
Wherever human beings come together – be it in private or socially, be it in public or politically – a space 
is generated that simultaneously gathers them into it and separates them from one another…Wherever 
people come together, the world thrusts itself between them, and it is in this in-between space that all 
human affairs are conducted (Arendt, 2006; 106). 
 
However, from an African phenomenological perspective being in the world takes place on the three 
planes I mentioned above. This dissertation warns that the pitfall of focusing only on the social world 
as per Arendt’s useful definition above is that it might lead to a situation where anti-black racism and 
other forms of discrimination have been attenuated but the spiritual world continues to be shattered and 
the material world remains one structured by economic inequalities. To be sure, the spiritual world takes 
primacy over the social world in the African worldview. This is because this world, “consists of the 
Supreme Being, the deities or divinities, ancestors, various spirit powers, the human being and nature” 
(Dovlo, 2009: 72). Conquest, dispossession, and the irruption of western modernity shattered this world. 
The project of decolonisation is thus incomplete until the spiritual world has been sutured. I will 
formulate this case in Part I (chapters 1 and 2). 
 
The three interrelated visions of constitution and belonging that I put forward in Part II aim at the 
holistic (re)making of the world because they attend to all these realms of African belonging in the 
world. This is the second objective of the study. The first chapter of Part II (chapter 3) focuses on what 
Mphahlele calls ‘first exile’ (psychic and spiritual alienation) and his proposal that the premier 
decolonisation task is the dual task of attaining spiritual liberation and (re)suturing the spiritual world. 
Overcoming ‘first exile’ leads to spiritual independence and enables a person to declare that they know 
what they are, namely, an umuntu (a human being) with cosmic belongingness. Mphahlele, however, 
recognised that this is not the end of the matter. He understood that in the inter-subjective social world, 
the anti-black racist will still treat a historically colonised person as less than human being and that 
institutionalised racism will still continue to be a problem. Mphahlele thus borrowed Black 
Consciousness tactics to further his African humanness strategy. Turning to the social world, I will 
focus on Biko’s proposal for overcoming institutionalised racism, internalised inferiority, and what he 
calls the ‘totality of the white power structure’ in the second chapter of Part II (chapter 4). Biko argued 
that Black Consciousness tactics will lead to a more Ubuntu-centered society. Finally, both Mphahlele 
and Biko discerned that re-membering the spiritual world and (re)making the social world count for 
nothing if the material conditions of the majority of citizens remain the same. In the final chapter 
(chapter 5), I will thus put forward Abahlali’s vision for the radical transformation of the material world 
in a quest for a world ‘where everyone counts,’ a humane world.  
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Flowing from the above, my third objective is to explore the constitutional implications of “death of 
the land” and of re-membering/‘resurrecting’ the land/world. In this respect, Part I is devoted to showing 
that settler constitution-making and various other processes aimed at securing the being-becoming and 
being-belonging of settlers ‘killed the land’ in the sense of dismembering the triadic world and 
interrupting the being-becoming of conquered people. In Part II, I then put forward a potential 
framework for (re)constituting the land/world. This Part of this dissertation proposes that decolonisation 
- and thus the re-membering of own worlds as route towards returning to the world (Mayibuye) - would, 
in the first place, mean engaging in all-inclusive constitution-making processes aimed at producing a 
constitution (“foundational law”) that would be constituting in the sense of (i) re-membering the triadic 
world, (ii) forging a home for everyone, and (iii) laying a framework for world belongingness.  
 
Such a constitution would be emancipatory to the extent that it lays down a framework for terminating 
what I consider the original sin in the founding of South Africa, namely full belonging for the minority 
of citizens and disjunctive inclusions for the majority of the population.  Such a constitution would be 
liberatory if it removes obstacles that prevent diverse sections of society from contributing to never-
ending processes of homemaking and world-creation. I aim to show that in this way a post-colonial 
constitution (‘foundational law’) would be facilitative of the project of returning to and returning the 
world because the world is, “that in which there is room for everyone: but a genuine place, one in which 
things can genuinely take place…(Nancy, 2007: 42. Original emphasis). As Glissant, the preeminent 
theorist of creolisation, might put it, such a constitution would thus be licencing world-creation and 
inclusive belongingness in the world because it would be based on ‘poetics of the diverse’ and ‘poetics 
of relation’.  The concept of creolisation is thus the fourth significant concept in this dissertation (along 
with the concepts of world/worldlessness, home/homelessness and liminality). I will show that 
decolonising visions of constitution and belonging reject autochthony and nativism in favour of 
collective processes of forging a creolising national consciousness, homemaking and world-creation. 
My use of this concept follows the following description of processes of creolisation proposed by Jane 
Gordon: “…in political terms, we could understand creolisation as the generalising of a shared, public 
will forged by individuals as they articulate what they seek in and through collectives that comprise a 
polity…” (J. Gordon, 2014: 4). 
 
The fourth objective of this dissertation is to insert the interconnected concepts of liminality, double 
consciousness, racial melancholia and ambivalence in analyses that investigate the character and 
motivations of prospective constitution-makers. The aim here is to move away from analyses that focus 
on the allege betrayal committed by post-colonial leaders and those that put too much emphasis on the 
power wielded by ex-colonising countries and on structural factors thus denying the agency of these 
leaders. In this regard, chapters 1 and 2 develop the argument that an overwhelming reason why ANC 
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leaders ushered in a neo-colonial world is because these elites did not reckon productively with their 
condition of double consciousness and melancholia. More pertinently, I pin point this failure as well as 
the debilitating state of ambivalence as the main causes of these elites’ disinclination to put forward 
decolonisation visions. In chapters 3 and 4, I put forward Mphahlele and Biko’s voyages of disalienation 
and proposals for exiting liminal worlds in order to be able to (re)make the world. 
Mphahlele and Biko’s proposals are germane to addressing what I reckon to be the premier 
constitutional paradox for historically colonised people. The enigma of homemaking/constitution-
making for victims of settler colonisation is that in order to (re)constitute home they ought to undergo 
processes of individual and collective rebirth themselves. The imperative for psychic (re)constitution 
and spiritual renewal is especially acute for the elite stratum of the historically colonised group. As we 
shall see in Part I, the colonised elites are often historical beneficiaries of liminal inclusion into the 
settler-constituted world. The paradoxical concept of ‘liminal inclusion’ is my attempt to account for 
the in-between status of this group vis-à-vis the rest of the conquered people. Colonial authorities often 
granted “exempted natives” status to these elites thus enabling them to claim some rights that were 
reserved for colonists. This positionality saddled these elites with an enervating sense of ambivalence 
with regards to the hegemonic world and its discourses. Thus rather than mourning the loss of their 
land/world and seeking to re-member them, these elites became preoccupied with their condition of 
social liminality. When colonial governments reneged on assimilation promises they made to these 
elites, these elites became riddled with racial melancholia. My discussion of the consequences of this 
condition on quests for constitution and belonging will rely on Freud’s classic distinction between 
mourning and melancholia together with Fanon’s discussion of the ‘abandonment neurosis’ that assails 
individuals who grew up thinking that they are of the white world. I aim to contrast the latter politics 
of melancholia with Mphahlele, Biko and Abahlali’s decolonising politics of mourning.  
 
One of the central claims of this dissertation is that the melancholic leader’s failure to overcome his or 
her racial melancholia and state of double consciousness results in such a putative homemaker unwilling 
or unable to propose terms of homemaking that would enable everyone to acquire a sense of material 
and affective belongingness in the “post-colonial” polity. Having shown that most anti-colonial elites 
found themselves imprisoned in a liminal zone (chapter 1), I will then in chapter 2 attempt a re-reading 
of the personal histories of Pan-African and Négritude leaders to show that the failure or unwillingness 
on the part of these leaders to work towards their own psychic and spiritual (re)constitution accounts 
for their ultimately neo-colonial visions. The suggestion here is that these leaders could not make home 
because they were not home themselves. In chapters 3 and 4, I show that Mphahlele and Biko’s 
decolonising and post-segregationist visions were grounded on their personal odysseys of disalienation 
and homecoming. To be sure, this twofold movement of overcoming liminal living and ‘returning’ to, 
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actual or invented, home-culture underlines all movements of African rebirth and reclamation of 
worldly belonging. It is in this context that Amílcar Cabral (1973: 45-47), the venerated liberation leader 
of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde Islands, legendarily propagated for a “return to the source;” a return 
that ‘re-Africanises’ the alienated leader. This message can also be detected in what I read as Kenyan 
writer Ngūgī wa Thing’o’s self-explanatory tetralogy on the theme of Mayibuye: Decolonising the Mind 
(1986), Moving the Centre (1993), Re-membering Africa (2009), and finally, Globalectics (2012).  
 
One of the leitmotifs of this dissertation is thus the theme of exile: psychic and spiritual exile, physical 
exile from homeland, cultural exile from ‘traditional’ home-culture and exile from the world. I have 
thus formulated a provisional typology to analyse the options available to exiled leaders and activists. 
To realise the fourth objective of exploring the impact of the exilic condition of elites on quests for 
constitution-making, I have formulated the following provisional typology of the options available to 
exiled activists. I propose that the option(s) that an exiled activist chooses will, to a large extent, 
determine whether they formulate a vision that results in a neo-colonial world of apartness or a vision 
that leads to a humane and all-inclusive post-apartheid world. Here is my provisional typology: To be 
functional in the world that has created him or her but rejects and excludes him or her, an exiled person 
is faced with at least three choices. First, he or she might seek further acculturation and assimilation. 
This will amount to a conscious effort to transform his or her condition from that of an exile to that of 
an immigrant. This would involve struggles for integration. Second, he or she could inhabit the slaver-
/settler-created house but refuse self-renunciation and assimilation. This possibility would involve 
performing acts of appearances and disappearances with the view of arrogating the fruits of the master’s 
house whilst staying enduringly in its shadows. To adopt the second possibility is to embrace the exilic 
condition and transform it to that of fugitivity. The third possibility open to the subjugated pariah is to 
refuse the putative permanence of the coloniser’s or enslaver’s world, to reject its teleological economy, 
rather desire its death. This possibility would involve a quest to de-link from that world and not simply 
retreat to its holes, shadows and borders like a fugitive. Rather, it would often mean initially opting for 
physical exile, fashioning belonging elsewhere, and forging insurgent strategies. I will apply this 
tentative typology to try to make sense of how the main protagonists of each chapter of this study arrived 
at their respective visions of constitution and belonging; namely, Solomon Plaatje and other founders 
of the ANC (chapter 1), Du Bois and Thabo Mbeki (chapter 2), Mphahlele (chapter 3), Biko (chapter 
4) and Abahlali (chapter 5).  
 
Theoretical Approach 
 
The unique theoretical contribution of this thesis is that it is centered around a fusion of two theoretical 
approaches, namely, a decolonisation approach to constitutionalism and a phenomenological approach 
from an African perspective. The fusion of these two theoretical approaches enables me to both 
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transcend dominant approaches to the problematic of constitution and belonging in postcolonies and to 
propose a framework for a holistic post-colonial constitution-making. I have constructed a 
decolonisation/decolonial approach to constitutionalism by drawing upon insights emanating from 
settler colonial studies, decolonial theories and most importantly, the living archive comprised of 
critiques and approaches advanced by African scholars and activists both during the eras of formal 
colonialism and today. Based on these resources, a decolonisation critique demonstrates that most 
processes of constitution-making and constitutional reforms actually facilitate the onset of neo-settler 
colonialism in the sense of perpetuating the institutional, socio-economic and cultural arrangements 
that were produced during settler colonisation. As I will demonstrate in Part I of this dissertation, in 
such a neo-colonial situation the majority of historically colonised people find themselves still cast as 
outcasts of the putatively new world. Phenomenologically-speaking, they, therefore, find themselves 
once again without a world.  
 
Finally, a note on the title of the dissertation. I have already defined the concepts of disjunctive 
inclusion, constitution and belonging. I have taken the first part of the title, Mayibuye iAfrika, from a 
prevalent anti-colonial rallying cry and manifesto of African nationalists. As I have already mentioned, 
African nationalists suggested that the problem of colonialism and settler colonisation was ilizwe lifile 
(‘death of the land’) and that the solution was Mayibuye iAfrika (‘Return Africa’/‘Re-member Africa’/ 
‘Resurrect Africa’). I have put this vision as a question in the title. I have done so for four reasons. 
Firstly, this dissertation is an enquiry into whether post-1994 constitutional re-arrangements have re-
membered and returned the land/world. Secondly, I am contemplating whether the aforementioned 
decolonisation approach (as opposed to liberal, critical race theory, and neo-Marxist approaches) is a 
useful lens to analyse contemporary black strivings for constitution and belonging. Thirdly, I am 
questioning whether politics of irredentism and redemptive returns are truly post-Apartheid or whether 
they could lead to another (nativist) world of apartness. Finally, I am wondering whether there is a way 
of re-membering the worlds of historical colonised people and of revalorising “non-western” life-
worlds without withdrawing into an own world, but rather to reimagine the Mayibuye exigency as an 
imperative to ceaselessly forge a creolising national consciousness and of reclaiming cosmopolitan 
belonging in the world.  
 
The theme of redemptive returns is thus another central leitmotif of this thesis: remembering, re-
membering, returning, disalienation, re-suturing, remaking, homecoming and ‘re-worlding’. However, 
as might have become clear thus far, by ‘return’ I do not mean the process of going back to a pre-
colonial world or culture. Rather, I mean collective processes aimed at re-membering and re-worlding 
in own terms to enable historically conquered peoples to reclaim belonging in the world. This reading 
is in line with Edward Said’s vision of Palestine as both, “…a place to return to and…. an entirely new 
place, a vision of partially restored past and of a novel future” (cited in JanMohamed, 1992: 226. 
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Original emphasis). Decolonising visions of constitution and belonging would agree with this 
suggestion because they do not only deconstruct notions of autochthony and nativism. These visions 
also deconstruct ‘Africa’ and thus the idea that re-existence means regaining the “original African 
world”. 
 
This deconstruction is based on an understanding that, firstly, there is no pure, detached, and untainted 
African world to go back to. Secondly, that “Africa” is an externally imposed appellation and perhaps 
identity. The African world and African identity that decolonising writers and activists propagate is 
thus the sort of identity that Stuart Hall stresses in his essay ‘who needs identity?’ (2000: 15). It is an 
identity sous rature - no longer adequate to reflect ‘Africa,’ and yet because it has not been superseded 
dialectically it is necessary for African-centered belonging-in-the-world. In this dissertation, Africa will 
thus appear under erasure. ‘Returning’ is thus also a deliberate catachresis.   
 
Overview of Thesis 
 
What are the constitutional implications of the decolonisation call, Mayibuye iAfrika? The thesis 
defended in this dissertation is that contemporary contestations around lack of constitution 
(etymologically, constare ‘to stand together,’ and historically, the imperative to constitute an inclusive 
polity) and belonging (affectively and materially) can only be resolved through constitutional re-
arrangements aimed at re-constituting “South Africa” on the spiritual, social and material planes – the 
three realms of African belonging in the world. Such processes of (re)constituting and re-membering 
Africa (and thus fidelity to the decolonisation call Mayibuye iAfrika) are only possible when 
constitution-makers undergo their own processes of disalienation, rebirth, and of returning from liminal 
worlds. Such voyages would enable these elites to contribute to processes of “African renaissance,” 
creolising national consciousness, nation-becoming and towards pluriversality. My original 
contribution is to propose decolonising constitution-making/homemaking processes inspired by Es’kia 
Mphahlele, Steve Biko and Abahlali baseMjondolo. I argue that Mphahlele, Biko and Abahlali’s 
interconnected praxes of Afrikan Humanness, Black Consciousness and Abahlalism rise to the 
decolonising challenge because they, respectively, seek to re-member and (re)make the spiritual world, 
the social world and the material world and in that way terminate the pariahdom and worldlessness of 
historically conquered people.  
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PART 1 
 
CHAPTER 1: THE ORIGINAL SIN IN THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA 
AND THE MELANCHOLIC CONSTITUTION VISIONS OF TRANSCULTURAL 
LEADERS 
 
Awaking on Friday morning, June 20, 1913, the South African native found himself, 
not actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of his birth [Sol Plaatje, 1916] 
 
Introduction  
 
Solomon Tsekisho Plaatje (1876-1932) opens the first chapter of his Native Life in South Africa 
(“Native Life”) (1916) with the above statement. Plaatje wrote most of the manuscript for Native Life 
in 1914 aboard a ship to England. Plaatje was travelling with a team of four other leaders of the South 
African National Native Congress (SANNC, later called the ANC). This deputation’s mission was to 
entreat the British government to nullify the South African Natives Land Act of 1913. Plaatje hoped to 
publish the book as soon as he landed in England and to use it as part of his deputation’s political 
campaign. In the prologue, Plaatje writes that his book aims to, “…describe the difficulties of the South 
African natives under a very strange law…” (2007: 15).  
 
The implementation of this law had resulted in “natives” being, “…driven from home, their homes 
broken up, with no hopes of redress, on the mandate of a government to which they had loyally paid 
taxation without representation” (Plaatje, 2007: 17). Plaatje, therefore, inflected his narrative of de-
homing and homelessness with the language of the American Revolution and of the discourse of natural 
rights emanating from the western world in order to situate the SANNC’s plea and the situation of 
African people within an international and transnational dialogue and locality. More specifically, 
Plaatje wished to show that the effects of the Natives Land Act were not simply to de-territorialise, 
dispossess, and scatter “natives” without redress. As we shall see, according to Plaatje, this “very 
strange law” had, more importantly, induced physical, social, psychic, and spiritual estrangement. As 
Plaatje apprehends it in the epigraph above, the outcome had been not so much slavery but a form of 
life perhaps much worse: a form of life of pariahdom and thus worldlessness in one’s own land.  
 
The aim of this historical and theoretical chapter is to introduce and illuminate the interlinked themes 
and concepts I have just alluded to namely, “native” non-belonging, pariahdom, unhomeliness and 
worldlessness as constitutive of the South African polity. Furthermore, I wish to demonstrate that 
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disjunctive inclusions into the settler-constituted polity led to the emergence of transcultural leaders 
such as Plaatje. More pertinently, I will focus on these elites’ liminal status-induced conditions of racial 
melancholia and ambivalence to show how these conditions shaped their visions of constitution and 
belonging. I begin chapter 1 with a focus on Plaatje both because Plaatje was a co-founder of the ANC 
and most importantly, because, in my reading, he formulated an existential phenomenological critique 
of the Natives Land Act, a pivotal piece of legislation in the colonial project of de-worlding conquered 
people. Plaatje’s seminal critique sought to demonstrate that the founding of South Africa portended 
the shattering of the world on spiritual, social and material planes. Finally, the historical significance of 
Plaatje is that in Plaatje we see that the ANC’s vision of constitution and belonging was ultimately 
grounded on a demand for the integration of African elites into the extant polity and, unwittingly, the 
non-belongingness of “raw natives”.  
 
1.1 Resisting Constitutionally-sanctioned Pariahdom and Worldlessness  
 
1.1.1 Against ‘death of the land’ 
 
Uneven processes of conquest, land dispossession and colonisation in the territory that became South 
Africa gained momentum in 1657 when the Dutch government ratified a policy of permanent white 
settlement in the Cape (Mostert, 1992: 129). From 1779 to 1879, settler-invaders unleashed Wars of 
Dispossession against indigenous peoples that culminated in dispossession of lands; outlawing of 
pivotal African customs and traditions; fracturing of clans; and the general stupefaction of the worlds 
of indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples regularly declaimed that “the land is dead” (ilizwe lifile) in 
response to these processes of colonisation and the irruption of the world of colonists (Jordan, 1980: 
102; Mostert, 1992: 854). This cry sought to convey the sense that conquest and colonisation heralded 
dislocation on three planes of African belonging-in-the-world. First, conquered people experienced 
disharmony, racial subjugation and generalised mutual resentment in the social world. Second, they 
experienced land hunger, destitution and loss of ancient relation with non-human beings in the material 
world. Most importantly, ilizwe lifile was a cry to the gods because disorientation on the material and 
social planes were felt to have negatively affected both the inner and the inter-subjective spiritual world. 
This is to say that the onto-triadic community constituted of the living, the yet-to-be-born (on whose 
behalf the living take care of the material world) and the living-dead (who assure stability and 
abundance on the material realm and perform ethical and juridical functions to ensure virtuous relations 
amongst the living) was thrown into disharmony. It is from this perspective that we should understand 
conquest, colonisation and settler homemaking as portending ‘the death of the land’ and thus 
worldlessness. 3 
                                                        
3 The notion that conquest and colonisation represent “death of land” in this sense can also be discerned in the 
mythology of Aboriginal people of “Australia”. Aboriginal people explain that the period of conquest and 
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By 1879, settler-invaders had managed to subjugate all indigenous kingdoms. This final military 
conquest accelerated colonisation in the form of the political domination of black people, racial 
proletarianisation, and the irruption of western modernity. This new reality gave impetus to the rise of 
African proto-nationalism and for calls for the land to come back. Anti-colonial chiefs and kings 
encapsulated this call in the pervasive anti-colonial rallying cry, Mayibuye iAfrika (‘Africa come back’/ 
‘Resurrect Africa’). In this opening chapter, I wish to explore the following question: What was 
different about the Native Land Act of 1913 that impelled Plaatje to posit that it was at this moment 
that indigenous people became pariahs in their own land? Furthermore, what exactly did Plaatje mean 
by pariahdom? 
 
1.1.2 Against colonialist discourse  
 
Plaatje’s Native Life in South Africa arose out of his investigative journalism into the impact of the Act 
on indigenous people. Having traced the history of the Act from its bill form to its final enactment, 
Plaatje then devoted chapter three of his book to a detailed analysis of the provisions of the Act. He 
concluded that the main objective of the Act was to, “prevent natives from ever rising above the position 
of servants to the whites” and that, ultimately, the promulgators of the Act sought, “the complete arrest 
of native progress” (2007: 57-58). In other words, Plaatje understood that the objectives of the Act were 
to entrench a Manichean world and to interrupt the being-becoming of indigenous peoples. According 
to Plaatje (2007: 58), the Act was a fulfillment of a “native prophesy” which predicted that the founding 
of the settler-created country will be followed a law that will criminalise and outlaw African humanity 
and belonging. In terms of this Act, Africans could only purchase land in Scheduled Native Areas. 
These Areas represented seven percent of the territory of South Africa. Furthermore, the state could 
forcibly move “native” families who were deemed surplus to labour requirements to these Areas. 
“Natives” who refused to become farm servants or were unwilling to move to these Areas 
(“concentration camps,” “human incubators”) became “fugitives,” “outcasts,” “unfortunate nomads,” 
“roving wanderers” and “exiles” (2007: 365, 349, 63-74, 104).  
 
                                                        
irruption of the world of settler-invaders (‘Wild Time’) led to the death of “Wanggala Time” or Dream Time. 
David Samuel Trigger (1985: 132-132) explains that Wanggala Time, “contains within it the earliest of all known 
time, the creative time when the major features of the physical and social universe were shaped”. Wild Time then 
represents “death of the land’ in the sense that it marks the end of Wanggala Time because, “it is the disruption 
of social and spiritual order” (Trigger, 1985: 133). In her magisterial account of the circumstances surrounding 
the killing of an Aboriginal man by a white police officer in 2004 in Palm Island, Northern Australia Chloe Hooper 
(2008: 56) located this killing in the history of on-going colonisation and pariah status of Aboriginal peoples in 
Australia. She thus refers to the inhabitants of Palm Island as, “refugees from Wild Time” (ibid.). She explains 
the manifestation of ilizwe lifile in the following terms: “We [European-Australians] knew that land was central 
to Aboriginal identity, that they saw themselves as inseparable from the land. No land meant no Dreaming, and 
no Dreaming meant no identity, no meaning. Wild Time was, among other things, a violent religious upheaval. It 
meant the smashing of those stained-glass windows in the night sky” (ibid.).  
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Plaatje’s chronicle of Native Life in South Africa aimed to demonstrate that the impacts of the Act went 
beyond land dispossession, mass scattering, and the socio-economic bondage of the conquered. 
Ultimately, the Act produced Native Life as a form of life that was, “deprived of the bare human rights 
of living…” (Plaatje, 2007: 31). From Plaatje’s perspective, therefore, the Act did not simply legalise a 
form of slavery; it produced something even more insidious: pariahdom. Plaatje’s description of the 
elements of pariahdom – servitude status, denationalisation, requirement to have a travel permit to be 
in South Africa, dislocation and incessant wandering and deprivation of basic human rights - is in line 
with Hannah Arendt’s much later use of the same concept. Arendt observed that German Jews in the 
1930s, very much like South African “natives”, had, “neither rights nor a country, are citizens of no 
nation – pariahs” (Arendt, 2007: 75. Original emphasis). In Arendt’s existential phenomenological 
analysis, then, to be a pariah is to suffer worldlessness (Feldman, 2007: lxvi).  
 
To the best of my knowledge, Plaatje was the first theorist to expound on constitutionally-sanctioned 
pariahdom. He did this in the context of demonstrating that the Natives Land Act was pivotal to the 
realisation of the objectives of the constitution that founded South Africa in 1910.   Plaatje’s unique 
contribution was to recognise that the ultimate aim of settler colonialism, in contrast to colonialism 
without settlement, is to shatter the autochthonous worlds of the indigenes and in their wake to impose 
that of settler-invaders. Unlike the colonialist, the colonist leaves home with no intention of returning; 
he or she aims to create a new home elsewhere. In these uneven processes of very violent de-homing 
and homemaking, settler-invaders seek to displace, delegitimise, and suppress indigenous perceptions 
of the world, ways of knowing, relationship with the surrounding environment, and spiritual 
anchorages. In a phrase, the settler aims to efface “the native’s” way(s) of being in the world. More than 
that, if ‘the world’ is understood as, “…a form of relating or being-with…” settler colonisation and its 
Manichean logic produce “natives” with the intention of expelling them from the world of fellow 
humans (Cheah, 2008: 30). As Plaatje understood it, the Natives Land Act accelerated and perfected 
colonisation understood as dehumanisation and the production of “natives” as pariahs of the new world. 
 
It is with this understanding in mind that Plaatje mobilised the lexicon of natural rights and the discourse 
of rationality to resist his people being cast as outcasts of the world. Plaatje was aware that at the heart 
of the aforementioned worlding and de-worlding processes was the irruption of western modernity into 
the world of the conquered. Western modernity is that long fifteenth century phenomenon whose 
condition of possibility is the violent expansion and universalisation of Europe and Eurocentrism; and 
at the other end, the dispossession, dislocation and, ultimately, ‘invisibilisation’ of the rest of the world. 
In the logic of western modernity, the colonised are ‘colonisable’ because they are not endowed with 
thinking capacity (Ramose, 2002: 526). This is because in this logic, unlike Descartes “non-westerner” 
does not think and, therefore, he or she is not (Maldonando-Torres, 2007: 252). This is also the condition 
of possibility for the expulsion of the colonised from the world of the Same.  
 31 
 
According to colonialist discourse, “non-western” populations (“savages” and “primitives”) can only 
be in the world of humans as dispensable tools of western modernity. However, and more importantly, 
colonialist discourse is always suffused with an ethic of horizontal and vertical differentiation. This 
ethic holds that “non-western” peoples can never be as human as people of the west; and at the same 
time, following the logic of divide and rule, that some “non-western” people or “tribes” or castes are 
better than other “non-westerners,” and can become westernised through western tutelage (Acheraïou, 
2008: 216-217). It is this latter group of “natives” that appropriate Christian mission philosophy and 
the values of the Enlightenment to resist invisibility and what I am here calling de-worlding discourses.  
 
The point here is that more than just simply protesting the Act, Plaatje and members of his group – all 
Christians and western-educated – undertook their deputation to the Imperial government to resist their 
interpellation as sub-humans and outcasts of the world. Even more critically, they also sought to remind 
citizens of the Metropole that colonised worlds and colonising worlds are co-constitutive. Their 
reasoning for the latter proposition was that colonised peoples have contributed as much as any British 
subject to the making of Great Britain and the western world. Towards this end, very much like 
Caliban’s appropriation of Prospero’s language in William Shakespeare’s The Tempest (see L. Gordon, 
2008: 3, and in general, Ashcroft, 2009), Plaatje appropriated the legal and literary language of the 
British to resist invisibility as well as constitutional attempts to produce him as a pariah. Plaatje was, 
therefore, aware that his narrative of resistance had to extend beyond simply countering colonial laws 
and their impacts. To be effective, his account had to challenge the whole gamut of colonialist discourse 
since it was this discourse that produced “natives” and the latter creatures’ specific form of life: a pariah 
life divested of worldly belongingness. Plaatje was thus unambiguous that his, 
…appeal is not on behalf of the naked hordes of cannibals who are represented in fantastic pictures 
displayed in the shop windows in Europe, most of them imaginary; but it is on behalf of five million 
loyal British subjects who shoulder ‘the black man’s burden’ every day… (2007: 18-19). 
 
In contesting the Natives Land Act, and thus the Union constitution indirectly, Plaatje thus staked his 
and his people’s belonging to a common humanity and a shared imperial citizenship. Plaatje’s decision 
to write the first-ever English novel by a black African, Mhudi (published in 1930 but written in 1919), 
was, therefore, impelled by this aspiration of countering a dehumanising and de-worlding discourse. 
Plaatje wrote Mhudi (Setswana for fog) during a three-year sojourn overseas with the intention that it 
was to be a fictional accompaniment to Native Life. Plaatje sought to show that his people fit the 
Aristotelian criterion of being human, namely, endowment with rationality. Thus Plaatje (1978: 21) 
declared in the preface that his objective was, “to interpret to the reading public one phase of ‘the back 
of the Native mind’”. More specifically, Plaatje used Mhudi to demonstrate that before the arrival of 
settler-invaders his people (the Barolong) had already constituted a civilised society and had an 
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unwritten constitution that was geared towards ensuring societal harmony, that was opened to 
assimilating edifying foreign influences, and that commanded that non-nationals must be treated with 
hospitality (Couzens, 1978: 7-12).4  
 
On the one hand, Plaatje, therefore, wielded the sword of literature to rebuff the coloniser’s history and 
to affirm his people’s story in order to establish historical belongness and worldliness. On the other 
hand, Plaatje, similar to Caliban and to Friday in Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, used the self-
arrogated tools and norms of western modernity (rationality, literacy, equity and natural rights) to 
expose the paucity of the much-proclaimed British sense of fairness and to excoriate the colonial legal 
order for its inherent duplicity. Thus in 1921 (republished in 1976), he published a booklet entitled The 
Mote and the Beam: An Epic on Sex-Relationship ‘Twixt White and Black in British South Africa. 
Plaatje appropriated the title of Jesus’s discourse on judgementalism to make the case that behind 
colonialist discourse, its civilising justification and legal system lay bad faith, double standards and 
often white uncivilised behavior.5 To sum up, Plaatje understood that to challenge constitutionally-
sanctioned pariahdom, he had to produce works of fiction and non-fiction that contested and 
undermined the discourse that undergirded this constitution. This is the first insight that we can draw 
from Plaatje’s critique. For the aforementioned reasons, the insight here is that struggles against lack of 
constitution and deprivations of belonging must begin with a frontal attack on colonialist discourses. 
Such an attack would be geared towards refusing a discourse that legitimises colonisation, dehumanises 
conquered people, causes self-alienation and naturalises the settler-constituted world as the only 
desirable world. As we shall see in this chapter and the next, Plaatje’s New African contemporaries as 
well as their New Negro exemplars recognised this imperative. However, their ambivalence towards 
the white world resulted in them failing to undertake a thoroughgoing critique and refusal of colonialist 
discourse. I posit that it is this failure that partly contributed to these leaders’ proposals of neo-colonial 
visions of constitution and belonging.  
 
I will now return to Arendt and her explication of pariahdom and worldlessness in order to explicate 
this first insight. In The Origins of Totalitarianism (1973) Arendt seems to summon colonialist 
discourse with approval to justify the colonisation and de-worlding of Africans. Arendt’s main 
explanation for why the Boers conquered Africans and dispossessed them of their land in the territory 
that later become South Africa is that these Europeans did not believe that Africans belonged to the 
human world or the world of the Same. According to Arendt, the historical worldlessness of Africans 
                                                        
4 In Mhudi Plaatje has one of the Barolong Chief explain this hospitality as follows: “my home is his home, my 
lands are his lands, my cattle are his cattle, and my law his shield” (cited in Couzens, 1978: 7). 
5 Plaatje thus closed his booklet with the following parting shot: “And as it is true that white men brought 
Christianity and civilisation to Bechuanaland, it is also true that the first authenticated cases of rape, murder and 
suicide in Bechuanaland were the work of a white man” (Plaatje, 1976: 92). 
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was evidenced by the fact that Africans had not conquered nature and fabricated anything useful to 
“Mankind”: 
What made them [the Africans] different from other human beings was not at all the colour of their skin 
but the fact that they behaved like a part of nature, that they had not created a human world, a human 
reality… (Arendt, 1973: 192). 
 
Arendt later elaborated further on the connection between lack of capacity or willingness to fabricate 
things of the world and worldlessness. Arendt (2005: 106-107) argued that people who did not produce 
“useful things” were not part of the world (even as they were part of the earth) because the world and 
the world of things are the result of the fact that human beings produce things. In The Human Condition 
(1998: 136), Arendt posited that people who had not yet developed the capacity or desire to fabricate 
and produce things ‘of the world’ could be considered worldless because worldliness, “is the capacity 
to fabricate and create a world” (cited in Janover, 2011: 28). With this short background, we are able to 
better appreciate Arendt’s colonialist assertion above that because Africans were natural men who, 
“behaved like a part of nature… they had not created a human world, a human reality”.  
 
In the case of South Africa, Arendt reports that otherisation and invention of race hierarchy were the 
only way Boer colonisers could make sense of, and pacify, African “savages”: “Race was the Boers’ 
answer to the overwhelming monstrosity of Africa – a whole continent populated and overpopulated by 
savages…” (Arendt, 1973: 192). If we put this in Arendtian discourse, and at the risk of belabouring the 
point, we could say that the Europeans’ compulsion to dispossess Africans of their lands, to “kill” their 
worlds, and to produce them as pariahs flowed from the idea that African humanity could be 
undermined because Africans were not “builders of worlds or cobuilders of a common world” (Arendt, 
1973: 590-591). Inspired by this discourse, Europeans regarded Africans to be outcasts of the world. 
Eurocentric cartographers were, therefore, following and buttressing this discourse when they drew the 
amity lines in the late sixteenth century. These uni-versalists sought to carve the globe into two with 
“non-Europeans” relegated to the world of non-humans.  
 
Colonialist discourse is thus based on what Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007: 45) refers to as “abyssal 
thinking”. This thinking tends towards de-worlding because it interpellates those on the “other side” of 
the abyssal line as “invisible, unintelligible, or irreversibly discardable” (Santos, 2004: 165). This 
discourse thus figures the latter peoples as “non-existent” (ibid.) To not exist, Jean-Luc Nancy 
explicates in The Creation of the World or Globalization, is, “to no longer be in the world“ (as 
summarised by Raffoul & Pettigrew, 2007: 5).  
 
Here is where I am going with this: inspired by a tradition of thinking stretching from Plaatje to Fanon 
and Nancy, I interrogate ‘abyssal thinking’ as the motor behind settler-colonial constitution-making. In 
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Plaatje’s existential-phenomenological reading, the Natives Land Act was made possible by and in turn 
buttressed a discourse which figured Africans as conquerable and deprivable of ‘bare human rights of 
living’ because they had contributed nothing to the world. They could thus be relegated to the ‘other 
side’ of the line.  
 
To be sure, in “The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition” Arendt (2007: 275) proposed that Jewish writers 
and intellectuals have contributed to the western world by weaving, “the strands of their Jewish genius 
into the general texture of European life”. It is on this basis that Arendt asserted that there was no basis 
to render Jewish people worldless. Conversely, Arendt seemed to argue that Africans are deserving of 
pariahdom and worldlessness because they had not contributed anything to the world of humans. In a 
phrase, Africa was, “the Dark Continent where the savages were numerous enough to constitute a world 
of their own, a world of folly,” writes Arendt (1973: 191). Arendt’s ethnocentric interpellation of Africa 
as a continent of darkness, a continent made up unproductive and dispensable species has characterised 
Eurocentric thinking from the age of Enlightenment up to today (see for e.g., Eze (ed.), 1997). 
 
Plaatje’s insistence that Africans are not ‘naked hordes of cannibals’ and his deliberate inter-textual 
strategy of mobilising the language of the American Revolution, of the Enlightenment tradition, of 
Christian evangelism and of Victorian romantic literature were his defences against worldlessness. 
These tactics together with his translation and performance of plays by William Shakespeare; his 
sojourning in England to give speeches, to interact with white and black politicians, and to briefly teach 
at the University of London was his way of performing belongingness to Great Britain and of 
demonstrating that Africans do not constitute ‘a world of their own’. This is to say that Plaatje’s 
resistance was directly against this latter attempt to de-world Africans because, as the translators of 
Nancy’s Creation of the World paraphrase, there is no independent world: “…if one ‘leaves this world,’ 
it is not to attain another world; it is simply no longer being-in-the-world, no longer being in a world, 
no longer having a world. To that extent “this world” is the only world” (Raffoul & Pettigrew, 2007: 5. 
Original emphasis). 
 
To recap, Plaatje elaborated a critique of conquest and settler constitution-making that understood that 
conquest and colonisation produce pariahdom and worldlessness as far as conquered “natives” are 
concerned. To resist these outcomes, Plaatje followed a three-pronged strategy. First, he sojourned on 
‘this side’ of the abyssal line as a way of enacting and claiming mobility, visibility, existence, and 
worldliness. Second, he sought to prove that his people are loyal Imperial subjects who contributed 
immensely to the co-building of the world through what he called the “black man’s burden”. Lastly, 
and relatedly, he demonstrated that Africans can master the tools of literacy and that they have thus co-
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authored civilised discourse and its world-producing capabilities.6 Crucially, black intellectuals and 
politicians adopted these strategies to enact belonging elsewhere and to constitute another world, 
namely, a Pan-African or Black Diasporic World.  
 
1.2 De-homed, Unhomed and Worldless in the White Man’s Polity 
 
The genius of Plaatje was to show that a radical refusal of seter-colonial constitution and its laws would 
involve a radical challenge of their underwriting discourse. It is important to remember that this 
discourse is based on a dichotomising system (savage versus civilised, primitive versus modern, human 
versus not-yet-human) that underlined nineteenth century anthropological discourses. In his seminal 
The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge (1988: 5-16), Mudimbe thus 
shows that colonialist discourse was aimed at fabricating the African as the negative figure of the Same. 
As far as South Africa is concerned, in Race and the Construction of the Disposable Other Magubane 
(2007: 180) points out that anthropological discourses and Enlightenment ideas influenced Jan van 
Riebeeck and his crew’s supremacist attitude. Colonialist discourse was thus behind these first settler-
invaders’ attitude of “misanthropic skepticism” - to use Nelson Maldonado-Torres’s characterisation 
(2007: 245) - vis-à-vis the Khoekhoe in the Cape and, later, with respect to other indigenous people in 
the rest of the territory.   
 
The second invasion by the British in 1806 led to a resolute campaign to assault the being-becoming 
and being-belonging of indigenous peoples. This onslaught sparked 100-years of Wars of Resistance 
mounted by the Xhosas on the frontier. The Xhosas, as was the case with other people facing colonial 
challenge, understood settler-invasion as world-shattering. They thus deployed their knowledge 
systems, cosmologies, ancestral spirits and everything else that anchored them to the three realms of 
African belonging-in-the-world (Mazrui, 2006: 477). The powerlessness of indigenous weapons and of 
the gods to resist material, social and spiritual conquests created conditions and the understanding that 
the land was being “killed”. More than just physical displacement, the conquered, therefore, 
experienced metaphysical and existential dislocation.  
 
As I mentioned in the previous section, the final War of Dispossession took place in 1878, and in 1879 
the two groups of settlers  (the Dutch and the English) were able to subjugate all indigenous chiefdoms 
and alienate their lands.  Soon after this military triumph, the British and the Boers signed a treaty of 
peace which paved the way for the establishment of the Union of South Africa. Herein a germane 
                                                        
6 A tentative suggestion can be made that with this three-pronged strategy, Plaatje – court interpreter, newspaper 
editor, political orator, teacher, pamphleteer, translator, novelist, and an intercessor and an itinerant between the 
worlds of the indigenous peoples and that of the colonists, a traveller between the settler colony and the metropole 
– sought to also world and hybridise the western world and its seemingly one-sided discourse.  
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historical point in relation to contemporary strivings for constitution and belonging: The question of the 
belonging of “natives” (the “Native Question”) dominated discussions before the United Kingdom’s 
House of Commons and at the 1909 Convention on the Constitution of South Africa. The main bone of 
contention was how to insert “natives” into the soon-to-be-established country without undoing the 
“racial” compromise between the English and the Boers. Thus a fundamental question became, “what 
was to be the future for Africans in a country that Europeans had adopted as a ‘white man’s country’?” 
(Magubane, 1996: 293). In this regard, British and Boers constitution-makers answered in the negative 
the question whether the Union constitution should extend the restricted franchise that Africans 
historically enjoyed in the Cape Colony to the rest of the envisaged Union. The reasoning here was that 
Africans, westernised or not, did not emerge out of civilisation unlike, “the white man, [who] even if 
poor or ignorant, was born into a community with a long civilised past behind it…” (Krüger, 1969: 35-
36). Colonialist discourse in the terms I have been discussing thus overdetermined the constitution of 
the country and polity settlers baptised as South Africa. 
 
The 1910 Constitution of the Union of South Africa was, therefore, a racial contract par excellence. A 
“racial contract”, as conceptualised by Charles Mills (1997), is a contract that does all that a social 
contract does but refracted through the prism of whites versus “non-whites”, those endowed with 
humanity and those who subsist below the line of the human. The objective of such a contract is to 
establish a racial oligarchy (Mills, 1997: 11). In the context of settler state-formation, the purposes of a 
racial contract are to found a settler polity, reify settler-invasion, legitimise white domination and put 
into practice the originary discourse that considers the conquered to be below the world of human 
beings. With this historical background, we can better appreciate why the Natives Land Act of 1913 
was a pivotal piece of legislation in these processes of constitutionally-sanctioned production of 
“native” pariahdom. This Act legalised land dispossession, segregation, mass removal of Africans to 
“tribal” reserves, and as Plaatje’s evocative vignettes of “roving wanderers,” internal “exiles” and 
“outcasts” revealed, above all, this Act sought to de-world conquered peoples.  
 
It is thus no coincidence that Plaatje apprehended this piece of legislation in Freudian terms. His task, 
we would recall, was to, “…describe the difficulties of the South African natives under a very strange 
law…” (2007: 15). A “very strange law” is a law that is both uncanny and portending of the uncanny 
because it secures the opposite of heimlich which is a sense of, “belonging to the house...not 
strange…homely” (Freud, 2003: 124). By describing the Act in these Freudian terms, Plaatje sought to 
drive home the point that the Act did not only make, “the natives homeless in South Africa” (Plaatje, 
2007: 335); it actually did much more. This law also brought about a pervading sense of 
unheimlich/unhomeliness. “To be unhomed,” Homi Bhabha (2005: 13) has elucidated, “is not [just] to 
be homeless…” This is because unhomeliness is a sudden condition of feeling disoriented in the world 
(Freud, 2003: 124). In “The world and home,” Bhabha (1992: 141) thus further explains that the word 
 37 
‘unhomely’ describes, “the estranging sense of the relocation of the home and the world in an 
unhallowed place”. Plaatje’s opening sentence - “awakening on Friday, June 20, 1913, the South 
African native found himself, not actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of his birth”– accords with 
Sigmund Freud and Bhabha’s formulations because it seeks to convey the idea that the coming into 
operation of this uncanny law turned, “those of us who are simply ‘Natives’ of the country, and who 
cannot claim the arrogant designation of ‘white South African’” (Plaatje, [1921] 1976: 89) into outcasts 
of the new world. “Natives” awoke to find themselves without a world after their home and their sense 
of being-in-the-world had been befuddled. They found themselves homeless and besieged by the 
unhomely. From an existential-phenomenological perspective, the conquered also apprehended their 
situation as that of being without a world.  
 
Writing most of the manuscript abroad a ship between the settler colony and the metropole (he 
celebrated this “mid-ocean” region as a “floating island” of racial harmony and cultural interaction, 
Boehmer, 2002: 141), Plaatje defined the Act in terms that sought to convey to his readers that this 
piece of legislation portended the shattering of the worlds of indigenous peoples on all three realms of 
African belonging-in-the-world. Thus Plaatje, firstly, showed that the impact of Act on the material 
world of Africans was to turn Africans into squatters, wanderers and landless paupers. Secondly, on the 
social plane, the Act’s objectives of segregation and mass removals concretised the world of apartness. 
These actions brought Plaatje’s integrationist vision of both settlers and indigenous peoples living in 
mutual recognition and cooperation into disrepute. Indeed, one of Plaatje’s cherished ideals was that of 
social integration and of South Africa being a home to all who live in it (Asmal, 2007: xiv). Lastly, 
Plaatje’s field notes showed that the Act represented the shattering of the spiritual world of Africans 
because the operation of the Act resulted in psychic alienation and world-disorientation. The latter 
consequences were the result of Africans being dislocated from ancestral lands, their ensuring mass 
wandering and the general stupefaction of families and clans.  
 
Further substantiation for my contention that Plaatje’s narrative of homelessness and unhomeliness is 
also a narrative of worldlessness on all three planes can be discerned from the fact that Plaatje modeled 
Native Life after W.E.B. Du Bois’s The Souls of Black Folk (1903). More specifically, in the prologue 
to Native Life, Plaatje specifically referred to chapter nine (“Of the Sons of Master and Man”) of Du 
Bois’s book. In that chapter, Du Bois described race relations in the American South with a focus on 
how socio-legal techniques proscribed racial contact. What would have appealed to Plaatje is that in 
addition to analysing the economic and political suppression of black Americans, Du Bois honed in on 
the social and spiritual implications of racial segregation. Du Bois (1986a: 487-490) invoked his most 
inventive literary device, “the veil of colour,” to describe the sense of invisibility and psychic alienation 
suffered by black Americans. Du Bois mourned that the American South was a world divided into two 
in which there is no “common humanity and a common destiny” resulting in “a writhing of spirit” 
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(1986a: 488, 487). In this way, Du Bois revealed to his readers that Jim Crow laws adversely affected 
the material, social, and spiritual worlds of black folk. Therefore, Plaatje aligned himself with Du Bois, 
and prophetically with Freud, to convey the insight that the consequences of the Act were not simply 
land dispossession and homelessness. More insidiously, this pivotal Act unhomed Africans and 
produced them as pariahs. As we have seen, pariahs are people who are worldless on the material, social 
and spiritual planes. In his most hyperbolic moments, Plaatje (2007: 105) thus figured the world-
shattering impacts of the Natives Land Act as a, “stealth war of extermination”.  
 
In Native Life Plaatje, then, told the story of the situation and condition of Africans in this new unhomely 
world; a world whose original sin is one, “of emerging and becoming without [the African] and against 
[the African]” (Mariátegui cited Santos, 2013: 27). However, it is not the entire story to claim that South 
Africa emerged on the basis of “natives” being outside the walls constituting its polity. As John Dube, 
the president of the SANNC and the head of its deputations to England, pointed out when bemoaning 
the constitution that founded South Africa, the calamity was not so much that the new polity emerged 
and became completely without Africans. The real tragedy was rather that in the new constitutional 
arrangement Africans were both dispossessed, rendered invisible, subjugated and incorporated, “as 
mere aliens in the land of their birth and ancient origin” (cited in Hughes, 2011: 146). From the vantage 
point of Plaatje and his fellow SANNC leaders, the original sin in the constitution of South Africa 
was/is, therefore, the sin of liminal inclusion as explained in the introductory chapter above.  
 
1.3 Leadership-in-the-Liminal 
 
1.3.1 The melancholia of transcultural elites  
 
To fully describe the psychosocial ramifications of being made internal exiles in the land of one’s own 
birth and ancient origin, Plaatje reached for another term that Sigmund Freud would later popularise. 
Plaatje clarified in the prologue that his, “is but a sincere narrative of a melancholy situation” (2007: 
15). Why and how did this colonisation lead to melancholia? Freud’s “Mourning and Melancholia” 
(1955) is useful in this regard. Freud explains that mourning is useful because it forces the patient to 
undertake reality-testing which will reveal that the lost object is indeed gone and that it is time to 
withdraw the libido from the lost object and invest it in a new object (Freud, 1955: 244). In melancholia, 
however, the grief is limitless because the loss is not only unconscious in the sense that the patient 
cannot articulate exactly what he or she has lost. The main problem is rather that the patient, “knows 
whom he has lost but not what he has lost in him” (Freud, 1955: 245. Original emphasis). The key 
difference between the two conditions is that, “in mourning it is the world that has become poor and 
empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself” (Freud, 1955: 246).  
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Reading through Plaatje’s narrative it is not clear what exactly it is that Plaatje believes he and his 
contemporaries have lost. From his analysis of the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the Act 
to his critique of the Act itself to his extensive and evocative field notes describing the actual 
consequences of this piece of legislation we gain an understanding that Plaatje was concerned with the 
fact that the Natives Land Act prohibited African peoples from buying land in the Union. Plaatje was 
also troubled by the fact that the Act precluded Africans from “squatting” on “European” farms unless 
they were contracted as poorly paid servants. As a result, “natives” had become “roving wanderers” 
and “exiles” in the land of their birth. However, throughout his narrative Plaatje never explicitly 
mentions the other grand iniquities of conquest and colonisation: subjugation of autochthonous 
sovereignties, land dispossession, white supremacy and enforced racialisation. Indeed, it is as if the 
supersession of  autochthonous homes were not objects worth mourning for. Rather, as I show below 
by way of reference to the distinction that Freud draws between mourning and melancholia, Plaatje and 
his contemporaries were more concerned about the fact that the founding of South Africa had come to 
mean that they are being relegated to the status of ‘raw natives’. This concern, as we shall see, had a 
decisive influence on Plaatje and fellow ANC leaders’ political consciousness.  
 
At the same time, Plaatje does not, indeed could not, mourn the loss of full belonging to the new 
constitutional polity. Despite his resistance and his wish for the settler polity to be all-inclusive, he must 
have been aware (as per the “native prophesy” he referenced) that the founding of South Africa was 
always going to be on the basis of institutionalised exclusion of “natives”. The situation buttressed by 
the Act was melancholic, then, because the object that Plaatje deemed lost was also not the (new) world 
that had irrupted onto his ‘traditional’ world. Rather, it was the inner world of his ego that had been 
affected. His ego was shattered and cleaved because as a “civilised” but racialised person, he was now 
forced to exist within and behind the Du Boisian “veil”. Enforced racialisation together with 
institutionalised estrangement had resulted in psychic alienation leading Plaatje to not so much mourn 
the loss of a sense of South Africanness or to be nostalgic about the seemingly shattered world of his 
ancestors. Instead, and similar to black Americans in Jim Crow USA, Plaatje was forced to wonder to 
himself: in the world inaugurated by the 1910 constitution and fortified by the Act, “What am I?” (L. 
Gordon, 2015: 128. Original emphasis). Having demonstrated that colonialist discourse was the pivotal 
instrument  in “the killing of the land” and further that its uncanny legal order produced homelessness, 
the unhomely and worldlessness, in the rest of the chapter I wish to focus on how internal and external 
alienation shaped the political jurisprudences and constitution visions of native leaders.  
 
To gain a better understanding of Plaatje’s “sincere narrative of melancholia” it is useful to understand 
how Plaatje and other SANNC leaders located their belonging and identity prior to the founding of 
South Africa. In Native Life Plaatje (2007: 68), wrote that when he and his black contemporaries were 
growing up (in the late 1880s), “we lived in a happy South Africa that was full of pleasant anticipations, 
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and now – what changes for the worse have we undergone! For to crown all our calamities, South Africa 
has by law ceased to be the home of any of her native children…”. The fact that Plaatje (who bore an 
English name and a Dutch surname and was raised on a German mission station) referred to native life 
as a life of happy belonging in and to South Africa even before South Africa was born indicates that 
Plaatje believed that he was of the white world and thus of the South Africa-to-be. To be sure, Plaatje 
was elected the first Correspondence Secretary General of the SANNC and chosen to be the 
spokesperson of the second and third deputations to England both because of his relentless investigative 
journalistic efforts and because Plaatje and the rest of the leadership of the SANNC were ‘exceptional 
natives’.  
 
All members of the SANNC deputation were westernised Africans who were first-generation or second-
generation converts to Christianity and who had received western education from a young age. Plaatje 
and his contemporaries, therefore, grew up as badumedi/amakholwa; that is, “believers” of the power 
of the Word of God and of the potency of the written word. Hlonipha Mokoena (2011: 20) explains that 
an ikholwa identity was more than just a religious identity; it was a political and social identity. Above 
all, amakholwa believed that their identity and their recognition as such should result in bestowal of 
citizenship rights as British subjects (Mokoena, 2011: 21). At the very least, the expectation and the 
main demand of amakholwa were that they ought to be treated differently vis-à-vis the rest of the 
(“uncivilised”) African masses.  
 
In the Natal colony and in the Cape colony, to varying extents, amakholwa did receive rights and 
privileges not granted to other “native” subjects, making this group, “a kind of colonial and black 
aristocracy” (ibid.). In terms of Law no. 28 of 1865, amakholwa of the Natal colony could even apply 
for exemption from being subjected to the Native Code. Reverend Dube, the leader of the SANNC and 
a “native” who was also raised on a mission station, was one such “exempted native”. In his exemption 
application form Dube, who was just returning from studies in the USA, declared that he wished, “to 
be governed by civil laws because he was civilised” (cited in Hughes, 2011: 55). ‘Exempted natives’ 
received most of the citizenship rights bestowed upon colonists. It is important to note, therefore, that 
the belonging and being-in-the-world subjectivity of Plaatje and other leaders of the SANNC were 
predicated on their being accorded a distinct legal place in the settler world. This scheme of including 
some natives and excluding others was a product of conquest and the ethic of differentiation that Amar 
Acheraïou, above, speaks of. This form of governmentality resulted in the emergence of hybrid figures 
– elites who had their feet in both the old worlds and new world; and as a result did not belong fully to 
either the world of colonisers or to that of the colonised.  
 
By hybrid figures, I do not mean “mixed persons” whose identity and being are products of a fusion of 
the worlds of the colonisers and the colonised. Rather, I mean, as do Ashcroft et al (2000: 139) elucidate, 
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new transcultural figures.7 These figures are new because they are formed in what Homi Bhabha (2005: 
54) calls the Third Space of enunciation. This is an in-between space between the cultures/homes of the 
conqueror and the conquered. It is important to point out that this terrain does not simply refer to a 
space of cross-cultural, cross-pollination of the colonising and colonised cultures. Such categorisation 
would elide the power relations inherent in colonial penetration (Ashcroft et al., 2000: 139). As Ashcroft 
et al. (2006: 137) further explain, and as I have noted in my discussion of de-homing and unhoming 
processes above, hybridity occurs, “…when settler-invaders dispossess indigenous peoples and force 
them to ‘assimilate’ to new social patterns”. This result in a state of being liminal. The colonised elites 
were thus caught in a double bind. Double bind because, on the one hand, the choice to stay in their 
subjugated and calcifying culture meant that their being-becoming could be severely hampered 
(JanMohamed, 1983: 5). On the other hand, if they endeavored to assimilate into the colonising culture 
they would be deracinated from home-culture while simultaneously prevented from becoming full 
members of the hegemonic culture. This liminal status is caused by the fact that the Manichaeism of 
colonialist praxis implies both forceful incorporation as well as enforced marginality of both calcified 
cultures and incorporated peoples (Mudimbe, 1988: 1-2; JanMohamed, 1983: 254).  
 
Liminal positionality and subjectivity thus resulted in a deep sense of personal and collective dislocation 
and estrangement - a sense of being wedged in a disconcerting interstitial zone. African people who left 
their communities to attend westernised schools were thus caught in-between two worlds. Zacharia 
Keodirelang Matthews, the first black South African to attain a South African university degree and the 
president of ANC-Cape Colony, explained this lived experience of debilitating liminality in the 
following terms: “we were being taught to live in two worlds, or at least to divide our spirit between 
two quite different ways of life, the one in reality abandoned forever, the other offering us no real chance 
to thrive and grow in a new way” (Matthews, 1983: 15. My emphasis). At the same time, educators, 
Matthews (1983: 45) adds, offered western knowledge, “on the basis of through-going white 
supremacy” which encouraged converts to despise their own culture and society (1983: 45). Converts 
were thus encouraged to aspire to be of the white world. However, assimilation into white society was 
impossible. These colonised transcultural figures thus underwent only two stages of van Gennep’s rites 
de passage (detachment and liminen). 
 
Liminality is caused by the fact that whereas colonialism is not primarily interested in the creation of 
minions for western modernity preferring to see the relationship between the conquerors and conquered 
as an endless struggle between barbarism and civilisation, “settler colonialism mobilises peoples in the 
teleological expectation of irreversible transformation” (Veracini, 2010: 99). This transformation is 
                                                        
7 Fernado Ortiz, a Cuban anthropologist, came up with the concept of transculturation. Following Ortiz, Mary 
Louise Pratt (cited in Attwell, 2005: 17) defines transculturation as the process, “whereby subordinated or 
marginalised groups select or invent from materials transmitted to them by a dominant or metropolitan culture”.  
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intended to create mimetic figures: the “reformed, recognizable Others…that is almost the same, but 
not quite” (Bhabha, 2005: 122. Original emphasis). Ralph Ellison explains that these mimetic persons 
are invisible to both the white/colonisers’ world and the world of colonised and/or non-educated people 
– they thus became, “different and of a different world” (cited in Rampersad, 2007: 48). These reformed, 
almost-but-never-quite-white figure, then, inhabited (to use an imprecise term) neither the 
autochthonous world nor the new world.  
 
1.3.2 Legal liminality and melancholic nationalism  
 
To relate this liminal positionality to constitutional issues, let us now return to Plaatje and his 
contemporaries. Plaatje and other ‘exempted natives’ wished to belong to colonial civil society, to be 
governed by the British legal order, and to acquire rights flowing from that legal system. However, 
successive colonial governments frustrated this longing. The political consciousness of these figures 
was shaped by these rejections. In the Natal Colony exempted elites started a newspaper to campaign 
against the regime of legal liminality that they were being subjected to. Heather Hughes (2011: 105) 
describes this legal liminality as, “the legal wilderness which exempted Africans were forced to wander, 
released from customary obligations but denied full rights as colonial subjects”. In 1875 “exempted 
natives” thus submitted a petition to the governor of the Natal colony demanding that their position of 
non-belonging and liminality be resolved. They specifically requested the governor to pronounce on 
their status as British subjects, the law that applied to them, and indeed which moral order they belonged 
to:  
Now here is our lament…We fled from Zulu country because of fearing Kafir Law…But now the 
Government wishes to drive us back again by saying that we ought to serve our old law which drove us 
from Zululand…We came here being young, and now are grown older – here is the question:  - How can 
a man become of the English? (cited in Mokoena, 2011: 22).  
 
Drifting in the psychic, social and legal wilderness; wedged in a debilitating Third Space but not 
wishing to go back to “Kafir” homes these transcultural elites asked: how may they complete the rite 
of passage? Their plea was for a constitutional scheme that would enable them to exit the liminal world 
and become of the white world. Parenthetically, it is important to emphasise, as is clear from the above 
petition, that promises of mission philosophy and of western Enlightenment did not blind transcultural 
elites to the fact that they could never become English. They could only hope to become of the English; 
that is, almost the same but not quite but more edified.  
 
Of more significance is the fact that the political jurisprudence and constitutional vision of this native 
leadership arose from within this space of legal and social liminality. Towards the late nineteenth 
century transcultural elites in the Natal colony had set up a civil society organisation called 
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Funamalungelo (‘demand/desire rights’). In the Cape Colony, they formed various Native Vigilance 
Associations to advocate for the defense of their ‘national rights’. By ‘national rights’ these elites meant 
the defense of rights that they believed were due to them in the colonial polities. It is this specific form 
of melancholic nationalism – nationalism not based on politics of irredentism but one borne in and 
conditioned by the Third Space – that became trans-ethnic, nationwide, and radical.  
 
From their vantage point in the Third Space, these leaders considered the law to be both the main object 
of their oppression and the main weapon for defending their rights and for crafting a sense of belonging. 
The following 1892 declamation encapsulates both the prevailing anxiety about law’s potency to 
unhome transcultural beings and a growing fracture amongst “native” elites between the majority that 
still held on to promises of assimilation and those who evinced a nascent black nationalism:  
It is very well for [white] politicians to be complaining about the existence of blacks, for this is what 
might have been expected in Africa – a black man’s country. We should have thought that coming to a 
black man’s country, Europeans would accommodate themselves to their surrounds and try to make 
worthy neighbours of the Natives instead of fretting and fuming over their large number and legislating 
with a view to get rid of them off the face of the earth (cited in Magubane, 2004: 176)  
 
Thus even before the founding of the Union of South Africa in 1910 the political consciousness and the 
terms of being-belonging of these elites were already being conditioned by their status as legally 
‘liminalised’ and socially ‘invisibilised’ beings. In the rest of this historical chapter, I aim to substantiate 
one part of this Part of the dissertation’s two-fold argument which is that the constitution visions and 
terms of belonging of these elites were impelled by a sense of melancholia and not that of mourning.  
 
1.4 New African Ambivalence 
 
1.4.1 Resisting invisibility and the ‘Segregation Fallacy’ 
 
In line with the aforementioned political consciousness and increased radicalism, towards the end of 
the century these elites altered their social identity from a kholwa/believer identity to an explicitly trans-
ethnic political identity that they designated “New African”. These reformed Africans were, however, 
still seized by a “civil imaginary” in that they held on to the promise that their conversion to Christianity 
and attainment of western education would convince colonial governments to recognise their humanity, 
extend civil rights to them and eventually integrate them into the South African polity (de Kock, 2004: 
117). Thus, their minds, similar to the minds of their New Negro exemplars, reached out, “…as yet to 
nothing but American [South African] wants, American ideals [South African liberal] ideals” (Locke, 
1925: 4). The unyielding demand of this group was a demand for, “equal rights to all civilised men” 
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(South African Native Congress, [1903] 1972: 18).8 These elites thus internalised the colonising 
discourse, accepted the legitimacy of the settler-constituted world and had jettisoned the decolonisation 
imperative of Mayibuye (‘return Africa’/‘resurrect Africa’).  
 
Alas, the 1910 constitution made it clear that South Africa was to be a White Man’s polity and that the 
new country would be founded on the basis of structural exclusion of African peoples. Constitutional 
‘invisibilisation’ of indigenous peoples was especially arduous on transcultural elites. Unlike the 
previous ‘ethic of differentiation’ adopted by missionaries and the liberal government of the Cape 
Colony, the Union government adopted what we can call an ethnic of communalism with regard to all 
indigenous persons. In terms of this policy, westernised or not, all indigenous people were “natives” 
and the state will treat all “natives” in the same manner. The Natives Land Act was a pivotal apparatus 
in this new ethic because it laid out a framework for racial segregation, mass removals and thus enforced 
‘tribalisation’.  
 
For our purposes, it is important to realise that constitutionally-enforced communalism is a 
manifestation of an aspect of colonialist discourse that Lewis Gordon terms a discourse of anonymity. 
“Anonymity” here does not simply mean being nameless. Rather, anonymity refers to a form of 
epistemic limitation in terms of which people racialised Black are generalised (L. Gordon, 2000: 381). 
Therefore, when it comes to the Black – whether westernised or ‘raw’ - there was no desire to know 
more.9 Gordon reminds us that ‘invisibilisation’ is a consequence of an unresolvable puzzle at the heart 
of the conquest project: conquered land always comes with people (L. Gordon, 2000: 378). The 
challenge that settler colonial constitution-makers face is what to do with conquered people when the 
                                                        
8 These elites regularly insisted that a distinction be drawn between themselves (“civilised men”) and the rest of 
the native masses (“raw natives”) (see the minutes of the South African Native Affairs Commission, [1905]1972: 
42-45). 
9 We can thus understand the decision of colonised and enslaved people to establish newspapers, to author 
enslaved persons’ narratives, and to pen works of fiction to be impelled by a need to counter anonymity and its 
de-worlding consequences. This is because, “black rootlessness and homelessness [are] inseparable from black 
namelessness” (West, 1999: 105). Crucially, as we saw with Plaatje, this imperative to manifest worldly presence 
through writing as self-disclosure and as consciousness-raising lay in a symbiotic relation with the constitutional 
campaign to “defend rights”. This dual law and literature task is outlined by I.W.W. Citashe (1982: 15) in this 
1880 poem:  
Your cattle are gone, my countrymen!  
Go rescue them! Go rescue them!  
Leave the breechloader alone 
And turn to the pen.  
Take paper and ink,  
For that is your shield.  
Your rights are going! 
So pick up your pen.  
Load it, load it with ink.  
Sit on a chair.  
Repair not to Hoho 
But fire with your pen.  
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majority of them have not been exterminated. More importantly, what to do when, as was the case in 
South Africa at the turn of the twentieth century (Krüger, 1969: 22), colonists were already dependent 
on “natives” and had incorporated them as servants in domestic households, farms and mines? In a 
fruitless attempt to resolve this aporia, conquerors and enslavers accepted de facto incorporation while 
elaborating means of implementing de jure invisibility and social misrecognition. The eponymous 
narrator in Ellison’s Invisible Man (2001: 3) memorably articulates the manifestation of this legally-
sanctioned invisibility in the following words:  
I am an invisible man. No, I am not a spook like those who haunted Edgar Allan Poe; nor am I one of 
your Hollywood-movie ecotoplasm. I am a man of substance, of flesh and bone, fiber and liquids – and 
I might even be said to possess a mind. I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see 
me…That invisibility to which I refer occurs because of a peculiar disposition of the eyes of those with 
whom I come in contact.  
 
Plaatje’s lament, therefore, was that in spite of, or because of, the fact that the conquered were always 
present in the white world, socio-legal attitudes suddenly render their presence an Absence (L. Gordon, 
1999: 99). The founding of South Africa in 1910 constitutionalised the liminal status of transcultural 
elites and thus their anonymity and invisibility. For transcultural elites, the new communalist framework 
meant that the foundational law, similar to the situation with respect to black Americans during the era 
of Jim Crow, suddenly declared them a “misbirth” (Du Bois, 1986c: 923). In this regard, Plaatje’s 
approving reference to Du Bois’s essay on “Of the Sons of Masters and Man” is significant.  
 
In that essay, Du Bois bemoaned the fact that segregation in the South of the USA had destroyed 
previous contact and being-togetherness of masters and house-servants. Such contact and bonds of 
affection, Du Bois (1986c: 489, 481) wrote, had engendered both sympathy and mutual understanding. 
Du Bois (ibid.) argues that mutual exposure had also shown that Negroes could assimilate the culture 
of western civilisation and function as equals in the white world (ibid.). Du Bois’s main complaint was 
that socio-legal machinations that emerged after the First World War sought to lump civilised Negroes, 
“with the lowest of their people” (Du Bois, 1986c: 491). This “drawing of the color-line” had resulted 
in feelings of betrayal, abandonment and spiritual turmoil (Du Bois, 1986c: 490). The drawing of the 
color-line and the lumping together of Africans were also sources of the melancholia of New Africans 
of South Africa. Thus, in The Segregation Fallacy and other Papers: A Native View of some South 
African Inter-racial Problems (1928), John Davidson Jabavu (England-educated educationist, 
newspaper editor, and the founder of the All-African Convention) lamented the fact that the social 
contact between educated Africans and educated whites had been legislatively proscribed, and that 
educated Africans were now forced to live in the periphery of the polity with uneducated Africans. 
Echoing Du Bois, Jabavu agitated for a policy that would enable western-educated, urban-based 
Africans to be fully included in the colonial polity. His reasoning was that these Africans had undergone 
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a “metamorphosis” and had thus made, “a steady transition from communalist tribalism into democratic 
individualism” (Jabavu, 1928: 8,9).  
 
This then is the sincere tale of melancholia that Plaatje wished to describe to his readers. As I have 
already pointed out, Plaatje did not impugn the Act for consolidating land dispossession or for its 
completion of the subjugation of indigenous sovereignties. His protest was rather that the ultimate 
intention of the Act was to halt “native progress”. The “native progress” that Plaatje and amakholwa 
were concerned about was personhood as being-becoming borne out of the fundamental tenets of the 
kholwa belief system: belief in individualism and private property; and of land purchase as a means of 
self-improvement, modern subjectivity and a sense of belonging in the world. The Act impeded the 
being-becoming of New Africans because it prohibited Africans from purchasing land. Furthermore, 
by massing transcultural elites with the rest of the conquered peoples the Act depersonalised African 
elites and rendered them invisible. The point here is that the melancholia of New Africans was caused 
by the fact that they were not sure what they have lost within themselves in this new world. More 
pertinently, these feelings of liminality, invisibility and pariahdom obscured the object of the grief of 
transcultural elites. It calibrated it to a desire to demand visibility and recognition, civil rights, and 
socio-economic opportunities in the settler-created world.  
 
1.4.2 Racial Melancholia  
 
In this regard, Magdalena Zolkos (2011: 197) reminds us that in Arendt’s formulation of pariahdom 
does not so much concern exclusion and subjugation in the strict sense of the word. Rather, pariahdom 
is about felt socio-economic inequality. Freud (1955: 248) also explains that the melancholic patient’s 
self-regard does not so much concern feelings of, “ugliness or weakness, or with social inferiority”. 
Above all else, the melancholic fears becoming poor (ibid.). Similarly, transcultural elites who 
established the SANNC (mainly overseas-trained lawyers and petit-bourgeoisie) feared that the 
bifurcated structure of the Union held the possibility of them being reduced to the ranks of uneducated 
and “uncivilised” Africans and thus of being pauperised (Mandaza, 1991: 77; Lodge, 1983: 2). Thus 
Pixley ka Seme, the main founder of the SANNC (which later became the ANC), explained that the 
formation of the SANNC was motivated by a need to form a national union with the objective of, 
“defending our [state-granted] rights and privileges” (cited in Thema, 1953: n.p. My emphasis). My 
contention is that dominant African nationalism of the early twentieth century was melancholic, shaped 
as it was by fears of elite nationalists being relegated to the status of “raw natives” and being 
impoverished. The emancipatory vision flowing from this fear was conditioned by feelings of being 
forever interned in the liminal space.  
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Feelings of being betrayed and of being abandoned thus predominated amongst New Africans. In Black 
Skin, White Mask (2008: 54) Frantz Fanon borrows from Réne Maran’s novel about a character named 
Jean Veneuse to illustrate the “internal melancholy” that assails a black person who suffers from what 
Fanon, following Germaine Guex, calls an abandonment neurosis. The neurosis is caused by a sudden 
realisation that despite growing up in the white world, the white world will always reject the 
transcultural person. Fanon (2008: 46) surmises the cause of Veneuse’s melancholia as follows: “Jean 
Veneuse is a Negro. Born in the Antilles, he has lived in Bordeaux for years; so he is a European. But 
he is black; so he is a Negro. There is the conflict”. Veneuse is a liminal being par excellence because 
in addition to being abandoned and rejected by the white world, “…the black [world has also] virtually 
repudiated me. That is precisely my position” (cited in Fanon, 2008: 53). Herein lies a pertinent point 
my thesis: in Fanon’s psychosocial analysis, rather than “restructuring the world” the melancholic elite, 
“will try to elevate himself to the white man’s level” (Fanon, 2008: 59-60).  
 
In a very useful expansion that accords with Fanon’s psychosocial analysis, David Eng and Shinhee 
Han (2000: 668) reconfigure Freud’s diagnosis from individuals to groups to refer to a condition they 
call “racial melancholia”. Based on their clinical observations of Asian-American students in the USA 
Eng and Han (2000: 671) explain that racial melancholia is caused by feelings of betrayal and 
estrangement that arise when assimilation processes remain suspended or unresolved. Confirming 
Fanon’s hypothesis, Eng and Han report that racial melancholia leads to a splitting of the psyche of the 
unassimilable racialised figure. Therefore, to paraphrase Freud, it is not the world that has become poor, 
it is the ego of this figure that has suffered. Suffering from abandonment neurosis and yearning for 
white recognition and assimilation, these figures often seek to appropriate tools of the dominant society.  
 
In the case of New Africans, the issue was exacerbated by their desire to integrate into a polity that was 
based on racialisation, radical segregation, and invisibility of all Africans. As Eng and Han (2006: 671) 
observe, the difficulty here is that the melancholic elite both knows and does not know that he or she is 
part of the larger group. To continue the fight for assimilation he or she is, therefore, forced to forget 
or deny widespread racism and institutionalised exclusion lest he or she admits to himself or herself 
that he or she wishes to join a racist society (ibid.). Their political outlook is thus overdetermined by 
ambivalence. Freud (1955: 251) has confirmed that ambivalence is a key trait of melancholia. Ellison 
(2001: xxxi-xxxii) also affirms that Invisible Man suffers from ambivalence because he or she both 
wants to belong to the dominant world and at the same time he or she resents this ‘invisibilising’ world. 
The result is a split of the consciousness of this hybrid-but-liminal person. He or she becomes what 
Stanley and Derald Sue call a Marginal Man (cited in Eng and Han, 2000: 675). A key question is the 
following: in what ways could the Marginal Man overcome or reckon with ambivalence in order to 
outline a constitution vision that will end the world that has both created and rejected him and her? The 
thesis I defend in this dissertation is that the consequences of the melancholic leader’s failure to 
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overcome his or her melancholia and attendant ambivalence results in this putative constitution-maker 
unwilling or not able to propose terms of homemaking that would enable everyone, and not just the 
“civilised,” to feel a sense of material and affective belonging.  
 
1.5 The Spiritual Strivings of Liminal Leaders: Double Consciousness and Assimilationist 
Desires 
 
I would like to end this chapter by relating the liminal status and melancholic condition of transcultural 
elites to their constitution vision. Being partially westernised and no longer being altogether African, 
the Marginal Man often wishes that hybridity implied more, not less-than. It was in reference to this 
liminality and associated psychic dismemberment and unhomeliness that in the opening essay of The 
Souls of Black Folk (1903) (a book, as we saw, served as a model for Plaatje’s Native Life) Du Bois 
meditated on the “spiritual strivings” of people of African descent. These strivings are impelled by the 
fact that colonialist discourse and its constitutional structure do not permit a person of African descent 
to attain a third stage of aggregation in the sense of fully belonging to the world and culture he or she 
has been incorporated into. Hybridity for these individuals does not manifest in an edifying doubleness. 
Rather, having both feet in the two cultures hybridity for liminal individuals implies a duality. Thus, to 
be a colonised or oppressed hybrid person is to always be at the brink of being torn asunder by, “two 
souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings, two warring ideals in one dark body” (Du Bois, 1986c: 
364-365).  
 
The colonised or ex-enslaved transcultural figure is, thus, not only in a state of vacillation with regard 
to the colonial culture, he or she, similar to Venuese, is also in a state of incongruity with regard to the 
home/ancient culture.10 In this regard, Keodirelang Matthews (an overseas-trained anthropologist, 
lawyer, educationist, and until 1952 a member of the National Executive Committee of the ANC) 
recalled that when he started to attend school, “I entered another world” (Matthews, 1983: 16). The 
convert thus lost a sense of mooring to his or her original community and world while gaining the 
knowledge and values of a far-away world. Matthews explained the sense of unhomeliness and 
dislocation from the world that flow from this act of cognitive deracination in the following manner:  
To be sure, the introduction to all of this came in a framework of total acceptance of things that had 
nothing to do with our own lives, our history, or our languages. Nothing we learned gave dignity to these 
things of our own… I remember nothing of my years in this school that touched any deeper awareness 
of the problems of our place in this world… (Matthews, 1983: 17. My emphasis)  
 
                                                        
10 Some indigenous people derisively referred to these converts as amakhafula (‘those spat out’) (Hughes, 2011: 
9). 
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As we have seen, colonialist discourse encourages the liminal-figure to reject his pre-school life-world, 
“…or at least to divide our spirit between two quite different ways of life” (Matthews, 1986: 15). As 
Freud would have it, these externally and internally alienated figures found themselves suddenly not 
able to relate to the world. The world lost all its coherence resulting in the fracturing of the ego and a 
divided consciousness that is unable to merge the colonisers’ and the colonised frames of reference 
(Irele 1992: 209). It is important to re-emphasise that homeless and melancholic elites often adopt 
hegemonic discourse and political praxis. That is, to attain recognition and visibility, the black-skin-
white-masked leader often appeals to dominant political jurisprudence and the western grammar of 
dignity. As Du Bois (1986c: 364) notes, the spiritual striving of the transcultural elite is impelled by a 
sense of double consciousness, “the sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of 
measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity”.  
 
In the case of colonial South Africa, the more the colonial state imposed policies of segregation and 
forced ‘tribalisation’, the more transcultural elites affirmed their place in western modernity and 
identified themselves fully with the colonising culture and the civilising discourse (de Kock, 2004: 
117). For this group, “belief in the superiority of European culture was basic to its world view, and its 
goals were unabashedly assimilationist” (Gerhart, 1978: 34). Over and over again, ANC spokesmen 
asserted that they are as mature and civilised as any [white] South Africans and thus they were deserving 
of recognition, incorporation, and equal opportunities in the Union (Gerhart, 1978: 38). According to 
ANC leaders, the key contradiction was thus not colonisation and “the death of the land”. To be sure, 
these leaders took the legitimacy of the state, and arguably of the settler-created world, for granted 
(Motlhabi, 1984: 40-41). The ANC’s constitution vision was thus predicated on the understanding that 
self-determination ought to result in liberal democratisation and integration. 
 
That the ANC’s constitutional vision was based on Du Boisian double consciousness comes through 
clearly in its first concrete elaboration of a constitution for a future South Africa. In 1943, directly 
inspired by the Atlantic Charter, the preamble to the ANC’s Bill of Rights proclaimed that, “we, the 
African people in the Union of South Africa, urgently demand the granting of full citizenship rights 
such as are enjoyed by all Europeans in South Africa” (ANC, 1943: n.p.). The leadership of the ANC, 
mostly Christian liberals, had thus imbibed the notion that the human rights discourse is the only 
legitimate grammar of dignity and that the bouquet of rights enjoyed by Europeans in South Africa and 
abroad were the most desirable. This understanding found concrete expression in the ANC co-
sponsored Freedom Charter of 1955. This Charter opens with the historically significant words: “South 
Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white” (Congress of the People, 1955: n.p.). Following 
from this declaration, Charterists could only make a call for equitable sharing of the land; and not the 
supersession of the settler-created polity.  
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With this liberal, but multi-racialist, Charter the ANC made it clear that it upheld the legitimacy of the 
state, it had renounced land reclamation, and the historical mission of revalorising subjugated 
indigenous life-worlds. The strategic focus of ANC leaders was on inclusion and democratisation. 
Furthermore, the Charter’s opening declaration and the assertion that, “our people [black and white] 
have been robbed of their birthright to land, liberty…,” (Congress of the People, 1955: n.p.) made it 
clear that for the ANC and its allies the goals of (re)conciliation and integration took precedence over 
historical and structural realities. More specifically, from its years in exile up to the 1990s when it 
returned to the country, the ANC continued to accept the legitimacy of the South African state and its 
international legality and only protested the legitimacy of the white minority government (Alexander, 
2002: 46). Although rhetorically the ANC will later accept its communist allies’ characterisation that 
the South African situation is that of “Colonialism of a Special Type;” neither for the communists nor 
for the ANC did that characterisation commit it to campaign for self-determination understood as full 
land reclamation and the restoration of subjugated indigenous sovereignties (Mafeje, 1986: 98-99). 
Mayibuye iAfrika (‘Return’/‘re-member’ Africa) was, therefore, not a key concern for the transcultural 
elites of the ANC.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The aim of this chapter was to introduce the main themes animating this dissertation. Plaatje’s 
existential-phenomenological interrogation of the constitution of the Union of South Africa as 
productive of “native” pariahdom and invisibility justify my premise that issues of belonging, both from 
a rights and duties perspective and from that of affectivity, are issues of constitution-making. 
Ultimately, the constitutional vision and terms of belonging elaborated by the dominant strand of 
transcultural “natives” reflected their melancholia and ambivalence. The rallying cry of ANC leaders – 
“equal rights for all civilised men” – was thus a melancholic cry flowing from their condition of double 
consciousness. I have argued that a melancholic constitution vision is ultimately assimilationist, elitist, 
and thus not geared towards imploding the settler-created world and “resurrecting the land”. Following 
from this, I hypothesise that this constitution vision would, in the putatively post-colonial polity, 
ultimately reprise colonialist discourse’s ‘ethic of differentiation’ and render non-elite “natives” 
unhomely and perhaps worldless.  
 
Finally, I have argued that the task of “resurrecting the land” on the material, social and spiritual planes 
is a fundamental constitutional task if the original sin of settler colonial constitution-making is to be 
expatiated and the realities of “native” pariahdom and non-belonging are resolved. In the next chapter, 
I show that Thabo Mbeki, de facto prime minister to Nelson Mandela and president of South Africa 
from 1999 to 2008, understood this task very well. As I will show, Mbeki understood that from the 
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perspectives of both constitution-making and nation-building the key challenge is how to achieve re-
birth, self-definition, and African reclamation of belonging-in-the-world.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE CONSTITUTION LEGACY OF PAN-AFRICANISM: 
POTENTIATED DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS OR RACIAL MELANCHOLIA? 
 
I am an African. 
I owe my being to the hills and the valleys…the seas and the ever-changing seasons that define the face 
of our native land... 
I owe my being to the Khoi and the San… 
I am formed of the migrants who left Europe to find a new home on our native land… 
In my veins courses the blood of the Malay slaves who came from the East…  
I am the grandchild of the warrior men and women that Hintsa and Sekhukhune led, the patriots that 
Cetshwayo and Mphephu took to battle, the soldiers [of] Moshoeshoe and Ngungunyane... 
My mind and my knowledge of myself is [sic] formed by the victories that are the jewels in our African 
crown… 
I come of those who were transported from India and China… 
Being part of all these people, and in the knowledge that none dare contest that assertion, I shall claim 
that - I am an African…  
[Thabo Mbeki, 1996. Original emphasis]  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter focused on two main interrelated themes: (i) Colonialist discourse and settler 
constitutionalists attempts to de-world “natives;” and (ii) the emergence of transcultural elites as well 
as these elites’ visions of constitution and belonging. I showed that the visions of these elites were 
melancholic visions that emerged out of, and lingered in, an unedifying liminal space. The setting for 
my contemplation of these issues was the period of colonial and Apartheid constitution-making. In this 
chapter, I shift the narrative to the early “post-Apartheid” era. This is a period when transcultural elites 
were charged with founding an inclusive post-segregationist polity. My main objective in this chapter 
is to complement the preceding historical and conceptual chapter by buttressing my thesis that the 
constitution visions of transcultural leaders were, in diverse but similar ways, visions borne of 
melancholia.  
 
The main insight I wish to convey in this chapter is that even when these elites occupied state office 
they continued to elaborate terms of homemaking that did not constitute a rupture with the fundamental 
character of the original sin of settler colonisation. I have contended that the original sin in the 
constitution of South Africa is that of full belonging for the minority of citizens and disjunctive 
inclusions in respect of the majority of the population. I will demonstrate that this constitutive iniquity 
persists in the “post-Apartheid” era. This persistence is in spite of explicit and laudable attempts by 
“post-Apartheid” leaders to link constitution-making and nation-building processes to the project of 
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ending conditions that produce pariahdom and de-worlding nationally and globally. If in the previous 
chapter I focused more on the influence of colonialist discourse in shaping both the emergence of 
transcultural “natives” as well as their terms of resistance, in this chapter I shift the focus to the agency 
of these leaders to understand why they reiterated the fundamental terms of this discourse. I aim to 
show that the reason why these leaders reprised colonialist discourse and a situation of no-world is 
because they failed to exit the liminal zone, overcome melancholia and re-suture with home-culture. A 
fundamental requirement here is the ability to potentiate double consciousness. This route is Paget 
Henry’s proposal for how transcultural leaders could overcome alienation and internalised 
inferiorisation. This chapter and the contemporary constitution failures I outline here clear the ground 
for the next Part of the dissertation in which I offer the disalienating, homecoming, homemaking and 
uBuntu-inspired constitution visions of Es’kia Mphahlele, Steve Biko and Abahlali baseMjondolo. 
 
I start the inquiry in the present era with an exploration of the disjuncture between, on the one hand, the 
goals of Thabo Mbeki’s “African Renaissance” and “unity-in-diversity” constitution-making and 
nation-building projects; and on the other hand, contemporary lived experiences of pariahdom, 
unhomeliness, and worldlessness. After locating Mbeki’s philo-praxis in the Pan-Africanism tradition, 
in section two I try to make sense of the aforementioned neo-colonial outcomes by exploring the 
impulse behind Pan-Africanist homemaking and world-making endeavours. Through an intellectual 
biography of W.E.B. Du Bois, I will investigate whether Pan-Africanist constitution-makers ever 
succeed in what I show are their avowed goals of overcoming internal alienation and exiting the liminal 
world in order to (re)constitute the world. Du Bois interests me because he is the main progenitor of 
twentieth-century Pan-Africanism and its politics of redemptive returns and reclamation of world 
belongingness. More pertinently, Du Bois deserves extensive study because his manifesto of how 
people of African descent can defy the “colour line,” achieve liberation and thus attain world 
belongingness directly influenced New Africans of South Africa. In section three, I return to South 
Africa to show that the main bequests of the constitution legacy of Pan-Africanism, as elaborated and 
implemented by Mbeki, are elite nationalism, lack of national consciousness, and thus the persistence 
of “native” pariahdom and worldlessness. The final chapter will offer Abahlali’s counter-hegemonic 
vision of constitution and belonging. Drawing on and transcending visions initially formulated by 
Mphahlele (chapter 3) and Biko (chapter 4), Abahlali’s on-going struggle is a struggle to de-constitute 
the current world in which the majority of inhabitants continue to experience homelessness, 
unhomeliness, rootlessness and worldlessness. Therefore, whereas this final chapter of Part I presents 
elite praxes of constitution and belonging, the final chapter of Part II counters with a non-elite praxis 
for the realisation of the Mayibuye desideratum; the exigency of re-membering and remaking the triadic 
world.  
 
 54 
2.1 Neo-Apartheid and Cultural Liminality in Thabo Mbeki’s New South Africa 
 
In May 1996, the Constitutional Assembly of South Africa’s first democratically-constituted parliament 
finally reached agreement on the text of the “Final Constitution”.11 Constitution-makers were quick to 
proclaim that the adoption of the Constitutional Bill marks, “…the birthday to the South African 
rainbow nation” and that, “[t]his is the day South Africa is truly born” (Cyril Ramaphosa cited in Oswin 
2007: 96). The epigraph at the head of this chapter is an extract from a speech that Thabo Mbeki, then 
deputy president to Nelson Mandela, gave when he addressed parliament on that occasion. As is clear 
from that extract, Mbeki used that occasion to draw a link between the putatively new foundational law 
and what for him were unfolding processes of post-Apartheid belonging and becoming.  
 
The enduring brilliance of Mbeki’s speech lies in the fact that Mbeki did not aver much with regard to 
the text of the Constitutional Bill or what the process of its drafting and adoption heralded for the 
consolidation of democracy. Rather, Mbeki used this occasion to, firstly, assert that the Final 
Constitution will consolidate the process of nation-becoming and that in this regard autochthony, 
migration, and settler-invasion should now be considered immaterial historical factors. Secondly, 
Mbeki’s performative utterance was a declaration that the Final Constitution of the new South Africa 
signals the death of the Manichaean world. In its ruins will rise a post-racial world characterised by an 
all-embracing, hybrid conception of Africanness.  
 
Mbeki’s appropriation of an identity (an identity that, as Mudimbe showed in the previous chapter, was 
invented by the order of knowledge of colonisation as the negative figure of the Same) was a gesture 
of deconstruction, resistance to de-worlding, and a staging of re-existence in the world. In what ways 
did Mbeki assert this reclamation of belonging in the world? In the first place, Mbeki submitted that the 
new constitution must indeed be a constitution in the sense of constituting a home to which all members 
of the “rainbow nation” could belong. In addition to the constitution facilitating inclusive homemaking 
and thus ending the state(s) of disjunctive inclusions and homelessness, Mbeki seemed to argue that the 
constitution will also bring to end the other three outcomes of settler constitution-making and 
concomitant pariahdom; namely, namelessness, unhomeliness, and rootlessness. Thus, secondly, 
Mbeki’s declaration that no one can contest his assertion that “I am an African,” the opposite of being 
an Invisible Man, was an attempt to counter namelessness, depersonalisation, and invisibility inherent 
in official colonialist designations such as Kaffir, Native, Bantu and the Black. Mbeki the politician 
assumed the mantle of a traditional praise poet to proclaim that he knows who he is and what his place 
in the world is.  
 
                                                        
11 The current constitution of South Africa is commonly referred to as the Final Constitution because it replaced 
the Interim Constitution that was in force between 1993 and 1996.  
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Thirdly, and related to the foregoing, in Mbeki’s worldview political independence and collective 
processes of nation-building are occasions to end both the State and a state of unhomeliness. This is 
because these processes will unfold under a framework of a constitution that, for him, is homegrown, 
homemaking and thus not uncanny. In this regard, Mbeki also reminded the world that being a 
transcultural person he has co-constituted the settler-imposed world even if this world sought to unhome 
him and turn him into a liminal being. Finally, Mbeki’s mobilisation and owning of the multifaceted 
history of conflict, complicity, resistance, of western modernity, Pan-Africanism, and, more 
significantly, of cosmopolitan relations and hybrid identities formed, if repudiated, in the settler colony 
were declarations of intent to terminate states of, real or imagined, rootlessness of historically colonised 
and enslaved peoples.12 Understood in this way, it is clear that for Mbeki the Final Constitution of the 
“new” South Africa was absolutely fundamental to the task of terminating ‘Native Life in South Africa’.  
 
Mbeki’s personal gesture of self-definition and self-reclamation of world belongingness preceded by a 
year his introduction of a collective self-definition and self-rediscovery programme. He termed this 
programme the African Renaissance programme. Mbeki (2002a: 72) outlined the rationale for this 
national programme as follows: “We speak about the need for the African Renaissance in part so that 
we ourselves, and not another, determine who we are, what we stand for, what our vision and hopes 
are, how we do things…” An important point to note here is that with this official programme Mbeki 
also proposed that the project of constitution-making must always be supplemented by and undergirded 
by a national ideology and a cultural rediscovery project if it is to be faithful to the holistic (that is, on 
all three realms) imperatives of Mayibuye iAfrika. How did Mbeki’s African Renaissance seek to 
achieve this three-fold re-membering Africa? 
 
Firstly, Mbeki linked the imperative of post-colonial re-humanisation with the project of reconstituting 
the material world explaining that within the framework of the African Renaissance poverty eradication 
and material development go together with, “the assertion of our pride as human beings…” (Mbeki, 
2002f: 125). Secondly, Mbeki posited that this national programme and its goals of African self-
definition and self-discovery are means of countering colonialist discourses and its Manichean social 
world. Mbeki thus argued that, “the only manner of reclaiming and recovering our self-identity, self-
respect and self-worth [is to] correct the distortion that we are subhuman” (cited in Gevisser, 2007: 
323).  
 
                                                        
12 This goal also applied to descendants of colonists. In this regard, in praise of The Native Intelligence of Thabo 
Mbeki (2007: 65) Ronald Suresh Roberts asserts that the impulse behind Mbeki’s poem-speech is “native 
magnanimity”. Roberts is, however, quick to add that Mbeki’s magnanimity is not a blank cheque. Rather it is a 
gesture that demands white people to root themselves in Africa: “…at the heart of Mbeki’s magnanimity is also 
an appeal for contemporary whites to move from living ‘on’ Africa, to a life ‘in’ Africa” (ibid.). 
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Finally, and above all, Mbeki implied that programme of African Renaissance was geared towards “the 
spiritual strivings” that Du Bois spoke of. In this regard, Mbeki thus proposed that, “the beginning of 
our rebirth as a Continent must be our own re-discovery of our soul…a journey of self-discovery and 
the restoration of our own self-esteem” (Mbeki cited in Gevisser, 2007: 323). Therefore, for Mbeki and 
proponents of the African Renaissance, resurrecting Africa and realising the rebirth of Africans were 
necessary if the maladies of double consciousness, psychic alienation, and spiritual exile were to be 
overcome. Understood in this way, Mbeki’s (re)constitution vision aimed to counter the historical de-
wording of Africans on all these three pivotal realms. More importantly, and similar to Plaatje, Mbeki 
insisted that the only decisive way Africans could achieve reclamation of worldly belongingness was if 
they mounted a frontal attack on colonialist discourses and their ‘invisibilising’ narratives. Mbeki thus 
urged Africans to rebel against these discourses by rediscovering and celebrating their own histories 
and by insisting on their immemorial belongingness-in-the-world. Counter-archiving will prove that 
Africans were not historically or naturally outcasts of the world. He put it in the following way: 
“Africa’s history, her culture, her works of art [have] the possibility to communicate the message that 
none need to think that anyone of us is anything other than part of one interdependent humanity” (2002a: 
100).  
 
For Mbeki, then, the emancipatory spirit of Mayibuye iAfrika dictated that the rebirth of the world of 
South African “natives” should be linked to the rebirth of Africa. Therefore, if the foundational law of 
the new South Africa and the national programme of African Renaissance were means of dismantling 
the world of apartness domestically, in its guise as a lynchpin of Mbeki’s continental diplomatic policy 
the African Renaissance was geared towards ending a situation Mbeki dubbed “global apartheid” (cited 
in Bond, 2013: xi). Towards this end, Mbeki formulated a continental programme entitled the 
Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (the MAP). With the MAP Mbeki sought 
to re-imagine and remap Africa’s place in the world with the aim of forging new terms for the re-
integration of Africa into the global economy and ‘the world’ (Mbeki, 2001: n.p.). Subsequently, Mbeki 
merged his MAP with the then Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo’s Omega Plan to create the New 
African Initiative. In 2001, under the aegis of this Initiative the self-explanatory New Partnership for 
African Development (NEPAD) was established.  
 
It should be clear from this brief introduction why Mbeki – who was singularly influential in crafting 
the image, vision, ideology, and institutional framework of the “new” South Africa as de facto prime 
minister during the Mandela presidency and again as the country’s president from 1999 to 2008 - is a 
person of interest for my main thesis. Mbeki is a meaningful figure because returning to South Africa 
after almost forty years in physical exile he sought to link the intersecting “post-Apartheid” imperatives 
of constitution (reconciliation, “unity in diversity,” equal rights for all, and post-segregationist nation-
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building) with those of belonging (universal citizenship, hybrid Africanness, Pan-Africanism, and a 
renewed integration of Africans into ‘the world’).  
 
However, in 2008 Mbeki’s presidency ended in humiliation when his party recalled him from office. 
Mbeki’s party opponents accused him of, amongst other things, manipulating state institutions against 
his party rivals; of alienating “the masses;” and crucially, of being a “black Englishman in tweed 
jackets” given to quoting Shakespeare and W.B. Yeats to befuddle detractors (Gevisser, 2008: 735). 
Mbeki’s erstwhile allies also accused him of working with World Bank consultants to parachute in a 
Washington Consensus-aligned macroeconomic policy framework that had deepened socio-economic 
inequalities and entrenched the inherited world of apartness. Even more significantly, in 2008 pervasive 
Afrophobic attitudes against non-nationals from other parts of Africa finally boiled over into nation-
wide pogroms in which 62 people were killed. Mbeki’s project of inaugurating a rebirth and a renewal 
of the polity to make it a place in which the ex-conquered no longer felt like pariahs ended, therefore, 
in a catastrophe.  
 
What went wrong? As I have outlined briefly above, critics levelled two types of criticism against 
Mbeki: a critique related to his disconnected personality and a critique of his socio-economic policies. 
One set of critics pointed to Mbeki’s alleged aloofness and alienating style of leadership. These critics 
reproached Mbeki for suffering from illusions of grandeur in that he believed that he is, “erudite, 
intellectual, a philosopher-king” who would descent from on high to save the benighted masses (Seepe, 
2002: n.p.). Drawing from the discussion in the preceding chapter, the criticism here was that Mbeki 
was a disconnected elite suffering from double consciousness. Mbeki’s most vociferous critics asserted 
that the bedrock of Mbeki’s proposed social contract (the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution 
programme, “GEAR”) was a neoliberal programme that deepened black poverty thus contradicting 
Mbeki’s self-declared mission of dismantling the inherited world of apartness. Indeed, Mbeki had in 
1996 observed that South Africa remained a country of two nations: “one of these nations is white, 
relatively prosperous…The second and larger nation of South Africa is black and poor...” (Mbeki, 1998: 
68-70). In practice, Mbeki’s “reverse GEAR” (as detractors labelled it) controverted this correct 
analysis. This neo-liberal policy also rendered constitutional promises of social justice and substantive 
equality hollow. Mbeki’s detractors thus concluded that his African Renaissance flagship programme 
was, “...not curative but palliative, calculated to distract South Africans from what really ails them: 
grinding poverty, increasing unemployment, crumbling social services; an ever-increasing gap between 
rich and poor” (Givisser, 2007: 325). 
 
Similar to their domestic counterparts, Mbeki’s continental critics contended that his continental 
projects of renewal and reclamation of belongingness-in-the-world (the African Renaissance, the 
NEPAD programme, and the nascent African Union which he played a leading role creating) 
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perpetuated neo-colonialism and “global apartheid”. These critics alleged that Mbeki worked with 
North-based consultants to impose market-based reforms with the intention of making Africa attractive 
to new forms of imperial exploitation (Bond, 2003: 14-16). If the objectives behind Mbeki’s continental 
policy was to usher in Africa’s rebirth and dismantle “global apartheid,” critics retorted that in reality 
Mbeki had supplied “…a glossy, New South Africa ‘shine’ to the chains of global apartheid” (Bond, 
2003: xi). Ultimately, similar to his domestic critics, Mbeki’s continental critics focused on Mbeki’s 
personality. They bemoaned the fact that Mbeki’s major flaw was that he was an alienated and 
alienating leader; or as per the sub-title of Adekeye Adebajo’s book, Mbeki was Africa’s Philosopher 
King (2016b). 
 
To sum up, Mbeki did not succeed in his self-declared goals of (re)constituting South Africa to become 
a land where the historically excluded and estranged could also feel a sense of material and affective 
belongingness. Adebajo (2016a: n.p.) thus surmises that, “Mbeki’s dream of Africa’s renaissance belied 
South Africa’s schizophrenia” and that by the time Mbeki was removed from office a defining trait of 
South Africa was a sense of “cultural limbo”. In a phrase, Mbeki’s new South Africa was still a space 
of namelessness, homelessness, unhomeliness, and rootlessness.  
 
2.2 The Melancholic Impulse behind Pan-Africanist Homemaking and World-Remaking 
Agendas 
 
I argue that Mbeki’s failure to contribute to the re-constitution of South Africa and to ‘resurrecting 
Africa’ is illustrative of a predicament that assails most transcultural Pan-Africanist leaders as I will 
demonstrate in this section. Their predicament is that their militant rhetoric of collective self-definition, 
self-discovery, and the crafting of a self-steering “Black World” belie the fact that they are still 
overwhelmed by the Du Boisian problematic of double consciousness. The preceding discussion points 
to the fact that Mbeki’s interrelated projects of resistance, self-definition and re-existence were natural 
engagements with what Du Bois termed the “spiritual strivings” of conquered and enslaved peoples. As 
Plaatje hints with his approving reference to Du Bois’s work, Du Bois suggested that the end of these 
strivings would be reached when the world has been reconstituted on the spiritual, social, and material 
planes. This is an agenda that Mbeki embraced and sought to pursue. My main objective in this section 
is to explore whether this Du Boisian manifesto of constitution and belonging facilitates an overcoming 
of liminality and the attendant problematic of double consciousness or whether this framework is still 
impelled by racial melancholia and thus unable to inspire quests for the re-manifestation of a world of 
plural co-existence. Du Bois’s pioneering manifesto will serve as a comparator vis-à-vis the constitution 
visions I advance in Part II of this dissertation. In particular, Du Bois’s manifold home-seeking quests 
and constitution visions serve as an entry point to my exploration of the impulse behind transcultural 
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elites’ quests to reconstitute their polities and to remake the world. I will compare and contrast this 
impulse with that of Mphahlele, Biko, and Abahlali in Part II.  
 
2.2.1 The Du Boisian manifesto 
 
We would recall that Du Bois elaborated his theory of double consciousness in the context of an anti-
black world that had both made black Americans and repudiated them. In these circumstances, Du Bois 
posited that the hybrid identity of black Americans was a curse – a doubleness that rather than resulting 
in self-consciousness splits the psyche and divides consciousness. It bears emphasising that this 
situation was particularly uncanny for those black Americans who, as Du Bois (1986a: 492) would have 
it, had been “uplifted” to the standard of “American civilisation”. These “uplifted” individuals existed 
in two worlds: one world composed of racially discriminated people whose habits, customs, and ideals 
were shaped by the memory of slavery and institutionalised discrimination; and another world, “which 
I came to call the white world” (Du Bois, 1986a: 653). A transcultural black person was denied both 
belonging and humanity in the latter dominant world: “I was not an American; I was not a man… [but 
simply] a coloured man in a white world,” Du Bois lamented (ibid). According to Du Bois (1986a: 
681), an educated black person was, therefore, a person alienated from both the white world and the 
black world; a creature not belonging to both worlds but existing in a “double environment”. 
 
 Existing not so much in two worlds but in an unhomely space, the ‘liminalised’ person had to grapple 
with internal contradictions that manifested as, “two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings, 
two warring ideals in one dark body” (Du Bois, 1986a: 364-365). The spiritual striving of a “coloured 
man” was thus a striving against this doubleness. This doubleness caused inner and external alienation 
as the hybrid-liminal figure struggled with both what he or she was (a person or a ‘coloured man’) and 
who he or she was (a Negro or an American? Or was he or she both?). In his 1897 milestone discourse 
on belonging, identity, and constitution Du Bois posed this riddle in the following terms:  
What after all, am I? Am I an American or am I am a Negro? Can I be both? Or is it my duty to cease to 
be a Negro as soon as possible and be an American? If I strive as a Negro, am I not perpetuating the very 
cleft that threatens and separates black and white America? Is it not my only possible practical aim the 
subduction of all that is Negro in me to the American? (Du Bois, 1986i: 821) 
 
As is clear, this question is also an inquiry into nationality, nationhood and racial justice. In The Souls 
of Black Folks (The Souls) (1903), Du Bois will argue that the end of spiritual striving can be found in 
a third path beyond historical calls for “Black Zionism” and assimilation. The task, as Du Bois saw it, 
was not to seek conjunction with Africanness to the exclusion or suppression Americanness. Neither is 
the ideal to cease being a Negro and seek to become an American. Rather, the disalienating quest was 
to become, “both a Negro and an American” (1986a: 365). However, Du Bois found that the 
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constitutional landscape and social attitudes prevented a subjugated transcultural person from enjoying 
a, “proud, enduring hyphenation” (Lewis, 1993: 281) in a “multiracial democratic America” (West, 
1999: 97). The resultant states of homelessness and unhomeliness were often encapsulated in this cry 
of pariahs: “Why did God make me an outcast and a stranger in mine own house?” (Du Bois, 1986a: 
364-365). Being in this state of internalised and external non-belonging the colonised mind of the 
transcultural person - unlike the “uncolonised mind” of a non-modern person (Nandy: 2011: 72) - is 
forced to confront this exilic condition. Du Bois’s own spiritual striving(s) would take him from 
walking the hallowed corridors of Harvard University as one of the first black American PhD candidates 
to a transformative sojourn in Germany to being buried on African soil in independent Ghana as a 
revered pioneer of the Black Diasporan/Pan-African World. Du Bois’s quests included the seemingly 
paradoxical identities of being a Europhile cosmopolitan, a tactical Black Nationalist, an internationalist 
of ‘the darker races of the world’, and a Marxist cosmopolitan.  
 
This brings us back to my tentative typology of the options available to a person produced as pariah. In 
the introductory chapter, I proposed a typology comprised of the following three paths: (i) to seek 
further acculturation and thus assimilation into the dominant house; (ii) to adopt a fugitive stance with 
the intention of arrogating the fruits of the hegemonic house without seeking to be part of it; and (iii) to 
undertake ‘voluntary’ physical exile with the intention of returning as a revolutionary determined to 
dismantle the master’s house. I will relate this provisional typology to Du Bois’s vision of emancipation.  
 
It should be clear that Du Bois’s proposed third path eschewed the traditional accomoditionist posture 
most notably typified by Booker T. Washington. Du Bois’s constitution vision was also at odds with 
Frederick Douglass’s later vision of “radical assimilationism” (cited in Lewis, 1993: 356). To gain a 
better understanding of Du Bois’s response to the existential riddle he posed above and to accurately 
trace the evolution of his seminal manifesto we would need to take a step back to a time before Du Bois 
proposed this hyphenated solution (the Negro-American proposal).  
 
Whereas in The Souls (1903) Du Bois seemed to reject an assimilative immigrant deportment (the first 
possibility in my typology), his answer to his 1897 riddle was still very ambivalent. In that 1897 speech, 
“The Conservation of Races” (The Conservation”), Du Bois (1986i: 815) strenuously postulated that 
white people and black people are members of two distinct races of differing blood and history. The 
struggle and destiny of black American was, therefore, “not absorption by the white Americans” (Du 
Bois, 1986i: 820. Original emphasis). Rather, the distinct mission of black Americans was to conserve 
their race and in that way to be in a position to make a unique contribution to the USA nation.  
 
Du Bois’s ambivalence and contradictions become evident when we consider his vacillations regarding 
the nature of black identity and black belonging. On the one hand, he claimed that the “black race” is 
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intrinsically American: “We are Americans, not only by birth and by citizenship, but by our political 
ideals, our language, our religion. Further than that, our Americanism does not go” (Du Bois, 1986i: 
822). ‘Further than that,’ black Americans belonged to a membership of a “vast historic race” made of 
different blood, history, and culture and must, therefore, constitute themselves into a separate race in 
an equal and democratic USA (ibid.). On the other hand, Du Bois also implied that the black “race” is 
a separate “nation”. To this end, he posited that if there is broad agreement about the country’s laws, 
language, and religion and if economic justice is guaranteed, “there is no reason why, in the same 
country and on the same street, two or three great national ideals might not thrive and develop…” (Du 
Bois, 1986i; 821-822). Du Bois’s manifold vacillations makes it difficult to work out what “America” 
was to Du Bois: was it a nation, a country, a race, a culture, or a world? As we shall see in the next Part 
of the dissertation, the answer to this question is pivotal in the formulation of struggles of de-
constitution and (re-)constitution. It would seem that the 1897 Du Bois believed that “America” was a 
country and a world constituted by two main races with irreconcilable identities. In this country and 
world, the black race was subjugated and pushed below the line of the human. For Du Bois, it was, 
therefore, important for “the black race” to take pride in their race, conserve it, and strive for 
constitutional and legislative amendments that will assure for them equal belonging in a multiracial 
USA (see Du Bois’s proposed Academy Creed: 1986i: 825). It is interesting to point out that already in 
1897, Du Bois displayed Pan-Africanist sensibilities. This is because Du Bois (1986i: 820) disclosed 
that his long-term wish was for the black race in the USA to conserve its racial identity so as to make 
its unique contribution to the USA society and in that way become “the advance guard” of “Pan-
Negroism” worldwide. However, Du Bois was not clear what ought to happen to this race of ‘different 
blood and history’ when all these objectives have been achieved.  
 
In the same year that Du Bois made this proposal (a proposal that could be understood as that of 
multiracialism, multi-nationalism, and multiculturalism) Du Bois published his most famous essay, 
“Strivings of the Negro People,” He would later retitle it as “Of Our Spiritual Strivings” (“Strivings”) 
and include it as the lead essay in the The Souls. With this widely-circulated and cited essay, Du Bois 
established himself as the premier intellectual concerned with the exilic condition of Americans of 
African descent. A shift in Du Bois’s constitution vision can be discerned in this essay. In this essay, 
Du Bois proposed that the end of the strivings of the ‘Negro race’ would be attained when socio-legal 
attitudes and constitutional arrangements are transformed in a way that would enable black people to 
assume a hyphenated identity and belonging; that is, to become Negro-Americans. Whereas in “The 
Conservation” Du Bois adopted the prevailing scientific method of the study of races; in “Strivings” he 
adopted an existential-phenomenological approach to the study of racism and the structural denial of 
black belonging. This approach enabled Du Bois to re-examine and eschew his conservationist 
manifesto. His focus shifted to tracing exactly when and how he “lost” his belonging to the mainstream 
USA world and to confront the psychosocial impacts of living behind the veil. This personal reckoning 
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would put him in a position to valorise his identity and fight for his right as a co-constitutive creator of 
the USA world.  
 
Du Bois thus opened “Strivings” with the following meditation on pariahdom and worldlessness: 
“Between me and the other world there is ever an unasked question…How does it feel to be a problem?” 
(Du Bois: 1986a: 363). In his unique threnodic tone Du Bois informed the reader that the sudden 
realisation that he was not of the USA world dawned on him in a wooden schoolhouse when a white 
girl rejected his advances. It was then that he realised that he was, “shut out from their world by a vast 
veil” (Du Bois, 1986a: 364). He was a being entombed behind ‘the veil’. Furthermore, and 
consequently, he came to realise that existence behind the veil deprived him of identity and self-
consciousness. This is because the dominant world, “only lets him see himself through the revelation 
of the other world” (Du Bois, 1986a: 364). This realisation led to a crucial insight. The insight was that 
the foremost spiritual striving of a behind-the-veil creature is a striving, “to attain self-conscious 
manhood” (Du Bois, 1986a: 365). We can discern a decisive shift in perspectives between “The 
Conservation” and “Strivings”. In the latter essay, his concerns extended beyond racial subjugation and 
the conservation of ‘the race’ as a means of resistance. In “Strivings,” Du Bois conveyed an appreciation 
of the fact that subjugated persons often lacked subjectivity and identity. Therefore, the struggle for 
constitution and belonging had to start there.  I would like to suggest that this is the first crucial insight 
of the Du Boisian manifesto. The insight here is that before striving to de-constitute and (re)constitute 
the world, the would-be leader ought to first return to himself or herself.  
  
As I have already hinted, the existential questions inherent in strivings for disalienation are questions 
of namelessness, rootlessness, homelessness, and unhomeliness. They are, in other words, questions of 
constitution and belonging in the terms I have so far laid out. A close reading of Du Bois’s constitution 
vision reveals that the resolution of the latter questions rested on three pillars: (i) the struggle to 
overcome the internalised condition of alienation which manifests in a doubled and thus divided 
consciousness; (ii) the quest to valorise “Negroness,” and subsequently Pan-African identity; and 
concurrently (iii) campaigns for constitutional and international law reforms to reconstitute the world 
in order to guarantee, in practice, universal citizenship rights. The first two pillars are interlinked in that 
a subjugated person can only overcome liminality and double consciousness when he or she refuses 
assimilation and thus self-renunciation. This move is dependent on a revalorisation of “Negroness” that 
is shown to not be inferior, or superior, to any race or identity. Having reclaimed his or her own 
humanity as a self-conscious person (the ‘what’ imperative), a subjugated but coming-into-self-
consciousness person would then be in a position to persecute the struggle against enforced racialisation 
and concomitant pariahdom. Only then could the exiled person be in a position to assert equal 
belongingness as a citizen of the world (the ‘who’ exigency).  
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I aim to undertake two tasks in the rest of this section. First, I will take what I regard as the three pillars 
of the Du Boisian manifesto – disalienation, rediscovery and valorisation of group identity, and the 
struggle to remake the world– in turns in order to tease out the Du Boisian legacy. Secondly, I will 
outline what I regard as the pitfalls of the Du Boisian manifesto. My main contention will be that 
although Du Bois’s tripartite gesture of belonging and constitution is valuable, and perhaps 
indispensable; in execution, Du Bois bequeathed to Pan-Africanist leaders a model of a philosopher-
king constitutionalist.  
 
2.2.2.1 The first pillar of the Du Boisian manifesto: overcoming psychic alienation and regaining 
personhood 
 
Du Bois’s first insight was that behind-the-veil people lack self-consciousness because they have 
internalised racist stereotypes about themselves. In Du Bois’s own case, he was not conscious of the 
material reality of the veil when he was growing up. He recalled that, “the colour line was manifest and 
yet not absolutely drawn” (Lewis, 1993: 18). His initial reaction to the awareness that he existed behind 
the veil was not to try to dismantle the veil or to assimilate into the world beyond the veil. Instead, he 
sought to soar high above ‘the veil’ by living, “above it in a region of blue sky and great wandering 
shadows” (Du Bois, 1986a: 364). This precocious black boy graduated at the top of his predominately-
white high school class, received his first degree at a leading black university (Fisk University), and 
was admitted to Harvard University. However, Du Bois will later realise that this transcendental posture 
- beyond supine assimilation and maddened insurgency - was quixotic and actually perpetuating of 
worldlessness. Du Bois confessed that this was the case because, “…for the worlds I longed for, and all 
their dazzling opportunities were theirs, not mine” (1986a: 364. My emphasis). The lived experience of 
daily racial slights, denial of life opportunities and of being prohibited from using certain public 
amenities forced Du Bois to realise that he was just a highly educated person still imprisoned within 
and by the veil. 
 
This realisation brought about another awareness. The awareness was that the experience of being 
interned on the underside of the world came with its own advantages. Specifically, this positionality 
and subjectivity proved advantageous for the elaboration of inventive solutions regarding the 
(re)constitution of society. This is because a person who exists behind the veil is gifted with an ability 
to see the world from a unique perspective. Du Bois described this gift as a gift of “second sight” 
(1986a: 364). As I will demonstrate throughout the course of this dissertation, ‘second sight’ is an 
indispensable instrument for voyages of disalienation and for projects of world de-constitution and 
(re)constitution. This is because ‘second sight’ serves both external and internal functions. Externally, 
this gift facilitates a re-evaluation of the world from its margins and borders. Such a standpoint can 
enable the racial melancholic to realise that what he or she thought he or she has lost and what he or 
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she assumed he ought to desire is in reality repugnant. Such a realisation can lead to an elaboration of 
a post-assimilationist constitution vision. Internally, and related to this external function, ‘second sight’ 
can empower the racialised figure to recognise that their consciousness is structured by the white gaze 
and its anti-black colonialist discourse. Such a recognition may cause a racialised person to appreciate 
that his or her “self-apprehension” is, to a significant extent, determined from without. More 
importantly, such an understanding makes it possible for the subjugated person to realise that politics 
of race consciousness are nonsensical because race consciousness, at this juncture, may be a 
consciousness that is imposed from without. Consequently, to overcome racial melancholia and to attain 
self-conscious personhood a subjugated person would need to cease seeing himself or herself through 
the gaze of the dominant world. The first task in the struggle for constitution and belonging is thus the 
twin striving for disalienation and attainment of self-consciousness.  I propose this task as the first pillar 
of the Du Boisian manifesto for constitution and belonging.  
 
Du Bois suggested that one way of sharpening ‘second sight’ is via education. It should, however, be 
obvious that if the main route towards bringing this potential gift to fruition is through (hegemonic 
forms of) education and pedagogy, then ‘second sight’ is itself a double-edged sword. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, this is because formal education and dominant pedagogy are often geared towards 
entrenching the internalisation of colonialist discourse. The route of education could, therefore, lead to 
further psychic alienation and loss of identity. Despite these risks, Du Bois’s life journey indicates that 
this route has the potential to enable a person of divided consciousness to overcome internalised 
inferiority, attain self-conscious selfhood, and begin to realise that to belong to the world he or she must 
be himself or herself. Indeed, Du Bois found that the long journey of education, “…at least gave leisure 
for reflection and self-examination; it changed the child of Emancipation to the youth with dawning 
self-consciousness, self-realisation, self-respect” (Du Bois, 1986a: 368). “In those sombre forests of his 
striving,” Du Bois continued, “his own soul rose before him, and he saw himself – darkly as through a 
veil; and yet he saw in himself some faint revelation of his power, of his mission” (Du Bois, 1986a: 
368). That mission was that he would need to rediscover himself if he was stage full belonging to the 
world (ibid.). From this disalienated standpoint, the racialised figure can then begin the process of 
identity-formation, and consequently, be in a better position to prosecute the struggle to de-constitute 
the world. 13  
                                                        
13 This move can also be discerned in Aimé Césaire’s A Tempest (1969); a rewriting of Shakespeare’s The 
Tempest. Césaire’s Caliban deploys ‘second sight’ to refuse the lie of colonialist discourse, to come back to 
himself, and thus initiate the process of decentering his subjugator:  
Prospero, you’re a great magician: 
you’re an old hand at deception. 
And you lied to me so much, 
about the world, about myself, 
that you ended up by imposing on me 
an image of myself: 
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2.2.2.2 The second and third pillars of the Du Boisian manifesto: Inventing group identity and 
(re)constituting the world 
 
Black people’s historical experiences of homelessness, unhomeliness, namelessness, and rootedness 
impel them towards quests to reconfigure their group identity. As we saw in the section above, this was 
the inspiration behind Mbeki’s projects of self-definition and rebirth. In this reconfiguration, blackness 
or Africanness move from being an imposed niggerised or kaffirised identity towards a proud, self-
asserted identity. Paget Henry explains the necessity for this move as well as the link between the first 
and the second pillars in the following words: 
DuBoisian double consciousness results from the Africana subject having to exist for a self-
consciousness that racialised itself as white…With regard to the psyche, the new division was created by 
the shattering and contesting of the “We” or the collective identity of the Africana subject. It was 
shattered by the caricature image of “the negro” as the polar opposite of “the white” that existed and 
continues to exist in the mind of the European and the Euro-American (Henry, 2006: 6). 
  
It, therefore, becomes imperative for the becoming-self-conscious person to resist and disavow an 
imposed group identity. This refusal must necessarily involve an invocation of a proud history of 
immemorial belonging-in-the-world and of being a co-contributor to human civilisation. Similar to the 
move Césaire’s Caliban enacts in A Tempest, the aim of such an undertaking is to implode an 
internalised sense of inferiority, historical invisibility, and ‘nobodyness’. As I will demonstrate 
throughout this dissertation, a proud group identity can be homely and world-securing. Relatedly, I will 
show that an evocation of a particular, but not particularised, group consciousness is indispensable to 
the projects of homemaking, of forging a creolising national consciousness, and eventually for an 
elaboration of a global consciousness and belonging.  
 
Let us come back to Du Bois. In the period between the late 1800s and the early 1900s, Du Bois 
deployed the fruits of ‘second sight’ to realise the three pillars of his vision of constitution and 
belonging. After PhD studies and intense periods of personal transformation in the USA and in 
Germany, Du Bois felt empowered enough to declare that he had discovered his “manhood”. He 
subsequently made it his mission to “uplift” the black race and to forge Pan-Negro consciousness. The 
publication and reception of The Souls in 1903 brought Du Bois to national prominence. In that same 
                                                        
underdeveloped, in your words, undercompetent 
that’s how you made me see myself!  
And I hate that image…and it’s false!  
But now I know you, you old cancer,  
And I also know myself! (Césaire, 1992: 64). 
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year, he published a programme outlining the responsibility of educated/“college-bred” Negroes. In this 
essay, “The Talented Tenth”, he insisted that black educated people should, “…be made leaders of 
thought and missionaries of culture among their people” (Du Bois, 1986d: 861). In 1904 he published 
“Credo,” his second landmark statement of belonging and constitution. Du Bois’s “Credo” was a 
rejection of Booker Washington’s strategy of gradual racial equality, a reiteration of his belief in the 
existence of two equal races which, however, are “made of one blood,” and a proclamation of his belief, 
“…in pride of race and lineage and self”. Du Bois also went on to assert the non-negotiable “Negro 
demand” for universal political and civil rights to enable the full integration of black Americans into 
the USA polity.  
 
To fulfil this vision, in 1905 Du Bois organised the first USA-based civil rights movement of the 
twentieth century in the form of the Niagara Movement. He also began putting together plans for 
Encyclopaedia Africana from 1909 with the intention of bringing together his civil rights campaign 
work with the work of achieving historical rediscovery, group consciousness, Pan-African awareness, 
and thus the affective upliftment of black Americans. He co-founded the National Negro Committee 
(later called the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, “the NAACP”) in 1909. 
In 1910, he became the NAACP’s Director of Publications and Research charged with editing the 
trailblazing and very influential Crisis: A Record of Darker Peoples magazine. He published The Negro, 
a sweeping study and a spirited defence of African and African-American history and civilisations, in 
1915. From 1919, Du Bois increasingly combined his national civil rights advocacy work and his pan-
Negro consciousness-raising project with that of Pan-African consciousness-forging and liberation. To 
this end, he took charge of organising Pan-African Congresses assuring his followers that the struggle 
of Africans on the continent and of people of African descent globally were linked in that the political 
liberation of the former is crucial for black American psychological confidence, spiritual belonging, 
and group consciousness (Lewis, 1993: 565). We can surmise that Du Bois’s sought to use his 
formidable intellect and moral courage to almost singlehandedly mould and valorise Pan-Negro and 
Pan-African identities and consciousness. He sought to deploy ‘second sight’ and the benefits of 
personal self-discovery to conscientise and to invent a proud black identity with the hope of reforming 
the USA and the world. The three pillars of Du Bois’s philo-praxis coalesced in this manner.  
 
However, Du Bois was not able to spark a mass movement, or in reality shape the racial consciousness 
of the majority of black Americans. The collapse of The Niagara Movement is an example of the 
limitation of Du Bois’s praxis. The Movement folded after only five meetings. Elliot M. Rudwick has 
argued that this organisation became defunct because, “the doctrine of the talented tenth…. isolated its 
members from the masses psychologically and ideologically and encouraged ‘an empyrean view’ of 
human rights…” (cited in Rampersad, 1990: 99). Transcultural elites’ assessment of human rights was 
empyrean because it was not premised on the idea that rights found in the constitution must be fought 
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for through mass mobilisation and direct actions. This view dovetailed with the Talented Tenth’s belief 
that positively enshrined rights and existing institutions were enough to secure the being-belonging of 
black Americans.  
 
2.2.3 The pitfalls of the Du Boisian manifesto  
 
2.2.2.1 The first critique of the Du Boisian manifesto: An assimilative vision  
 
This “empyrean view” reveals a crucial aspect of the Du Boisian manifesto, and it provides a source of 
my first critique. My first critique of the Du Boisian manifesto is that Du Bois and his fellow Talented 
Tenth travellers considered the USA, as country and as a polity, to be legitimate and desirable. For these 
civil rights agitators, all that was missing were processes of desegregation and integration. Hence the 
Movement made the following demand and affirmation in its in its 1906 Declaration: “We claim for 
ourselves every single right that belongs to a freeborn American…The battle we wage is not for 
ourselves alone but for all true Americans...” (cited in Lewis, 1993: 330). It is in this regard that Cornel 
West (1999: 97) discerns that one of the foundations of Du Bois’s political philosophy is “American 
optimism”. However, as Marcus Garvey (Du Bois’s bitterest rival in black quests for constitution and 
belonging) could have also pointed out, “American optimism – in the ugly face of American white-
supremacist practices – warrants, if not outright rejection, at least vast attenuation” (West, 1999: 99).  
 
My first critique in relation to what I regard as the third pillar of the Du Boisian manifesto 
((re)constituting the polity and the world) is, therefore, that Du Bois’s emancipatory vision was not 
driven by the exigency of overhauling the whole edifice that is the USA. Du Bois believed that robust 
moral and intellectual critiques of racism and segregation, an appeal to the conscience of white liberals, 
and legally-sanctioned demands for civil and political rights would reform the polity and terminate the 
exilic status of black Americans. My contention is that such a constitution strategy is one marred by 
racial melancholia. Racial melancholia assails individuals who grew up thinking that they are of the 
white world or those who believed in promises of assimilation into whiteness. From the previous chapter 
,we would recall that racial melancholia is a concept that David L. Eng and Shinhee Han borrow from 
Freud’s elaboration of the distinction between mourning and melancholia. Freud explained that grief 
that is impelled by melancholia is unending because the patient knows the object that he or she has lost 
but does not know what exactly he or she has lost. Freud determines that what the patient has actually 
lost is the inner world of the psyche. Fanon invoked the example of the fictional character of Jean 
Veneuse to make sense of the ‘inner melancholia’ of these individuals. For Fanon, these ‘black skin-
white mask’ figures suffer from internal alienation and external exile that manifest in a condition of 
abandonment neurosis. Finally, Freud and Fanon highlight the fact that these individuals are unable to 
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“reconstruct the world” because they are saddled with a persistent form of ambivalence as far as the 
object of grief is concerned.  
 
As I have discussed in preceding passages, members of the Talented Tenth exhibited ambivalence as 
far as the hegemonic USA world was concerned. To be sure, the hyper-awareness of being Marginal 
and Invisible Men motored the constitution and belonging visions of these elites. The contention here 
is that, similar to their New Africans successors, the problematic of invisibility was the premier 
grievance of these transcultural leaders. To be explicit, my critique here is that the emancipatory vision 
of Du Bois and his fellow black elites was geared towards the being-belonging of black hybrid-liminal 
individuals. In this regard, commenting on the mainstream society’s embracing of Ellison’s The 
Invisible Man James Baldwin (2014: 147) asks: “Invisible to whom? Are we [black people] invisible to 
one another?” Understood from that perspective, as Baldwin (2014: 107) further implies, subjugated 
people who are obsessed with their felt experience of invisibility have as the horizon of their striving 
assimilation into a shallow and ethically-corrupt American life. Applying this to our critique, we may 
say that the message here is that Du Bois and the Talented Tenth’s constitution vision and terms of 
belonging flowed from their marginal existence and obsession with their own sense of invisibility.14 
Theirs vision, similar to that of amakholwa and their grievance against the ‘segregation fallacy,’ was a 
reactive constitution vision emerging out of the liminal world.15 The contention here is that the telos of 
their constitution vision was less radically to (re)constitute society but to be visible in the dominant 
world.  
 
The failure to elaborate a decolonial third pillar is linked to the failure, or reluctance, to reckon properly 
with the second pillar - the valorisation of actually-existing forms of belonging and identity of the 
‘masses’ of subjugated people. Such a reckoning would enable an expansion of the emancipatory vision 
beyond elitist quest for recognition, visibility and integration into mainstream society. Following from 
this, it is clear that a prerequisite for realising all these three pillars is the willingness to reach beyond 
‘second sight’. That is to say that if ‘second sight’ contributes to individual processes of disalienation 
and self-reclamation of personhood, an additional sight is required to contribute to the valorisation of 
group identity. An augmentation of ‘second sight’ would enable popular-democratic quests for the 
                                                        
14 Thus in the afterword to Larry Neal and LeRoi Jones’ (editors) Black Fire: An Anthology of Afro-American 
Writing (1968) Neal conceded that Invisible Man is a profound piece of writing. However, he went on to protest 
that the novel had only minimal resonance with the actual world of black people: “we know who we are, and we 
are not invisible, at least not to each other. We are not Kafkaesque creatures stumbling through a white light of 
confusion and absurdity” (cited in Rampersad, 2007: 452).  
15 During the height of the flowering of Black Consciousness poetry in 1970s South Africa, Mafika Gwala (2009: 
95) similarly sneered that, “Ralph Ellison lived a marginal existence with his white friends and came out with the 
idea he was an ‘invisible man’”.   
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reconfiguration of group identity and an elaboration of a radical de-constitution and constitution agenda. 
Moreover, as we shall later see, popular-democratic quests are routes toward national consciousness 
and nation-becoming.  
 
The first function of insurrectionary potentiation of ‘second sight’, to use Paget Henry’s characterisation 
(2012: 79), is, therefore, that such a potentiation shifts the strivings of historical subjugated people from 
a demand for “absorption” into the extant world (see the 1906 Second Declaration of Principles of the 
Niagara Movement) towards a popular and democratic struggle to end the world and its various abyssal 
lines. Henry (2006: 8) suggests that one way of achieving what he calls “potentiated second sight” or 
potentiated double consciousness is, “…through the recovery of a significant measure of first sight, that 
is, the ability to see oneself as an African as opposed to ‘the negro’ that the white mind was constantly 
producing and projecting”. Therefore, whereas the first pillar (overcoming internal alienation) is 
realised through enlivening the gift of ‘second sight’ through further formal education; the route 
towards achieving potentiated double consciousness is through staging a return to Africanness or 
Negroness. As I discussed in the introductory chapter, this two-fold gesture (overcoming liminality and 
double-consciousness and staging a ‘return’ to home-culture) also powers the constitution and 
belonging visions of all movements for rebirth of the African world.  
 
2.2.3.2 The second critique of the Du Boisian manifesto: A salvationist forging of group identity 
 
This brings us back to the riddle that is Du Bois. Similar to the roots and routes question that Countee 
Cullen asks of his “Heritage” (1925),16 Du Bois will later, in Dusk of Dawn (1940), wonder what Africa 
is to him. For our purposes, we need to take a prior step and ask: when Du Bois propagated for 
Negroness in the context of his proposal of a hyphenated identity, to what extent was he recovering his 
‘first sight’? Put differently, in addition to asking what “America” is to Du Bois, we must first ask: what 
was Negro to/in Du Bois?  
 
Firstly, we would recall that Du Bois claimed not to feel or experience the effects of the “colour line” 
when he was growing up. Du Bois (1986b: 638) also described the surrounding culture of his childhood 
                                                        
16 In the opening stanza of this poem, Cullen (2005: 1443) – a prominent protagonist of the movement of Harlem 
Renaissance of the 1920s and, for a time, Du Bois’s son-in-law – poses the question in the following manner: 
What is Africa to me: 
Copper sun or scarlet sea, 
Jungle star or jungle track, 
Strong bronzed men, or regal black 
Women from whose loins I sprang 
When the birds of Eden sang? 
One three centuries removed 
From the scenes his fathers loved, 
….What is Africa to me?  
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as, “…not African so much as Dutch and New England”. Furthermore, as David L. Lewis (1986: 53) 
points out in the first of his magisterial two-volume biography of Du Bois, in all his autobiographies 
Du Bois has little to say about the black community from whence he came. It is as if black people were 
a mystery to him. For instance, Du Bois recounts that he was repelled by the frenzy and outpouring of 
images when he visited a black church whilst a student at Fisk. As Cornel West (1999: 91) observes, it 
was as if Du Bois was, “an anthropologist visiting some strange and exotic people.” For his part, Du 
Bois (1986a: 681) confessed that formal education and social ambition engendered feelings of 
superiority in educated black people versus other black people.  
 
Secondly, Lewis’s (1993: 148) insistence that Du Boisian scholars ought to forefront Du Bois’s “proud 
hybridisation” is a very significant intervention. Du Bois was proud of his mixed ‘racial heritage’. Thus 
when Du Bois applied for a grant to study in Germany he inserted a post-script explaining that he forgot 
to mention that he is, “…one half or more a Negro, and the rest French and Dutch” (cited in Lewis, 
1986: 107, 120). In Darkwater: Voices from the Veil the fifty-year-old Du Bois foregrounded his hybrid 
origins announcing that he was born with, “a flood of Negro blood, a strain of French [and] a bit of 
Dutch…” (cited in Lewis, 1993: 26). What we have here then is a profile of a person who did not 
identify with a specific race. To be sure, there is nothing wrong with taking pride in “racial 
hybridisation”. What is of significance is not only that Du Bois did not regard himself as belonging to 
the world of ‘the black race”. The fact of the matter is that he held this world in slight derision. When 
he cast his eyes upon this world he saw, in contradistinction to the world of “the white races”, a mass 
of ignorance, disease and inefficiency in governance (Du Bois, 1986a: 681-682). As Cornel West points 
out, in Du Bois’s epoch-making work, The Souls, “…there are eighteen references to ‘black, backward, 
and ungraceful’ folk, including a statement of his intent to scatter civilisation among a people whose 
ignorance was ‘not simply of letters, but of life itself”” (West, 1999: 90).   
 
The point here is that Du Bois’s appropriation and forging of Negroness was a reaction to rejection. His 
was an identity forged from within the liminal world of invisibility. Indeed, it was only in college that 
Du Bois became a Negro. At Fisk University Du Bois came across proud smart boys of, “my own 
world” (cited in Lewis, 1986: 64). “Henceforth,” Du Bois professed, “I was a Negro” (cited in Lewis, 
1986: 72). From that moment onwards, Du Bois developed a quasi-religious faith in his race (Lewis, 
1986: 66). Understood in this way, Du Bois’s missionary zeal with regards to the task of valorising 
black identity was a compensatory gesture that emerged from feelings of and a lived experience of 
estrangement from ordinary black people (Rampersad, 1990: 88). It would seem, therefore, that Du 
Bois’s fashioning of the second pillar was driven by feelings of melancholia and abandonment. These 
feelings had, indeed, caused what he identified as a nagging sense of “spiritual isolation” (cited in 
Lewis, 1993: 55-56).   
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The point of this excursion into Du Bois’s Negro-becoming is to, first of all, propose that Du Bois’s 
blackness was impelled by racial melancholia. Secondly, and more importantly, this excursion is 
important because it enables me to make the case that this locus of enunciation constrained the frame 
of Du Bois’s proposal for hyphenated identity and belonging. One pole of this proposed third path 
(American in Negro-American) was an external identity forged by mainstream society to the exclusion 
of black Americans. The other pole (Negro in Negro-American) was an invention and a conception 
framed by black American elites. Their locus of enunciation was thus a liminal space that E. Franklin 
Frazier in his famous study of The Black Bourgeoisie (1965: 25) called a “world of make-believe”. It 
was thus Negroness alien to the one conceived and daily performed by “un-uplifted” black Americans. 
Finally, this was a group identity that Du Bois and the Talented Tenth figured would arise - and be 
worthy of recognition, acceptance, and integration - after transcultural black elites had cleansed it of its 
backwardness and uplifted it to the standard of “American civilisation”. My second critique of the Du 
Boisian manifesto, is therefore, that Du Bois’s elaboration of the second pillar was based on an elitist 
and salvationist fashioning of group consciousness.  
 
Given the above, Arnold Rampersad’s (1990: 87) conclusion that in the early twentieth century Du Bois 
was “profoundly accomodationist” than even Booker T. Washington is a fair assessment. To 
Washington’s declamation of the degradation of black art and spirituality, Du Bois added culture and 
proclaimed that black culture could only be elevated by the Talented Tenth (ibid). West (1999: 89) thus 
assesses that, “Du Bois was first and foremost a black New England Victorian seduced by the 
Enlightenment ethos and enchanted with the American Dream”. “In short”, West (1999: 90) continues, 
“[Du Bois] was reluctant to learn fundamental lessons about life – and about himself – from [ordinary 
black people]”. Ultimately then, Du Bois and his Talented Tenth contemporaries had limited faith in 
the capacity of ordinary black people to organise and to elaborate strategies to de-constitute and 
(re)constitute the world. Rather, the Talented Tenth, similar to their New African counterparts, 
harboured notions of the civic and social immaturity of ordinary Africans in the USA and in Africa 
(Lewis, 2000: 114). We need to pause and absorb a crucial insight here regarding the connection 
between the third and second pillars, and thus the connection between my first and second critiques: an 
integrationist agenda in respect of the third pillar (reconstituting the polity) always goes together with 
an attitude of denigrating the life-worlds of the majority of the “un-uplifted” subjugated peoples. This 
is the most adverse outcome of the aforementioned incapacity to deepen ‘second sight’ and develop it 
into ‘first sight’.  
 
What is the relevance of this biographical discussion for questions of constitution and belonging in 
Africa? It bears repeating that, after he displaced Washington and Garvey, Du Bois became the USA’s 
leading black public intellectual and leader in the first half of the twentieth century. Through his 
political leadership of numerous civil rights organisations and via his fiction and non-fiction writings, 
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Du Bois sought to mould and evoke Negroness and to articulate a framework for Pan-Negroness. 
Moving from this standpoint, in his convening of Pan-African Congresses, a task in which he threw 
himself with commendable dedication, he called forth and framed Pan-Africanness. It is not by accident 
that Du Bois was widely regarded as a sort of a “Pan African Moses” (Lewis, 1993: 8).  
 
To some extent, Du Bois’s social elitism, the optimism he conferred on the extant world, and 
concomitantly his fetishisation of the USA Constitution and existing international law instruments were 
replicated in the constitution praxis of Pan-Africanism. Similar to the Niagara Movement and the 
NAACP, Du Bois’s Pan-African Congresses were, “…upper class in structure and piecemeal in agenda” 
(Lewis, 2000: 114). On the one hand, declarations of Pan African Congresses were radical in that they 
highlighted and condemned colonial excesses and demanded civil and political rights for colonised 
peoples. On the other hand, as is clear from the Second Manifesto of the Pan African Congress, this 
gathering of elite black people moved from the premise that African elites needed to uplift, 
“…backward and suppressed groups” (cited in Rampersad, 1990: 153).  
 
2.2.3.3 The third critique of the Du Boisian manifesto: Attachment to colonialist discourse and a 
reiteration of a world of apartness  
 
Two main deleterious consequences flow from a top-down conceptualising of Negroness and 
Africanness. The first consequence is a salvationist conceptualisation of group identity. A salvationist 
conceptualisation negates the project of crafting group consciousness from below and from a diverse 
set of individuals and sectors. I have already dealt with this consequence in preceding passages. The 
second pitfall of an elitist approach to group identity is the danger of an absolutist understanding of 
racial and cultural identities. This is my third and final critique of the Du Boisian manifesto. My 
contention here is that an absolutist conception of identity is an outcome of a failure to cultivate 
potentiated double consciousness and to learn from non-liminal people’s performance of their identities. 
As I will show, an absolutist conceptualisation of group identity runs contrary to the lived experiences 
of creole identities among non-elite black people in the USA and of cultural syncretism in Africa.  
 
In one of the earliest incisive studies of the origins of Pan-Africanism, Collin Legum (1965:16) 
confirmed that Pan-Africanists struggle with ambivalence and that, “this spirit of ambivalence 
proclaims the inability of Negroes to disengage themselves from the West, even for those who feel their 
rootlessness within its society”. I contend that this inability extends to an apparent inability to 
completely disengage from a discourse that considers “the black race” and “the white race” distinct and 
antithetical identities. By this I mean that even in the process of forging group belonging to overcome 
rootlessness and namelessness, the racial melancholic is ambivalent about delinking from the 
framework of a discourse that has historically moulded his or her identity. More pertinently, an inability, 
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or unwillingness, to take a distance from colonialist discourse leads to an ambivalent response to the 
question whether people of African descent are part of a shared humanity or whether they are a people 
unique and apart – inhabitants of a so-called Black World.  
 
In the case of Du Bois, he made speeches, wrote books and staged theatre performances that 
demonstrated “Negro contribution” to civilisation. This was part of his project of moulding a proud 
Negro consciousness. However, as we saw above, Du Bois and members of the Talented Tenth 
configured Negroness at a distance from the lived experiences of non-liminal black people. The 
Negroness that Du Bois fashioned was thus for most part an essentialist identity based on irreconcilable 
differences between the “black race” and the “white race”. This essentialism often extended to the idea 
that each race has, or should have, a distinct and coherent consciousness. This understanding can be 
discerned even after the methodological shifts that Du Bois undertook after “The Conservation”. 
Indeed, Du Bois’s (1986a: 365) assertion that the ends of the spiritual strivings of a fragmented person 
would be when he or she merges his or her “double self into a better and truer self” is an intimation that 
Du Bois did not accept the possibility of edifying doubleness. As Doris Sommer (2005: 175) has 
persuasively argued, it would seem that for Du Bois, a “truer self” would be a self with a “coherent 
consciousness” rather than a self endowed with a consciousness that dwells in the tension of hyphenated 
consciousness. Furthermore, it would appear that Du Bois’s ‘truer self’ is also not a self whose 
consciousness is a product of the amalgamation of two streams of consciousness. Thus while Du Bois 
sometimes declared that black people are part of the American society and that they have contributed 
to the constitution of “American” identity he often spoke as if black Americans’ double inheritance is 
a problem. Ernest Allen (1997: 51. Original emphasis) thus regrets that,  
…rather than celebrating an authentic ‘dual consciousness’ as a tool for achieving enriched cultural or 
political synthesis, or as a platform for generating multiple levels of understanding – in other words, as 
a potential solution in whole or in part – Du Bois treated the question of “twoness” chiefly as a (real or 
imaginary) problem, even as he affirmed the desirability of preserving certain of its (unspecified) parts.  
 
As is well known, this disavowal of dual consciousness is one of Du Bois’s enduring legacy. This legacy 
can be detected in the work of black cultural activists who are vexed with questions of cultural mimicry 
and group alienation. The founders of the USA Black Arts Movement exemplified this posture of 
renunciation. For example, Amiri Baraka [nee LeRoi Jones], one of the founders of this Movement, 
proposed that the de-constitution of the USA was impossible without the de-constitution of the self that 
the dominant USA world had produced. Thus writing of and writing off his earlier self, “LeRoi,” Baraka 
instructed his heir as follows: 
When I die, the consciousness I carry I will  
to black people. May they pick me apart and take 
the useful parts, the sweat meat of my feelings. And leave  
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the bitter bullshit rotten white parts  
alone (Baraka, 1991: 124).  
 
On the other hand, we find black existentialists who took a contrary view; even as they accepted notions 
of black invisibility and subjugation. For example, one of Ralph Ellison’s consistent themes was the 
imperative to embrace and celebrate black people’s ‘dual inheritance’. We find this insistence in 
Ellison’s brilliant 1963 rejoinder entitled “The World and the Jug”.  Ellison argued that whilst it is true 
that black people suffered oppression and institutionalised marginalisation, it did not follow that black 
people were hermeneutically sealed from the USA world by a steel jug. The main thesis advanced by 
Ellison (1995: 124) was that “Negro Americans” (his term) originated in and evolved in the USA. 
Consequently, Negro Americans’ had shaped mainstream USA culture, both borrowing from it and 
influencing it. The fact that ‘Negro Americans’ have been rendered invisible did not negate this point. 
Ellison (1995: 130-131), therefore, rejected Du Boisian double consciousness if by this it was meant 
that “Negro Americans” are so acculturated or alienated that they have forgotten who they are. More 
specifically, Ellison argued that ‘Negro Americans’ were less a racial group than a hybrid people who 
constituted a sub-culture of the USA society. Ellison was, therefore, dismissive of Black Nationalist 
tendency to denounce cultural hybridity and inter-culturality. Concomitantly, Ellison derided black 
militants’ commandment that black people must search for and recover a pure Negro consciousness or 
value system. He (1995: 123) charged that instead of accepting the inherent hybridity of the USA 
experience, race consciousness writers imposed an image of a “prefabricated negroes” that did not exist 
in reality. For our purposes, it is clear that this imposition flows from a failure to develop ‘third sight’ 
or to recover first sight as proposed by Paget Henry and Amílcar Cabral.17 As far as Du Bois is 
concerned, on the one hand he celebrated the gift of ‘second sight’ as one of the advantages of existing 
in a liminal space. On the other hand, he seemed to disavow both in-betweenness and duality.  
 
Although Du Bois was not a racial purist and an anti-mulatto, in his political praxis, not social life, he 
seemed to believe that cultural hybridity and dual consciousness would lead to non-belonging and 
spiritual unhomeliness. Thus whatever political differences separated Du Bois and Garvey, ultimately, 
both leaders, “…saw the world as comprising separate cultures, each reflecting a distinct heritage and 
demanding freedom of expression” (Rampersad, 1990: 149). In the case of Du Bois, he moved from 
                                                        
17 Recalling the comments in footnotes 14 and 15 above, it is perhaps important to point out that Ellison’s avowal 
of double consciousness did not mean that he himself had recovered his ‘first sight’ and was striving for the radical 
de-constitution and (re)constitution of the USA. From a young age, Ellison self-consciously estranged himself 
from the world of black people. He was, in the words of the then exiled South African poet Keorapetse Kgositsile 
“the ‘original’ displaced man” (cited in Rampersad, 2007: 435). The resulting ‘inner melancholia’ might well 
explain Ellison’s inability to complete a second novel. Furthermore, as Cornel West regrets, “Ellison became such 
an American nationalist” (cited in Rampersad, 2007: 549). The point here is that there is thus no inherent 
contradiction between embracing dual consciousness and having assimilationist desires. Conversely, as we shall 
see, there is also no necessary contradiction between disavowing dual consciousness and harbouring integrationist 
desires.  
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asserting a ‘proud hybridisation’ to identifying with a particular race. It would seem that Du Bois’s 
insistence on apprehending dual inheritance as a poisoned chalice was an antagonistic riposte to 
mainstream USA society’s denial of his ‘proud hybridisation’. Light in complexion and a Europhile, 
Du Bois’s reaction to this rejection was to throw himself with religious fervour into racial 
consciousness. In “The Song of the Smoke” (1914) he would thus proclaim: “I will be black as 
blackness can/The blacker the mantle, the mightier the man!” (cited in Echeruo, 1992: 680).  
 
Du Bois suffused his Pan-Africanism with this predicament of double consciousness and hyper-
awareness of invisibility (Lewis, 2000: 39). His message to peoples of African descent intimated that 
they needed to demarcate clearly the cultural and racial differences between themselves and their 
colonisers. Such a delineation was necessary, so the argument went, if Black Folk were to overcome 
psychic alienation, cultivate a proud group consciousness, and thus be in a position to tear down the 
veils that rendered them invisible and subjugated. However, as George Ciccarieollo-Maher points out 
(2009: 380), doubleness and thus divided consciousness, “…is more acute among those who hold out 
the ultimately contradictory hope for the permeability of the veil”. These are Marginal Men in Eng and 
Han’s elaboration of racial melancholia. These liminal beings end up producing ‘prefabricated negroes’ 
who are the opposite of the lived reality of ordinary black Americans or Africans. On the one hand, 
these elites’ politics of otherness is a reaction to enforced racialisation and consequent feelings of being 
rootless, nameless, unhomely, and homeless. On the other hand, these leaders impose a consciousness 
and an identity on non-liminal people. This imposition is epistemic, psychic and spiritual violence 
against people who might not be experiencing feelings of invisibility, divided consciousness, and 
worldlessness. The most important point to note here is that aggressive alterity together with an 
absolutist conceptualisation of ‘race’ or ‘culture’ are symptoms of melancholia. These positions denote 
an ambivalence stance towards colonialist and racialist discourses. This has always been case when 
Africana people began formulate politics of otherness in the nineteenth century.  
 
To be sure, Du Bois’s own influential ideas about racial identity and racial and cultural belongingness 
had their roots in nineteenth century quests to valorise African culture and ‘the African Personality’. 
Du Bois’s indebtedness to the ideas of the originators of Pan-Africanism, such as Edward Blyden and 
Alexander Crummel, is evident in his writings on African civilisation and history. Du Bois also 
republished the writings of these two Pan-Africanists in Crisis. In 1909, he wrote a letter to Blyden 
requesting Blyden’s assistance for the compilation of Encyclopaedia Africana. In The Souls (1986a: 
512-520), he devoted an entire chapter to Crummel holding him up as a pioneer who constructed terms 
of belonging-in-the-world that black people could take pride in. In the rest of this section, I wish to 
show that one of the legacies of Du Bois’s Pan-Africanist precursors is an aggressive dependency upon 
colonialist discourses. I borrow the concept of “aggressive dependency” from Ali Mazrui. This is 
Mazuri’s (1977: 34-35) characterisation of a posture of an African epistemological and political rebel 
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who fails to develop an “autonomous African mind”. The dependency is aggressive because the 
militant’s attachment and conditioning by colonialist discourses appear in projects that profess to rebel 
against these discourses. My exploration of dominant forms of Pan-Africanism’s attachment to 
colonialist discourse relies on Anthony Appiah and V.Y. Mudimbe’s post-structuralist readings.  
 
Anthony Appiah has argued that Crummel’s (1819-1898), and thus Du Bois’s, valorisation of Pan-
African identity reiterates the colonialist discourse it seeks to rebel against. Appiah (1992: 3) contends 
that Crummel (a black American priest, politician and academic who was a missionary in Liberia and 
later returned to the USA to establish the first independent black independent Episcopal church) 
arrogated the right to speak for, act, and campaign on behalf of Africans because he insisted that Africa 
was the home of all Negroes. Crummel’s singular guiding vision was thus race and this vision guided 
his influential articulations on African nationalism, the unity of the “black race” and his call for black 
people in the diaspora to return to Africa. Crummel believed in the notion of racial purity, and together 
with Blyden, he set up a political party in Liberia to campaign against mulattos (Frenkel, 1974: 280). 
Appiah thus contends that these Pan-Africanists took their conception of blackness from the racist 
scientific conception of race that was in vogue in the late nineteenth century.  
 
Let us now turn to Edward Blyden (1832-1912). It was Blyden who first came up with what I regard as 
the early Du Bois’s unarticulated premise of and attendant racial politics of ‘distinct but equal’. Blyden 
(born to ex-slaves in Danish West Indies and died a statesman in Sierra Leone) was an outstanding 
intellectual of the black transnational world, a world he was the principal inventor of. Blyden formulated 
and promoted themes of black consciousness, black pride, African self-rule, pan-Africanism, and the 
contentious notion of “the African Personality” in books such as The Vindication of the Negro Race 
(1857), The Negro in Ancient History (1869), Christianity, Islam, and the Negro Race (1888), African 
Life and Customs (1908) (see Frenkel, 1974: 277; Mudimbe, 1988: 111, 122; 188; Neuberger, 1985: 
154). Blyden’s most enduring contribution to dominant forms of Pan-Africanism and Afrocentrism was 
his development of the ideology of radical alterity. Blyden developed this ideology in reaction to 
prevailing Eurocentric notions that Africans were signs of initial primitiveness. Blyden strongly rejected 
the ethnocentric thesis because it implied that races are proceeding on the same historical path, with 
other races playing catch up. The following passage sums up the influential foundations of Blyden’s 
philosophy:  
There is no absolute or essential superiority on the one side, nor absolute or essential inferiority on the 
other side. It is a question of difference of endowment and difference of destiny... The two races are not 
moving in the same groove with an immeasurable distance between them, but on the parallel lines…They 
are not identical, as some think, but unequal; they are distinct but equal (cited in Mudimbe, 1988: 118.  
Mudimbe’s emphasis). 
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As we can see, Blyden’s strategy was to escape the ‘inferiorisation’ of Africans by absolutising the 
differences between the Self and the Other. The strategy here is to discursively transport Africans from 
their position on the underside of the uni-verse/Euro-American world to their own universe, a Black 
World. Leopold Senghor, the first president of Senegal and one of three principal founders of the 
Négritude movement, expressed this move in poetic form: 
For myself I have nothing to fear I am before 
Adam I belong neither to the same lion 
nor to the same tree I am of another warmth and of another cold 
(cited in Irele, 2003: 40).  
 
From the Biblical to the zoological to the climatic, Senghor invoked and evoked all manner of figures 
and affects to overplay his dissimilarity in order to deny the charge that the African is a defective 
European. This was pivotal to his evocation and valorisation of négritudity. Senghor’s main inspirations 
in this regard were USA New Negro discourses as well as the ethnological research he read in Paris.  
 
In the case of Du Bois, although he was influenced by Crummel and Blyden he was erudite enough to 
attempt a move away from the unsustainable scientific conception of race that permeated his earlier 
articulations of blackness. Du Bois later attempted to ground the second pillar of his manifesto on a 
more socio-historical conception of Pan-Africanness. This change comes through in his Dusk of Dawn 
autobiography (1940). Du Bois now asserted that the ties that bind black people together was a common 
history of enslavement, colonisation, and racial discrimination (cited in Appiah, 1992: 40-41). This 
socio-historical conception is the premier basis for contemporary discourses of Pan-Africanism. Appiah 
is unimpressed by this basis. For Appiah, this conception still does not indicate that Pan-Africanists 
have delinked from colonialist discourse. The socio-historical explanation, Appiah (1992: 41-42) 
maintains, does not fully account for Du Bois choice to identify with Africans on the continent. To 
support his argument, Appiah marshals as evidence the same passage above wherein Du Bois sought to 
move away from the discredited scientific conceptualisation of race. In this passage, Du Bois added 
that “the heritage” of slavery and racial subjugation, “binds together not simply the children of Africa, 
but extends through yellow Asia and into the South Seas” (cited in Appiah, 1992: 40-41). This being 
the case, there is no reason why Pan-Africanists need to fashion their belonging and identification 
exclusively with Africa and ‘Africans’. Ultimately, these Pan-Africanists write as if they are forced to 
make a choice between Africa, on the one hand, and other suffering people, on the other.  Appiah 
surmises (1992: 42) that this ‘choice’ is imposed by the very racism Africans suffer from and struggle 
against. The main functions of this choice and identification (almost akin to Zionism) is to use race as 
a basis for moral solidarity and (following Blyden, Crummel, Martin Delany, Garvey and Du Bois) to 
argue that the slogan ‘Africa for Africans’ means that only Negroes/people of African descent can claim 
 78 
Africa as their home. Thus “Negro,” a category invented by ‘the white man’ to racialise and thus 
dominate “non-whites,” was given a central place in black quests for constitution and belonging.   
 
Mudimbe makes similar arguments in The Invention of Africa (1988). Mudimbe contends that from 
Blyden to post-colonial African leaders and theorists, African politics of otherness have sought to 
escape ethnocentric discourses by reinventing Africa and Africans as ‘distinct but equal’. Mudimbe 
(1988: x) shows that “African” discourses of otherness are ultimately based on what he calls the 
“colonial library;” namely, anthropological and Christian scholarship. In a follow up book, The Idea of 
Africa (1994: 52-55), Mudimbe demonstrates that the ‘colonial library’ was based on ethnological 
reason. Ethnology is a study of extracting, refining, and isolating types in society. The upshot of 
thinking from the colonial library is thus the view that Africanness and Europeanness are distinct, and 
even antagonistic, cultures and ways of being-in-the-world. More specifically, and more germane to the 
ultimate goals of colonialist discourse (production of “non-western” pariahdom and worldlessness), this 
dominant form of African alterity tends to answer the lie of colonialist discourse with another lie that 
ultimately disavows human affinity and global conviviality (Mbembe, 2012: 253).  
 
The intention behind dominant forms of African politics of otherness is, therefore, to forge African 
consciousness, and thus discursive and political self-determination, by purging (or more accurately, by 
proclaiming to purge) the European consciousness and heritage. This purging, a la Amiri Baraka (nee 
LeRoi Jones) above, is said to be integral to the realisation of the first and second pillars of a decolonial 
vision of constitution and belonging. The hope here is that politics of radical alterity would defeat the 
malady of double consciousness by averting colonialist epistemological ordering and discursive 
subjectivisation. Mudimbe and Appiah disagree. Mudimbe (1988: 79) counsels Africans to embraces 
the fact that western epistemologies and the traumas of slavery, Apartheid, and colonisation form an 
intractable part of Africa’s modern heritage. To renounce this multiple heritage is to impoverish oneself. 
Appiah (1992: 72), similar to Ellison above, also asserts that the quest to bracket off the colonial 
experience and the impact of cultural contact is a deceitful quest. Appiah and Mudimbe’s advice is that 
a vision and praxis that embrace these experiences and heritages is a much more powerful form of post-
colonial epistemological vigilance because it would avoid new forms of bad faith and self-denial.   
 
Appiah and Mudimbe’s proposals of pro-active synthesis thus transcend constitution and belonging 
visions that conceptualise ‘African renaissance’ and (re)constitution enterprises as quests for a 
‘coherent consciousness’. Appiah and Mudimbe proposals thus substitute the search for a supposedly 
originary “coherent consciousness” for one that Ngūgī (2012: 41) terms a “unified consciousness”. 
These proposals are in a sense, then, motored by an avowal of duality. That is to say that they are 
inspired by a need to embrace double consciousness in order to potentiate it. From this perspective, the 
desiratum to remember and re-member Africa ought to be driven by a mature and authentic programme 
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that recognises and embraces the fact that the modern African is an “inheritor of two worlds” (Ngūgī, 
2012: 41).18 From the perspective of constitution and belonging visions based on active synthesis 
attempts to eradicate western influences are thus misguided nativism. 19  
 
For purposes of my main thesis, as I will shortly show, nativism is itself a symptom of racial 
melancholia and thus an attitude of aggressive dependency on the west masked in militant language. 
The most serious consequence of nativism is that it ossifies and cages in African cultures and identities. 
Such an ossification reiterates colonialist praxis. From the previous chapter, we would recall that the 
settler constitutionalist produces “the native” during the course of settlerisation and the imposition of 
the Euro-modern world. “The native” is a creature expelled from history, frozen in time and space, and 
wedded to “tribal” customs and traditions. Such a humanoid is incapable of assimilating edifying 
influences from elsewhere. “The native” thus lacks transcendence and cannot evolve and ‘develop’. 
The point here is that what is often apprehended and invoked as “native culture” is often colonialist 
invention.20 As Nicholas B. Dirks (1992: 3) reminds us, colonialists deployed cultural technologies to 
conquer societies. Colonialists achieved this by reconfiguring conquered societies to create new 
categories and oppositions between the coloniser and the colonised, European and African, modern and 
traditional, West and East and so on. Therefore, it was the colonising structure that disarticulated the 
“chain of societies” to create distinct religions and ethnic groups (Amselle, 1998: xiii). This process led 
to what Paul Gilroy (1993: 2) terms “cultural insiderism” which is an over-integrated conception of 
culture based on immutable, ethnic differences.  
 
More to the point, nativism and its purging schemes are colonialist because they contradict the essence 
of African cultures and ontologies. In this regard, Mogobe Ramose (2007: 310-311) has shown that one 
of the fundamental differences between these cultures and Eurocentric cultures is the fact that the latter 
cultures are based on “bounded reasoning”. To valorise and protect identity from this perspective is to 
operate from, “…within completely closed and sealed boundaries [which] … do not allow for the 
possibility of change of identity resulting from external influences” (Ramose, 2003a: 142). In contrast 
to this, African humanness commands that African identities must be based on the logic of permeability 
of boundaries. Openness is mandatory because the fundamental philosophy uniting all cultures 
associated with Africa is the idea that to be a human being is to recognise the humanity of other persons 
                                                        
18 Or more accurately, as per Ali Mazrui’s self-explanatory book title The Africans: A Triple Heritage (1986), 
some Africans must work with the fact that they are inheritors of three worlds comprised of the indigenous world, 
the western world, and the Islamic world.  
19 Achille Mbembe (2002: 254) defines “nativism” as a mode of African self-writing that relies on a “metaphysics 
of difference” whose point of departure is that, “…Africans have an authentic culture that confers on them a 
peculiar self irreducible to that of any other group. The negation of this self and this authenticity would thus 
constitute a mutilation.” 
20 This is in addition to the fact that there is nothing originary about culture and tradition; they are always invented 
and reinvented from inside and outside.  
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and to establish human relations with them (Ramose, 2005: 272). A condition of possibility of being a 
human be-ing (Ramose’s appellation to emphasise the idea of perpetual motion and openness) is, 
therefore, to always be in the process of becoming by always reaching out of oneself and culture 
(Ramose, 2005: 41).  
 
Culture as a collective be-ing is thus also always in motion. The essence of an African way of life, is 
therefore, a repugnance towards stagnation, boundedness, completeness, and absolutism. The highest 
ambition of cultures associated with Africa is rather the attainment of cosmic harmony and wholeness. 
This is to say that the striving here is for humanness and Africanness rather than for humanism and 
Africanism. An important insight here is that because African humanness demands openness and 
wholeness, and because Africans are never in a “normative coma” even as exist under conditions of 
conquest (L. Gordon, 2015: 129), Africans remain Africans even when they adopt norms and values 
from those they encounter. This insight does not mean that cultures associated with Africa lack 
boundaries and hence distinctiveness. As Ramose points out in the context of African ontologies,  
the boundary… underlines the originary relationship of complementarity subsisting between the ‘I’ and 
‘the other’. In this way, ‘be-ing’ constitutes boundary as the recognition of the ineradicable network of 
complex relationships between and among beings; the ‘I’ and ‘the other’ as the human being and other 
beings as well. On this view, the community of ‘be-ing’ already exists in potency and is actualised by 
the concrete existence of diverse human and other beings on planet Earth, including the continually 
unfolding pluriverse (Ramose, 2013: 30. My emphasis). 
 
It could thus be concluded that absolutism and the search for ‘coherent consciousness’ and uniqueness 
are actually un-African. Jean-Loup Amselle has brilliantly demonstrated this insight in his very 
important book, Mestizo Logics: Anthropology of Identity in Africa and Elsewhere (1998). Amselle 
(1998: 1) contrasts ‘ethnological reason,’ or ‘bounded reasoning,’ with “mestizo logics,” which is “…a 
continuist approach that would emphasise an originary syncretism or lack of distinctness”. Amselle’s 
(1998: xiv) study shows, that contrary to colonialist and nativist understandings, African cultures are 
based on, “originary syncretism…mixture is originary”. The message here is that post-colonial 
constitution projects would be reflective of a decolonised consciousness only to the extent that they 
avoid the trap of ethnological reasoning. The projects of disalienation and liberatory group 
consciousness should thus aim to rediscover the lived experiences of openness and 
syncretism/‘syncretness’ (see also, Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991: 199-246). 
 
There are thus two broad arguments against manifestos of constitution and belonging that consider 
quests for rebirth and reclamation of a belonging-in-the-world to be impossible without the 
aforementioned purging and absolutising strategies. The first broad argument is that the disavowal of 
historical influences, cultural intermingling, and multiple heritages is unrealistic and impoverishing. 
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Such a disavowal is a reflection of what F. Abiola Irele terms “a pathology of alienation” (Irele, 1992: 
214) - in our terms, a symptom of racial melancholia. The second argument is that such putatively 
cultural revivalist projects are actually reflections of still colonised mindsets and a replication of 
colonialist praxis of constitution. This is because such projects reiterate the fiction of race and they 
negate the fundamental character of non-Eurocentric cultures in that they are based on bounded 
reasoning and cultural stagnation.  More importantly, these projects contradict the spirit and ethical 
prescription of African humaneness (contra ‘African humanism’).  
 
To sum up, the aim of this section was to demonstrate that Pan-Africanism has been the main vehicle 
that “New World” Africans have assembled in the context of having been rendered rootless, homeless, 
unhomed, and nameless. These ideology and vision were carried forward and adapted by spiritually and 
physically-exiled African elites in their struggles for visibility, belongingness, self-determination, and 
homemaking. In this regard, Du Bois’s triple gesture of disalienation, cultivation of group 
consciousness, and the (re)constitution of the world proved indispensable. I have been concerned to 
argue that African quests to overcome pariahdom and worldlessness would need to be vigilant not to 
repeat the pitfalls of the Du Boisian manifesto. Pan-Africanism would, therefore, need to be re-imagined 
into Pan-Africanness if it aspires to serve as a catalyst for African re-birth and African reclamation of 
belongingness-in-the-world as well as to the never-ending project of pluralistic world (re)constitution. 
Pan-Africanness is a third path beyond colonialist interpellation and nativist Pan-Africanism. This is 
the path that Thabo Mbeki sought.  
 
2.3 Pan-Africanism in the ‘new South Africa’: No Rebirth, No National Consciousness 
 
I would like to end this final chapter of Part I with an exploration of the influences of the Du Boisian 
manifesto on South Africa’s post-1994 (re)constitution project. This exploration will be guided by two 
questions. Firstly, why did South Africa’s project of constitution and belonging fail? Secondly, why did 
Mbeki’s third path prove to be a cul-de-sac? To recap the discussion in the introductory section above: 
having outlined the original sin in the constitution of South Africa in chapter one, my objective in the 
first section of this chapter was to demonstrate that Mbeki set for himself the task of ‘resurrecting 
Africa’ on all three planes of African belonging in the world, namely, the spiritual, the social, and the 
material. Towards this end, Mbeki sought to underwrite the ‘Final Constitution’ with a national 
ideology that would ensure collective self-discovery, rebirth, and the inculcation of a proud identity and 
consciousness. My conclusion in that section was that Mbeki’s “African Renaissance” programme 
proved incapable of terminating “native” pariahdom and worldlessness. In this section, I am concerned 
to investigate the reasons why Mbeki’s constitution and belonging vision and praxis re-enacted a world 
of apartness, and thus continuing strivings for constitution and belonging.  
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The previous section revealed that Pan-Africanism is an ideology of redemptive returns fashioned by 
black people in the ‘New World’. It was subsequently imported into the continent by transcultural 
Africans. Similarly, Mbeki’s African Renaissance was a philo-praxis of an outsider. The roots of 
Mbeki’s African Renaissance programme can be found in the observations he made when he came back 
from exile. Mbeki complained that black South Africans were a dislocated people. According to Mbeki, 
black people in South Africa were not only burdened with a slave mentality; they had also become a 
de-cultured people with no ethical framework. Going around South Africa, Mbeki claims to have come 
to the shocking realisation that, “these South Africans are not quite African, they’re European” (cited 
in Gevisser, 2007: 324). African Renaissance was thus Mbeki’s attempt to craft a national identity and 
to come up with a set of ethical norms for a people that needed to be reborn. In the rest of this section I 
aim to demonstrate that the reasons why this hope never materialised is because Mbeki committed the 
same mistakes that often derail the Du Boisian manifesto of constitution and belonging. To recap, I 
outlined three pitfalls of this manifesto: (i) an inability to elaborate a post-assimilationist de-constitution 
agenda due to the transcultural leader’s inability to take leave of the liminal world; (ii) a top-down 
conceptualisation of group, and eventually national, consciousness; and finally, (iii) a conceptualisation 
of identity that shows ambivalence towards colonialist discourses. I will proceed to take these pitfalls 
in turn. 
 
2.3.1 Mbeki’s failure to ‘return to the source’ and a top-down forging of national consciousness  
 
The geneses of Du Bois’s Pan-Africanism can be traced to his discovery that he lived in a ‘double 
environment’ and thus lacked a sense of belonging. Similarly, the inspiration behind Mbeki’s vision of 
constitution and belonging originate, ultimately, from his own sense of disconnection. Mbeki’s public 
justification for the imperative of African rebirth was that Africans in South Africa had become de-
cultured and deprived of a frame of reference. In truth, as he told his biographer, his programme of 
rediscovery and (re)constitution was inspired by both a sense of, “national and personal disconnection” 
(cited in Gevisser, 2007: 324). Mbeki’s sense of personal disconnection and his estrangement from 
home-culture began in his childhood. Mbeki’s parents conferred on him a sense of in-betweenness. 
Mbeki’s parents defied strictures of tradition, culture, and class: they came from two different ethnic 
groups; they shunned Christianity and church people even though they were also westernised and highly 
educated; and they did not partake in the qaba (the unconverted “raw natives”) lifeworld even though 
they lived with and interacted with Amaqaba (Gevisser, 2007: 6-7). Physically and culturally the 
Mbekis thus existed in an in-between world. They were, in Mark Gevisser’s (2007: 61) words, “…in a 
no man’s-land between the two cultures: they were able to mix in both worlds but belonged, ultimately 
to neither”. Furthermore, as he revealed to his biographer (Gevisser, 2007: 6-7), Mbeki’s feelings of 
homelessness and rootlessness were exacerbated by the fact that he was sent into exile. Mbeki’s exilic 
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condition began at the age of eight when his parents separated him from his siblings and send him to 
attend school in another town. The ANC later identified Mbeki as a future leader of a free South Africa 
and sent him to England for further education. He returned to South Africa after forty years in exile. 
This brief background shows that Mbeki’s personal background is one of liminal existence - physically, 
culturally, and perhaps, spiritually. Accordingly, while Nelson Mandela busied himself with the 
national project of reconciliation, Mbeki worried that individual and collective projects of post-colonial 
being-belonging and being-becoming would be impossible if Africans did not rediscover their historical 
belongingness and self-identity. Mbeki put in this way, “…unless we are able to answer the question: 
Who were we?, we shall not be able to answer the question: What shall we be?” cited in Gevisser, 2007: 
16).  
 
My contention that Mbeki’s African Renaissance was ultimately a striving for his own personal rebirth 
finds support in the fact that, “Mbeki first started talking about an ‘African Renaissance’ publicly at 
around the time he was ‘called back home’ by the elders of his clan” (Givisser, 2007: 18). At home, 
Mbeki’s elders narrated the history of his people from the nineteenth century up to then. His reaction 
was as follows: “why have we been distant from this fascinating history? It was never part of us, that 
kind of rootedness...I said: ‘I really must study all of this’” (cited in Gevisser, 2007: 7). It was this 
poignant encounter that provided the seeds of Mbeki’s agenda of constitution and belonging. 
 
To put it in Henry’s terms, Mbeki’s elders were, therefore, coaxing him to go beyond ‘second sight’ 
and to rediscover his ‘first sight’. This ‘first sight’ would enable Mbeki to reckon with his feelings of 
personal disconnection and thus re-suture with home-culture. Mbeki’s elders were thus inviting him to 
exit the liminal world and to ‘return to the source’. It is important to remember that ‘the [primary] 
source’ for Cabral is found amongst people who are not completely ensnared by western modernity. 
From Cabral’s perspective, as we saw in the previous chapter, the originators of Pan-Africanism never 
returned to ‘the source’ because their cultural revivalist praxis relied on the colonial library. In the case 
of Mbeki, Gevisser (2007: 728) reports that the cornerstone of Mbeki’s African Renaissance was Martin 
Bernal’s three volume study entitled Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilisation 
(1987-1991). Therefore, indigenous sagacity was not a source that Mbeki appealed to in order to retrieve 
“rootedness” and thus be able to enact a reclamation of belonging-in-the-world. Mogobe Ramose (2000: 
58) has thus also advanced the thesis that Mbeki’s project could not lead to the rebirth of Africa because 
Mbeki did not dip into the African counter-archive and the modern lived experiences of people not 
educated in the western paradigm. Ramose (2000: 56) thus charges that Mbeki’s African Renaissance 
programme was not an instantiation of rebirth because its gaze was still fixed on the North. Furthermore, 
and relatedly, Mbeki’s Pan-Africanist philosophy adhered to a linear conception of history: from the 
European Renaissance to the African Renaissance. In this regard, Maboge More (2002: 65) asks: “Can 
African self-understanding be explicated in terms of and using European categories such as 
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‘renaissance’?” Mbeki’s “northbound gaze” (Ramose, 2000: 58) can thus be regarded as evidence that 
Mbeki’s Africanism betrayed his ambivalence towards historicism and Eurocentric/colonialist 
discourses.  
 
It is no wonder, then, that Mbeki’s critics claimed that he was an alienated and alienating philosopher-
king. For his part, Mbeki, similar to Du Bois and Frederick Douglass (Rampersad, 1990: 172), regarded 
himself as a “prophet-in-the-wilderness” whose burden was to drag his nation towards (western?) 
modernity by adopting unpopular but correct policies (Gevisser, 2007: 735). Similar to Africana 
missionaries such as Blyden and Crummel, Mbeki returned from physical exile convinced that his 
manifesto of constitution and belonging will ‘resurrect the land’.  However, as Seitlhamo Motsapi notes, 
returning leaders such as Mbeki were actually still wedded to colonialist modes of constitution and 
governing. In the name of regeneration and modernisation, these “new blacks” imposed Euro-American 
schemes that heralded unhomeliness and led to dystopia: 
& so the new blackses arrive… 
from the fiery splash of pool 
 pits they preach us redamp 
  shun from the dust 
   of the old ways 
their kisses bite 
like the deep bellies of conputers 
the gravy of their songs 
smells like the slow piss of culculatahs.  
 
& so 
the new blackses arrive 
& promise us life beyond the bleed 
of the common yell 
they promise us new spring 
for the slow limp 
of our heads 
 
meanwhile 
the ladder finds the sky at last 
heart or herd slinks to the waters 
mbira grows into a synthesiser 
the songs ask for more sugar 
& my salt sets sail for babylon 
(Motsapi, 2002: 3).  
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We can thus conclude that Mbeki’s ‘African Renaissance’ presented the first two pitfalls of the Du 
Boisian manifesto: it was motored by a salvationist outlook; and as we saw in section one above, his 
constitution and belonging projects were ultimately integrationist and ineffectual in achieving his self-
declared goals of ending domestic and global apartheid. The final argument that I need to make is to 
show that Mbeki’s self-acclaimed third path reiterated the ‘distinct but equal’ discourse. This argument 
is indispensable to my argument that the ANC’s post-1994 vision of constitution and belonging reprised 
a world of apartness.   
 
2.3.2 Mbeki’s hybridisation as a discourse of ‘distinct but equal’ 
 
Mbeki declared his third path as follows:  
The Constitution whose adoption we celebrate constitutes an unequivocal statement that we 
refuse to accept that our Africanness shall be defined by our race, our colour, our gender or 
our historical origins (Mbeki, 1996: n.p.). 
 
 
With this refusal, Mbeki proposed to transcend both nativist and colonialist conceptions of identity. He 
thus sought to disarticulate the conjunction between race and belongingness. For Mbeki, the 
constitution’s opening statement that, “the Republic of South Africa is one…democratic state founded 
on the following values...non-racialism….” (Section 1(b)) as well as its entrenchment of cultural and 
religious freedoms was proof positive that being African in South Africa ought to be apprehended in a 
capacious manner. “Diverse people unite!” thus decrees the motto on the new national coat of arms that 
Mbeki unveiled on Freedom Day, 2000. Mbeki and other constitutionalists thus proclaimed that the 
‘final constitution’ does away with historical antagonisms relating to identity by giving birth to a 
“Rainbow Nation” – a hybrid nation. It would thus seem that Mbeki’s proposal was a proposal for 
rebirth and nation-becoming based on the principle of “originary syncretism”. I aim to show that such 
a supposition is incorrect.  
 
Firstly, Mbeki was incorrect to assert that the constitution decrees a de-racialised notion of Africanness 
or that the constitution does away with separateness based on identities. The fact is that the ‘final 
constitution’ recognises the existence of racial and distinct cultural categories. Under the imperative of 
recognising ‘cultural differences,’ the constitution entrenches freedoms and rights based on disparate 
and bounded cultural and religious identities. Furthermore, constitutionally-mandated legislation such 
as the Employment Equity Act of 1998 explicitly recognises the existence of “black people” for 
purposes of affirmative action programmes. Secondly, as Denis-Constant Martin (2006: 165) points 
out, Mbeki’s 1996 speech sought to overcome the old divisions of the past and to call forth a history of 
hybridity. However, Mbeki, “did so in a manner that still relied on the old vision of a society composed 
by the juxtaposition of discrete groups, the change being – and it was not small change indeed – that 
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they are now treated equally” (ibid. My emphasis). In any case, lawmakers understand the notion of 
hybrid nationhood in oppositionist terms. In this respect, section 1(b) of the Broad-based Black 
Economic Empowerment Act of 2013 elaborates that “black people” is a, “generic term which means 
Africans, Coloureds, and Indians”. Therefore, Africans are not “Coloureds” or Indians. Conversely, 
South Africans of Indian descent and “Coloured” people (a nefarious ‘racial’ category that includes 
Khoi and San people, and also people who are descendants of often violent sexual relationships between 
European colonists and indigenous peoples) are not regarded as African. Thirdly, in his own subsequent 
articulations it was clear that Mbeki conceived of Africanness as distinct from other South African 
identities such as South African Indianness, Coloured identity and European identity. Thus talking 
about the stubbornness of the “National Question”, Mbeki argued that this stubbornness, “…points to 
the amount of work we [Africans] still have to do in organising among the white community. To a 
certain extent the same reality applies to the Indian and Coloured communities” (cited in More, 2002: 
65).  
 
It is thus clear that South Africa’s post-1994 constitution and belonging manifesto was not based on 
“originary syncretism.” Rather, it was motored by a hybridisation impulse. The difference between 
“originary syncretism” and “hybridity” is that with hybridisation the assumption is that originally 
bounded and separate identities are blended together. The Rainbow Nation metaphor and Mbeki’s 
conceptualisation aptly illustrate this point. Hybridity thus denies the historical fact of miscegenation 
and cultural intermingling from the time European and other settlers came to the territory that will later 
become South Africa (Martin, 2006: 173). More importantly, the hybridity agenda does not constitute 
a rebirth because it is not faithful to the fact, as Ramose noted in the previous section, that the essence 
of African cultures and identities is that of opennness based on relations of complementarity with no 
beginning and not ending. It is in this regard that Martin, also relying on Amselle, proposes a new South 
African agenda of creolisation. The creolisation agenda is the opposite of Mbeki’s hybridisation agenda 
or even that of métissage because,  
both [hybridity and métissage] originally imply that pure and homogenous elements entered into a 
combination. They cannot accommodate a history of mankind made of métissages of métissages, of 
hybridisation of hybridities, in which there was never a beginning, never any barrier to blending and 
mixing (Martin, 2006 :169). 
 
The main problem with the hybridisation agenda is that its locus of enunciation is the liminal world. 
Hybridisation is thus an agenda of and for transcultural person. These are people who exist in Du Bois’s 
‘double environment’ and are thus homeless. As we saw above, such individuals tend to generalise their 
psychological and spiritual predicaments onto the entire group.  
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This point brings us an important limitation of Mudimbe and Appiah’s synthesis agenda. The 
“hybridisation solution” proposed by Appiah and Mudimbe does not address the fact that the colonial 
encounter bequeathed multiple heritages and also caused the forceful integration of Africa into the 
world system. It is this integration that is responsible for Africa’s current malaise and stagnation. Tsenay 
Serequeberhan (1993: 113) thus also argues that at the heart of the malaise gripping Africa is series of 
“non-traditional” pasticcio that were caused by the forceful insertion of Africa into the European world. 
Any post-colonial reconstitution agenda would have to deal with this pasticcio. Such an agenda would 
have to remember and re-member Africa and not simply dismiss the idea of an African identity as per 
post-modernist critiques. An agenda based on active synthesis as propagated by post-modernist 
theorists such as Mudimbe and Appiah could also defang struggles against de-worlding and for a 
pluriversal world. Additionally, the third path proposed by these transcultural elites only aims to 
hybridise the “reality” of the subjugated group while leaving the dominant pole intact. In contrast to 
this, the creolisation agenda seeks to change both poles and to affirm African-centered belonging to the 
world. Therefore, making a case for creolisation as opposed to hybridisation, Jane Gordon summarises 
the issue in this way:  
Although the insights borne of this position [exemplified by Bhabha’s hybridity and Gloria Anzaldúa’s 
bordercrossing] were thought to extend more generally to illuminating the process of disavowing the 
constructed nature of membership and belonging and the disciplining and repressive capacities of both, 
hybridity often became more closely associated the angst of specific individuals whose mediating role 
ironically reasserted the logic of pure, distinct groups through which they moved as a go-between. While 
the existential insight produced by this homelessness or permanent in-betweenness made for rich literary 
and philosophical reflection, it often was pitched against the spirit and forms of anticolonial and 
progressive politics that required, however open-endingly, defined collectivities through which people 
could struggle for more democratic conditions (J. Gordon, 2014: 6). 
 
To conclude, Martin’s proposal of creolisation, a process and not an identity, is a proposal that resonates 
with a proposal of remembering and re-membering Africa as Becoming. This vision is faithful to 
African humanness because it revalorises the principle of originary syncretism; the ‘hybridisation of 
hybridities’. More significantly, such a constitution and belonging vision answers to the African 
humanness’ prescription of always reaching out to attain be-ing-becoming and thus world-creation. 
Glissant would endorse such an understanding of syncretism based on what I have been calling African-
centered belonging-in-the-world. In the “Introduction to a Poetics of the Diverse,” Glissant (1999: 120) 
argues that, “to live a world-totality from the place that is one’s own means to establish a relation, not 
consecrate exclusion”. Martin’s synopsis of Glissant’s world-creation vision shows that this African 
humanness-aligned vision rejects both Pan-Africanism in its nativist and integrationist guises. Rather, 
Glissant’s poetics of Relation share affinities with Ramose’s proposal of African humanness-mandated 
quest for pluriversality:  
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A poetics of Relation answers the obligation to think in terms of worldness (mondialite) and not of 
globalisation (mondialisation): a universe that for the first time in history can be envisioned as 
inextricably multiple and one. The multiplicity of the world thought as mondialite accommodates 
individuals and specificities; it eliminates all contradictions between multiplicity and singularity… 
(Martin, 2006: 171). 21 
 
From the foregoing, we can understand why Mbeki’s Pan-Africanism and hybridity-based constitution-
making project did not facilitate nation-becoming or a ceaseless process of national consciousness or 
reclamation of belonging-in-the-world.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have been concerned with three main objectives: (i) to formulate the pillars of Du 
Bois’s very influential manifesto and its pitfalls, (ii) to set out the reasons for contemporary strivings 
for constitution and belonging in the ‘new South Africa,’ and (iii) to demonstrate that “post-Apartheid’ 
leaders such as Mbeki continued to struggle with racial melancholia and ambivalence. I have argued 
that Mbeki’s Du Boisian-influenced (re)constitution agenda presaged national atrophy, a generalised 
state of unhomeliness, and dearth of national consciousness and nation-becoming.  
 
Ultimately, Mbeki’s putatively radical agenda of African rebirth, de-racialisation of civil society and 
the economy as well as renewed integration of Africa into ‘the world’ betrayed his aggressive 
dependency on colonialist discourse. This is a symptom of racial melancholia.  Mbeki’s agenda was a 
third path only because it combined, rather than superseded, the constitution and belonging visions of 
both Pan-Africanist integrationists and nativists. This combination enabled black transcultural elites, 
for the first time in the history of South Africa, to overcome ‘the segregation fallacy’. These elites were 
thus able to cash in the assimilation cheque that was made out to them just before the constitution of 
South Africa in 1910. These transcultural elites were, and still are, thus able to make demands for their 
integration into the extant world on basis that they are “black” or “native” and should thus benefit from 
black economic empowerment schemes. In the meantime, the majority of black people remain wedged 
on the underside of “the new South Africa”.  
 
                                                        
21 In The Creation of the World or Globalisation, Nancy (2007: 61. Original emphasis) similarly proposes that, 
“what is necessary is a world that would only be the world of singularities, without their plurality constructed as 
a unitotality”. Of more relevance to my contention here is Nancy’s (2007: 109) further insistence that, “a world 
is a multiplicity of worlds, the world is a multiplicity of worlds”. This being the case it becomes necessary for 
Africans to assert the reality of an African world in the context where they are constantly being reminded that 
they ‘come from nowhere;’ or as Arendt puts it, that they exist in a ‘world of folly’.  
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I have argued that these neo-colonial outcomes should be located in the history of New African 
integrationist agenda. More specifically, these neo-Apartheid outcomes reflect the pitfalls of the Du 
Boisian manifesto of constitution and belonging; namely, an integrationist agenda that perpetuates a 
world of apartness; a top-down forging of collective identity and national consciousness that miscarries 
the project of forging post-colonial creolising national consciousness; and an attachment to colonialist 
discourse reflected in a reconfirmation of a ‘distinct but equal’ framework. The post-1994 re-
manifestation of a world of apartness - a world in which the minority belong and the majority continues 
to experience ‘Native Life in South Africa’ - is an outcome of an emancipatory vision that failed to 
‘resurrect the land’ on all three planes of African belonging-in-the-world. Part 2 of the dissertation puts 
forward counter-hegemonic constitution and belonging visions that, I argue, attempt to terminate the 
original sin in the constitution of South Africa and to elaborate post-Apartheid being-togetherness  
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PART 2 
 
CHAPTER 3: AFRIKAN HUMANNESS AND THE (RE)CONSTITUTION OF THE 
SPIRITUAL WORLD 
 
Ambivalence, ambivalence. Always having to maintain equilibrium. You walk with 
this double personality as a colonised man…. The pendulum swings between revulsion 
and attraction…Ambivalence [Es’kia Mphahlele, 1974]  
 
I am looking forward to the day when our culture will so much unify us…[w]e shall 
have absolutely no distinction, and we will stand together [Es’kia Mphahlele, 1955] 
 
 
Introduction  
 
I begin this Part with Es’kia Mphahlele’s prefigurative constitution-making praxis. By prefigurative I 
mean that Mphahlele’s praxis, as is the case with those of Biko and Abahlali, sought to enact post-
Apartheid forms of belonging and living even before the end of Apartheid. Mphahlele (1919-2008) was 
a writer of fiction, a journalist, a cultural activist and organiser, and above all, a teacher. Mphahlele’s 
vision of constitution and belonging was based on what he termed Afrikan humanness. The focus of his 
philo-praxis was predominantly on (re)constituting the spiritual world. The significance of the life and 
thoughts of Mphahlele is that they, in the first place, span colonial, Apartheid, and “post-Apartheid” 
eras.  
 
The second significance of Mphahlele’s thought, as the epigraphs at the head of this chapter attest, and 
as I am going to demonstrate, is that Mphahlele is a premier theorist on the predicaments faced by 
people who find themselves interned in the liminal zone. As I have suggested in the preceding Part of 
this thesis, a fundamental question facing exilic elites is what route they ought to take to reckon 
productively with their condition of ‘inner melancholia’ and concomitant feelings of ambivalence. To 
borrow from Mphahlele’s second epigraph above, such a productive reckoning is essential if these elites 
are to contribute to the constitution (‘standing together’) of a polity with ‘no distinctions’. I will show 
that Mphahlele’s decolonising vision was made possible by the fact that he realised, firstly, that the 
problem of Apartheid was not simply a problem of racial subjugation and segregation. Rather, the 
problem of Apartheid was a problem of a world carved by numerous invisible lines resulting in a failure 
of constare, a ‘stand togetherness’. As can be seen in the second epigraph, Mphahlele proposed that a 
post-Apartheid constitution (‘foundational law’) should constitute an intercultural home for all. In this 
way, as I am going to argue in this chapter, Mphahlele brought together the two etymological origins 
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of constare, namely, ‘to stand together’ and ‘to agree/fit together’. Furthermore, as the first epigraph 
shows, Mphahlele implied that ANC’s and other Pan-Africanist leaders’ failure to formulate genuine 
constitution-making policies was linked to these leaders’ state of spiritual and psychic fragmentation. 
Focusing specifically on transcultural elites, Mphahlele urged anti-colonial leaders to overcome their 
condition of ambivalence if they hoped to contribute to the Mayibuye imperative of re-membering of 
the world. 
  
This is the reason why I have devoted an overwhelming portion of this dissertation to elites (Plaatje, 
Du Bois, Mbeki, Mphahlele, and Biko). This is because this stratum of colonised society is usually the 
one that takes up the cause of independence. As we saw in the previous chapter, these elites’ leadership 
of the anti-colonial struggle meant that their visions of constitution and belonging usually shaped “post-
colonial” societies. In the preceding Part of this study, I focused on the dominant faction of this elite 
sector, the ones who were propelled to the forefront of constitution-making. In this chapter and the next 
one, I will explore the visions suggested by the non-dominant wing of the elite sector. Mphahlele and 
Biko were both influential individuals who, similar to Mbeki and other Pan-African leaders, received 
missionary education. They both battled with the problematic of liminality and concomitantly double 
consciousness. I will show that Mphahlele and Biko’s counter-hegemonic praxes were made possible 
by their ability to potentiate double consciousness and thus ‘return to the source’. In the final chapter, I 
will explore the convergences between the prefigurative, counter-hegemonic vision of Abahlali, a 
movement of mostly uneducated and impoverished people, and those of Mphahlele and Biko. 
Mphahlele’s own life story is a lesson on how elites could overcome what Mphahlele called ‘first exile’ 
(psychic and spiritual alienation), re-suture with home-culture and thus be in a position to contribute to 
collective processes of homemaking. Apart from the chronical reason (the fact that Mphahlele came 
before and influenced both Biko and Abahlali), this is the second reason why I have started this Part of 
the study with Mphahlele.  
 
The third reason why Mphahlele is important to my main thesis is that his non-fiction, creative and 
literary critique work sought to formulate a counter-discourse that could resist the historical de-worlding 
of Africa and its people. By way of overview, Mphahlele’s lifetime mission can be illustrated with a 
passage from Mphahlele’s first non-fiction book, African Image (1962). Right in the middle of that 
book Mphahlele writes the following: 
I do not know what Hannah Arendt means when she says ‘…they [Africans] had not created a human 
world, a human reality.’ What more human reality does one need than that people have socially and 
politically organised lives? Of course, our civilisations did not float on the back of advanced technology 
or on stocks and shares. Africans have always been more interested in human relations than in gadgets, 
even when they realise that they have to operate machines for a living… (Mphahlele, 1962: 91): 
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Mphahlele expressed puzzlement at Arendt’s attempt to ‘phantomise’ Africans and their world. 
Mphahlele seemed to wonder to himself: How could anybody lay a standard for what is human and 
what counts as ‘the world’ when the projects of being human and of creating the world are so diverse 
and never-ending? In actual fact, Mphahlele was aware that the basis upon which Arendt and other 
purveyors of colonialist discourse assign the value of Absence (L. Gordon, 1999: 99) upon Africans is 
a commonplace Eurocentric gesture of relegating Africans to a non-world. Mphahlele’s response here 
was simply to avow African forms of creating and appearing in the world without totally rejecting Euro-
American instruments and epistemologies. In this way, Mphahlele calmly asserts the Presence, 
worldliness, cultural openness, and world re-making capacity of Africans against the cavalier claims of 
one of the most influential Euro-American theorists on worldliness, appearance, and natality.  
 
My aim in this chapter is to trace Mphahlele’s voyages of disalienation, homecomings, and 
homemaking. Tracking Mphahlele’s physical and spiritual odysseys will enable me to distill the main 
pillars of his decolonising praxis. In 1957, Mphahlele ‘choose’ to exile himself from South Africa. 
Twenty years later, although a tenured professor in the USA, Mphahlele decided to return to Apartheid 
South Africa. Why did Mphahlele leave? And, why did he return? The answers to these two questions 
are key to understanding Mphahlele’s strategy of constitution and belonging. The answers to these 
questions are also fundamental to understanding why Mphahlele proposed that the (re)constitution of 
the spiritual world is the primary constituent element of Mayibuye exigency.   
 
I will discuss Mphahlele’s striving against what he called ‘first exile’ in section one. In section two, I 
will explore Mphahlele’s decision to physically exile himself and to seek belonging in “the Black 
World”. In the final section, I will analyse the main constitution, becoming, and belonging lessons to 
be derived from Mphahlele’s decision to take leave of his homeland. In this regard I will focus on 
Mphahlele’s decision to disavow “the Black World” and subsequently his deconstruction of Africanity 
(hence Afrikanness). I will show that Mphahlele’s deconstruction was based on the argument that 
Africanity as elaborated by Pan-Africanists and the early Négritude movement reprised colonialist 
discourse and thus perpetuated the worldlessness of Africans. Finally, I will show that Mphahlele’s 
return to Apartheid South Africa was impelled by a need to recover ‘first sight,’ and to re-suture with 
home-culture (‘the source’) in order to learn from it, to educate it and to engage in collective 
conscientisation processes aimed at molding ‘the source’ into a decolonising and creolising constituent 
power. Mphahlele predicted that unless ordinary people prefigure post-Apartheid becoming and 
belonging and forge themselves into a motive force that will de-constitute the South African world, the 
‘new’ South Africa will be ushered in by alienated elites who will reiterate a world without ‘standing 
togetherness’.  
 
 93 
3.1 Mphahlele’s Striving against ‘First Exile’ 
 
3.1.1 ‘Being born black in this country…is a political event’22 
 
Mphahlele has described his life as one of “exiles and homecomings” (cited in Manganyi, 1983: 11). 
Typical of the situation of many conquered people, Mphahlele’s exile began in his childhood. He was 
born in Marabastad, a “black-Indian ghetto” in the outskirts of Pretoria. Mphahlele’s parents sent him 
to live with his grandmother in a “black reserve” in the rural areas when he turned five-years-old. 
Ostensibly, he was being ‘returned’ to his ancestral location. However, the experience of living with a 
grandmother that Mphahlele perceived as uncaring made this an unhappy return. His parents sent him 
back to Marabastad after a few years. This childhood experience impressed in him a duality and an 
ambivalence that would constitute a “never-ending dialogue” between his rural/ancestral and urban 
streams of consciousness (Mphahlele 2002: 9). Back in Marabastad, young Mphahlele noticed “a 
certain ambivalence and disharmony” between his neighbours and their surroundings (Mphahlele, 
2002: 189). The disharmony was caused by the fact that the ghetto was full of dirt and muck. At the 
same time, residents were in a constant state of hyper-vigilance against the hazards posed by both 
hoodlums and the government superintendent of the ‘black location’. The dis-ease of the inhabitants 
was ultimately caused by the fact that colonial spatial regulations made it impossible for “natives” to 
dwell where they desired. The colonial regime regularly evicted African communities from their 
ancestral homes and dumped them in Marabastad or other ghettoes. Mphahlele recalled that this 
experience of violent de-homing and relocation engendered in new arrivals a feeling of melancholia 
because it was as if they were, “coming to a strange land, almost as if they were exiles” (Interview with 
Manganyi, 2010: 477). From a young age, Mphahlele, therefore, perceived a generalised state of 
unhomeliness. 
 
The experience of being “caged” in a ghetto impressed on Mphahlele’s young mind both the reality of 
enforced racialisation and the fact that he was on the wrong side of the color line (1974: 26, 28; 1962: 
68). From a young age he, therefore, developed a fluctuating mixture of envy and hatred vis-à-vis white 
people and the white world. These feelings of ambivalence were heightened on those days when he 
cycled to the white suburbs to deliver the laundry his mother had washed for white people. The 
ambivalence was aggravated by lack of human recognition from the other side. His early dealings with 
his mother’s white patrons left him with a feeling of being made invisible, as if, “I did not exist” 
(interview with Manganyi, 2010: 468). This very brief survey of Mphahlele’s early life demonstrates 
that, in colonial South Africa, the world between the ancestral world and the settler suburban world was 
a world of political oppression, rootlessness, unhomeliness, disharmony, impoverishment, enforced 
racialisation and depersonalisation. This was not a Third Space of ‘happy hyphenation’. Chabani 
                                                        
22 Mphahlele cited in Thuynsma, 1989: 8. 
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Manganyi, Mphahlele’s most important biographer, thus characterises life in the in-between world of 
Mphahlele’s upbringing as a life of “spiritual exile” (Manganyi, 1983: 29). 
 
As we saw in Part 1 above, spiritually-exiled/‘liminalised’ persons often develop feelings of internal 
and external ambivalences. Internally, as Mphahlele points out, these persons’ consciousness vacillated 
between the sensibilities of the ancestral home and that of the alien/western modern setting. This 
psychic oscillation is made worse by the fact that colonial spatial regulations and precarious living made 
it impossible for conquered and displaced persons to experience feelings of habituation and sovereignty 
over their own life. It is in this context of being homeless and riddled with feelings of unhomeliness 
and worldlessness that most of the colonised begin to look towards western education for socio-
economic mobility and spiritual succor. Mphahlele also looked towards education as, “the mountain 
path to Canaan” (Du Bois, 1986a: 367). He thus determined that the only way he could resolve his 
spiritual striving was to become an immigrant of the South African world (the first option in my 
typology of options available to exiled person). Mphahlele received a scholarship to study at a 
prestigious Christian mission school for black students.   
 
The discussion in Part 1 above left us with a cautionary note regarding this route: the journey and 
process of receiving western education can lead to another form of homelessness and thus increased 
spiritual restlessness. Mphahlele (1984: 269) would thus later reflect that the process of being sent to 
school was akin to being sent into “the wilderness” with neither precedent nor guidance. Aligning 
himself with the theme of Ambiguous Adventure, Cheik Hamidou Kane’s acclaimed novel, he 
(Mphahlele, 1982: 42) wrote that journeying into this new world was similar to undertaking, “an 
adventure into the night”. This adventure is a nightmare that The Gambia’s Lenrie Peters dramatised as 
being characterised by a “bloodless war” for the spirit of a colonised person (cited in Mphahlele, 1982: 
39). The war metaphor is apt. A character in Kane’s novel concludes that western education is a much 
more devastating weapon than the physical weapons of colonialism: “The cannon compels the body 
and the school bewitches the soul” (cited in Ngūgī, 2009:16). As we saw in the previous Part, the feeling 
of being bewitched comes from the fact that to journey into this space is to journey into an ambiguous 
spiritual space. The school-goer is eventually elevated above his or her “unuplifted” family and 
community. The ambiguity here is that the “wrench” from the community is cruel, “if at the same time 
exhilarating” (Mphahlele, 1984: 60). The adventure is exhilarating because western education, as Du 
Bois also realised, can also provide the colonised with tools to understand and manipulate western 
modernity. Ultimately, western education added another internal dialogue on top of the antagonistic 
dialogue going on between the ancestral consciousness and the urban-setting consciousness. It is this 
addition that launches the colonised person into a journey toward becoming transcultural. It is in this 
context of trying to understand himself and the psychic unhomeliness he was going through in this 
‘ambiguous adventure’ that Mphahlele theorised and pioneered notions of “ambivalence” and hybridity.    
 95 
 
In a paper published in 1967, and reproduced in 1973, Mphahlele (1973: 121) wrote that Africans have 
been enticed by the “neon lights” of western homes ever since they were forcibly incorporated into 
western modernity in the long sixteenth century. The enticement, and eventual sense of betrayal, is 
severe for those who are victims of this modernity’s teleological praxis. This is the “uplifted” stratum 
of the colonised group. Mphahlele’s main philosophical contribution was, firstly, to demonstrate that 
colonised transcultural persons are actually saddled with two layers of hybridity: the often-disagreeable 
negotiation between the ancestral spirit and the urban-setting sensibility as well as the tug-of-war 
between the indigenous consciousness and the western one. Secondly, in his philosophical and creative 
writings, Mphahlele demonstrated the ramifications of these dizzying forms of hybridity. Mphahlele 
revealed that double hybridity did not mean he became, “the oversimplified and sensationalised 
Hollywood version of a man of two worlds” (Mphahlele 1973: 121). Rather, he became a liminal-hybrid 
person. The subjectivity of a liminal-hybrid person is a subjectivity jammed in a limbo by, “a 
‘civilisation’ that beckoned us from across the colour line but at the same time resisted us” (2013: 27). 
“And so here I am, an ambivalent character,” Mphahlele simply declared (1973: 121).  
 
It should be clear by now that the concept of ambivalence (a key trait of racial melancholia) is one of 
the leitmotifs of this dissertation. I wish to explicate this concept further because it is also pivotal to 
understanding Mphahlele’s (and Biko and Abahlali’s) voyages of disalienation, homecomings, and 
homemaking. The concept of ambivalence conveys the sea-saw standpoint of individuals who find 
themselves interned between the ancestral home and the house of settler-invaders. Existence in this 
‘double environment’ leads to divided loyalties and shifting stances towards the world of colonisers 
and its discourses. Thus, “rather than assuming that some colonised subjects are ‘complicit’ and some 
‘resistant’, ambivalence suggests that complicity and resistance exist in fluctuating relation within the 
colonial subject” (Ashcroft et al., 2000: 12-13). This vacillation is the result of the fact that the process 
of creating ‘mimic men’ never results in completely complicit and domesticated persons. Rather, an 
excess or slippage always occurs in this process of producing the reformed Other (Bhabha (2005: 123). 
This excess creates figures that are neither altogether lost to the autochthonous home nor have full 
belonging in the coloniser’s house. This is because, as Mphahlele sought to demonstrate, western 
modernity and colonialist discourse both summon and reject colonised people. Liminal-hybrid 
individuals thus end up with a deep sense of inner conflict. For these almost mimetic figures, “the 
pendulum swings between revulsion and attraction… the two selves are apt by turns to fight, quarrel, 
despise each other, hug each other, concede each other’s roles…” (Mphahlele, 1974: 41, 281).   
 
The crucial insight that Mphahlele, therefore, wished to convey was that feelings of ambivalence do not 
only relate to western modernity and its regimes of coloniality. More insidiously, feelings of revulsion 
and attraction are internal and internalised. For Mphahlele, then, to be a colonised transcultural person 
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was to be hybrid in the sense of embodying split selves. Spiritual unhomeliness is the result, therefore, 
of the fact that two warring streams of consciousness are coursing through the subjectivity of the 
liminal-hybrid: “that’s the anguish: not being two but the African having become both” (Mphahlele, 
1974: 46-47). Mphahlele called attention to the idea that what we are dealing with here is a not an 
edifying aggregation that results in one ‘being two’ and thus embodying syncretic or creolising 
sensibilities. Rather, we are here dealing with an internal dualism – an embodiment of internal 
multiculturalism as opposed to inter-culturality. Spiritual multiculturalism leads to a divided 
consciousness. This split renders a liminal-hybrid individual unhomely and homeless. Understood this 
way, conquest and colonisation do not only ‘kill’ the land; they also kill the spirit of colonised elites. 
We are now in a position to understand the reason why Mphahlele proposed that the task of 
(re)constituting the spirit world is a premier one.  
 
Returning to my provisional typology, the first course that presents itself to the internally exiles person 
is a quest for further acculturation and thus assimilation. To adopt this deportment, as we have seen in 
Part I above, is to attempt a move from being an exile with ‘partial presence’ (Bhabha, 2005: 193), to 
being an immigrant with full Presence in western modernity and the house of the colonist. It is, in other 
words, an attempt gain admission to what Arendt (1998: 179) calls “the space of appearance”. Arendt 
(ibid.) submits that entry to this space can only be secured through action and speech. According to 
Arendt (1998: 178) speech-acts enable a person qua person to appear to one another. This is because 
words, in particular, enable disclosure and distinctiveness (Arendt, 2006: 152). Words, in other words, 
are key to overcoming anonymity, and thus depersonalisation and invisibility. More pertinently, Arendt 
(1998: 178) goes as far as to argue that without words, appearance is impossible because the newcomer 
would not be able to answer the question asked of every newcomer “who are you?” Following Arendt, 
Julia Kristeva (2001: 71) asserts that to respond to this question, the newcomer must first find a 
discourse, a lexis. Kristeva suggests such a discourse is the province of narrativisation. From an 
Arendtian, and Heideggerian, perspective narrative and story-telling are, therefore, ways of asserting 
belonging and worldliness.  
 
These strategies are also important in African discourse and its modes of self-writing. However, as we 
shall shortly see, Mphahlele’s life and intellectual biography contradict Arendt’s proposals regarding 
appearance and worldliness. Briefly put, Arendt is blind to the fact that in settler colonial settings such 
as South Africa, or the USA where she was writing from, to appear in this way is to negate oneself and 
to suffer further unhomeliness and homelessness. This is because the settler world casts itself as the 
only human world. The historically ‘invisibilised’ person is thus put in a position of being a perpetual 
interloper. As Du Bois painfully learned, the feeling of being declared a ‘misbirth’ were exacerbated 
by the fact that, “I sort of had to justify myself” (cited in Lewis, 1993: 31). Nevertheless, this project of 
rehabilitating identity and manifesting worldly presence through the telling of stories and the offering 
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of autobiographies has appealed to successive generations of enslaved persons and other dehumanised 
and de-worlded peoples. 
 
In 1946, Mphahlele published a collection of short stories. He was only the second black South African 
to do so. This collection contained vignettes of township life. Similar to Plaatje with Mhudi, Mphahlele 
sought to use his stories as a window into the ‘invisibilised’ lifeworld of “natives”. Anti-colonial 
intellectuals, mostly of a communist bent, met Mphahlele’s collection with derision. These reviewers 
dismissed this collection as a product of a person trying too hard to win the recognition of the white 
world. They assessed that Mphahlele was a cognitively and spiritually deracinated person who, “has 
had the gods of his fathers exorcised by the missionaries…” (cited in Mphahlele, 1959: 165). 
Mphahlele’s doomed attempt to reclaim worldliness recalls Frantz Fanon’s observations in “The Negro 
and Recognition”. Fanon (2008: 165. Original emphasis) chastised colonised elites for mistaking their 
mission in life as, “….to be, to emerge” in relation to the coloniser. It could thus be argued that in the 
middle of the century, Mphahlele belonged to that bloc of transcultural persons that H.I.E. Dhlomo, 
writing on the eve of Apartheid, derided as “Neither-Nor” persons bedeviled by double consciousness:  
This type of African is not sure of himself, proud of his racial identities and affiliations and cultural 
heritage, as his tribal brother. He is neither wholly African nor fully Europeanised. He is in the desert 
between Egypt and Canaan, sometimes overwhelmed by the nostalgia to turn back, at other times by the 
urge to press forward…He uses European measuring-rods for success, culture, goodness, greatness… 
(cited in Couzens, 1985: 33). 
 
Mphahlele would later disavow this collection regarding it with a mixture of amused scorn and disdain 
(Obee, 1999: 25). Therefore, in 1946, Mphahlele had not yet realised the importance of the first pillar 
of the Du Boisian manifesto.  This pillar suggests that the transcultural elite should first resolve his or 
her own condition of internalised alienation/exile if he or she is going to reclaim belongingness-in-the-
world. In the case of Mphahlele (1973: 121), he recalled that it was only later in life that he came to the 
realisation that the first task facing him was to undergo “an agonising [internal] journey” which would 
culminate in him developing an “innate personality equipment” (Mphahlele, 1973: 121). This 
equipment would empower him to reconcile his many layers of enervating dualism (ibid.). As I 
discussed it in the previous chapter, Du Bois posited that the only route towards developing a self-
conscious subjectivity was through a deeper descend deeper into western modernity’s rite of passage. 
This descent helps sharpen ‘second sight’. As I mentioned above with reference to Césaire’s Caliban, 
such a potentiation of double consciousness enables the transcultural person to begin to subject 
colonialist discourse to intense scrutiny; and in the process, to reevaluate himself or herself and the 
world. This was the case with Mphahlele who states that the further he progressed with western 
education the more he developed intellectual tools to question some of the myths of Christianity and 
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European civilisation (Mphahlele, 2007: 211-212). It thus happened that when he turned 21-years, 
Mphahlele forsook Christianity and became a non-believer. His spiritual odyssey was gaining steam.   
 
Mphahlele’s potentiated ‘second sight,’ and thus initial radicalism, is evident in the slant he adopted 
when he co-founded an independent African-run newspaper in 1949. The Voice of Africa (The Voice) 
was an explicitly African nationalist newspaper. Mphahlele and his co-editors announced the 
motivation behind establishing this newspaper as follows: 
There is a general political inertness among us. Nothing . . . ever awakens our political consciousness... 
Self-pity never solved personal or national problems: it is a maladjustive reaction. . . (cited in Sandwith, 
2006: 72).  
 
From this first editorial, we can discern that the editors wished to address racial melancholia by 
assaulting feelings of internalised inferiority, victimhood and political apathy. The Voice exposed the 
hypocrisy of white liberals and upbraided the ANC for being elitist and assimilationist. More to the 
point, the editors, “argued that in its insistence on following only constitutional methods of resistance - 
at the same time adopting an extremely patronising attitude towards the ‘backward’ poor majority - the 
‘lethargic and slow-moving ANC’….had become isolated from its people” (summarised by Sandwith, 
2006: 75). Mphahlele and his co-editors were, therefore, offering a critique that applies to Du Boisian 
praxes of constitution and belonging. The critique here is that integrationist politics, or politics of 
evolutionary constitution-making, always go together with the denigration and marginalisation of the 
lifeworlds of the majority of historically marginalised people. Thirty years later, Mphahlele reiterated 
this same critique during the political debates leading to the transition to the “new” South Africa. For 
purposes of this Part of the study, it is important to point out that Mphahlele and his co-editors 
anticipated one of the central contentions of Black Consciousness philosophy. They did this by rejecting 
a reformist vision in which, “both races can live in this country peacefully, not as masters and servants, 
but as partners, the white race playing the role of senior partner” (cited in Sandwith, 2006: 76). At the 
same time, Mphahlele and his co-editors rejected emergent politics of nativism encapsulated in the 
slogan “Africa for Africans”. The editors, rather, advocated for cooperation and unity amongst all 
oppressed peoples including Indians and Coloureds. Again, the editors were laying down a model for 
Black Consciousness politics vis-à-vis the dominant Pan-Africanist politics of the time.  
 
Not to be mistaken for assimilated intellectuals, Mphahlele and his co-editors combined this rejection 
of politics of radical alterity with a disavowal of the myths of colonisation. Thus from 1951 Mphahlele 
penned a five-part series entitled “What it means to be a Black Man”. In this series, Mphahlele 
dismissed the moralising pretences of western civilisation by exposing the ways in which the South 
Africa legal system subjugated black people (Sandwith, 2006: 83). Furthermore, Mphahlele and his co-
editors provided a model for resolving the problematics of double consciousness, ambivalence, and lack 
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of constitution. The lack of constitution is what Mphahlele in 1955 (in the second epigraph above) 
referred to as the absence of ‘standing together’. Towards this end, in addition to calling for an 
expansive notion of Africanness, the editors chided black intellectuals and activists who called for the 
complete repudiation of western culture. Thus, when the ANC Youth League urged black people to, 
“resign from anything European,” an anonymous editor of The Voice (most probably Mphahlele) 
retorted that, 
when nationalism takes this trend, the attitude is strikingly uncongenial to a progressive temperament: it 
is a poisonous and disastrous transition of thought that must narrow and stereotype men's outlook on 
things forcing them to see no glory in Debussy, Baudelaire, Maurois and others who are unAfrican (cited 
in Sandwith, 2006: 80).  
 
Finally, and following this inter-cultural stance, the editors strenuously denounced the Apartheid 
regime’s efforts to impose “Bantu culture” on black people. Mphahlele and his co-editors responded by 
reproducing studies that showed that cultures are products of mutual borrowings (Sandwith, 2006: 82).   
The editors, therefore, valorised cultural syncretism and rejected the idea that cultures are bounded up 
and originary. The Voice (which was mostly funded by the three editors) ran until 1952. It ceased to 
circulate after Mphahlele was dismissed from his teaching job. 
 
The Apartheid authorities dismissed Mphahlele from his teaching job when he mobilised against the 
Bantu Education Act. Hendrik Verwoerd, then Minister of Native Affairs, had rationalised the necessity 
of Bantu Education on the basis that missionary education had fostered in “the native” a feeling, “that 
that its spiritual, economic, and political home is among the civilised community in South Africa” (cited 
in Matthews, 1983: 198). The aims of Bantu Education were, therefore, to ‘re-tribalise’ and intensify 
the de-worlding of Africans by eradicating conditions that produced transcultural “natives” and a 
creolising national consciousness. The regime banned Mphahlele and other leading campaigners from 
the teaching profession. This attack prompted Mphahlele to undertake his first journey into physical 
exile. He took up a teaching post in Lesotho in 1954. Mphahlele’s first foray into bodily exile was, 
therefore, motivated by his refusal to contribute to more black subjugation and to a ‘re-tribalising’ 
ideology that would both fragment black people and inspire politics of nativism. With this act of refusal 
and physical exile, Mphahlele was completing his transition from aspiring to become an immigrant to 
being a fugitive. 
 
3.1.2 On the quixotic and spiritually-enfeebling nature of disobedient fugitivity  
 
Mphahlele returned to South Africa in 1955. He obtained an M.A. degree in English with distinction 
becoming the first black South African to be bestowed that honour. His dissertation was a critique of 
representations of black and white characters in South African literature. Mphahlele’s conclusion was 
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that these representations were products of colonised mindsets (Godzich, 1988: 29). This dissertation 
is significant because it shows the transformations that transcultural figures often go through – from 
trying to assimilate to being what Abdul JanMohamed (1992: 219-220) calls “specular border 
intellectuals”. Even though only a year separates Mphahlele’s honour’s dissertation (a study in English 
romantic poetry) and his master’s dissertation, a vast critical fissure separates the two. As Apartheid 
intensified and it became clear that assimilation was impossible, Mphahlele’s ambivalence tilted 
towards menace. Physical distance-taking, and the fact that he had begun an independent study of 
radical black American literature, contributed to his spiritual distance-taking. By the late 1950s 
Mphahlele had thus completed a journey he began when he co-founded The Voice in the late 1940s. He 
had advanced his ‘second sight’ to an extent of rejecting assimilationist promises.  
 
Barred from practicing his “faith”, teaching (Thuynsma, 1989: 2), Mphahlele decided to join Drum 
magazine as a fiction editor, sub-editor and political reporter. Drum was a pivotal vehicle for the black 
urban cultural renaissance of the 1950s. Drum distinguished itself by its acerbic writings and its coterie 
of brash, extremely innovative, and hard-living black journalists. Taking their cue from the Harlem 
Renaissance of the 1920s, these writers charted a third path beyond their timid black literary 
predecessors and the literary tradition of white liberal writers (Brown, 2013: 46). True fugitives, these 
artists lived in the interstitial space that one Drum journalist, Nat Nakasa, baptised as the “Fringe City”. 
Nakasa (2005: 9) explained that Fringe City was “between two worlds” and constituted, “life in a ‘No-
man’s Land’ where anybody meets anybody”. In this zone, black artists and intellectuals came together 
with white intellectuals and students to kick it to jazz and consort with one another. Fringe Living, 
taking place mainly around the vibrant African-Indian-Coloured slum of Sophiatown, was an attempt 
to pre-figure post-apartheid living. This was because this way of living was not so much a matter of 
‘crossing the line,’ it was, Nakasa insisted, “jumping the line or wiping it clean” (cited in Brown, 2013: 
54).  
 
Mphahlele never became part of ‘the Drum gang’. He quit the magazine after two years. Mphahlele 
regarded the bohemian multi-racial and inter-racial life on the border of the two worlds to be idealistic 
and meaningless. Liminal dwellers acted as if Apartheid did not exist, as if racial categorisation did not 
exist, and consequently often ridiculed overt political mobilisation.23 In the context of Apartheid and 
apartheid, this kind of interstitial living only got the colonised so far because it shied away from 
                                                        
23 As Bloke Modisane, one of the most flamboyant Fringe dwellers, reflected in his much-acclaimed biography 
Blame me on History (1963), there was, however, no realistic way out of being involved in politics. This was 
because the black Fringe dweller was imbricated in the web of oppression and identity politics: “But I am black, 
because I am black I was a piece of the ugliness of Sophiatown and a victim of the violence of white South Africa; 
I became an unwilling agitator trapped in the blackness of my skin, and because I am black I was forced to become 
a piece of the decisions, a part of black resistance. I wanted to be both black and unconcerned with the games at 
politics, but a non-committed African is the same black as a committed Native” ([1963] 1986: 140. My emphasis).  
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confronting questions of identity, double consciousness, ambivalence  and non-belonging. In a situation 
of forced tribalisation, political oppression, and apart-heid to eschew these questions was not to 
transcend spiritual unhomeliness and homelessness, it was actually to exacerbate them. Exiled Haitian 
writer Dany Laferrière’s reflections on the aporias of this kind of living are apposite here: 
The dictator insists on being the center of your life 
and what I did best in mine 
was to banish him from my existence.  
I admit, to do that sometimes I had to throw 
the baby out with the bathwater (Laferrière, 2009: 109).  
 
For Mphahlele, not only was liminal living escapist; it was also a sham. On the one hand, there was no 
real co-living because at the end of the night white Fringe sojourners retired back to their spirit-edifying 
suburbs while their black counterparts remained in their spirit-sapping slums. White Fringe dwellers 
visited the border city as respite from their humdrum, established existence. A white character in 
Mphahlele’s fictionalised autobiography put it as follows: “I can slum because I want real basic and 
expressive companionship which slums affords in plenty. Yet I couldn’t live in a slum; because it is a 
slum” (Mphahlele, 1984: 136. Original emphasis). On the other hand, such encounters only seemed to 
work because all liminal dwellers wore masks. The same white character imagines Mphahlele’s 
character thinking the following: “I have to keep accounting myself to the white man…never the other 
way round…So what do I do? I lie openfaced and laugh inside because you are not likely to know that 
I am lying, and if you know it, I know you can do fuckall about it” (Mphahlele, 1984: 137. Original 
emphasis). 
 
For Mphahlele, then, fugitive living under apartheid, and under “post-Apartheid” as we shall see in the 
final chapter below, was at best ineffectual in bringing about the kind of internal and external 
transformations demanded by the situation. At worse, it acutally exacerbated them. For one whose 
consciousness had been raised, the only possibility that remained was to mobilise politically to try to 
bring about political change. However, as we saw above, Mphahlele’s involvement in the ANC’s 
politics of integration convinced him that such politics re-centered white people and were never going 
to result in meaningful change. Mphahlele was left with the two options: stay and pursue radical 
“unconstitutional” tactics or leave the country. Mphahlele decided to take up a teaching post in Nigeria.  
 
To recap, Mphahlele was in the process of realising the first pillar of the Du Boisian manifesto by the 
time he decided to go into physical exile. He had overcome, or rather believed he had overcome, self-
alienation and attained what Du Bois called ‘self-conscious manhood’. Mphahlele, now endowed with 
a sharpened ‘second sight,’ decided to seek belongingness inside the African Diaspora when he realised 
that the second option of my typology of dealing with the exilic condition (becoming a fugitive) was 
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quixotic. Leaving on the eve of the first wave of the decolonisation of African nations, Mphahlele might 
have believed that exile in Africa would put him in a position to contribute to Pan-Africanism and 
projects aimed at cultivating of a proud African identity.  
 
3.1.3 Black inter-nationalism: a home of the homeless?   
 
Mphahlele’s route was not unique; he was following a route plotted by previous generations of black 
elites. These New African activists and intellectuals include the first president of the ANC, John Dube 
who left South Africa in 1887 to study in the USA; the man credited with coming up with the idea of 
forming the ANC, Pixley ka Seme who left South Africa at the begin of the twentieth century and 
returned with degrees from Colombia University and the University of Oxford; and as I discussed in 
the first chapter above, Solomon Plaatje who had several sojourns in England and North America. 
Although Mphahlele’s route was not unique, he has been described as, “the first Black South African 
to be truly international” (Thuynsma, 1989: 1), and a person in whom, “we have the most sustained 
record of the encounter between a black South African writer and the cultures of the diaspora” (Attwell, 
2005: 111). A brief overview might be useful at this point. Mphahlele’s ‘spiritual striving’ impelled 
him to involve himself in pivotal moments of belonging and becoming of “the Black World”. 
Mphahlele’s involvements included his active, and often critical, participations in the 1950s 
Sophiatown Renaissance in Johannesburg when he worked for Drum magazine; the late 1950s West 
African Anglophone cultural renaissance when he was teaching and co-editing a literary magazine in 
Nigeria; the Négritude movement when he was a director of an international cultural center in Paris in 
the 1960s; and finally, the Black Art Movement and “Negro literature” when he was a professor of 
literature in the USA in the early 1970s.  
 
Mphahlele exiled himself from South Africa with two main ambitions in mind: (i) to attain belonging 
within a proud global black identity and (ii) to achieve spiritual fortification. His hope was to then return 
to his homeland no longer intending to be a fugitive; rather an insurgent bent on de-constituting the 
house that had rendered him a pariah. A key question that arises is whether diasporic belonging or exile-
living could ever prepare a transcultural elite to achieve the aforementioned goals; or whether such a 
detour is a route towards deepening ‘first exile’. This question is germane to my thesis because, as we 
have seen, transatlantic alliances, exiles, and foreign sojourns have always been pivotal to black 
people’s strivings for constitution and belonging. To answer this question, I will momentarily take leave 
of Mphahlele’s life and instead go on a theoretical detour to reflect on the question whether black inter-
nationalism could be a home of the homeless, and thus a space for personal and collective rebirths and 
world belonging.  
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I begin my reflections on exile and inter-national (un)homeliness with Edward Said - one of the most 
emblematic transcultural and exile figures of the twentieth century and a contentious critic of 
nationalism, hegemonic forms of belonging, and blind anti-imperialism. In “The mind of winter: 
Reflections on exile,” Said (1984: 49) starts off by chastising writers who romanticise the idea of exile. 
Such idealising can be seen in the western imagination where restlessness and boundary crossings have 
become leitmotifs. Said makes it clear that although an exiled person can enliven the new environment 
and might even rake in some personal achievements those accomplishments should not detract from the 
fact that exile, “is the unhealable rift forced between a human being and a native place, between the self 
and its true home; its essential sadness can never be surmounted” (ibid).  
 
Let us go back to my provisional typology regarding the options opened to an internally-exiled person: 
to become an immigrant, a fugitive, or a mobilising diaspora-cum-insurgent. Said (2000: 50) writes that 
to be an exile is to be in a “perilous territory of not-belonging”. This is a third space between ‘the inside’ 
and ‘the outside’ that processes of nationalism draw in an effort to construe a sense of rootedness and 
belonging. A bold gesture by an exile would be to refuse to belong to the inside of the host nation. This 
refusal can take two extremes. On the one end of the spectrum: a person in exile could adopt a ‘fetish 
of exile’ refusing to commit to anything and refusing all connections and commitment. If the exile 
adopts this deportment, he or she falls prey to petulant cynicism, and perhaps melancholia because of a 
longing for home. On the other end of the spectrum: there could be pressure to join and develop new 
loyalties. The latter option brings with it a loss of, “critical perspective, of intellectual reserve, of moral 
courage” (Said, 1984: 54). Said suggests that an exiled person who goes beyond these two extremes 
can develop a scrupulous subjectivity that questions accepted notions and ways of belonging. Such 
subjectivity comes from the fact that having crossed borders and crushed barriers, the exile remains 
suspicious of habituations (Said, 1984: 54). This positionality lends to the exile an originality of vision 
and thus a way of being aware of a multiplicity of cultures and homes. Such a person, therefore, 
develops a contrapuntal awareness that refuses traditional and ultimately oppressive notions of settling 
and belonging (Said, 1984: 55).  
 
Such an empowering sense of contrapuntal awareness is made possible by the fact that a transcultural 
person, even one saddled with a double consciousness is, in the words of Du Bois, gifted with a ‘second 
sight’. Salman Rushdie takes up this notion of an enabling doubleness in “Imaginary homelands” 
(1991). Rushdie argues that ‘second sight’, or what he calls a “double perspective,” (1991: 19, see also 
Said, 1994: 44) is borne out of the fact that an exiled or emigrant intellectual has an identity that is “at 
once plural and partial” (Rushdie, 1991: 15). Plural and partial because such person is no longer of the 
home-culture and is now “partially of the West” (Rushdie, 1991: 12). Although this positionality may 
lead to angst because, “sometimes we [feel] that we straddle two cultures; at other times, that we fall 
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between the two stools,” Rushdie (1991: 15) asserts that this habituation is on the whole a fertile 
territory for the writer or intellectual to occupy because it grants him or her a contrapuntal awareness. 
  
If in that 1992 essay Rushdie exhibited some angst, writing in his memoir a decade later he would pose 
a more optimistic question: “[I]s it possible to be – to become good at being – not rootless, but multiply 
rooted? Not to suffer from the loss of roots but to benefit from an excess of them? (Rushdie, 2012: 53-
54. Original emphasis). To be multiply rooted is, in my provisional typology, to be both an exile and 
immigrant. It is to be endowed with a dual ontology that comes not from feeling like a straddler but 
from looking back to historical cultural identity and forward towards the society of repositioning 
(Ashcroft et al, 2005: 425). This dual ontology is made possible by and leads to a constant movement 
between a multiplicity of homes. This continuous movement critiques and eschews essentialised and 
fixed notions of home, nation, belonging and identity in favour of syncretic understandings (Stock, 
2010: 26). 
 
However, is multiple rootedness a possibility for all exiles and migrants? Rushdie is quick to add that 
for multiple rootedness to be a possibility, “the different roots would have to be of equal or near-equal 
strength…” (2012: 53-54). Is this possibility open to all exiled persons? Leaving aside, for now, the 
question whether it is ever possible for anyone to be equally rooted in multiple homes (cultures), the 
reality is that ‘host’ societies often display prejudice against exiled persons. The ‘host’ society’s 
hostility often thwarts quests for additional rootedness. It is in this context that in Home and Exile then 
USA-based Chinua Achebe cautioned against the tendency to celebrate the notion of restlessness and 
of the writer-in-exile. Achebe (2003: 92) reminds us that when a writer from the west travels he carries, 
“the confidence of authority of his homeland with him”. A traveler from the Third World, however, 
finds that he can never appropriate multiple attachments; that in fact the imperial center holds nothing 
but misery and non-belonging for him or her (ibid). Kamau [nee Edward] Braithwaite (the Barbadian 
poet and historian who once accepted his status as a, “rootless man of the world” (2000: 45)) conveys 
in exact terms the seemingly endlessness exilic subjectivity of the racialised émigré. In, “Rights of 
Passage: Postlude-Home” Braithwaite seem to bemoan the fact that victims of imperial 
displacement/de-homing can never complete the rite of passage and attain rights of full belonging:  
Where then is the nigger’s 
home? 
In Paris Brixton Kingston 
Rome? 
Here 
Or in Heaven?  
What crime 
his dark  
 105 
dividing 
skin is hiding? 
What guilt 
now drives him 
on?  
Will exile never 
end? (Braithwaite, 1973:77). 24 
 
In a world of almost universal anti-blackness, it is almost impossible for black people and other cultural 
and racial minorities to resolve their psychic displacement and spiritual unhomeliness by being at home 
both in their left-behind home-culture and the culture of the host environment. That travelling black 
bodies often experience terror and that in white-dominated spaces and territories black people are 
expected to be invisible often impel black people to hide themselves and their cultures (hooks, 2009: 
93). Indeed, to borrow a felicitous term from Frank Wilderson’s (2008: 59) harrowing memoir of exile 
and Apartheid, black people are often compelled to travel “incognegro”. To move about ‘incognegro’ 
is to never arrive because one’s identity is not being positively transformed. There is no transformation 
and aggregation because one is travelling with a false identity, with a mask: We wear the mask that 
grins and lies/It hides our cheeks and shades our eyes/This debt we pay to human guile/With torn and 
bleeding hearts we smile/And mouth with myriad subtleties (Paul Laurence Dunbar in Roberts, 2007: 
128). When a transcultural person adopts an incognito (mis-) appearance he or she suffers more spiritual 
liminality because he or she is forced to subdue a part of himself or herself in order to assimilate -  
except that assimilation is impossible. The result is further self-renunciation, more invisibility.  
 
Is invisibility, however, always a disability? Let us recall the opening testimony of the eponymous 
narrator of Invisible Man: “I am an invisible man…I am invisible simply because people refuse to see 
me. I‘m not complaining; nor am I protesting. It’s sometimes an advantage to be unseen” (Ellison, 2001: 
3). What possible advantages could there be to be unseen by “people;” to be seen as a nothing? The 
clue lies in the rest of Paul Laurence Dunbar’s nineteenth century poem: Why should the world be 
otherwise/In counting all our tears and sighs?/Nay, let them only see us, while/We wear the mask (cited 
in Roberts, 2007: 128). To put on a mask is, from this perspective, to engage in an act of refusal - a 
refusal to dwell in the world whose standard of humanity one does not seek to emulate, rather to 
                                                        
24 Frank Wilderson also recalls a time when his then South African wife came to join him in the USA. His wife 
became depressed when her dreams of swapping racist South Africa for a land where one could pursue happiness 
without discrimination did not materialise. Wilderson (2008: 26) recalls a conversation in which he dashed his 
wife’s optimism: “You don’t need a law degree to know that African immigration is an oxymoron.... A land of 
opportunity. A step up in the world. You were so inebriated with your arrival that you thought you’d pass through 
customs and be changed forever…A vertical leap from kaffir to immigrant, when all you made was a lateral move 
from kaffir to nigger. That’s what’s eating you”. Wilderson (2008: 59), a leading theorist of Afropessimism, 
concludes that black people are “cosmic hobos” with no place and time in the universe.  
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disavow. An exiled person who wears a mask refuses to be seen. The mask allows an ‘invisibilised’ 
person to rebuff, or at least to distort (further) the white man’s gaze.  
 
The performative act of refusing acceptance is an embrace of that Third Space that Said calls the 
‘perilous territory of not-belonging’. ‘We wear mask’ is the opposite of being coaxed into wearing a 
‘black skin, white mask’. It is in other words, a descend into fugitivity in the sense conceived by Fred 
Moten (2008: 179). Moten (ibid.) proposes that blackness is as a state of being that refuses to be 
captured by the logic of the dominant, of the settled, that is, of the hegemonic home. As Moten (2013: 
756), following Fanon, puts it, blacknesss-as-fugitivity, “signifies a relationality that displaces the 
already displaced impossibility of home and the modes of relationality that home is supposed to afford”. 
More pertinently, such a fugitive relationality is a “sharing of life in homelessness” that comes about 
through refusing that which has been refused (ibid.). It is a refusal, therefore, of being human according 
to the prescription of colonial and “post-slavery” praxes; namely, dwelling in the nation-state and in 
western modernity or of being admitted into the Arendtian space of appearance.  
 
In the remainder of this sub-section, I aim to delve deeper into the aforementioned notions of (i) ‘sharing 
life in homelessness’ as a release from, not intensification, of exile; and (ii) a critique of the nation-state 
and western modernity by black ‘fugitives,’ and, finally (iii) an exploration of the limitations of black 
internationalism’s disembodied universalism-as-home.  
 
JanMohamed (1992: 218) terms being-togetherness in homelessness a condition of “homelessness-as-
home”. This kind of homelessness is a habituation of those border-crossers JanMohamed names 
“specular border intellectuals.” Whereas ‘syncretic intellectuals’ are ‘at home’ in both the formative 
culture and the new culture; ‘specular intellectuals’ are unwilling or are unable to be “at home” in the 
two cultures (Jan-Mohamed, 1992: 219-220). The latter group of intellectuals thus approach the host 
culture coldly and analytical. Most importantly, JanMohamed (ibid.) shows that it is the latter set of 
intellectuals that, consciously or unconsciously, seek or reflect new ways of group formation. The 
pivotal question, as JanMohamed implies, is how, precisely, does a colonised/ oppressed person enter 
the third space; what their intentions with regards to the original home (culture) and the 
colonists/master’s home are; and what do they regard as the culmination of their spiritual striving.  
 
To sum up the discussion so far: although black transcultural intellectuals are often unwilling or are 
prevented from achieving multiple rootedness; that that they wear masks to disfigure the gaze of 
racialisation; and that they often, willingly and or unwillingly, occupy interstitial spaces in-between 
homes, nothing prevents them from having a contrapuntal awareness to deconstruct hegemonic spaces 
and belongings. What makes this deconstruction possible is the transformation of an exiled person’s 
positionality from that of unwanted liminal being to being a fugitive who is at home in not habituating 
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any home. I have suggested that black inter-nationalism (a response to the Du Boisian ‘spiritual 
strivings’) is a sharing of life in homelessness by fugitives-cum-diaspora. Complicating my main thesis 
is the fact that it is precisely for this latter reason that black internationalists, as we shall shortly see, do 
not only critique the idea of nation-states and other forms of belongings demanded by western 
modernity. They also reflect a tension between nationalism and the need to supplant it. 
 
Black struggles are for the most part struggles against western modernity-as-coloniality. These struggles 
have thus been analogous, cross-cultural, and collaborative. This is one of the takeaway points in Cedric 
Robinson’s Black Marxism: The Making of a Black Tradition (1983). In this path-breaking study, 
Robinson makes the case for the existence of a historical or social tradition of black radicalism across 
the globe. Robinson (2000: 72) rejects the tendency to read instances of black revolts, or rebirth, as 
historically and geographically bounded acts that simply respond to exigencies of particular places. The 
fact is that black inter-nationalism, in all its varieties and conflicts, emerges from the sense that third 
space (dis)location conferred on black people a common desire to end their bane of unhomeliness 
(Robinson, 2000: 166). As Michael Hanchard (2005: 113) also observes, this common cause has 
resulted in strategic collaboration of black actors across the divide of colony, state, nation, and local 
cultures. Hence black inter-nationalism. What makes black inter-nationalism a discourse of resistance 
against de-worlding and what transforms it into “worldliness-without-world” (JanMohamed, 1992: 
234) are the interlinked ideologies that perform, in the world, the humanity, the being-togetherness, and 
the belonging-in-the world of black peoples.  
 
Understood in this way, black inter-nationalism is thus a constitution of a people and a world – the so-
called Black World. This world is a creation of specular border intellectuals, such as Solomon Plaatje 
(see Boehmer, 2002: 141), who assemble on the margins of nation-states to forge and instantiate 
alternative forms of belongings and cultures (also see Gilroy, 1993: 16). In this regard, Gilroy (1993: 
1-3), Hanchard (2003: 7-8) and others have observed that black diasporic movements and transnational 
black politics seek to problematise the homology between nations and states. There is thus a subtle 
paradox and indeed a tension that can be perceived in black internationalists’ stance regarding the 
nation-state: calling for territorial sovereignty and statehood and at the same time prefiguring an 
internationalism that would subvert the nation-state (Hanchard, 2005: 118). Black inter-nationalism is 
thus proposed as ‘homelessness-as-home’. Could this proposal help surmount homelessness, 
rootlessness, namelessness and unhomeliness? Or is this world another instance of de-worlding and 
rootlessness that in his 1956 letter of resignation from the French Communist Party Aimé Césaire 
([1956]2010: 152) denounced as “emaciated [disembodied] universalism”? 
 
In the final section below, I trace Mphahlele’s journey from seeking Pan-Africanist membership in “the 
Black World” to disavowing this world. Mphahlele’s odyssey demonstrate that if the Black World does 
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exist, it is often an unhomely and harrowing space particularly for exiled African intellectuals. This 
realisation led Mphahlele to conclude that the problematics of ‘first exile (spiritual and psychic 
alienation) and worldlessness could only be resolved ‘at home’. This realisation is the foundation of 
Mphahlele’s prefigurative praxis of constitution and belonging.  
 
3.2. Mphahlele’s Constitution Vision: Seek Ye First the Spiritual Kingdom25 
 
3.2.1 Regaining Africa and deconstructing Africanity 
 
Something inside Mphahlele thawed when he arrived in Nigeria. The asthma that he had been suffering 
from since he was twenty-years old immediately disappeared. Manganyi (1983: 14), a Black 
Consciousness psychologist, speculates that this psychosomatic relief points to the fact that Mphahlele 
was becoming spiritually rejuvenated. Mphahlele (2013a: 20) confirms that his first days in Nigeria felt 
like freedom and “daytime” after the “nightmare” in South Africa. He found that urban Nigerians still 
practiced their ‘traditional’ cultures. He could thus immerse himself in a society that was proudly 
African. Mphahlele (2013a: 25) will later confirm that West Africa, “gave Africa back to me”. One of 
the key insights from Part I of the dissertation is that a ‘liminalised’ person can attempt disalienation 
without returning to home-culture. This was indeed the case with Du Bois. Du Bois claimed to have 
attained ‘self-conscious manhood’ and Negro-becoming even though he never re-sutured himself with 
ordinary black folks. I have outlined the pitfalls of such being-becoming in chapter two above. In the 
previous section of this chapter, I showed that Mphahlele believed that further education had enabled 
him to achieve disalienation to such an extent that he could even be a ‘voice of Africa’. However, we 
now learn that it was only when Mphahlele immersed himself in an African atmosphere that Africa was 
finally returned to him. I will shortly return to the significance of this insight.  
 
In “The pleasures of exile” George Lamming (2000: 40) explained that West Indian writers went to 
exile because they were faced with the choice of either taking the risk of dying with bitterness or leaving 
their homelands. Mphahlele (1962: 54) also writes that, “I had to get out or shrivel up with bitterness”. 
Writing for Drum Mphahlele’s writing had been choked with bitterness and protest. Exile emancipated 
Mphahlele from bitterness and he could thus write without a poisoned pen (ibid.). It was in this frame 
of mind that he finished his most acclaimed work, Down Second Avenue (1959). This autobiography 
exposed the harsh realities of growing up under colonialism and Apartheid. This autobiography is a 
demonstration of how much Mphahlele had matured spiritually. His first published work had revealed 
a writer striving after white recognition and assimilation, while his editorials and columns in The Voice 
                                                        
25 I propose this shorthand to draw a contrast between Mphahlele’s vision of constitution and belonging and that 
of dominant forms of Pan-Africanism. This shorthand is my riff on Kwame Nkrumah’s very influential 
proclamation: ‘Seek ye first the political kingdom and all things will be added unto you’. 
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of Africa presented a man who was of necessity outwardly-focused and belligerent. In Down Second 
Avenue, we meet a man who is going down memory lane to re-member himself and begin anew his 
mission of attaining self-conscious personhood. This is to say that autobiographical writing in exile 
enabled this coming-to-self-consciousness writer to critically journey back into his or her ‘ambiguous 
adventure’. This was one of the ‘pleasure of exile’ for Mphahlele. More importantly, away from 
Apartheid, Mphahlele was now compelled to define his identity on other terms than those motivated by 
bitterness and the socio-historical fact of racial subjugation. Mphahlele (2013a: 20) thus recalled that 
landing in Nigeria took away the reactive and bitterness-inflected “crutch” that was central to his idea 
of himself. He was thus compelled to search for other grounds for his self-consciousness and self-
definition than the ones imposed by his behind-the-veil existence. Therefore, as we shall see, his poetics 
diverged from those of Jean-Paul Sartre’s Black Orpheus poets (1964: 13-14). These poets’ négritudist 
poetics were impelled by aggressive dependency and thus a striving towards radical alterity. 
 
Mphahlele landed in a Nigeria that was in the midst of a literary and cultural renaissance. Mphahlele 
threw himself into this renaissance. This renaissance was also his personal rebirth. In addition to 
teaching at a high school and later at a university, he co-established a club for writers and artists. He 
also contributed to and later co-edited the felicitously entitled Black Orpheus journal. In South Africa, 
Mphahlele used to write with “barbed wire between the mouth” (Mphahlele, 2002: 178). For as long as 
he sustained such an oppositional tension he was always distracted from journeying into his own soul. 
Physical exile enabled Mphahlele to begin the voyage towards resolving his spiritual unhomeliness. In 
this regard, Mphahlele explained the work he and his co-editors were doing at Black Orpheus in a 
manner that suggested that he was traversing liminality towards the frontier: “We are pioneers at the 
frontier, seeking a definition of ourselves and the past from which we have come” (Mphahlele cited in 
Benson, 1986: 17). If the colonists’ act of over-running the frontier leads to ‘death of the land’ and ‘the 
relocation of home and the world,’ Mphahlele and his co-editors and contributors were redefining the 
terms of engagement. 
 
It was during this time of trying to take leave of a liminal consciousness that Mphahlele wrote African 
Image (1962). Support for my suggestion that exile enabled Mphahlele to rethink and re-fashion the 
first and second pillars of the Du Boisian manifesto (disalienation and valorisation of group 
consciousness) can be found in the preface of this book. Mphahlele (1962: 16) described this first non-
fiction book of his as a work about, “the sense and nonsense that is often said and thought by whites 
and blacks…about each other and about themselves”. As we shall shortly see, Mphahlele’s intentions 
with this book were to engage in discursive self-determination in order to redefine the terms of 
engagement between himself and colonists. African Image, then, aimed to deconstruct the false image 
that colonialist discourse had imposed on Africa and Africans. To more specifically draw a link with 
my discussions in Part I above, Mphahlele wished to offer a demystified notion of Africanness.  
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We can illustrate Mphahlele’s deconstruction and construction impulses by going back to the section 
of African Image with which I began this chapter. Firstly, we would recall that in that section Mphahlele 
resisted what he regarded as Arendt’s attempts to relegate Africans to a non-world. Mphahlele opened 
that chapter by affirming Africa’s own civilisations and the reality of Africa’s history, a history that he 
(1962: 90) pointed out had been interrupted by missionaries, traders, and then by military conquests. 
However, his wish was not to recover pre-colonial African culture and identity. He instead celebrated 
what he referred to as his “detribalised,” hybrid, but still African identity. His creolising identity ensured 
both a trans-ethnic solidarity and allowed him to, “enjoy the best of both [African and European] 
worlds” (Mphahlele, 1962: 91). It was not that he belonged to both worlds. Rather, he was privy to 
both, and as such he was, “one up” against colonists (Mphahlele, 1962: 66).  
 
Secondly, Mphahlele (1962: 92) warned white settlers that unless they adopt “certain” African ways of 
life they will continue to be materially prosperous but be bedeviled by a strong persisting sense of 
alienation from fellow humans and the surrounding environment. This alienation comes from the fact 
that even though white settlers are no longer European they are not yet African. Therefore, Mphahlele 
turned colonialist discourse on its head to make the charge that it was white settlers who occupied a 
barren liminal ghetto of “unreality”. In this sense, Mphahlele was intimating that European settlers 
suffered from white racial melancholia. I will return to this notion in the next chapter when I outline 
Steve Biko’s vision of (re)constituting the social world. According to Mphahlele, white people 
continued to be settlers because they continued to evade indigenous peoples and the surrounding 
landscape. Settlers masked their [Sartrean] inauthentic existence with a “civilised posture” (ibid.). To 
buttress the point that conquerors were the ones who suffered from spiritual unhomeliness, rootlessness, 
and worldless, Mphahlele mobilised the following passage from Octavio Mannoni’s Prospero and 
Caliban: 
What the colonial in common with Prospero lacks, is awareness of the world of others, a world in which 
others have to be respected. This is the world from which the colonial has fled because he cannot accept 
men as they are. Rejection of that world is combined with the urge to dominate... It is always a question 
of compromising with the desire for a world without men (cited in Mphahlele, 1962: 78-79). 
  
Finally, Mphahlele announced that his mission was to ‘civilise’ white South Africans. Mphahlele’s 
civilising mission, or his burden, aimed to help descendants of colonists to regain worldliness through 
African-centered belonging-to-the-world. Although Mphahlele will later revise African Image, the 
rudiments of his vision of constitution and belonging are found in this 1962 edition. Two features of 
Mphahlele’s then nascent vision of stand out: (i) a desire for a creolising form of Africanness, and (ii) 
the idea that white settlers should be assisted to become and to belong. It is important to point out that 
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of African otherness. As we saw in the previous chapter, 1960s Africa was the zenith of political and 
epistemological decolonisation and radical discourses of otherness. As I discussed in Part I, these 
ideologies promoted ideas of ‘Africa for Africans’ and of ‘African authenticity’. Mphahlele entitled 
this chapter “Going my way?”. This title suggests that Mphahlele was aware that his constitution and 
belonging vision was incongruent with dominant Pan-Africanist visions. 
 
To be sure, Mphahlele opened African Image with a critique of the notion of “African Personality”. 
Mphahlele’s (1962: 19-20) main argument against this concept invented by Edward Blyden was that it 
does not have any ontological reality. Mphahlele (1962: 21) conceded that the evocation and invocation 
of the idea of African Personality might have some resonance in the field of politics. However, even on 
this plane, divergent understandings of what freedom ought to entail made an all-encompassing idea of 
African Personality “nonsense” (ibid.). According to Mphahlele (1962: 23), if necessary at all, the 
search for this identity should be confined to personal quests undertaken by physically and culturally 
exiled leaders. Morphed into a national quest, this personal quest became “re-colonisation” of people 
who were never wrenched from their ‘traditional’ communities and culture (ibid.)    
 
Mphahlele carried the same critique against Négritude in chapter two of his deconstruction and 
reconstruction of the African Image. Mphahlele inquired, “What price ‘Négritude’?”. He answered that 
the price that came with Négritude were romanticism, exoticism, and the calcification of African 
cultures. Mphahlele specifically rejected the purity stance adopted by most négritudist artists and 
thinkers. He asserted that such a stance is an unnecessary deception. Again, Mphahlele empathised with 
the fact that Négritudism was being embraced by ‘liminalised’ Africans desperate for ways to deal with 
their psychic restlessness. He (1962: 27), however, warned that the Négritude movement was 
unfortunately, “too preoccupied with anthropological creepy-crawlies” to sufficiently deal with the 
dilemma of double consciousness. In this way, Mphahlele anticipated Mudimbe and Appiah’s post-
structuralist critiques. Finally, in an earlier paper entitled “The cult of Négritude,” Mphahlele (1961: 
50) went as far as to argue that the Négritude project was not a decolonising project because it was a 
project propagated by returning “middle class disciples” intent on “auto-colonising” the rest of the 
continent.  
 
Mphahlele’s 1962 book is, therefore, an early exposé of the potential pitfalls of the Du Boisian 
manifesto of constitution and belonging. Mphahlele’s warning was that Pan-Africanism and Négritude 
leaders never actually exit the liminal world. Instead, these elites imposed their own image of African 
rebirth and Africanity based on their particular socio-cultural station and psychic predicaments. Their 
salvationist efforts amounted to “auto-colonisation’. Finally, Mphahlele observed that these leaders 
recolonise the non-transcultural majority by elaborating a static notion of “African culture”. Rather than 
learning from the unassimilated majority (‘the source’), these elites deployed an aggressive anti-western 
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discourse which was nevertheless a colonialist discourse because it was based on ‘anthropological 
creepy crawlies’.  
 
3.2.2 Of prodigals and the (re)constitution of home 
 
Mphahlele would later adjust his attitude towards Négritude and African Personality. He now granted 
that both of these ideologies could be useful launching pads to spark the “spiritual odyssey” of 
transcultural persons. Mphahlele now perceived that these movements of return aimed to convert 
spiritually and culturally exiled leaders into prodigals. Following the leitmotif of Leopold Senghor’s 
poetry, Mphahlele (1982: 38) understood that returning elites were prodigals not because they had 
squandered their heritage; rather they had tried to bury it. Thus deracinated individuals suffered from 
disinherited imaginations (Mphahlele, 1982: 36-37). They were personalities uprooted from their 
African beliefs and epistemologies. Mphahlele’s position was that he would support these ideologies of 
return if the impetus behind them was to facilitate the prodigal leader’s re-appropriation of their home-
culture, and thus identity. Such a return would then be an endeavor to contribute to the reconstitution 
of self and home; rather than a ‘recolonisation’ endeavor.   
 
To my mind, Mphahlele’s most insightful contribution to the debates around disalienation and post-
colonial becoming was his warning that the return would always be a “qualified return” (Mphahlele, 
1982: 38). The leader’s return is qualified between the transcultural leader can never, should never, 
completely purge his or her western stream of consciousness. Secondly, the return is constrained by the 
fact that to stage their return an alienated person naturally deploys equipment typically associated with 
western modernity such as novels, poetry, and history books. It is from this perspective that Gambia’s 
Lenrie Peter’s deployed the metaphor of “Parachute Men” to describe these prodigals. It is precisely 
because the exiled elite seeks to stage their return using western equipment, dramatised here by a 
parachute, that the return is awkward, and it is always a beginning:  
The violent arrival 
Puts out of the joint 
Earth has nowhere to go 
You are at the starting point.  
Jumping across worlds 
In condensed time 
After the awkward fall 
We are always at the starting point (cited in Mphahlele, 1982: 39).  
 
Another factor that conditions ‘the return’ is the fact that home-culture is dynamic; it is not a “museum 
specimen” (Mphahlele, 2002: 96). The fact that ‘the source’ is inherently syncretic and that the 
encounter with western modernity has altered it means that the ancestral shrine is now painted with 
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paints obtained from the urban center, the ‘traditional’ dress is adorned with fabrics and beads obtained 
from Europeans, the ‘ancient’ music now issues from electric guitars, and the ‘original’ poetry now 
carries inflections from elsewhere. The ‘source’ is thus neither wholly traceable to an original Past nor 
is it hybrid in the sense I discussed in chapter 1 above as being ‘almost-European’. Rather, ‘the source’ 
is creolising in the sense used by Jane Gordon (2014: 167) to call attention to historically colonised 
cultural practices that have been altered by their encounter with western modernity while still remaining 
“authentically” African, for example. To borrow from Ashish Nandy’s idea of the spiritually and 
culturally ‘uncolonised’ Indian as the Other Orient (2011: 72), the source is the Other African. ‘Other 
African’ because in its dynamism “it assimilates – i.e. adopts – while it can also resist” harmful aspects 
of western modernity (Mphahlele, 2002: 96). Mphahlele’s proposal, then, was that to circumvent 
nativism, decolonising modes of redemptive returns/returning ought to aim (i) to remember, re-member, 
and recreate African myths and cultures, and then (ii) to continue assimilating and domesticating aspects 
of western modernity on African terms. In this way, the return is a return to the principle of originary 
syncretism. Furthermore, understood in this way, the return is always a starting point.  
 
To sum up the journey so far: physical exile enabled Mphahlele to recreate the first and second pillars 
of the Du Boisian manifesto. This is because physical exile helped Mphahlele to both regain Africa and 
to deconstruct Africanness. Furthermore, exile enabled Mphahlele to begin to reclaim and redefine his 
African identity without the poetics of bitterness, pain and ‘pathology of alienation’. Finally, being an 
outsider endowed Mphahlele with a unique perspective to critically evaluate how in the course of 
putative homemaking transcultural leaders deepened homelessness and unhomeliness. As we will see 
later, Mphahlele will later deploy these exilic insights in his trenchant critique of South Africa’s post-
1990 ‘nation-building’ processes.  
 
 3.2.3 Africa is not for Africans 
 
My main aim in this sub-section is to bring Mphahlele’s experience to bear on proposals of 
homelessness-as-home. As we have seen, exile not only launched Mphahlele on a spiritual odyssey; it 
also endowed him with what Said calls a scrupulous subjectivity. Invoking Said is, however, also a 
reminder that the exilic condition should not be romanticised. Said (1994: 35) mourned that exile is 
“one of the saddest fates” that can befall a person. The condition is sad and fraught with danger because 
the exiled person could be thrown into another liminal world, “neither completely at one with the new 
setting nor fully disencumbered of the old, beset with half-involvements and half-attachments” (Said, 
1994: 36). It is with this experience in mind that Mphahlele ([1974]1984: 6) aimed to demonstrate that 
exile-living is “fragmented” living. He conveyed this sentiment by way of a fictionalised autobiography 
he entitled The Wanderers (1974). In Mphahlele’s case, he had taken flight into other parts of Africa in 
search of the daytime of home after the uncanniness and nightmare of the occupied home. However, he 
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found himself caught between daytime and nightmare. Exile-living thus came with its own 
ambivalence: “from innocence to experience to the acceptance and resentment of placelessness…,” 
wrote Mphahlele (2013a: 126). 
 
Mphahlele’s engagement with African ideologues of radical alterity had convinced him that an all-
embracing African identity that all Africans belong to does not exist. At the same time, the more he 
lived in Nigeria the more he came to realise that the rhetoric of Pan-Africanism and African unity was 
simply rhetoric. Mphahlele and his family were never allowed to be part of the Nigerian society. They 
were embraced by a small group of professionals and artists composed mainly of inter-racial couples. 
Mphahlele was thus thrown into a form of ‘Fringe Living’ he had resisted in segregated South Africa. 
He could not assimilate into Nigerian society. He could only be an expat. Addressing The Wanderers, 
Mphahlele declaimed as follows:   
You’re an expatriate. Take your chances, tread softly, human cultures have stone walls. Find the crevice 
and dig your way through and don’t try to go further than it allows you. Africa has several enclaves with 
walls and around them and several crevices in the walls (Mphahlele, 1984: 247-248).  
 
To live as an expat, Mphahlele (2013a: 3) thus lamented, is to live in the bubble of the “international 
community”. Mphahlele advised African exiled intellectuals to give up the quest for ‘full belonging’. 
Rather, they must take their chances in interstitial spaces/crevices. However, “what are we seeking 
when we enter through the crevices?” asked Mphahlele (ibid.). Mphahlele partially answered this 
question in “Africa in Exile” (1982). Mphahlele (1982: 33) provisionally agreed with Paul Toberi’s 
suggestion that border-living in exile  could be a positive endeavor because it enables the exiled person 
to keep his or her own national and spiritual identity. It is this retention that ensures a contrapuntal 
consciousness. There are, however, costs to the exile holding fervently to his or her own national and 
spiritual identity. Firstly, as Mphahlele inquires above, what then is the point of leaving home and 
seeking belonging elsewhere? Secondly, as Achebe reminds us in the previous chapter, the privilege of 
proudly carrying and affirming home-culture wherever one goes is a luxury often only available to 
western intellectuals. Thirdly, and even more pertinently, what is the African exile’s own spiritual 
identity when colonisation had degraded and suppressed the autochthonous spiritual world and 
produced spiritually colonised elites?  
 
Indeed, as Mphahlele (1982: 33) noted, the majority of African artists and intellectuals cross borders 
not for professional reasons, but because they hanker after “spiritual self-fulfillment”. For these 
displaced people, Theodor Adorno’s writing-as-dwelling (Said, 1994: 43) would, therefore, not suffice. 
According to Mphahlele (1984: 234) the condition of a specular intellectual in crevices is essentially a 
“condition of anonymity”. Speaking of his fictionalised self, Mphahlele wrote that, “he wanted just as 
many people as could feel his presence and give him a sense of community” (ibid.). In contradistinction 
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to border-living and the bubble of the expat community, he preferred African humanness/ubuntu-living 
amongst other people because the community, “gives me reason for being alive” (Mphahlele, 1984: 
73). Too often, however, the exiled African finds that this kind of ubuntu-living is out of reach. Rampant 
‘tribalism,’ xenophobia and chauvinism denied Mphahlele embeddedness in the Nigerian society 
(Mphahlele, 1984: 286). In Kenya, the political elites boycotted the African cultural centre that 
Mphahlele had established. Instead, they choose to frequent the once ‘European-only’ establishment. 
Most of the Kenyans he was working with at the cultural centre eventually turned out to be xenophobes. 
They would later conspire against him and force him to abandon the centre.  
 
Mphahlele had no choice but to take up PhD studies in the USA. After finishing his PhD studies (the 
manuscript of The Wanderer constituted his PhD submission), Mphahlele’s wife insisted to the reluctant 
Mphahlele that they should return to Africa. Mphahlele applied for and received a lectureship position 
at the University of Zambia. When the Mphahleles arrived in Zambia, Zambia had recently signed a 
peace and co-operation pact with the Apartheid regime and sentiments against South African refugees 
were prevalent. Mphahlele’s experience in Zambia caused him to decide to abandon Africa. Mphahlele 
thus learned that the “Black World” could be as uncanny and unhomely as the left-behind ‘dead land’. 
Instead of helping him end his spiritual unhomeliness and homelessness exile became, “a ghetto of the 
soul” (Mphahlele, 1987: 57); “often a soul-mutilating process” (Mphahlele, 1984: 6). 
 
3.2.4 ‘The tyranny of place’ 
 
Mphahlele returned to the USA in 1970 to take up a post of associate professor of literature at his alma 
mater, the University of Denver. By the time he left Africa his lived experience as an African 
exile/wanderer confirmed to him that the idea of African unity – if not ‘Africa’ itself - was just rhetoric. 
In Africa he had become just another “black alien” (Mphahlele, 1984: 6). Years living in the crevices 
of Nigerian, Kenyan, and Zambian societies taught him that there is, “no use in assuming an immediate 
common heritage among blacks everywhere. No use” (Mphahlele, 1984: 247). Having left South Africa 
to seek belonging in “the Black World”, Mphahlele’s distressing experience led him to question the 
existence of this world. “The ironies and paradoxes of the black world. Oh the games we play with one 
another…,” Mphahlele (2013a: 126) thus reflected.  
 
To be sure, Mphahlele was uncomfortable with the idea of “the Black World”. In “Your History 
Demands Your Heartbeat: Historical Survey of the Encounter between Africans and African 
Americans,” Mphahlele traced the history of exchange of ideas, concepts, aesthetics and bodies between 
black South Africans and black Americans. In a largely autobiographical section, Mphahlele (2002: 
159) recalled that black South Africans first took a flight into ‘the Black World’ to escape their 
conditions of conquest, subjugation, and the denial of the fruits of western modernity. New Africans 
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looked towards New Negroes as exemplars that a person could be black and still thrive in western 
modernity. This “lofty myth” was exploded for Mphahlele when he began reading black American 
radical literature and engaging in a sustained correspondence with Langston Hughes.  
 
Secondly, not only did black South Africans have a false picture of their American counterparts, many 
USA black internationalists also had a false picture of Africa. In the process of seeking to rediscover 
Africa and fashion it as their spiritual anchorage they ‘primitivised’ and exoticised Africa. In his 
reflections, Mphahlele thus agreed with Alain Locke’s assessment that these Pan-Africanists adopted a 
“Caucasian strain” in their imagining of Africa (cited in Mphahlele, 2002: 168). Thirdly, Mphahlele’s 
skepticism of black internationalism focused on its ‘return to Africa’ ideology. He derided people of 
African descent who returned to ‘the motherland’ often, “prepared to eat the dust under our feet in self-
abasement in an attempt to identify with Africa” (Mphahlele, 1963: 82). He (ibid.) thus expressed 
agreement with the once self-exiled James Baldwin’s contention that black Americans will have to fight 
their struggle, and resolve their spiritual striving, in the USA as “native sons” of the USA. 
 
Finally, Mphahlele bemoaned the fact that black elites in the diaspora dominated the discourse about 
the spiritual strivings of people of African descent. Specifically, as Appiah would later contend, 
Mphahlele (1973: 174) worried that New World transcultural figures had introduced an unhelpful 
element of race consciousness to the discourse about the problems of African belonging and becoming. 
Mphahlele’s main concern was that the result of this was that too much focus was put on race and 
racism. This focus distracted Africans from fundamental tasks facing them. These tasks include 
resolving the ambivalences riddling transcultural Africans, reclaiming and redefining African identity, 
and achieving cultural and political self-responsibility.  
 
Mphahlele’s main publication in the USA was a collection of essays that engaged critically with the 
dilemma that Du Bois first set out in his 1897 meditation on belonging, identity, and constitution. This 
dilemma is whether Americans of African descent should seek a cultural and symbolic return to Africa 
or assert their identity as black Americans. The crux of Mphahlele’s argument in Voices in the 
Whirlwind (1973) was that black Americans must seek their being-becoming in the USA (see in general, 
Mphahlele, 1973). Mphahlele feared that most black poetry was excessively bitter and too focused on 
protest to enable this project of being-becoming. Black American interlocutors were stunned by 
Mphahlele’s appraisal. They labeled him an “Afro-Saxon or Euro-African” who had lost touch with his 
African identity (Manganyi, 1983: 272-273). They suggested that Mphahlele was an interloper who had 
failed to penetrate and understand ‘African-American’ culture (ibid.). 
 
Once again, the Mphahleles were thrown entirely upon themselves because they refused all manner of 
what Said calls egregious belongings. They had to negotiate the “dark alley” of exile alone (Mphahlele, 
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2013a: 53). While the USA was professionally more fulfilling than Africa; spiritually the country did 
not ease Mphahlele’s spiritual restlessness. It was during this time that Mphahlele rediscovered ‘African 
humanism’. Having to negotiate the “dark alley” of exile by themselves, the Mphahleles took heart in 
the words uttered by Gita teacher Vinoba Bhave. Bhave had suggested that even when one is facing 
hardship (the ghetto of exile, or prison in the case of Bhave) “the heart can be tuned to produce unbroken 
music” (cited in Mphahlele, 1987: n.p.). Mphahlele’s inner meditation brought the realisation that 
Afrikan (sic) humanness is his unbroken music:  
We carried the song across countries 
over oceans 
over snow-topped mountains 
Afrika (sic) my music (ibid.).26  
 
Mphahlele’s rediscovery of and immersion in Afrikan humanness enabled him to finally and truly begin 
the process of exiting the liminal world he first entered when he was sent to school. The insight here is 
that during the transition from ‘second sight’ to recovery of ‘first sight the liminal person must 
remember and re-member the unceasing but muted song of Afrikan humanness. This continuous song 
is a tonic against ‘inner melancholia’ and will become a lodestar that guides the alienated person back 
home. Mphahlele’s voyage out of liminality is similar to the route Josiane Nespoulous-Neuville 
suggests Senghor took to re-suture himself with “the Kingdom of Childhood”: 
First stage is the trial of separation... [ neophytes] feel like outsiders in an alien and threatening world…  
The second stage brings the first major trial, the anguish of a night of initiation…come to grips with the 
existential agony of darkness.  
The third stage is that of the initiatory teaching itself. Presence and transcendence are experienced 
through the rituals of death and rebirth…This is an immersion in the invigorating wellspring of Négritude 
…The last stage opens the way to a new fullness of being (Nespoulous-Neuville, 1999: xxiii-xxiv.) 
 
Afrikan humanness had always accompanied Mphahlele during his wanderings through ‘the dark alley’ 
of exile. However, he could not connect to this philosophy of life because he sought spiritual edification 
elsewhere. In the USA, Mphahlele had flung himself into the ivory tower of the academia. He did not 
feel the weight of exile as long as he immersed himself in work and gloried in an intellectually-
stimulating life (Mphahlele, 2013a: 113). However, unlike Adorno’s homeland-less exile figure that 
dwells in writing, such a stance is more suited to a person who is egocentric. As we have come to 
                                                        
26 Mphahlele’s decision in the early 1980s to evoke and invoke Afrika with a ‘k’ is a profoundly decolonial 
decision. Firstly, it is an understanding that “Africa” is an externally imposed appellation and identity. Secondly, 
following Mphahlele demystification of Africanity, this decision is an indication of his discomfort with prevailing 
essentialising discourses of Africanness. At the same time, having had Africa restored to him in West Africa, 
desiring to contribute to the de-Europeanisation of the continent, and now reclaiming the spirit of Afrikan 
Humanness, he needed to hold on to an African identity, “even if we have to create a myth” (Mphahlele, 2013a: 
135).   
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understand, Mphahlele was not an individualist. He longed for ubuntu-living. The Sartrean existentialist 
direction was, therefore, not an option for Mphahlele (Godzich, 1988: 29).  
 
Afrikan humanness demanded of Mphahlele to seek a ‘real’ place with people, “not place in the theatre 
of the mind. But a place that contains real life” (Mphahlele, 2013a: 126). At the same time, Mphahlele 
realised that he was still psychologically imprisoned to South Africa: he kept having nightmares in 
which he was hounded by those he left behind in South Africa (Mphahlele, 1984: 313). Additionally, 
he was, in spite of himself, still saddled with bitterness and was still burdened with racial reflexes 
learned in South Africa (Mphahlele, 1984: 312). He could not put South Africa behind him. He (1987: 
49) characterised this tug of the occupied home as, “the tyranny of place”.  
 
This tyranny imposed various ambivalent stances and Mphahlele found himself, “doing everything to 
court and diminish alternately the tyranny of place” (Mphahlele, 2013a: 125). Those exiles that 
attempted to escape this tyranny suffered severe depression and melancholia leading to early alcohol-
induced deaths: “My days have fallen/into nightmarish despair,” then USA-based poet Keorapetse 
Kgositsile lamented (cited in Mphahlele, 1982: 45).27 The despair is caused by the reality that the writer 
can only produce “imaginary homelands” (Rushdie, 1991: 10). This feeling is exacerbated by the 
frustration that comes from the fact that the exiled writer is producing art that cannot be enjoyed by 
those it is intended for (Mphahlele, 1982: 45). Feeling even more alienated, the exile writer turns to 
writing for, “that vaguely defined ‘world intelligence’” (ibid.) For Mphahlele this was not good enough 
(2013a: 169). The pursuit of world intelligence is ultimately a striving after ‘disembodied universalism’. 
A revolutionary writer abroad thus became an “disembodied voice” (Mphahlele, 2013a: 123). For the 
Mphahleles, ‘placelessness’ was aggravated by the fact that the work that Mphahlele and his wife were 
doing, teaching and social work respectively, demanded a community and a cultural milieu if it was 
going to be relevant to nation-building (Mphahlele, 2013a: 160). Mphahlele came to realise that a black 
foreign intellectual was ultimately irrelevant to the USA education system and its cultural goals 
(Mphahlele, 2013a: 159).  
 
In 1975, a friend with whom Mphahlele had founded The Voice of Africa and a theatre group in Soweto 
in the 1950s came to visit the Mphahleles. This friend had never left South Africa but was spiritually 
and culturally fulfilled. He had set up theatre groups across South Africa. Later that year, Mphahlele 
                                                        
27 Author Nortje, the black South African poet who killed himself in Oxford in 1970, conveyed this sense of 
despair and psychic dislocation in a poem entitled “Waiting”. From a distance, exile seemed full of pleasurable 
possibilities and endless vistas. In actual fact, exiling-living is one big pause that interrupted being-becoming: 
“The isolation of exile is a gutted/warehouse at the back of pleasure streets;/the waterfront of limbo stretches 
paranomically….” (Nortje, 1992: 83). Nat Nakasa, who famously embraced Fringe Living,’ jumped to his death 
in New York City in 1965. Nakasa’s melancholia and depression were caused by the fact that he had become a, 
“native of nowhere...a stateless man [and] a wanderer” (Nakasa, 2005: 203). 
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wrote a letter to this friend in which he claimed that, “but for the academic and intellectual and literary 
growth I have experienced outside [South Africa] the whole exercise in exile can be written off as utter 
waste” (Mphahlele, 2010: 254-255). Mphahlele was being slightly hyperbolic here to convey feelings 
of deep frustration and despair. The ‘tyranny of place’ will not let him be. After twenty years in bodily 
exile, the Mphahleles returned to Apartheid South Africa. 
 
3.3 Towards the Ending of ‘First Exile’: Reconstitution of Self and Nation 
 
Mphahlele (2013a: 234) recalled that he left South Africa an agnostic but came back as a firm believer 
in Afrikan humanness. Therefore, bodily exile enabled Mphahlele to descend further into the night of 
the ambiguous adventure to accomplish his spiritual odyssey, and thus attain self-conscious 
personhood. Mphahlele was fifty-five years old when he returned to South Africa. The Mphahleles had 
not, however, come back to ease themselves into old age and retirement. Rather, the spirit of Afrikan 
Humanness impelled them to come back to establish their seriti, their ‘presence’ (Mphahlele, 2013a: 
183). The Mphahleles felt deprived of seriti in exile because they could not embed themselves in any 
community. They were unable to contribute to the cultural and spiritual welfare of those around them. 
They thus continued to suffer spiritual restlessness and worldlessness. This is because seriti (lit. a 
shadow) is more than an individual’s existential quest for appearance. It is a, “life force by which a 
community of persons are connected to each other” (Cornell and Muvangua, 2012: 529). From an 
Afrikan humanness perspective, then, seriti cannot manifest through narrative self-disclosure as 
Arendt’s notions of appearance and worldliness would suggest.  
 
The ethical prescriptions of Afrikan humanness charged Mphahlele with the responsibility of 
contributing to the cosmic harmony of his ancestral home. Cosmic harmony is realised when there is 
cultural, spiritual, and political justice. The more a person contributes to this task, the more that person’s 
own being-becoming and being-belonging are realised. A person’s striving against rootlessness and 
spiritual unhomeliness would not be effective without such a contribution.  Since the exilic condition 
is both internal and external, Mphahlele (1984: 6) summed up the imperative of returning as follows: 
“there are no heroes, outside the possibility of return and the war to reclaim your country”. Can the 
exile truly return? Can home ever be truly reclaimed? What did Mphahlele mean when he said ‘the 
return ‘is always a qualified enterprise? This final section of this chapter is animated by these three 
questions.  
 
Mphahlele interviewed for several university posts when he came back to South Africa. Inevitably, 
white interviewers were patronising and racist. Mphahlele’s biographer hears Mphahlele lamenting: 
“…on the verge of severing my links with life in exile I was again entering another version of spiritual 
exile” (Manganyi, 1983: 29). To deal decisively with the condition of exile that had gnawed since he 
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was a child Mphahlele had, therefore, to boomerang into a third exile. It is this third exile that would 
potentiate ‘second sight’ back into ‘first sight’. Let us get to the main point of this last section. 
Mphahlele’s homecoming and homemaking endeavors carry three important lessons for one part of my 
two-fold thesis. This is the part that relates to the exigency for the spiritually-alienated future 
constitution-maker to return from the liminal world and re-suture himself or herself with ‘the source’. 
I have argued that such a return and re-suturing are indispensable to overcoming racial melancholia. 
Mphahlele’s return to Apartheid South Africa offers three inter-related lessons. First, it is not a matter 
of simply re-suturing and re-membering oneself with ‘the source’. ‘The source’ might itself be in need 
of being re-membered and reconstituted. Second, exile(s) gifts the prodigal leader with a ‘double 
perspective’ that can empower the returnee to engage critically with ‘the source’ without needing to 
adopt a fugitive or liminal positionality in relation to own community. Third, such a prospective 
constitution-maker can then be in a position to elaborate terms of belonging and constitution that move 
constitution and belonging struggles beyond constitutionalism and towards constitutionness - never-
ending processes of seeking ways ‘to stand together’ and ‘to fit together’. 
 
Let us continue with Mphahlele’s third exile. Not only was Mphahlele entering another form of spiritual 
exile, he was also returning to a people very much in exile. The year before Mphahlele’s return (1976) 
the Apartheid regime had responded to the Youth Uprising against Bantu Education by killing and 
injuring hundreds of children and detaining thousands more. As the Mphahleles were making their way 
back to South Africa, hundreds of children were either in detention or preparing to go the other way 
into exile. Furthermore, a denuded survivalist culture had taken hold in the black ghettoes thus 
overshadowing the ‘traditional’ culture of Afrikan humanness. The Mphahleles were, thus, coming back 
to a spiritually, “colonised people…” (Mphahlele, 2013a: 237). It is for this reason that Mphahlele titled 
a post-return short stories collection of his Renewal Time (1988). Or as he put in the preface to another 
collection of short stories published shortly after his return, “by revolution I understand renewal” (1981: 
xii). Freedom time is renewal time because conquest led to ‘death of the land’. Mphahlele was coming 
to contribute to the renewal of his people and to prepare them for liberation.  
 
As I suggested in the introductory chapter, spiritual rebirth and the (re)constitution of the spiritual world 
is a premier task because the enigma of homemaking or the primary constitutional paradox for a 
historically conquered people is that to ‘resurrect the land’ they ought themselves to become new at 
cultural and spiritual levels. Since colonial occupation first took place at spiritual and cultural planes, 
de-occupation must start there too. In this regard, in Devil on the Cross, a novel about neo-colonialism 
in Kenya, Ngūgī’ wa Thiong’o has one of the characters pose this constitutive question as follows:  
This country, our country is pregnant. What it will give birth to, God only knows…Our country should 
have given birth to its offspring long ago…What it lacks is a midwife…The question is this: who is 
responsible for the pregnancy? (Ngūgī, 1987: 45-46). 
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In a situation of neither political nor cultural revolution, the pregnancy is not provoked by the majority 
non-elites; they are not the constituent power. The new nation is stillborn because its midwives are men 
and women who are themselves not yet home because they are not yet reborn. Therefore, contrary to 
Nkrumah’s renowned injunction that African revolutionaries must ‘seek first the political kingdom and 
all else will follow,’ but similar to the Indian nationalists discussed by Partha Chatterjee in The Nation 
and its Fragments (1993: 7), Mphahlele understood that the first stage towards homemaking must 
involve a reclaiming and rebuilding of spiritual and cultural liberation. Mphahlele’s experience in 
Kenya had taught him that political independence that is not preceded by cultural and spiritual 
independence often led to independence and mobility for the transcultural elite minority, and invisibility 
and stagnation for the non-modern majority. Furthermore, rampant corruption and the lack of 
humanness generally exhibited by state elites are the result of the fact that the historically de-worlded 
come to power/into office without intra-, inter-, and cosmic re-membering of the spiritual world.  
 
Mphahlele had returned before any intimation of revolution and before the commencement of the 
process of negotiated settlement with the hope of contributing to the process of creating a renewed and 
thus decolonising constituent power. In this regard, Mphahlele (1974: 64), echoing Frantz Fanon, 
posited that the aim of becoming independent is to forge a national consciousness. Fanon makes a 
distinction between nationalism and national consciousness. Nationalism without national 
consciousness, Fanon observed, leads to neo-colonialism, chauvinism and xenophobia. This is what 
Mphahlele experienced in ‘independent Africa’. More importantly, Fanon demonstrated that the 
development of national consciousness is aimed at the rebirth of the nation. This rebirth is only possible 
when both the nation and nationalist elites are disalienated (Fanon, 1970: 114-115). In turn, national 
consciousness is a prerequisite of a truly national culture. Here we would recall Mphahlele’s 1955 
speech at the historic gathering for the Freedom Charter (the second epigraph at the head of the chapter) 
that he looks forward to a day when interculturality will be the source of nation-becoming and ‘standing 
together[ness]’. The ultimate aim of Mphahlele’s renewal project was to contribute towards the forging 
of the second pillar of the Du Boisian manifesto. The aim here is to contribute to the fashioning of group 
consciousness in order to lay seeds for a future national consciousness. I will shortly outline how 
Mphahlele’s strategy avoids ‘the pitfalls of nationalism’. 
 
In a mid-1980s essay that was very critical of Mphahlele’s decision to return to Apartheid, Ntongela 
Masilela (n.d: n.p), a South African USA-based scholar, granted that Mphahlele’s return had led to new 
politics of cultural intervention. Mphahlele threw his energy towards helping to refashion the education 
and literature of his people. This is because Mphahlele recognised that literature is an important tool in 
building national consciousness (see also Okolo, 2007: 22; Irele, 2001: 7; JanMohamed, 1983: 266). In 
the case of 1980s South Africa, the black cultural landscape was dominated by the protest literature 
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inspired by the praxis of Black Consciousnes. Mphahlele immediately started holding writing 
workshops with the aim of shifting young black artists beyond protest culture. We will recall that almost 
immediately after leaving South Africa, Mphahlele was convinced that protest art might lead to an 
atrophy of imagination and thus waylay the artist from the urgent task of rediscovering the self and 
community. “Excessive protest poisons one’s system,” Mphahlele (1962: 54) had written. Taking stock 
of black South African literature in the 1980s, Mphahlele worried that the poetry and the fiction of the 
time was not moving beyond the anguish of the moment. Mphahlele (2002: 176) insisted that even 
under conditions of repression the artist’s job is to move the people beyond the social reality of ‘white 
savagery,’ for example.  
 
One of Mphahlele’s (1974: 270) key insights is that a work of literature must contribute to the process 
of post-colonial becoming even before the end of formal colonialism by helping to determine, “what 
kind of society we want, how we are going to get there….” Protest literature was not fit for this purpose 
because it conscripted the colonised people to the moment. This is because such a literature lacked a 
myth; “the myth…that there is tomorrow” (Mphahlele interview with Manganyi, 2010: 485). Writing 
in 1982 (2002: 96) Mphahlele was clear that confronting the fact that there is tomorrow forces a 
colonised people to engage with that “other liberation” which has to do with, “the freedom of mind, of 
the spirit”. It is only when a shift is made from protest literature to a literature that aims to decolonise 
the mind and spirit, and that thus construct a national consciousness, that a move can be made from 
what David Scott (2004: 7) refers to as a move from “anti-colonial longing to post-colonial becoming” 
(see also, Motha, 2010: 287).  
 
The crucial lesson we can draw from Mphahlele is that if a westernised intellectual wishes to contribute 
to collective processes of being-becoming, then such an intellectual must stage a return; a return in the 
first place from melancholia and aggressive dependency. Furthermore, even if the writer seeks to move 
beyond protest literature to a literature that contributes towards national consciousness, as long as the 
writer is still alienated from home-culture, he or she would only produce a literature that contributes to 
more confusion and dislocation. Therefore, although artists can help forge a national consciousness by 
resolving the Manichean ‘dialogue’ and merging the various streams of consciousness: 
when the dialogue is simply a rhetorical projection of mind and feeling or self-indulgent nostalgia on the 
part of the poet who in reality stays aloof from village life just on the edge of town or from life as it is 
lived by his people at the basic level, the tone sounds phoney, at best a militant posture (Mphahlele, 1974: 
288-289. My emphasis)   
 
It is of major significance, therefore, that Mphahlele’s first substantial post-return research project 
involved travelling to the rural northern part of South Africa to collect and record live performances of 
oral poetry. This research project on orature should be seen as part of Mphahlele’s quest to reclaim and 
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re-center his ancestral heritage.28 As Mphahlele often averred, it is in poetry that the wisdom, values, 
and beliefs of the autochthonous home are kept (Mphahlele, 2002: 143). Mphahlele had started to 
reclaim the spirit of Afrikan humanness whilst he was a wandering ‘black alien’; and now on his return 
he was going back to “the source” to learn about contemporary Afrikan humanness. This process 
enabled him to avoid the pitfalls of négritudist ‘cultural revival’ and Pan-Africanist salvationist forging 
of group consciousness. From his voyages to the non-modern colonised, Mphahlele’s view that Afrikan 
culture is not static was confirmed. He learned that contemporary Afrikan culture is creolising. What 
enables this creolisation, as I discussed in Part 1 above, is the fact that at the base of this culture is a 
humanness that, “has never sought to shut out anybody. It has always been a humanism that could 
absorb many things, influences, members” (Mphahlele interview with Manganyi, 2010: 467). 
Mphahlele was learning that principles of originary syncretism and permeability of boundaries were 
being kept alive by ‘the source’. 
 
Therefore, staging returns, re-asserting the lived philosophy of Afrikan humanness, and exalting a 
creolising Afrikan culture of the non-modern majority are at the heart of becoming post-colonial. 
Mphahlele (2002: 137) warned, however, that in this quest the imperative is not to fight a ‘rearguard 
action’ by trying to revive a supposedly pure traditional culture. He echoed Fanon by asserting that the 
mission of his generation was different from that of their grandparents: “different times make and 
demand different heroes” (Mphahlele, 1984: 345). The mission of his generation was to end traumatic 
ambivalences and the marginalisation of modern Afrikan culture. Their mission was to work towards 
an “African synthesis” (Mphahlele declared, 2002: 74). Under colonialism Africans had been forced to 
assimilate aspects of western modernity on the colonisers’ terms (Mphahlele, 2002: 242). The outcome 
of this was what Mphahlele (2002: 19) called a “confused hybridity”. This is what led to a disinheritance 
of African imagination (ibid.). The redemptive return will enable the reclamation of imagination. 
Africans would then be empowered to take charge of the process of synthesis (ibid). Afrikan humanness-
driven synthesis is the sine qua non of post-colonial constitution and belonging: “This, after all, is how 
multiculturalism can rise to nonracialism, which goes concurrently with the intercultural enterprise, 
before the latter totally refines and supercedes it” (Mphahlele, 2002: 82. My emphasis). This 
creolisaition proposal is another proof that Mphahlele’s constitution and belonging vision transcended 
those of Négritudism and Pan-Africanism.  
 
However, Mphahlele contended that the post-dialectic inter-cultural moment would only become 
possible if black people took steps to “strengthen” themselves first (Interview with Manganyi, 2010: 
                                                        
28 Orature, simply put, is literature transmitted by word of mouth (Ngūgī, 2007: 4). Pitika Ntuli, a South African 
polymath, extended this concept to emphasise that the fusion of all art forms is the basic characteristic of orature 
(ibid.). More importantly for our purposes, this fusion assist in re-memberance and spiritual wholeness because it 
expresses a more profound wholeness and totality of life (Ngūgī, 2007: 5). 
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484). Mphahlele’s Afrikan humanness strategy, therefore, carried elements of Black Consciousness 
philosophy. This is because Mphahlele understood that in a colonial situation before Afrikan humanness 
can reestablish itself as the lived philosophy of the nation-in-formation, the humanity of black people 
needed to be affirmed first (Rafapa, 2006: 11). If this is not done, we could find a situation where the 
discourse of African humanness/Ubuntu is ubiquitous but the majority of Bantu (black people) continue 
to experience dehumanisation. Relatedly, Mphahlele emphatically rejected the multi-party 
negotiations’s discourse of non-racialism: “I can’t see myself running around celebrating my non-
something [being non-racial] instead of my somethingness: the fact of being African” (Mphahlele, 
2002: 18). Therefore, in line with a revolutionary humanness that demands a renewal of and a 
reasserting of Afrikan identity Mphahlele warned that it was a mistake to put all efforts at becoming a 
“non-racial society”. Mphahlele advanced two reasons for this. Firstly, non-racialism does not resolve 
the fact that transcultural black people still suffer from spiritual exile. In the “post-Apartheid” era the 
transcultural ex-conquered would thus still be ‘Neither-Nor’ spiritually homeless characters. The 
immediate task, Mphahlele argued, “[i]s not to try and win over whites to the side of non-racialism but 
to strengthen our sense of an African identity. Our African consciousness at the deeper levels of culture 
where it is felt as a spiritual necessity…” (2013a: 240. Original emphasis). Secondly, Mphahlele 
worried that “non-racialism’ had marginalised the ideology of Black Consciousness. The result was that 
the transitional era was the, “era of institutional integration and assimilation” (Mphahlele, 2002: 176-
177). Mphahlele observed that integration and assimilation processes aggravated spiritual exile: “we 
are exiles spiritually. We are even apologetic, if not ashamed of being African” (Mphahlele (2013: 148). 
This led Mphahlele to conclude that black leaders were still in exile. The implication of this was that 
because (re)Afrikanised people had not taken charge of the process of constitutional re-arrangement and 
thus no home-making will be achieved.  
 
Conclusion  
 
On the eve of South Africa’s transitional period we thus observe Mphahlele – in keynote addresses, 
speeches, book prefaces and introductions, a monthly magazine column – advancing the argument that 
the main aims of the political transition ought to be the forging of a conducive environment for the re-
assertion of Afrikan humanness and Afrikan-becoming. He observed that the discourse of non-racialism 
and the hastiness surrounding “the reconciliation project” obfuscated these objectives. Exile had thus 
endowed Mphahlele with a scrupulous subjectivity as far as processes of constituting post-colonial 
nationhood are concerned. He was able to look at South Africa’s transitional processes through the 
lenses he had forged as a specular intellectual at the borders of recently independent Africa.  
 
Mphahlele was very critical of the ‘new’ South Africa that was supposedly being build. He feared that 
South Africa’s supposed (re)constitution processes was being undertaken mainly by exiles: white 
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people (‘the no-longer European but not-yet African’ people) and black transcultural nationalists 
returning from prisons, banishment, physical exile and studies abroad. From an Mphahlelian 
perspective, these exiled leaders never returned; they were still spiritually homeless. These putative 
constitution-makers could thus never (re)constitute home. Mphahlele proposed that transitional 
processes and nation-building efforts should be imbued with Afrikan humanness if they were to end 
spiritual de-worlding and realise the aspiration of remembering and re-membering Africa. Alas, 
contrary to Mphahlele’s counsel, these elites forged a ‘new’ South Africa without the concomitant 
collective project of reclaiming Afrikanness (in spite of, or because of, Mbeki’s ‘African Renaissance’ 
project). Without spiritual re-homing, the intercultural home could not be ‘resurrected’. More pointedly, 
Mphahlele’s warning that constitutional negotiations will guarantee a transition from white domination 
to white hegemony (Mphahlele, 2013b: 213) shows that Mphahlele’s vision anticipated and embraced 
certain elements of Black Consciousness. In the next chapter, I will discuss Steve Biko’ Black 
Consciousness proposals for (re)constituting the social world. 
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CHAPTER 4: BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE (RE)CONSTITUTION OF THE 
SOCIAL WORLD 
 
This country looks, My Lord, like a province of Europe…It has no relationship 
rootwise to the fact that it happens to exist in Africa…We want to be…complete 
Africans [Steve Biko, 1977] 
 
Introduction  
 
The aim of the previous chapter was to put forward Es’kia Mphahlele’s contribution to my exploration 
of a holistic agenda for post-Apartheid constitution and belonging. Mphahlele’s contribution is his 
proposal that personal and collective returns to Afrikan humanness are indispensable for non-elitist and 
unceasing projects of remembering and re-membering Africa. The proposal is that such projects will 
help usher in a post-segregationist and intercultural society. In this chapter, I will explore Steve Bantu 
Biko’s (1946-1977) philo-praxis for constitution and belonging. I aim to demonstrate that Biko’s vision 
aligns with that of Mphahlele. To be sure, Biko described a post-Apartheid society to be a society that 
is constituted on the basis of a “modern African culture” and that puts the quest for “true humanity” at 
its foundation (Biko, 2004: 45, 99). Biko’s main proposal was that the praxis of Black Consciousness 
is the only route towards such an anti-racist, united and humane society. This is Biko’s main 
contribution to my proposal of a holistic (re)constitution framework. As Biko argued before court in 
1977 (reproduced in the epigraph at the head of this chapter), South Africa will continue to be an alien 
and alienating house and black people will continue to be non-Africans of Africa unless black people 
adopted and deployed Black Consciousness tactics. My main objective of this chapter is to demonstrate 
that Black Consciousness is a tactic while Afrikan humanness is the strategy.  
The symbiotic relationship between these two philo-praxes will become clear at the end of the chapter. 
It suffices for this background section to remind the reader that Mphahlele returned to Apartheid South 
Africa with the mission of helping to foster a black constituent power for a post-Apartheid society. 
Mphahlele put his efforts into teaching, hosting writing workshops and other conscientisation processes. 
He thus co-founded black people-only programmes including the African Writers Association and the 
Council for Black Education and Research. These programmes were explicitly inspired by the Black 
Consciousness Movement. These programmes aimed to showcase and cultivate black self-reliance, self-
pride, and self-determination, and thus to shift black people’s consciousness beyond poetics of 
bitterness and hatred of white people. Mphahlele was, therefore, aware that the full measure of and the 
blossoming of ‘spiritual decolonisation’ is to be found in the social realm.  
Looking towards the future, Mphahlele (1987: 58) agonised that black leaders’ marginalisation of Black 
Consciousness will result in a “post-Apartheid” future characterised by a “fragmented black force” with 
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no sense of solidarity and intra-humanness. As we saw in the previous chapter, Mphahlele’s Black 
Consciousness leanings can also be discerned from the fact that he regularly warned that the 1990s 
mantra of non-racialism will result in white domination transmuting into white hegemony, while black 
people’s minds and souls continue to be colonised. Writing after the putative end of Apartheid, 
Mphahlele (2002: 81) thus observed that black people’s historical inferiority complex had transformed 
into a pervasive sense of post-colonial victimhood mentality - a symptom of racial melancholia in the 
terms of my thesis. Finally, writing in 1995, Mphahlele (2002: 82) predicted that black people will re-
member, remember and resurrect Biko and Black Consciousness if historical conditions remain the 
same. Therefore, Mphahlele’s Afrikan humanness-centered strategy of constitution and belonging 
embraced the tactic of Black Consciousness. At the same time, as Ruth Obee (1999: 113) has shown, 
Mphahlele’s project of encouraging black communities to reclaim black pride through African culture 
and traditions helped pave the way for Black Consciousness. I have already alluded to the fact that Biko 
echoed Mphahlele when he called for black people to forge and remember a modern Afrikan culture 
based on the principle of inter-culturality. More importantly, Biko (2004: 108) was at pains to impress 
that the ultimate quest of Black Consciousness is a quest for “true humanity,” that is, a striving for 
Afrikan humanness. Biko’s tactic of Black Consciousness was thus aimed at realising Mphahlele’s 
dream of a post-colonial national consciousness based on a creolising Afrikan humanness. 
My main thesis is that main constitutional task facing historically settler societies is to re-member and 
(re)constitute the triadic world shattered by settler constitution-making. I argue that “post-colonial” 
leaders have failed in this task because their visions of constitution and belonging are shaped by their 
liminal status-induced conditions of double consciousness and racial melancholia. In the previous 
chapter I explored Mphahlele’s strategy for (re)making the spiritual world. In this chapter, I will focus 
on Steve Biko’s strategy for (re)making the social world. I will show that both Mphahlele’s Afrikan 
humanness and Biko’s Black Consciousness were concerned with the constitutive sin of “native” 
pariahdom and worldlessness. I have argued that the main source of black non-belongingness are 
colonialist/anti-black discourses and values that relegated black people to a non-world. We have already 
gained insight into Mphahlele’s counter-discourse and praxes in this regard. As far as Biko is concerned, 
the name Black Consciousness already gives us a hint of Biko and fellow Black Consciousness 
Movement adherents’ avowed mission to challenge anti-black discourses and values in order to stage 
self-constitution and belongingness. By way of overview, this Movement (under the aegis of the South 
African Students’ Organisation, ‘SASO’) elaborated this mission in its first “Policy Manifesto” as 
follows: “The basic tenet of black consciousness is that the black man must reject all value systems that 
seek to make him a foreigner in the country of his birth….” (SASO [1971] 1978c: 99-100). The themes 
of disalienation, redemptive returns, consciousness-building, and reclamation of belonging-in-the-
world are, therefore, at the core of Mphahlele and Biko’s interrelated constitution visions.  
My goal with these background and overview remarks was to make a case for the interrelatedness of 
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this tactic (Black Consciousness) and strategy (Afrikan humanness) in order to justify my reasons for 
putting them together in my framework for holistic (re)constitution. My aim is this chapter is to explore 
the tactic of Black Consciousness as it specifically relates to the (re)constitution of the social world. In 
the first section, I will trace Biko’s striving against what he termed the ‘totality’ of the white power 
structure. In section two, I will distinguish Black Consciousness from black constitution visions that 
are burdened by racial melancholia and thus perpetuate worldlessness. In the final section, I will 
demonstrate that the Black Consciousness Movement’s constitution vision of ‘One Azania, One Nation’ 
is a creolising striving towards pluralist co-existence. This section will explore Biko’s proposal on how 
to avoid ‘the pitfalls of nationalism’.  
 
4.1 Biko’s Striving against the ‘Totality’ of the White Power Structure  
 
The literal meaning of Bantu Steve Biko’s first name is ‘people’. Biko liked to joke that this meant that 
he was the ‘son of man’ (Wilson, 2011: 18). Biko’s friends understood him to mean that he believed 
that his life should enact the core ethical prescription of Afrikan humanness; namely, umntu ngumtu 
ngabanye abantu or a person is a person by means of other people (ibid.). Afrikan humanness and its 
emphasis on service to others as route towards being-becoming, therefore, framed the entirety of Biko’s 
life. This philosophy of life also motivated and underpinned his Black Consciousness praxis. Another 
phenomenon that framed Biko’s life and inspired his emancipatory philosophy was the reality of an 
institutionalised world of apartness. He explicated this reality in the following terms:  
I have lived all my conscious life in the framework of institutionalised separate development. My 
friendships, my love, my education, my thinking and every other facet of my life have been carved and 
shaped within the context of separate development (Biko, 2004: 29). 
In chapter one above, we saw that settler-invaders constituted this Manichean social world during the 
hundred-year Wars of Dispossession and other wars inland. I also demonstrated that colonialist 
discourse supplied the rationale behind settler-invaders’ attempts to ‘kill the land’ and to localise the 
logic of the amity lines. Thus in Race and the Construction of the Disposable Other, Bernard Magubane 
(2007: 182) also shows that the epistemic arrogance of the first group of settler-invaders supplied 
rationale for their exploits of dispossession, massacre, and enslavement. Magubane (2007: 183) further 
demonstrates that the depiction of indigenous peoples as sub-human and barbaric was central to the 
European creation of otherness. Ultimately, Jan van Riebeck and his crew’s attitude to indigenous 
people led to white settler’s belief that there was are substrata of beings without ontology (Mostert, 
1992: 106-107).  The point that I am making here is that conquest, colonisation, and the conqueror’s 
imposition of Euro-modern rationality (instruments deployed to ‘kill the land’) had two main 
intertwined objectives: the shattering of the socio-cultural worlds of indigenous peoples and the 
installation of a social world based on the human/non-human dichotomy. Plaatje made this point 
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eloquently in chapter one above. Plaatje’s critique pertained to the high period of colonisation.  
In 1948, the white minority-regime instituted the system of Apartheid (Afrikaans for “apart-hood” or 
separateness). The aim of Apartheid was to formalise, institutionalise, and systematise ‘separate 
development’. If colonisers’ acts of ‘killing the land’ were attempts to render the conquered people 
spiritually unhomely and to interrupt their being-becoming; the architects of Apartheid addressed 
themselves more to the realm of the social world with the view of consolidating black subjugation and 
invisibility. More pertinently, the aim of Apartheid was to entrench what can be regarded as the “social 
death” of black people. Social death is a state of existence that Plaatje described as a state of being, 
‘deprived of the bare human rights of living…’. Black social death was necessary, so proponents of 
Apartheid argued, to prevent the social death of white people. D.F. Malan, the first Prime Minister of 
Apartheid, thus explained that Apartheid was necessary because, “a course of equality between white 
and black races must eventually mean national suicide for the white race…” (cited in Brown, 2013: 17. 
My emphasis). Following this logic, Apartheid ideologues determined that the only way to prevent the 
death of settler being-belonging was to entrench the constitutive racial contract and to continue to keep 
South Africa white.  
Hendrik Verwoerd, the most influential ideologue of Apartheid, further explained that, “‘keeping 
[South Africa] White’ can only mean one thing, namely White domination, not ‘leadership,’ not 
‘guidance’…” (cited in More, 2008: 51. Original emphasis).  Apartheid was, therefore, a different mode 
of governmentality when compared to colonialism. We would recall that the English were of the view 
that ‘an ethic of differentiation’ was essential to ensuring the long-term survival of the social world of 
colonists. Under this scheme, colonialists cultivated “exceptional natives,” or ‘liminalised’ Africans, in 
order to create a buffer zone between the world of the white minority and the world of the hordes of 
“natives”. Apartheid ideologues, perhaps influenced by events in India and elsewhere, feared that 
colonial ‘leadership’ and ‘guidance’ risked creating transcultural persons who would turn out to be a 
menace to white society. Therefore, Apartheid was based on what we can regard as an ‘ethic of 
communalism’ with the aim of ensuring the social death of black people.  
Born two years before the enactment of Apartheid, Biko’s childhood was thus lived under this system 
of brute domination and radical estrangement. Biko spent his early childhood years in Ginsberg 
Location, a black ghetto attached to a place called King William’s Town. Ginsberg Location is a product 
of ‘separate development’. Ginsberg, a local white industrialist, built this “black location” to relocate 
black people from the white part of the municipality (Mangcu, 2012: 82). By law, a strip of land had to 
be reserved between the ‘black location’ and the white suburbs. This strip of land sought to emphasise 
the sense of metaphysical otherness between the black location and the suburb. When Fanon (1963: 29) 
famously described the settler colonial world as a world “cut in two…,” he was, in the first place, 
describing the alterity between these two zones.  
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Therefore, under Apartheid political subjugation, social invisibility, and dehumanisation were meant to 
be the primary markers of black people belongingness-in-the-[white]world. In chapter two above, I 
discussed Du Bois’s analysis that behind-the-veil person regard western education as a route towards 
visibility, recognition, and thus bestowal of humanity. The Apartheid regime did not want to leave such 
possibilities to chance. In 1953, the regime promulgated the Bantu Education Act. As we saw in our 
discussion of Mphahlele’s mobilisation against this Act, the ultimate aim of Bantu Education was to 
consolidate both the dehumanisation and pariahdom of black people.  
This was the context of Biko’s social upbringing. Biko was academically gifted, and when time came 
for him to attend high school the impoverished community of Ginsberg pooled together resources to 
grant him a bursary. The community wanted Biko to study at the legendary Lovedale College (‘the Eton 
of Africa’) -  the same school where Thabo Mbeki received his education. It could be said that Biko’s 
community was keen for him to further his schooling at one of the few remaining missionary schools 
so that he will grow up without being poisoned with the chalice of black inferiority. The community 
hoped that Biko will further sharpen his ‘gift of second sight,’ and later return to ‘resurrect their land’. 
Missionary education, however, also meant that Biko imbibed ideals of Enlightenment as well as ideas 
about British sense of fairness and non-racialism.  
Biko’s moment of political consciousness came after he was arrested with his brother on suspicion of 
being a member of the proscribed Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (the PAC). He was released after 
a long interrogation (Mangcu, 2012: 109). His brother, who was indeed a member of the PAC, was 
detained for ten months (ibid.) Despite the fact that he was never charged, let alone convicted, Biko 
was summarily expelled from school. He felt betrayed by an institution that he considered a paragon 
and an oasis of equity and fairness. After this episode Biko declared that, “I hate authority like hell” 
(cited in Wilson, 2011: 23). Despite this declaration, Biko continued to be an avowed non-racialist who 
believed that racial prejudice and Apartheid could be defeated through mutual cooperation between 
black people and good white people.  
Biko was later admitted to study medicine at the University of Natal (Non-European section). He was 
immediately attracted to the non-racial politics of the dominant National Union of South African 
Students (NUSAS). NUSAS was one of the few remaining multiracial organisations in South Africa 
(Woods, 1978: 48). In his second year of university, Biko went to Rhodes University to participate in a 
NUSAS congress. It was here that Biko came to realise that the tactic of non-racism is not only 
inefficacious, it is ultimately deceptive. At this congress, white delegates were booked accommodation 
in university residences whereas those classified as “Indian” and “Coloured” were meant to stay in 
town. African students were ordered to stay in black ghettos far from the congress venue. Biko was 
outraged and he proposed that the meeting should be moved to a ‘non-racial’ venue. To his shock, white 
students regarded this proposal as too radical. Biko came to realise that his cherished principle of non-
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racism principle was trickery. This was the seed of his political and philosophical rupture: 
I realised that for a long time I had been holding onto the whole dogma of non-racism almost like a 
religion, feeling that it was sacrilegious to question it…I began to feel there was lot lacking in the 
proponents of the non-racist idea…They had this problem, you know, of superiority, and they intended 
to take us for granted and wanted us to accept things that were second class (Biko cited in Wilson, 2011: 
31).  
Later that year Biko encountered the same duplicity of white liberals at another NUSAS congress. Biko 
put a specific challenge to his white ‘comrades’ at this congress. He asks white students to act in 
solidarity with black students by defying a law that stipulated that black students could only be in ‘white 
areas’ for less than seventy-two hours. Specifically, he requested white students to engage in direct 
action when police come to arrest black students. “We said all right, when the vans come to collect us, 
whites should all lie in front of the [police] vans so that they don’t move… They [whites students] could 
not accept this. They saw it as an extremely irresponsible, radical line…” (cited in Gerhart, 1978: 22). 
These two episodes taught Biko that in a deeply anti-black country a strategy of non-racism only 
benefitted white liberals; and more importantly, that white people could not be relied upon for the 
radical de-constitution of South Africa. Biko immediately convened a meeting of the black caucus to 
convince black students to form their own student body. Biko and his group formed the blacks-only 
South African Students’ Association (SASO) in July 1969. 
SASO adopted a separatist tactic from its inception. SASO (1978: 99) was at pains to emphasise that 
this position should not be construed as “anti-whitism” or even a reactive posture. They explained that 
their decision to constitute an all-black organisation was, rather,  a “positive way” to work towards de-
constituting and eventually reconstituting “South Africa” to attain a “normal situation” (ibid.) Over and 
over again, SASO activists proclaimed that only “black people” could be the constituent power for 
Azania, a post-South Africa world. I will come back to the significance of this later on. Biko’s 
explanation for a separatist tactic was that this tactic is a lesser sin compared to what he described as 
the ‘farcical non-racialism’ of multi-racial organisations (Biko, 2004: 13). White people were dominant 
in these organisations and they expected black people to simply assimilate into organisations that in 
essence were white organisations (ibid.). From Biko’s (2004: 163) perspective, this set up was a 
concrete manifestation of what he termed “the ‘totality’ of white power”. What did Biko mean by a 
‘totality’ of white power? 29  
Biko (2004: 66) argued that, firstly, Apartheid should be apprehended as a ‘totality’ of white power 
because it accorded all privileges of life to all white people. The ‘totality’ of this structure was such that 
                                                        
29 It is of utmost significance to emphasise that Biko articulated this “totality” in inverted commas to make the 
obvious point that totalisation is an aspiration never completely achieved in reality. See from example, Biko 2004: 
163.  
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all white people were beneficiaries of Apartheid. The corollary to this was all white people were 
accomplices in the crime of black dehumanisation (SASO, 1978: 99). Secondly, the ‘totality’ of white 
power was such that white people believed that they could be both beneficiaries and opponents of 
Apartheid (Biko, 2004: 163). More than the egregious acts of racism, this manifestation of white power 
was what sustained the constitutive ‘racial contract’. Thirdly, white supremacy, white vanguardism, 
and white social life were made possible by a system that was, “blatantly exploitative in terms of the 
mind and body” of black people (ibid.). Finally, white power presented itself as a totality to black people 
because it sought to both oppress them and condition their response to their oppression (Biko, 2004: 
55).  
Manganyi (1973: 27) took this argument further by showing that the seeming totality of white power 
expresses itself radically different to white people and to black people. Manganyi argued that this 
differential application and condition led to a situation where two modes of being-in-the-world existed 
in South Africa; namely, a white-being-in-the-world and a black-being-in-the-world. Manganyi 
asserted that because of this reality it becomes necessary for black people to form a strong blacks-only 
organisation to resist this putatively totalitarian system. Manganyi submitted (ibid.) that this move was 
necessary because the main instrument that white power used to enforce these differential modes of 
being in the world was “psychic manipulation” (ibid.).  
The thesis that the main problem in South Africa was the ‘totality’ of white power and concomitant 
‘psychic manipulation’ of its victims was the first insight of the Black Consciousness philosophy. The 
second insight was that the South African social world is constituted by a White world and a Black 
World that were not totally separate. Rather, the former world relied for its sustenance on the 
cannabilisation of the latter world. These two insights together with BCM’s insistence that only “black 
people” could become the constituent power for a non-racist and anti-racist society make up what I see 
as the three pivots of Biko’s praxis of constitution and belonging.   
Therefore, in his first Presidential Address, Biko emphasised that the formation of SASO was not a 
tactical move to pressurise NUSAS into being more accommodative of Black students and their 
concerns (see in general Biko, 2004: chapter 1). Biko (2004: 4) argued that SASO’s main aim was 
rather to build a “solid identity” among black students so that they could “do things for themselves”. 
More pertinently, Biko (2004: 5) explained that black students were not agitating for more visibility, 
rather they were working towards “real black participation”. Moving forward, black students were to 
assume the burden of their fate by eschewing the paternalism of white liberals, or what Manganyi (1973: 
17) recognised as “white fathering”. Already at this early stage a central tenet of the Black 
Consciousness philosophy could be detected. This was that although Apartheid sought to marginalise 
Black people and produce them as Absent, black strivings for constitution and belonging should not 
aim for recognition. Rather, the black struggle for liberation should seek to dismantle the entire system 
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and (re)constitute it on the basis of principles of majoritarian democracy.  
BCM adherents posited that the failure of the previous generation of anti-Apartheid and anti-colonial 
politicians was due to their failure to carry out a thorough analysis of the ‘totality’ of the white power 
structure and to elaborate a revolutionary theory in response to it. As per my analysis in chapter one 
above, BCM activists proposed that victims of this form of colonisation needed to launch a frontal 
attack on colonialist discourse if they hoped to supersede a system that sought to render them pariahs. 
Such an attack would mean engaging in an epistemic revolt to resist the discursive powers of 
colonisation. Towards this end, part of the preamble of SASO’s launching Manifesto proclaimed as 
follows: “We, the black students of South Africa, [belief] that the black man can no longer allow 
definitions that have been imposed upon him by an arrogant white world concerning his being and his 
destiny…” (SASO, [1969] 1978a: 97). 
This preamble neatly summarises the enduring relevance of Black Consciousness philosophy. To 
repeat, the main theoretical contribution that Biko and his BCM comrades made was to show that the 
South African social world is framed by a ‘totality’ of white power that divides the world into the White 
world and the Black world. More importantly, the BCM argued that the white world attempted to 
colonise the being of the Black person through both institutional and psychological oppression. Biko 
thus referred to “two forces” that colonised the being of ‘the black man’:  
He is first of all oppressed by an external world through institutionalised machinery, through laws that 
restrict him from doing certain things, through heavy work conditions, through poor pay, through very 
difficult conditions, through poor education, these are all external to him, and secondly, and this we 
regard as the most important, the black man in himself has developed a certain state of alienation, he 
rejects himself, precisely because he attaches the meaning white to all that is good, in other words he 
associates good and he equates good with white (Biko, 2004: 111). 
We can hear echoes of Du Bois’s analysis that black people are saddled with double consciousness. 
Biko thus identified the ‘first truth’ of the South African situation to be the ‘spiritual poverty’ that black 
people have been made to suffer from. This spiritual impoverishment manifested itself in the fact that 
most black people had come to accept oppression as natural. Consequently, a preponderant attitude that 
black people exhibited was that of inauthenticity in the form of a “two-faced attitude” (Biko, 2004: 
113). According to Biko, the existentialist philosopher, an inauthentic life is non-life because it is life 
devoid of responsibility and agency. At a more profound level, this is an attitude of self-deprivation of 
existence because, “bad faith is the effort to evade human reality through denial of agency” (Gordon, 
2000: 377). The point I wish to emphasis here is that Biko’s Black Consciousness philosophy, as the 
name implies, was more than a reaction to white racism. The BCM’s foremost area of concern was 
black people’s complicity in their own oppression and thus self dehumanisation (Sanders, 2002: 174-
179). For Biko, then, the decolonial project of remembering and re-membering Africa was a stillborn 
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project until black people acknowledged their complicity in ‘the killing of land’. An attitude of Black 
Consciousness was, therefore, first and foremost a critical consciousness and awareness of the myriad 
ways in which a black person was imbricated in and was collusive in the entrenchment of the ‘totality’ 
of the white power structure.  
According to Biko, black people’s bad faith lives were proof positive that black people were a defeated 
people, not simply in terms of being a politically conquered people. Rather, black people were 
humanoids with conquered souls: “all in all the black man has become shell, a shadow of man, 
completely defeated, drowning in his own misery, a slave, an ox bearing the yoke of oppression with 
sheepish timidity” (Biko, 2004: 31). Black depersonalisation was the result of the fact that the South 
African society was fundamentally an anti-black racist society. Flowing from the foregoing, it is clear 
that if for Mphahlele the first task in (re)constituting the spiritual world was to remember the onto-
triadic community made up of the living, the living-dead, and the yet-to-be-born; the first task in 
(re)constituting the social world was to ensure that black people remembered the fact that they were not 
useless non-beings. Therefore, in addition to processes aimed at ensuring cosmic re-membering, “an 
inward-looking process” (Pityana cited in Woods, 1978: 34) was needed to address the psychic world 
of black people so that they could assert their Presence in the world. Without this painful psychic 
interrogation, black people will never be able to reclaim their agency and assume responsibility to 
(re)constitute the world. To sum up:  
the first step therefore is to make the black man come to himself; to pump back life into his empty shell; 
to infuse him with pride and dignity, to remind him of his complicity in the crime of allowing himself to 
be misused and therefore letting evil reign supreme in the country of his birth (Biko, 2004: 31). 
The BCM offered the Black Consciousness programme as such a first step. Black Consciousness was, 
therefore, a counter-hegemonic discourse and praxis to challenge the ‘totality’ of the white power 
structure and to effect reawakening and re-existence.  
 
4.2 Black Consciousness versus Black Melancholic Visions of Constitution and Belonging   
 
The rest of my investigation of Biko’s means of achieving post-Apartheid constitution and belonging 
will be motored by two central questions. The first question is the following: in what ways were Black 
Consciousness distinguishable from other black philo-praxes of constitution and belonging? Secondly, 
in what ways did BCM activist-philosophers interact with the Du Boisian manifesto and how did they 
avoid its pitfalls? In this section, I am concerned with addressing the first question. The Négritude 
movement will serve as my comparator. The aim of this section is, therefore, to clear the way for the 
final section in which I show that Biko’s tactic of constitution and belonging is a liberatory route 
towards (re)constituting the social world.  
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4.2.1 ‘Black man, you are on your own’: A disalienating cry towards authentic living  
 
 
I have so far attempted to show that in the first half of the twentieth century dominant black politics of 
constitution and belonging were overridden with melancholia. This melancholia was revealed in New 
Africans’ striving against, and an obsession with, their status of social invisibility. These socio-legally 
‘liminalised’ individuals confirmed Fanon’s psychosocial analysis that racialised individuals who suffer 
from a neurosis of abandonment are disinclined to ‘reconstruct the world’.  Mphahlele focused our 
attention on the intra- and inter spiritual worlds to demonstrate that on the cosmic plane, the only route 
towards overcoming melancholia is through remembering and reclaiming Afrikan humanness. 
Mphahlele’s odyssey showed that taking flight into a fictional Black World would not do. The 
disalienating work has to be realised at home.  
Analysed from an Mphahleleian perspective, the BCM was a home-based movement that sought to 
address the psychosocial impacts of racial melancholia. The discussion in the previous section of this 
chapter showed that Biko and his BCM protagonists believed that racial melancholia is connected to an 
internalised sense of ontological and social inferiority. Bad faith-living in the inter-subjective realm of 
the social world was the main outcome of racial melancholia. Biko thus showed that a Black person 
lived an inauthentic existence because he or she had internalisesed what Derek Hook (2012: 105) calls, 
a ‘white mask psychology’. As a result of this, his or her consciousness was doubled and divided. The 
BCM proposed that racial melancholia could only be overcome through deliberate programmes that 
emphasised self-awareness and self-pride. Such programmes would, as Freud would have it, enable the 
melancholic to invest the libido in a new object – the object here being the self and own community 
that the melancholic elite had up to then shunned. The BCM’s challenge to black people was that black 
people needed to shun the white world and to disavow the white liberal scheme of upliftment, 
recognition, and integration of “natives”. It is in this context that Barney Pityana, a co-founder of SASO, 
came up with the following rallying cry of the BCM: “Black man, you are on your own” (cited in 
Gerhart, 1978: 294).  
This statement should be understood as an existential declaration of personhood (being a ‘man’), of 
rootedness and identity (appropriating and embracing the idea of being black), and of responsibility, 
agency, and maturity. This performative utterance is an acceptance of pariahdom and a decision to 
delink from the white-dominated world. This cry was, therefore, of a different quality and had a 
different objective to that uttered by Du Bois’s pariah who constantly cries out, ‘why did God make an 
outcast and stranger in my own house?’. The latter bellowing is a cry against abandonment and a plea 
for recognition. Pityana’s cry and the BCM’s declaration had a radically different telos. The BCM’s 
declaration of intention to shun the world that had denied black people membership to the family of 
humans makes it a sibling of other black radical praxes of constitution and belonging. What all these 
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black praxes have in common is the expressed intention to delink from the white world. This intention 
serves as notice of intention to reconstitute the world in ways that would realise black belonging. 
Pityana proposed that such a realisation would only be possible when black people adopt, “a positive 
unilateral approach” (cited in Woods, 1978: 35). The idea here was that a separatist posture would 
enable black people to overcome racial melancholia and attendant double consciousness. The thinking 
here was that victory over racial melancholia will empower black people to work towards self-conscious 
personhood and eventually group consciousness. Pityana, citing Fanon, thus asserted that a black 
consciousness project would enable black people “TO BE” and to assert their “BEness” (cited in 
Woods, 1978: 34. Original emphasis). I have proposed that these ambitions constitute the first and 
second pillars of a Du Boisian manifesto.  
4.2.2 Delinking for re-existence  
 
 
My discussion of settler-invaders’ ‘construction of the Other’ and my explication of Biko’s analysis of 
the depersonalisation of Black people highlighted the fact that the second pillar of the Du Boisian 
manifesto plays a very critical role when it comes to the social world. The argument here is that 
racialised groups needed to cease aspiring for whiteness. Instead black people needed to accept their 
race if they wished to de-constitute the hegemonic world. Stated differently, it would seem that the 
quests for disalienation, self-pride, and re-existence begin when a black person does not ‘accidentalise’ 
their ‘race’ (Fanon, 2008: 32). Consequently, the first task facing a racialised subject who seeks to attain 
self-consciousness personhood is to recognise the fact that they have internalised black phobia and are 
involved in self-renunciation. This is what SASO wished to address. Point 1 of SASO’s first Policy 
Manifesto thus began with the following words: “SASO is a black student organisation working for the 
liberation of the black man first from psychological oppression by themselves through inferiority 
complex…” (SASO, 1978c: 99. My emphasis). As we can see, SASO wished to rehabilitate and 
embrace blackness. This aspiration flowed from Biko’s analysis that the “first truth” to be distilled from 
the fact that South Africa is an anti-black racist society is the truth that black people are spiritually 
impoverished and that they reject themselves.  
Biko never offered a comprehensive definition of alienation. However, we can piece together what Biko 
had in mind from his testimony at the 1976 ‘subversion by intent’ trial of seven leading BCM members. 
According to Biko, a state of alienation is an internalised sense of inferiority that, firstly, stemmed from 
economic exploitation (Biko, 2004: 111). Secondly, precarious existence and political oppression 
buttressed this sense of Marxist alienation and intensified it into an existential form of alienation. 
Thirdly, Biko showed that self-renunciation resulted in feelings of being homeless, rootless, and 
nameless. The latter feelings came from the fact that colonialist discourse instilled in black people the 
idea that they had no past and no present because they had no culture, no civilisation, and no religion.  
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In the first half of Black Skin, White Mask, Fanon thus demonstrated the many tragic ways in which 
self-negation manifests in the social world. From mastering the white man’s language to marrying a 
white person to vigorously absorbing European education, the racialised person goes through all of 
these efforts hoping to achieve ‘lactification’ and thus ascent to the white world (see in general, Fanon, 
2008: chapters one to three). As we saw with respect to New Africans, these actions only lead to a 
further destabilisation of subjectivity and self-alienation. Writing in the context of South Africa of 
the1930s, Gilbert Coka thus lambasted New African elites as follows: “There is no progress in Africans 
aping Europeans and telling us that they represent the best in the race, for any ordinarily well trained 
monkey would do the same. The slave mentality still holds our people in chains…” (Coka, 1935: n.p.). 
Therefore, the black-skin-white-mask person only succeeded in becoming an imitation. 
In Fanon’s case, it would take the white gaze of a child to strip him of his imitation. In “The Lived 
Experience of the Black Person”, Fanon told that story to illustrate the psychic impairment suffered by 
an alienated black person when his blackness is exposed. In Fanon’s case, the white gaze brought home 
the fact that white civilisation and colonialism had forced “existential deviation” on a black person 
(Fanon, 2008: 6). Experiencing existential deviation, the Black is forced to ask herself or himself, a 
painful question: “in reality, who am I?” (Fanon, 1963: 200). This question is a question of identity and 
belonging. An alienated black person thus found himself or herself in a no-man’s land between a 
supposedly zone of human beings (the white world) and a supposedly zone of non-beings (the ‘savage’ 
world) he had renounced. Unable to use that third zone to come up with alien and disruptive identities, 
the mimetic and melancholic person concludes that only two options are available: to be elevated into 
the zone of humans or throw himself back into the zone of the Blacks. Spurned by ‘the real world’ (the 
white world), the temptation is then to assert some form of black authenticity. In Fanon’s case, he took 
this option as a way of spitting at the white world. He dived into the absoluteness of his blackness, “to 
assert myself as a BLACK MAN. Since the other hesitated to recognise me, there remained only one 
solution: to make myself known” (2008, 87. Original emphasis). Thus began Fanon’s flirtation with 
Négritudism. As Fanon declares above, the rationale behind this course of action is to delink from the 
white world in order to assert re-existence.  
4.2.3 Black Consciousness is not black authenticity  
 
 
Léon-Gontran Damas, Léopold Senghor, and Aimé Césaire are the main ‘founding fathers’ of the 
Négritude movement. Senghor has explained that exiled black people founded this movement in order 
to rehabilitate their African origins. They hoped that this undertaking of revalorising Africanity would 
empower them to cultivate a proud group consciousness and identity in the face of white rejection and 
internalised feelings of inferiority and non-beingness:  
We lived in an atmosphere of rejection, and we developed an inferiority complex. I have always thought 
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the black man was searching for his identity. And it has seemed to me that if what we want is to establish 
this identity, then we must have a concrete consciousness of what we are – that is, of the first fact of our 
lives: that we are black; that we were black and have a history, a history that contains certain cultural 
elements of great value; and that Negroes were not, as you put it, born yesterday… (cited in Nkosi, 2005: 
268).  
Négritude was thus a search for this ‘first fact’ (the ‘fact of being black’) and to use that rediscovery to 
forge a sense of group pride and identity. More pertinent for purposes of this chapter, Senghor confirms 
that Négritude emerged in a context where black elites from the French colonies grappled with the 
following question: “Who am I?” (cited in Vaillant, 1990: 90). Négritude was, therefore, a vehicle that 
transcultural black people living in France and in French colonies created to forge historical and 
contemporary belongingness. The Négritude movement congregated around the journal Présence 
Africaine. As the title of this publication suggests, the objective here was to reclaim Africanism in order 
to assert Presence in a context where the French social world had produced Africans as Absent. 
Négritude and Présence Africaine, therefore, sought to bring forth, “the dignity of otherness” 
(Mudimbe, 1992: xvii). Négritudists sought to achieve this alterity through a double agenda of, 
“articulating theoretically the norms for a process of disalienation on the one hand, and of illustrating 
the values of cultural difference on the other” (Mudimbe, 1992: xxii). Similar to Pan-Africanism, an 
Anglophone sibling of Négritude, this movement was thus a movement of rebirth, redemptive returns, 
and belonging. 
However, as Bernard Mouralis (1992: 6) has pointed out, négritudists incessantly recalled the 
conflictual context with the western world. The result was that their sense of African self-affirmation 
was based on constant criticism of the West (ibid.). This is in spite of the fact that Senghor often asserted 
that the creation of a “métissage civilisation” had to be based on, “memory without hatred...” (Vaillant, 
1990: 264-265; Wilder, 2015: 62). Négritudists constant critique of the west thus exemplified a nativist 
mode of self-writing characterised by what Ali Mazrui in chapter two above referred to as “aggressive 
dependency,” or what Denis Ekpo (2005: 118) in another context called a condition of oedipal psycho-
dependency. Similar to the dominant strand of Pan-Africanism, Négritudism was, in the first place, 
therefore, mainly a program of reaction. It could be argued that this reactive stance demonstrates that 
négritudists were still conscripted to the world of their oppressors. Secondly, Négritude writers’ 
attachment to colonialist discourse is seen in the fact that the condition of possibility of Présence 
Africaine was the Eurocentric movement of cultural relativism that emerged in the 1940s (Mudimbe, 
1992: xix). As Mphahlele put it in his scathing criticisms of Négritude in the 1960s, this movement was 
thus reliant on anthropological concepts to articulate itself. 
Thirdly, consequently, this movement essentialised “black culture”. In this regard, Senghor had 
described Négritude as the “…the sum of the cultural values of the black world…" (cited by Manganyi, 
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1973: 36). More explicitly: “Négritude is the whole of the values of civilisation – cultural, economic, 
social, political – which characterise the Black peoples, more exactly the Black-African world. It is 
essentially instinctive reason…the sense of communion, the gift of imagination, the gift of rhythm – 
these are the traits of négritude” (cited in Gibson, 2003: 68). Senghor wished to rediscover and valorise 
these values in order to assert Presence in the face of universal ‘invisibilisation’ of black people. My 
contention is that this move does not help black people to reclaim belongingness-in-the-world. I have 
in previous chapters showed that claims of a universal African culture or the existence of the values of 
the ‘Black World’ are fictional, deceptive, and unnecessary. At the spiritual level, attempts to assert 
bounded and originary African cultures or traditions freeze the spirit and perpetuates spiritual 
unhomeliness. In the social realm, these assertions perpetuate invisibility and de-worlding because they 
conjure up a black or African person that does not exist in reality. This is the case because in their 
attempt to rehabilitate blackness, Négritude artists produced, “fiction black, ideal black, black in the 
absolute, primitive black, the Negro,” as Fanon (1970: 34) charged. Fanon’s hostility towards Senghor’s 
project had to do with the fact that Senghor, ultimately, was not interested in displacing the colonialist 
discourse and its Manicheanism. What Senghor simply did was to reverse the terms of colonialism: to 
white supremacy’s inhumanity he opposed Black essential pride and supposed humanism. He, 
therefore, substituted one myth for another. In this way, Senghor fell into the trap set by colonialist 
discourse. Senghor reified the terms of this discourse because this discourse of apartness relies on 
alleged fixities of identities for its power and persistence (Bhabha, 2005: 94). Early Négritudists thus 
reinforced Manicheanism because its point of departure was Africa’s total difference (Vaillant, 1990: 
252).  
The fourth reason why the Négritudism could not be relied upon to serve as the basis for (re)constituting 
the social world is that it did not seek to fundamentally deconstruct and reconstruct the world. Rather, 
it demanded ‘African presence’ in the extant world. Ultimately, Senghor’s project was not aimed at 
dislodging alleged white cultural supremacy. The allegation here is that being an elite 
Francophone/French scholar, Senghor was more interested, consciously or unconsciously, in pleading 
for a seat at the European/uni-versal table. Indeed, Senghor managed to gain unprecedented recognition 
and achieve profound ‘presence’ in the universe of his former colonisers. 30 Thus the more Senghor 
articulated Négritudism and principles of radical alterity, the more the French considered him the, 
“perfect black Frenchman” (Vaillant, 1990: 324).  
 
The BCM sought to distinguish itself from the Négritude movement. It is important to start off by 
mentioning that proponents of South Africa’s Black Consciousness philosophy did borrow some 
elements of the Négritude movement. In particular, the imperative to take cognisance of the proud 
                                                        
30 Senghor was the first African to be inducted into the sacred Académie française.  
 140 
history of Africa’s contribution to human civilisation and to use that as the basis for self-constitution 
and rebirth appealed to proponents of the BCM. However, Biko’s BCM did not share the Négritude 
movement’s raison d’être. As I have already discussed, Damas, Senghor, and Césaire’s initial 
motivation was to change the perception that the French public held about black people. The ultimate 
aim here being to secure black Presence and thus white recognition. As far as the BCM was concerned, 
recognition demands were anathema. This is because Black Consciousness activists did not recognise 
the legitimacy of the Apartheid regime. Therefore, the BCM did not raise any grievances against the 
white-minority regime (Motlhabi, 1986: 120). Likewise, white people, as a collective, did not exist as 
far as the BCM was concerned. Consequently, the BCM did not direct demands towards “the 
oppressors” (Khoapa, 1972: n.p.). As Biko made clear in his first SASO Presidential Address, the BCM 
did not want to assert black people’s presence (in the white world). Instead, SASO and the BCM sought 
to dismantle the ‘totality’ of the white power structure, supersede South Africa, and constitute Azania 
from a Black Consciousness perspective. Furthermore, SASO did not share Négritude’s obsession with 
a pan-black culture. In a June 1971 newsletter SASO, thus, explained that they understood Négritude 
(being Negroness) to mean black identity, but that “black identity… is an attitude towards life” (cited 
in Magaziner, 2009: 238, My emphasis). According to the BCM, then, there was nothing 
metaphysicalor ontological about being black. Finally, as I have discussed in the preceding pages, the 
BCM was determined to delink from colonialist discourse.  
The BCM can also be distinguished from Pan-Africanism. The crucial distinction here is that the BCM 
did not identify itself with an Africanist agenda. Some elements of Pan-Africanism were obviously 
attractive to the BCM. For example, Biko explained that BCM protagonists were encouraged by the 
self-confidence and self-assertiveness of African nationalist leaders of the 1960s and early 1970s, “guys 
who could speak for themselves” (Biko, 2004: 23). Biko was also attracted to the politics of the PAC 
over those of the ANC because of Africanists uncompromising attitude towards land restitution 
(Wilson, 2011: 23). However, Biko could not join the PAC because he believed that the PAC’s 
Africanist identity was too narrow. According to Biko, as Mphahlele and his African Voice co-editors 
first propagated, what was needed was, rather, a political programme that would unite all oppressed 
groups in South Africa. It was also for this reason that Biko persuaded his Black Consciousness 
comrades to embrace Black Theology over African Theology. Biko reasoned that African Theology 
would isolate people of Indian ancestry and “Coloured” South Africans (Mangcu, 173-174). 
Finally, SASO was also dissimilar to the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and 
other USA-based Black Power groups. Although SASO was influenced by the aesthetics and style of 
organising of these groups SASO, deviated substantially from the goals of SNCC and other Black 
Power movements. Firstly, BCM organisers constantly emphasised that theirs was not a Black Power 
agenda. Rather, it was a black consciousness agenda –a qualitatively more radical project as I will 
shortly demonstrate. Furthermore, unlike the SNCC and the Black Panther, SASO admitted into its 
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ranks people who were not classified as Black. Lastly, it is incorrect to suggest that Black Consciousness 
was influenced by the philosophy of Marcus Garvey. As I will discuss in the next section, this is because 
the BCM fervently rejected the notion of ‘race,’ let alone that of racial purity.  
To conclude this section, as I have already mentioned above, SASO was at pains to assert that its 
separatist posture should not be construed as a posture of “anti-whitism”. More to the point, SASO 
emphasised that hatred of white people is a manifestation of racial melancholia and aggressive 
dependency. In a paper circulated at its 1971 ‘Formation School’ SASO articulated this point as follows:  
we must not be limited in our outlook. There is a mile of difference between preaching Black 
Consciousness and preaching hatred of white. Telling people to hate whites is an outward and reactionary 
type of preaching which, though understandable, is undesirable and self-destructive. It makes one think 
in negative terms and preoccupies one with peripheral issues. In a society like ours it is a ‘positive feed-
forward’ approach that leads one into a vicious circle and ultimately to self-destruction through ill-
advised and impetuous action. In fact it is usually an extreme form of inferiority complex where the 
sufferer has lost hope of ‘making it’ because of conditions imposed upon him. His actual aspirations are 
to be like the white man and the hatred arises out of frustration (SASO, [1971] 1978d: 103) 
 
This directive is sufficient proof that the BCM was concerned to ensure that its members overcame 
racial melancholia and aggressive dependency. To sum up: in its quest to (re)make the social world the 
BCM rejected the liberalism of the USA Civil Rights movement; it took a distance from the Africanist 
exclusivism of Pan-Africanism; it spurned the racial and cultural essentialism of Négritude; and it 
eschewed the Black Nationalist agenda of Black Power and Garveyite movements. Rather, the BCM 
borrowed from these philosophies and transcended them to come up with a potent philosophy that 
addressed the unique situation of black people under Apartheid.31 Having distinguished Black 
Consciousness from dominant theories of re-birth and authenticity, a question that arises is the 
following: what did Black Consciousness stand for? More precisely, what was the Black 
Consciousness’s vision of constitution and belonging?  
 
4.3 Biko’s Constitution Vision: ‘One Azania, One Nation’ 
 
4.3.1 ‘There is no Black problem’: Negating Apartheid’s negation of politics   
 
 
SASO justified its propagation of Black Consciousness in its First Manifesto in the following terms: 
                                                        
31 Borrowing from these philosophies, and those of European existentialists, was Biko and the BCM’s strategy 
(similar to Plaatje’s) of refusing the Apartheid regime’s strategy of culturally ossifying black people and denying 
them national and inter-national mobility, global identification and thus world belongingness.  
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“SASO upholds the concept of black consciousness and the drive towards black awareness as the most 
logical and significant means of ridding ourselves of the shackles that bind us to perpetual servitude” 
(SASO, 1978c: 99). SASO thus made it clear that it sought to cultivate group consciousness in order to 
realise the liberation of black people in society. With this declaration, SASO sought to avoid one of the 
drawbacks I highlighted in chapter two above. I discussed this drawback in the context of discussing 
Du Bois’s failure to recover ‘first sight’. This pitfall arises when a racialised person deploys their gift 
of ‘second sight’ to achieve disalienation but does not go further and recover their “first sight”.  
The tendentious point is that it is not enough for a racialised being to proclaim, like Césaire’s Caliban, 
that they have discovered the white lie and that they now know themselves and will proceed to remake 
the world. As I suggested in chapter two above, as important and indispensable such an individual 
disalienation process might be, it ends up being an interior process lacking any real structural impact. 
Furthermore, as Mphahlele discovered, it is not sufficient for the “non-being” to reclaim his or her sense 
of humanity and belonging-in-the-world on the spiritual plane. It is for this reason that upon his return 
to South Africa, Mphahlele borrowed the means of Black Consciousness to realise his Afrikan 
humanness ends. Mphahlele, therefore, understood that fundamental lesson of existential 
phenomenology: “…self consciousness without freedom leads to contradictions” (L. Gordon, 2011a: 
21). In other words, even if a conquered person remembers and embraces Afrikan humanness and is 
thus able to proclaim that he or she now knows that he is an umuntu (a human being with cosmic 
belongingness), on the social plane the anti-black racist will still subjugate umuntu and treat him or her 
as a non-being. Recall thus Fanon’s opening lines in “The Lived Experience of the Black”: “‘Dirty 
nigger!’ Or simply, ‘Look, a Negro!” (Fanon, 2008: 82). 
The fact is that the ego of the Black collapses when it meets the gaze of the white man. Even if a black 
person undertakes an existentialist quest to transcend his or her situation of unfreedom, in the real world 
of inter-subjective relations such achievements of self-consciousness and spiritual assertion of freedom 
do not matter: “The black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man,” Fanon (ibid.) 
concludes after the above episode. The Black has no ontology in the (white) world. Proponents of Black 
Consciousness followed this logic. For example, in his ground-breaking phenomenological study 
entitled Being-Black-in-the-World (1973) Manganyi agreed broadly with the notion that Black 
Consciousness should inspire self-reclamation of consciousness. However, Manganyi (1973: 23-24) 
asserted that Black Consciousness must lead to action and efforts aimed realisation of freedom in the 
social world. Manganyi (1973: 22-23) critiqued the writings of existential phenomenologists and in 
particular those of Victor Frankl who argued that although freedom is finite, a person can always 
transcend their somatic and psychic determinants by adopting a free attitude towards these 
determinants. Manganyi implied that Frankl is engaged in too much abstraction. Manganyi’s rejoinder 
was that although it is true that a person can transcend somatic and psychic limitations by adopting 
certain attitudes towards them; sociological limitations will always be harder to transcend. Manganyi 
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(1973: 23) offered the example of a healthy enslaved person who is sold to a slaver.  The stance that 
this enslaved person takes, Manganyi posited, must be evaluated by whether it results in the actual and 
real improvement of the lot of the slave. From this analysis, Manganyi (1973: 24. My emphasis) offered 
the following: “The first lesson appears to be that we have a duty to be conscious of our responsibility 
to deal with the limitations of our freedom. Black consciousness and solidarity must mean a posture 
which will express a movement away from indifference and despair to rational, organised activity”. 
Soaring above ‘the veil’ was, therefore, out of question for Black Consciousness activists. For the BCM, 
the first pillar of achieving self-conscious personhood had to be followed by the cultivation and 
imposition of group consciousness in the political field. This is to say that the Black Consciousness 
Movement strove to play the political game in order realise that first prerequisite of re-existence; 
namely, to “achieve otherness” (L. Gordon, 2011b: 74).  
In the “Introduction Into Politics,” Hannah Arendt (2005: 93. Original emphasis) writes that, “politics 
is based on the fact of human plurality…politics deals with the coexistence and association of different 
men”. From this perspective, black people could only engage in politics, and hope to (re)constitute the 
social world, if they elaborated tactics that would radically negate Apartheid’s negation of plurality and 
coexistence. It follows then that the BCM had to refuse the seductive missionary politics of creating 
mimetic persons. Biko and the BCM’s separatist tactic enabled them to engage in political acts that 
demonstrated black self-reliance, self-pride, and thus subjectivity-becoming. Biko and BCM 
protagonists would thus endorse Jacques Rancière (2004: 7) explication that, “all political action 
presupposes the refutation of a situation’s given assumptions, the introduction of previously uncounted 
objects and subjects...” In this regard, SASO explained ‘Black Consciousness’ in the following words:  
‘Black Consciousness’ is essentially a slogan directing us away from traditional political big talk to a 
new approach. This inward-looking movement is calculated to make us look at ourselves and see 
ourselves, not in terms of what we have been taught through the absolute values of white society, but 
with new eyes (SASO, 1978d: 101). 
The ‘traditional big talk’ that Black Consciousness disavowed was that of making recognition demands 
on the white man through liberalism and assimilationist discourses. The BCM understood, firstly, that 
it was impossible to introduce ‘uncounted objects and subjects’ (the idea of post-South Africa/Azania 
and black people who are beings-in-themselves) without developing new ways of seeing the world. 
This would involve the disavowal of colonialist discourses. Secondly, the BCM was aware that to 
develop ‘new eyes’ and to elaborate previously discounted ways of thinking and being-in-the-world 
they had to institute an epistemic and political break with the world that sought to relegate black people 
into a ‘zone of non-beings’. Flowing from this, two imperatives became necessary. First, black people 
had to delink from the clutches of the white world and render this world superfluous. Second, to render 
this world superfluous, to resist the subjugating powers of white consciousness, and to re-exist on own 
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terms, black people had to offer a strong counterpoint against whiteness. It is for this reason that Biko 
explained the tactic of Black Consciousness in the following Hegelian terms, 
The thesis is in fact a strong white racism and therefore, the antithesis to this must, ipso facto, be a strong 
solidarity amongst the blacks on whom this white racism seeks to prey. Out of these two situations we 
therefore hope to reach some kind of balance – a true humanity where power politics will have no place 
(Biko, 2004: 99).  
The BCM’s separatist tactic was thus a means toward a humane, united, and non-racial polity. In Part I 
of this dissertation I argued that one important aspect of the melancholic condition of New Africans 
was the fact that they were obsessed with the fact that they were invisible in the settler social order. 
Black Consciousness impelled black people to abandon this thinking. If black people were to 
(re)constitute the South African social world in such a way that black people will no longer be treated 
as invisible non-beings, then black people had to first re-exist for themselves – ‘to look at ourselves and 
see ourselves’ as SASO put it. This coming together of black people is self-valorisation, an instantiation 
of appearance on own stage, and thus a rejection of the colonialist idea that black people are invisible.  
In line with BCM’s proposition that ‘second sight’ and attainment of self-consciousness must lead to 
action if they are not to be ultimately purposeless, Invisible Man also confirms that, “without the 
possibility of action, all knowledge comes to one labelled ‘file and forget’” (Ellison, 2001: 579). This 
insight induces Invisible Man to decide to end his hibernation and liminality. If promises of assimilation 
where a way for the white world to, “keep this Nigger-Boy running” (Ellison, 2001: 33) - running from 
the world, running from good faith living, running from other “Niggers,” indeed running from himself 
or herself – Invisible Man would need to stop running, “…since even an invisible man has a socially 
responsible role to play” (Ellison, 2001: 579). This role is that abandoning a ‘two-faced’ attitude and 
thus assuming the responsibility of co-creating and reconstituting the world. 
Similarly, Biko (2004: 53, 25) also demanded of black people to, “stop running from themselves” and 
to realise that, “there is nothing the matter with them”. The Black Consciousness philosophy thus led 
to an awareness that black people are not what Du Bois referred to as a ‘problem people’.  Biko urged 
black people to realise that there was no ‘black problem’ or a ‘problem with blacks’. Rather, black 
people encountered problems in their lived experiences: “problems of oppression, problems of poverty, 
problems of deprivation, and problems of self-alienation” (Biko, 2004: 138). Biko’s shifting of the 
discourse of problemacy allowed black people to stop running from themselves in a vain attempt to 
prove that they are not a problem.  
At the aforementioned 1977 trial, having given an eloquent lecture on the causes of self-negation and 
self-hatred and having rejected the idea of “the black problem,” Biko went on to put the Apartheid 
system and white society on trial. He bust the myth that Apartheid is an instance of western modernity 
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or a civilising force. He showed that the South African polity is sustained by violence and fear. He then 
proceeded to appropriate the Apartheid courtroom and turn it into a political rally by suggesting that 
the white world must be charged with terrorism:  
…what we have to experience…certainly is much more definite, much more physically depressing than 
the charge you are placing against these men for the few things they have said… I think put together all 
this [anti-black violence] is much more terrorism than what these guys have been saying. Now they stand 
charged. White society is not charged (cited in Mangcu, 2012: 195).  
Whereas the Apartheid regime sought to negate black politics; Biko suggested that Apartheid is what 
needed to be banned. Black Consciousness’s tactic of re-existence was ultimately based on this kind of 
discursive inversion; a tactic that Nahum Chandler (2008: 305) identifies as one of “overturn 
[renverser]”. I will shortly return to this idea. Biko’s testimony before court is also testimony of the 
kind of bravery and commitment to tell the (black) truth that the BCM demanded of black people. This 
display of maturity, freedom, and radical responsibility was an exercise in self-actualisation and proof 
by black people to themselves that they are not defective beings. The BCM thus spawned a whole 
generation of black people who no longer acted like a ‘problem people’.  
Having shown what Black Consciousness is not and what it stood against, and before closing this 
chapter with an elaboration of the constitution and belonging tactic of the BCM, I will now recap what 
Black Consciousness is. For our purposes, Maboge More’s succinct summation will suffice:  
From an identity point of view, Black Consciousness means (1) black people’s consciousness or 
realisation that the world is infested with an anti-black social reality and (2) black people’s recognition 
of themselves as black and proud of the fact. From a liberation perspective, Black Consciousness meant 
black people’s intense desire to annihilate this social reality as a condition for universal humanism (More, 
2014: 180).  
In the rest of the chapter, I seek to elaborate Black Consciousness’ prefigurative praxis of constitution 
and belonging. I contend that this praxis is a revolutionary praxis to (re)constitute the social world 
because it deliberately averted pitfalls of a Du Boisian manifesto of constitution and belonging. As can 
be expected, however, BCM activists were also influenced by Du Bois. More specifically, exponents 
of Black Consciousness often invoked Du Bois’s famous proposition that ‘the problem of the twentieth 
century is the problem of the colour line’ as well as Du Bois’s notion of “double consciousness” (More, 
2014: 179). However, as I will shortly show, Black Consciousness’s praxis of constitution and 
belonging transcended the Du Boisian manifesto in fundamental ways. By way of reminder, I have 
suggested that the three pillars of the Du Boisian manifesto are (i) disalienation and attainment of self-
conscious personhood; (ii) forging/rehabilitation of group consciousness and identity; and (iii) quests 
to (re)constitute the world. I have proposed that the three pitfalls of the Du Boisian manifesto are (i) an 
unwitting attachment to colonialist discourse as reflected in a reiteration of the notion of the existences 
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of “races” as natural and antithetical phenomena; (ii) a salvationist praxis of consciousness-raising and 
a top-down elaboration of constitution and belonging in ways that undermine the process of forging 
national consciousness and nation-becoming; and (iii) ultimately, a reformist and integrationist vision 
that does not fundamentally dismantle the world of apartness. I will first address the first pillar and the 
first pitfall. I will then read the BCM praxis in relation to the second pillar and second pitfall; and then 
finally, I will do the same with respect to the third pillar and the third pitfall.  
 
4.3.2 Exposing white racial melancholia, deconstructing Blackness, ‘blackening’ the world 
 
 
It should be clear that a premier task that the BCM set for itself was that of disalienation - ‘to make the 
black man come to himself,’ as Biko explained the agenda. This is first pillar of the Du Boisian 
manifesto of constitution and belonging. Towards this end, Biko and BCM activists appropriated and 
embraced blackness. In this regard, the BCM followed a route that had been chart by previous black 
movements of disalienation and rebirth. In the previous section, I argued that the BCM transcended 
these movements because it made a concerted effort to overcome racial melancholia and aggressive 
dependency. In this sub-section, I aim to show that Biko and the BCM, similar to Mphahlele’s 
deconstruction of Africanity, sought to refuse colonialist-Apartheid discourse by deconstructing 
Blackness and in that way avoid the first pitfall of the Du Boisian manifesto.  
Biko understood that in the context of the ‘totality’ of the white power structure any move to deconstruct 
Blackness and reconstruct black personhood had to start with a refusal of whiteness and a confrontation 
with white consciousness. Biko’s brilliant two-fold proposition was that if black people were serious 
about overcoming racial melancholia and double consciousness they had to make sure that they do not 
spend too much time rehashing the evils of Apartheid and trying to shame overt racists. Rather, black 
people had to refuse the entirety of the white world. Such a total refusal included refusing the help of 
white liberals. Such a total refusal, as we shall shortly see, would ensure that black people gain self-
empowerment and thus self-conscious personhood. Such total refusal would also plant the seeds of a 
black constituent power. Flowing from this, the second part of Biko’s proposition was that well-
meaning white people could only become part of black constituent power if they confronted their own 
bad faith and racial melancholia and when they became traitors to whiteness and the white world. 
Biko first elaborated the concept of the ‘totality’ of white power when he explained why black students 
had decided to break away from NUSAS and the United Christian Movement. Biko (2004: 11) 
explained that organisations dominated by white people would always be biased towards “white issues”. 
Biko explained that it was impossible for white liberals in those organisations to change and be pro-
black because they belonged to the “oppressor camp” (Biko, 2004: 11). According to Biko (2004: 20), 
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ultimately, in an anti-black society white people are a homogenous community of people who enjoy 
unjustified privilege, were aware of this injustice, and were all the time trying to justify their position. 
From a Bikoian perspective, what marked out white people as a homogenous group was the fact that 
their white skin conferred on them privilege and power at the expense of black people. All white people 
were, therefore, accomplices and beneficiaries of the original sin in the constitution of South Africa. In 
this regard, explicating the “racial contract,” Charles Mills (1997:11. Original emphasis) also writes 
that, “all whites are beneficiaries of the Contract, though some whites are not signatories to it”. Biko 
(2004: 24) went further and posited that the fact of being an on-going beneficiary of the racial contract 
and the original sin is, “what demarcates the liberal from the black world”.  
The brilliance of Biko is that he did not just bemoan ‘separate development’. More importantly, he 
turned Apartheid’s Manichaeism against Apartheid. At one level, he did this in order to build a strong 
sense of black solidarity. Biko and Pityana’s message was that black people could only exercise self-
responsibility and reclaim existential freedom if they understood that they existed in a different world 
to that of white people. Biko (for e.g., 2004: 82) constantly reiterated that the white-dominated world 
was the real evil in South Africa because it had claimed monopoly over comfort and security at the 
expense of black people. Biko’s objective was thus to conscientise black people to loathe the white 
world and not lust for it.  
At another level, by emphasising the aloneness of black people in the South Africa polity, Biko and 
BCM philosophers were consciously isolating white liberals and exposing their Satrean bad faith. He 
took up this theme in July 1970 in his first article for what was going to be a regular column in SASO’s 
newsletter writing under the telling nom de plume of “Frank Talk”. Biko’s “Black souls in White skins?” 
echoed Fanon’s Black Skin, White Mask. Whereas Fanon focused on the split personality of the Black 
person, Biko focused on the double consciousness of the good white person. He thus introduced three 
‘previously unthinkable objects’: (i) the notion that the conquered are beings with a soul and, moreover, 
that the ‘black soul’ was a prerequisite for being a political subject and ultimately for being-becoming; 
(ii) the black gaze that racialises and discursively undresses white people; and (iii) the idea of white 
racial melancholia.  
As a prefigurative constitutionalist, Biko was already laying the seeds of future nation-becoming and 
the role that all Azanians (white and black) were going to play in the post-South Africa polity. Since 
there was no ‘Black problem,’ Biko demanded that white liberals desist from wanting to help black 
people. He deployed Karl Jasper’s concept of “metaphysical guilt” to make the argument that all white 
people in South Africa were guilty of a crime against humanity against black people. Ultimately, white 
people must realise that, “there is nothing the matter with blacks. The problem is WHITE RACISM and 
it rests squarely on the laps of white society” (Biko, 2004: 25. Original emphasis). Thus if good white 
people were serious about playing a role in the reconstitution of society they had to do two concrete 
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things. First, Biko demanded that ‘the good white’ to repudiate white supremacy and boycott the 
benefits of white privilege. Second, he (2004: 27) demanded that white people fight white supremacy 
in the white world - the only problematic world. Biko’s argument was that if white liberals really wanted 
to change the status quo they had to engage in an internecine battle that would result in the death of 
whiteness and the killing of the white world. In this way, Biko impelled good white people to confront 
their bad faith. The following statement by Nadine Gordimer, an internationally-acclaimed white writer, 
captured the mode of critical self-reflexivity that Black Consciousness imposed on ‘good white people’. 
Commenting on the emergence of Black Consciousness Gordimer thus reflected as follows:  
We shall need to see our efforts not so much as attempts to right wrongs on behalf of blacks as to set our 
society free from the lies upon which it is built. The role of protector, honourable though it may have 
seemed, and great courage though it undoubtedly showed in certain individuals at certain times, is one 
of those lies (cited in Khoapa, 1973: 48). 
Biko was clear: White liberals ought to stop deceiving black people and themselves. They knew what 
the problem was. They knew that the problem was not individual acts of racism. The problem was not 
even segregation. The real problem was the ‘totality’ of the white power structure. More importantly, 
Biko forced a crisis on liberals. If white liberals wanted to help, they had to commit race suicide and 
become liminal creatures, fugitives, and insurgents of, in, and, against the white world. Similarly, Biko 
castigated white leftists for privileging a class analysis over a race one. Biko commented that a class 
analysis was a defensive mechanism adopted by white people who did not want to face up to the fact 
of the ‘totality’ of white power. These white radicals failed to face up to the truth that even if the 
economy were to be altered along socialist lines, the whole system of white values would remain 
(Interview with Gerhart, 2008: 34). In such a socialist society, white values and colonialist discourse 
would reconfigure but not eliminate the constitutive sin. Biko intuited that although some white radicals 
were prepared to commit class suicide, they could not be persuaded to commit race suicide. In this 
regard, referring to a debate that took place amongst white and black leftists during the transition to the 
“new” South Africa Frank Wilderson puts this matter succinctly: 
even if these White radicals had been persuaded …that the essential nature of the antagonism was not 
capitalism but anti-Blackness (and no doubt some had been persuaded), they could not have been 
persuaded to organize in a politically masochistic manner, that is, against the concreteness of their 
communities, their own families, and themselves, rather than against the abstraction of ‘the system’ 
(Wilderson, 2008a: 102. Original emphasis).  
Thus, if colonisation and ‘death of the land’ had forced an existential crisis on transcultural black 
people, Biko was now imposing a similar existential crisis on ‘good white people’. Biko was asking 
them to confront a very fundamental question: can you fight white supremacy and still be white? His 
answer was clear: only people with “black souls” could play a role in the (re)constitution of society. If 
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white rejection had triggered melancholia and attendant Sisyphus-like struggle for recognition in 
respect of transcultural black people; Black Consciousness’s rejection of good white people sought to 
do the same thing. In this regard, Gordimer (2010: 281) confesses that Black Consciousness’s separatist 
tactic and rejection of white people had a traumatic impact on the psyche of liberal and radical white 
people. This is because Biko and his BCM ideologues forced good white people to confront the fact 
that they were “Janus oppressors” (Gordimer, 2010: 282). Gordimer (2010: 277) explained that in her 
case this trauma together with the discovery of the lie at the heart of the South African polity impelled 
her to undergo a “rebirth” or “second consciousness” in order to become a political subject and to finally 
belong to South Africa. Flowing from my earlier arguments, we can understand Gordimer’s 
metamorphosis as follows: To truly become and to truly belong she had to potentiate her double 
consciousness. Similar to the voyage of self-discovery and attainment of self-conscious personhood 
that melancholic black people go through, such a potentiation assist white people who want to contribute 
to the (re)constitution of the South African social world to “change the concept of who and what they 
are….” (Gordimer, 2010: 281).  
Biko and the BCM’s ingenuity lay not only in forcing an existential crisis on good white people and 
forcing them to confront their bad faith existence. Biko and the BCM’s ultimate aim was to destroy 
blackness and whiteness discourses. Their tactic was one of radical displacement, not reversal, of 
colonialist-Apartheid discourse. Biko and the BCM’s project brings to mind a word from a later era: 
deconstruction. This is how Robert Bernasconi’s surmises Jacques Derrida’s method of deconstruction: 
“to address a hierarchically determined oppositional system, it is not sufficient simply to reverse the 
priorities. The task is to neutralise or displace the opposition itself” (Bernasconi, 2003: 97. Also see in 
general, Chandler, 2008). Biko’s gesture was two-fold. Firstly, as we saw above, he deprived whiteness 
of all innocence and civilisational pretenses: Whiteness was evil. Whereas Apartheid discourse sought 
to marginalise black people and deny them a political life, Biko, secondly, argued that to do politics 
and to lead an ethical life, one needed to be black. That is, one had to have a “black soul”. Whereas 
Fanon thought that the “white man” could only be suppressed through violence; Biko thought that white 
people had to commit race suicide and seek being-becoming by, to borrow the felicitous title of Antjie 
Krog’s 2009 book, “begging to be black”. 32 
                                                        
32 Writing in the late 2000s Krog’s writes that her quest of “becoming black” (Krog, 2009: 92) was impelled by a 
feeling of non-belonging, psychic restlessness, and perhaps melancholia: “I want to be part of the country I was 
born in. I need to know whether it is possible for somebody like me to become like the majority; to become 
‘blacker?’ and live as a full and at-ease component of the South African psyche”. ‘Becoming black’ would 
presumably also enable an at-easy sense of belongingness to South Africa and end the feeling of “fierce 
belonging” that Krog evinced a decade earlier (Krog, 1998: 277).  Incidentally, Gordimer’s 1977 musings were 
contained in a lecture on white consciousness entitled “What being a South African Means to me”. On how this 
process of decolonial becoming is made possible by liminality, see Motha, (2010: 286). As stated earlier, from a 
Black Consciousness perceptive, the demand for liminality ought only be directed at white people because it is 
this group that has historically placed itself at the centre of the South African polity.  
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White people had to beg to become black because blackness was not a problem, whiteness was. SASO 
Policy Manifesto put it as follows: “the white man is either a part of the solution or part of the 
problem…” and, “in this context because of the privileges accorded to them by legislation and because 
of their continual maintenance of an oppressive regime whites have defined themselves as part of the 
problem” (cited in Khoapa, 1973: 40). At the 1976 treason trial these resolutions were put to Biko as 
examples of how SASO promoted ‘race prejudice’. Biko’s answer reveals this displacement tactic I 
have been discussing:  
In a situation where you have a hiving of privileges within society for the sole enjoyment or for the major 
enjoyment by one section of society, you do get a certain form of alienation of members who are on 
opposites sides of the line, and that the white man’s specifically has got to decide whether he is part of 
the problem – in other words whether he is part of the total white power which we regard as the problem 
- or he accedes and becomes part of the black man…” (2004: 138. My emphasis). 
 
The choice for white people was simple, Bantu Biko argued: either they remained in their inhumane 
world (the world of those who are not abantu/persons) or they try to cultivate ethical existence and thus 
pursue being-becoming by assimilating into blackness. Therefore, in terms of Black Consciousness the 
dissolution of whiteness through assimilation into blackness was a route towards ending what Biko 
called the mutual ‘alienation’ of people on opposite sides of the world. From this perspective, Black 
Consciousness was less a separatist strategy than as strategy to blacken the world. Addressing white 
students, Ben Khoapa explained this strategy in the following way:  
Too many people think blackness means withdrawing and tightening the circle. On the contrary, 
blackness means expanding and widening the circle, absorbing and integrating instead of being absorbed 
and integrated and from that perspective, it is easy to see that a philosophy of liberation requires black 
people to cast their light not over one thing but over everything… (1972: n.p. My emphasis).  
The BCM encapsulated the telos of this tactic in the slogan: “One Azania, One Nation”. 33  As is clear, 
at the heart of the BCM’s vision of constitution and belonging was the intention to build one nation of 
Azanians. To recap the discussion so far: SASO adopted a separatist posture in order to engage in 
politics as per Arendt and Ranciére’s definitions above. A separatist posture was a tactic to try to create 
a constituent power that will birth Azania for the benefit of everyone who lives in ‘South Africa’. In 
                                                        
33 Why Azania? In The Rise of Azania and the Fall of South Africa (1983: 4-5) David Dube explains the 
significance of this appellation for black strivings for constitution and belonging in the following manner: 
“…‘South Africa’ was not only a creation of white settlers and their colonial backers, but ‘South Africa’ was 
never meant for the blackman. A ‘South African’ has always been and is a white person….Azania distinguishes 
the mentally liberated Blacks from the mentally colonised Blacks. The use of Azania when referring to ‘South 
Africa’ distinguishes those who know South Africa is colony from those who say South Africa is ‘an independent 
state’”.  
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the context where Apartheid refused politics, the BCM sought to blacken the polity and thus create a 
political environment for the radical de-constitution and (re)constitution of the social world. The BCM 
declared that only those with ‘black souls’ could do politics. Refusing the ‘traditional big talk’ aimed 
at integrating into the extant world, the BCM showed that there was no world to integrate into. More 
fundamentally, the BCM declared that politics only exists and emerges on the underside of South 
Africa. The underside of South Africa was not a’ zone of non-beings’, but a zone of political beings. 
Therefore, all those who wanted to reconstitute society had to embrace Black Consciousness and 
become ‘part of the black man’. Lewis Gordon (2008b: 89) summarises this gesture as follows: “Black 
Consciousness is thus identical with political life, and those who are willing to take the risk of politics 
in a context where the state has waged war on politics are, as their opposition mounts, blackened by 
such a process”.   
From the perspective of Black Consciousness, then, white liberalism and white left radicalism were not 
political projects. Rather, they were projects aimed at bolstering whiteness and sustaining the world of 
apartness. In this world of apartness, politics is negated because plurality is negated. Similar to dominant 
black struggles, the latter projects did not seek to create a constituent power to fundamentally 
(re)constitute society. Black Consciousness forced ‘good white people’ to confront their own racial 
melancholia. Commenting on Invisible Man, Ann Cheng (2005: 124-125) explains that white racial 
melancholia is caused by the fact that white people depend on black people for their identity and self-
consciousness and yet they constantly attempt to deny black people. White racial melancholia is, 
therefore, the result of the fact that white people have psychically incorporated that which they deny 
(ibid.). As is the case with alienated black people, white people had to overcome their racial melancholia 
if they wished to play a socially-responsible role. For Biko, it was only by embracing ‘black soul’ and 
becoming black that white people could become political actors.  
Biko and BCM philosophers were able to make this demand and to ‘blacken’ politics because they 
adopted a broad definition of blackness. BCM activists proposed that blackness was a shorthand for 
ethical living. This was possible because Biko essentialised whiteness: all whites were the same because 
Apartheid accorded them privileges and they gladly embraced these ill-gotten privileges.  On the other 
hand, blackness was neither an essentialist phenomenon nor a metaphysical one. Black Consciousness, 
as an existential phenomenological philosophy (see in general, More, 2008; L. Gordon, 2008b), laid 
down two elements of blackness. In the first place, ‘black’ referred to the lived experience of being 
oppressed. SASO (1978c: 99) declared that “black” includes all, “those who are by law or tradition 
politically, economically and socially discriminated against as a group in the South African society”. 
Secondly, and more fundamentally, ‘black’ referred to the, “willingness of the oppressed individual to 
identify with fellow oppressed people against the oppression” (Khoapa, 1973: 43). Biko (2004: 52) 
explained SASO’s resolution in the following succinct terms: “1. Being black is not a matter of 
pigmentation – being black is a reflection of a mental attitude. 2. Merely by describing yourself as black 
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you have started on a road to towards emancipation…”  
At the same time, the BCM declared that not all people whom Apartheid racialised as Black were not 
black. Biko (2004: 52) explained that people who aspire to whiteness, those who collaborate with the 
system of Apartheid, and  those who feel inferior to white people are not ‘real black’. In the vocabulary 
of SASO such beings are “non-whites” (see Khoapa, 1973: 43). In spite of their relentless aspiration, 
such persons were not part of the white world. Non-whites were, therefore, also not part of the ethical 
world of black people. As Biko (2004: 86) posited, such persons were liminal figures: “Any black man 
who props the system up actively has lost the right to being considered part of the black world… [such 
people] are colourless white lackeys who live in a marginal world of unhappiness”. Therefore, only 
those who had the consciousness that the main antagonism in South Africa was anti-black racism, 
cultivated and embraced blackness, and were willing to sacrifice their lives fighting against the ‘totality’ 
of white power could be considered black.  
A fundamental pillar of Biko’s praxis of constitution and belonging was thus an attempt to ‘blacken 
politics’ by first deconstructing the colonialist discourse that characterised black people as defective-
beingness. At the same time, he re-constructed blackness by broadening it to be open to all those who 
aspired to be ethical beings. The discussion in this sub-section and the previous section alerts us to the 
fact that Black Consciousness did not fall into the nativist pitfall of a ‘distinct but equal’ discourse. 
Unlike Du Bois, Biko did not wish to ‘conserve the race’. Biko, rather, wished to supersede the concept 
of race in order to achieve a post-South African society which he wished to be ‘colourless’. Another 
fundamental difference between the BCM and early Pan-Africanist and Négritudist approaches to the 
first and second pillars of the Du Boisian manifesto is that the BCM cared about what happens to white 
people. Biko’s tactic of radical displacement through ‘tactical re-signification’ (Lloyd, 2003: 26) aimed 
to ultimately destroy both racialised identities and their associated psychic complexes. To do this, Black 
Consciousness forced both white people and black people to confront their conditions of racial 
melancholia. With regards to black people, as SASO put it in the previous section, the aim was to 
conscientise black people into forming a strong block of solidarity, and thus lay seeds for a future 
constituent power. More importantly, SASO wished to pursue this objective without collapsing into 
white hatred and anti-colonial longing (two pitfalls of a nativist vision of constitution and belonging).  
 
4.3.3 Forging a black constituent power through dialectical conscientisation 
 
In its Policy Manifesto, having set its goal as that of creating a non-racial “open society,” SASO (1978c: 
100) declared that it, “believes that a truly open society can only be achieved by blacks”. With this 
declaration, as I have already discussed in the previous section and as C.R.D. Halisi (1999: 130, 129) 
rightly notes, the BCM reformulated, “the legitimate standards of civic participation,” and thus, 
“challenged the white government’s power to decide the most basic question of citizenship, ‘who are 
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the people’”. According to the BCM, people who were to play a role in the constitution of Azania were 
not White or Black, but rather black. The BCM, therefore, regarded group consciousness to be part of 
a transient phase towards ‘One Azania, One Nation’ based on an all-encompassing national 
consciousness. We can, therefore, understand that for Biko and his BCM existential-phenomenologist 
companions, the aim of forging group consciousness was to constitute a black constituent power that 
will birth a post-South African polity on the basis of, “a true humanity where power politics 
[identity/group politics] will have no place” (Biko, 2004: 99). This then was Black Consciousness’s 
unique contribution to the second pillar of the Du Boisian manifesto. Another way in which the BCM 
transcended related movements of rebirth and race consciousness was in the fact that this movement 
sought to avoid the Du Boisian pitfall of top-down cultivation of group consciousness. In this regard, 
the BCM employed Paulo Freire’s tactic of dialectical conscientisation and community development 
programmes to circumvent this pitfall. These are the same tactics that Mphahlele also resorted to.  
The BCM’s quest of awakening black people and urging them towards being-becoming necessarily 
involved a lot of reading and other intellectual work. This is because Black Consciousness was first and 
foremost an epistemic and ideological struggle: “a continuous struggle for truth” leading to an 
examination and questioning of, “old concepts, values and systems” (Biko, 2004: 102). Therefore, 
between 1968 and 1972 (the period of the making of Black Consciousness thought) SASO engaged in 
an immense amount of intellectual production (Magaziner, 2009: 226-227) However, from its early 
beginnings proponents of Black Consciousness were anxious to ensure that a fissure did not develop 
between BCM students and the rest of the black community. We can detect this anxiety in SASO’s very 
first Manifesto: 
A. We black students are:  
1. an integral part of the black oppressed community before we are students... 
2. committed to a more disciplined involvement in the intellectual and physical world… 
3. committed to work towards the building of our people and to the winning of the struggle for liberation 
and guided by the central purpose of service to the black community on every technical and social level 
(SASO, 1978a: 97).  
SASO was thus anxious not to be perceived as a disconnected band of ivory tower intellectuals who 
wished to forge group consciousness and to elaborate black visions of constitution and belonging from 
above. This anxiety went beyond matters of perception. SASO activists were also eager to build a 
popular-democratic movement. SASO leaders warned that “grassroots support” and the adoption of 
Black Consciousness by a critical mass of black people were indispensable if the philosophy of Black 
Consciousness was to be “effective” (SASO, 1978d: 102). Towards this end, SASO adopted Freire’s 
conscientisation methodology (Wilson, 2011: 59). Biko had read Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed 
(1968) and had sought out Anne Hope who was offering workshops on Freire’s methodology (Ibid.). 
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Fifteen SASO members attended four months of these workshops with a monthly obligation to return 
to their communities for three weeks of intensive research and practice (Ibid.). Through such a 
dialectical conscientisation method, SASO could contribute towards the awakening of black 
communities while also learning from and being conscientised by ordinary black people. Freire’s 
conscientisation methodology was perfect in this regard because it demanded of Black Consciousness 
activists to constantly engage in critical self-reflexivity to ensure that they were, “marching to the same 
tune as the rest of the community” (SASO, 1978d: 105). Freire explains this anti-philosopher king 
pedagogy as follows:  
Those who authentically commit themselves to the people must re-examine themselves constantly…To 
affirm this commitment but to consider oneself the proprietor of revolutionary wisdom – which must be 
given to (or imposed on) the people – is to retain the old ways (Freire, 1996: 42-43). 
 
Lindy Wilson (2011: 60) reports that Freire’s methodology resonated with Biko because it accorded 
with his open and unimposing leadership style. Biko detested the cult of personality and preferred to 
stay in the background whilst others took charge (Woods, 1978: 36). Biko’s acquaintances, such as a 
Father Aelred Stubbs (cited in Wilson, 2011: 53), report that Biko “had a deep-seated institution of 
togetherness” and believed in collective leadership. This is the reason why the BCM was characterised 
by a large pool of talented leaders and spokespersons from its inception (Woods, 1978: 36).  
It could thus be said that Freire’s dialectical methodology helped proponents of Black Consciousness 
to recover their ‘first sight’. From Cabral and Henry’s perspective, the recovery of ‘first sight’ is a 
prerequisite for a genuine attempt to fashion a constantly unfolding and creolising national 
consciousness. This is a genuine attempt because it encourages equal and democratic participation from 
all sectors of society. In this regard, Jane Gordon (2014: 131) has shown that popular-democratic 
participation was also Fanon’s indispensable ingredient for forging a national consciousness. Mass 
participation enables people who have been historically infantalised and muted to make themselves 
subjects of history and co-builders of a new society. In this way, the processes of dismantling ‘the racial 
contract’ and of (re)constitution would then be based on what Jean-Jacques Rousseau called the 
“general will;” and not on what Jane Gordon (ibid.) calls the “will of some”. Freire’s conscientisation 
methodology is indispensable to this project because it helps the oppressed people to perceive their 
situation clearly, recognise that they can change it, and become new by overcoming their divided, 
inauthentic selves (Freire, 1996: 30). In the context where Fanonian armed struggle was not an option, 
conscientisation was a way of creating new men and women who will prepare themselves to be part of 
the constituent power towards Azania.  
This brings us to the BCM’s second tool of operationalising the second pillar of the Du Boisian 
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manifesto namely, the Black Community Programmes (BCP). Ben Khoapa, the first director of BCPs, 
explained the aims of BCP’s in words that demonstrated their indispensability for the shaping of 
consciousness through self-remaking, subjectivity-becoming and self-actualisation: “Black people want 
to know, and must know, more about who they were and who they are if they are seriously concerned 
about whom they intend to become (Khoapa, 1973: 1. Original emphasis). Khoapa further explained 
the rationale of these programmes in ways that demonstrated their indispensability to the bottom-up 
process that I discussed in the previous passages. Khoapa proclaimed that BCPs were aimed at, “issues 
of empowerment, the development of the ability to decide, the ability to be critical….” (cited in Wilson, 
2011: 57). The BCM praxis, therefore, held that conscientisation efforts were meaningless unless they 
helped black people to achieve liberation understood as the fulfillment of the human potential of 
historically-dehumanised people.  
In the context where the BCM was urging black people to delink from the white world and to make no 
demands against the state the BCP programmes were central to sustaining black communities and to 
inculcating a spirit of self-reliance and self-determination. In this way, de-linked people could meet 
their own spiritual, psychic, social and material needs (Black Community Programmes, 1978a: 331). 
From a Bikoian praxis of constitution and belonging, therefore, community programmes together with 
dialectical conscientisation were indispensable tools for forging constituent power from below. Leslie 
Hadfield (2016: 19) thus concludes that, “facing an oppressive state, community action was a way to 
develop people in preparation for a future political liberation”. 
 
4.3.4 Towards pluralist co-existence  
 
I have in the preceding sub-sections attempted to outline Black Consciousness distinctive philo-praxis 
of constitution and belonging. The uniqueness of the BCM’s vision was its sincere attempt to avert the 
pitfall of inadvertent attachment to colonialist discourse as well as the pitfall of elitist nationalism.  In 
this final section, I aim to show that the BCM elaborated an anti-assimilation praxis. Biko famously 
articulated his objection against “integration” as follows:  
Does that mean that I am against integration? If by integration you understand a breakthrough into white 
society by blacks, an assimilation and acceptance of blacks into an already established set of norms and 
code of behavior set up and maintained by whites, then YES I am against it. I am against the superior-
inferior white-black stratification that makes the white a perpetual teacher and the black a perpetual pupil 
(Biko: 2004: 26). 
 
The outcome of integrationist politics, Biko argued, would be that black people simply continue to be 
“appendages” of white society (Biko, 2004: 55). Furthermore, according to Biko, integration into the 
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South African/white world would perpetuate both white racial melancholia and black racial melancholia 
because, “the people forming the integrated complex [would] have been extracted from various 
segregated societies with their inbuilt complexes of superiority and inferiority and these [would] 
continue to manifest themselves even in the ‘nonracial’ set up of the integrated complex” (Biko, 2004: 
21). For Biko, then, integrated/ “new” South Africa would be a neo-Apartheid world in a sense that 
only a few “intelligent and articulate” [transcultural] black people would be extracted from the black 
world and assimilated into the white world (Biko, 204: 21). 
Biko’s warning was that the failure to deal decisively with the ‘totality’ of the white power structure 
would leave the colonial-racist situation intact. In such a situation, the ‘post-Apartheid’ society would 
simply be a neo-Apartheid society. Biko predicted three main consequences of such a scenario. First, 
neo-Apartheid would lead to black-on-black exploitation; a situation where, “black will compete with 
black, using each other as rungs up a ladder leading them to white value” (Biko, 2004: 101). Secondly, 
under a “deracialised” neo-Apartheid political economy black people would continue to be the damned 
of the earth. He explained this in very prescient terms: “this is one country where it would be possible 
to create a capitalist black society. If whites were intelligent…and South Africa could succeed to put 
across to the world a pretty convincing picture, with still 70 percent of the population underdogs” 
(Interview with Gerhart, 2008: 42). Finally, the original sin of “native” pariahdom would continue 
because white values, European epistemologies and aesthetics would continue to frame South Africa 
ensuring that South Africa remains a “province of Europe” (Biko, 2004: 148). Biko (2005: 70) thus 
proposed that the decolonisation imperative was to, “overhaul the whole system”. 
The BCM’s vision of de-constituting South Africa might not have the same rhetorical radicalism as 
Fanon and Algeria’s National Liberation Front ‘destruction of the colonial situation’ rallying cry. 
However, it substantially amounted to the same vision. This is clear from a debate that a group of SASO 
members had on the significance of the statement “before entering the open society, we must first close 
ranks” (Gerhart, 1978: 276). This was a standard line from the USA Black Power movements. SASO’s 
conclusion was that in the context of South Africa this statement should be changed to make it clear 
that only black people could create an open society. SASO proposed that the statement should be 
amended to read: “before creating an open society we must first close our ranks”. They explained the 
significance of this amendment as follows:  
The difference of course is of paramount importance in that in the first one, the Afro-Americans accept 
that they will never be in a position to change the system in America, and adopt the approach that if you 
can’t beat them, join them – but join them from a position of strength; whereas implicit in the latter 
statement is a hope to establish a completely new system at some stage…Purely from a consideration of 
who we are, we realise that it is we who must be allowing others to participate in our system. We must 
not be the ones to be invited to participate in somebody else’s system in our own private yard (cited in 
Gerhart, 1978: 276. My emphasis).  
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Biko often declared that he was in favour of an open, common, and inclusive society, but that only the 
oppressed could articulate the method or approach to this kind of society (Wilson, 2011: 26). Although 
SASO was steadfast in its insistence that only black people could be constitution-makers, it was at pains 
to explain that it, “…believes that South Africa is a country in which both black and white live and shall 
continue to live together” (SASO, 1978: 99). At a 1976 trial Biko (2004: 136) explained that this 
statement meant that the BCM believes in “a plural society with contributions made to its development 
by all segments of the community… We intend to see [white people] staying here side by side with us, 
maintaining a society in which everybody shall contribute proportionally”. The BCM’s vision of 
constitution and belonging is one we could thus identify as a quest for pluralist co-existence.34  
More specifically, this vision accorded with Mphahlele’s vision of re-membering and remembering 
Africa and a valorisation of creolising African culture. Biko argued that in an open society European 
culture could not be dominant. Rather cultures will rub and affect each other “like fashion” thus leading 
to a situation of inter-culturality (Biko, 2004: 147). Biko’s remarks in this courtroom exchange deserve 
to be quoted at length:   
Counsel: the question I think which is of greater interest to us is on the first day of the open society, on 
the following day, is there going to be general destruction – any destruction or proscription of existing 
culture and cultural values?   
Biko: I think a modification all round.   
Counsel: Now what sorts of modifications are envisaged?   
Biko: ….all that [SASO] insist on is primarily a culture that accepts the humanity of the black man. A 
culture that is sufficiently accommodative of African concepts, to pass as an African culture. What we 
are saying now is that at the present moment we have a culture here which is a European culture. This 
country looks, My Lord, like a province of Europe. You know, to anybody who perceives the behavior 
pattern it looks like a province of Europe. It has no relationships rootwise to the fact that it happens to 
exist in Africa…we behave like Europeans who are staying in Africa. So we don’t want to be just mere 
political Africans, we want to be people living in Africa. We want to be complete Africans, we – social 
Africans…must understand Africa and what Africa is about. And we don’t’ have to go far. We just have 
to live with the man here, the black man here, whose proportionate contribution in the joint culture is 
going to sufficiently change our joint culture to accommodate the African experience. Sure, it will have 
European experience, because we have whites here who are descended from Europe. We don’t dispute 
that. But for God’s sake it must have an African experience as well (Biko, 2004:148).   
                                                        
34 Neville Alexander (2002: 39) has shown that the BCM believed that there existed two nations which will be 
dissolved into one nation in Azania. The BCM’s vision of “One Azania, One Nation” might open it up to criticisms 
that such a vision of nation-state contradicts the movement’s goal of pluralist co-existence. The discussion of this 
justified critique is, however, outside the scope of this study.  
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As is clear, Biko did not wish to see the elimination of European culture. Rather European culture would 
have to make a proportional contribution in a future society. More importantly, he was calling for the 
elimination of white culture. The two must be distinguished. White culture does not accept the humanity 
of “the black man”, it is exploitative and does not lend itself to humane inter-subjectivity and mutual 
recognition. European culture need not be purged because, as I discussed in Part I above, it is part of 
the heritage of the historically conquered and is an integral component of a pluriversal world.  
Finally, this brings us to Biko’s thoughts on the role of African culture in the constitution of the future 
open society. It has been suggested that at the core of Black Consciousness is a deep investment in 
‘African humanism’. Cornel du Toit (2008: 32) thus writes that underlying Black Consciousness was 
not merely a resistance against colonialism and Apartheid; it was rather a, “spontaneous expression of 
African humanism”. Andries Oliphant (2008: 215) is even more explicit in asserting that Biko was an 
African humanist who considered that “the future humanisation of the world will take on an African 
quality”. Ruth Obee (1999: 5) puts forward the theory that Biko and his Black Consciousness 
companions must have read some of Mphahlele’s work on Afrikan humanness and used that as a 
“strategic launching pad” for their philosophy. More (2004b: 213) argues along the same line asserting 
that Biko’s ultimate mission was the restoration of African consciousness.  
For his part, Biko recognised the fact that colonialism had interrupted the natural evolution of African 
culture and that there was, therefore, a need to recover and re-member African culture and civilisation. 
He (2004: 57, 53) wrote that one of the aims of Black Consciousness was to correct colonial-Apartheid 
distortions of African culture and to encourage black people proud of their culture and value systems. 
Biko’s views on culture are summarised in his 1971 speech entitled “Some African cultural concepts” 
(2004: 44-51). In that speech he started off by observing that if South Africa was a normal society 
acculturation and inter-culturality would naturally take place. However, in Apartheid South Africa 
cultural fusion has been one-sided because African culture has been destroyed and bastardised by the 
‘colonialist’ and ‘exploitative’ “Anglo-Boer culture”.  Biko did not believe in the recovery of some pre-
colonial African culture. Rather, as the title of his speech hints, he advocated for the retrieval of some 
vital elements of African culture. He focused on three main elements of African culture that needed to 
be retrieved and actively promoted. He first focused on the humanness at the core of African culture. 
This humanness, Biko argued, also encouraged a spirit of communalism which inspires joint-
community action. Second, he called for the valorisation of the culture of music and the use of music 
in joy, sadness or to ease the burden of work. Third, he posited that the Azanian society ought to abide 
by the African principle of communal ownership of property.  
In conclusion, Biko’s third way (beyond Apartheid and integration) was an attempt to properly get over 
the conflict/structural antagonism and to open the possibility of a truly pluralist co-existence beyond 
the racist pluralism imposed by colonial-apartheid (Turner, 2008: 73). The third option ensures a move 
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towards a post-apartheid social world because it seeks to explode the myth of colonial ontological and 
epistemic difference. This move ensures a ceaseless motion towards pluralist co-existence based on 
mutual respect, self-determination and what can be called inter-culturality. Biko explained this vision 
in the following terms:  
Each group must be able to attain its style of existence without encroaching on or being thwarted by 
another. Out of this mutual respect for each other and complete freedom of self-determination there will 
obviously arise a genuine fusion of the life-styles of the various groups. This is true integration (Biko, 
2004: 22).  
It is in this sense that More (2008: 59), following Lucius Outlaw, suggests that Biko’s liberatory 
synthesis is aimed at “pluralist integration”. I hope by now it is clear that by ‘pluralist co-existence’ I 
do not mean the type often evoked by liberal multiculturalists to, “enable assimilation and 
forgetfulness” (hooks, 2009: 105). In Biko’s praxis there is no forgetfulness of dispossession and 
damnation. Biko thus insisted that there would never be co-existence unless there is radical 
redistribution of the economy and an end to socio-economic subjugation (Interview with Gerhart, 2008: 
34). Biko was also clear that pluralist co-existence could only take place after land re-conquest because 
land dispossession and displacement of African people, “is working against our existence” (Biko, 2004: 
90). Landlessness makes it difficult to find spaces to perform rituals and rites that are geared towards 
the realisation of cosmic harmony between the living, the living-dead and the yet-to-be-born. Since 
African humanness is a pursuit for wholeness and cosmic belongingness anything that interferes with 
this pursuit is working against African existence. The ‘quest for true humanity’ as firstly, a 
deconstruction and dismantling of the ‘totality’ of the white power structure; and secondly, a ceaseless 
motion towards affirming one own humanity through recognising and respecting the humanity of 
others, therefore, enable pluralist coexistence when it is based on the pursuit of justice – including 
epistemic justice, aesthetic justice, land justice, economic justice and cultural justice. This is the justice 
of African humanness as Bantu Biko understood it. This is how African humanness, via Black 
Consciousness, could (re)constitute the social world.  
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate the homology between Mphahlele’s constitution and 
belonging vision and that of Biko’s. I have argued that both Mphahlele and Biko believed that Afrikan 
Humanness and Black Consciousness are indispensable to the termination of the constitutive sin and 
for holistic (re)constitution of the historically conquered world. I have also showed that the Black 
Consciousness Movement of South Africa transcended previous movements of rebirth and self-
discovery because it made serious attempts to assist black people to overcome racial melancholia and 
aggressive dependency. Biko, therefore, understood that the struggle to re-exist was not complete with 
the reclamation of blackness as a defiant and positive category. To end the struggle there would be to 
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remain fixated with ‘the white man’ and the dual world he has created. Biko went to the very beginning 
of the installation of the Manichean world and proposed that black people ought to recover African 
culture. Here Biko emphasised that the goal was not to seek to recover pre-colonial African traditions.  
Rather, the goal was to recover the spirit and culture of what Mphahlele referred to as Afrikan 
humanness. The point here is that Black Consciousness was not just a philosophy of alterity; it was, as 
Biko often proclaimed, a ‘quest for a true humanity’. Thus Black Consciousness was, ultimately, based 
on the philosophy of African humanness/Ubuntu.  
Towards this end, Black Consciousness forced both black people and white people to work towards 
being-becoming and belonging – even before the end of Apartheid. Biko’s genius was that he rejected 
both Black Nationalist strategy of reversing racial hierarchies and the liberal strategy of countering 
white power with a non-racist discourse. Biko showed that both these strategies left white power and 
colonialist discourse intact. These two approaches were also driven by bad faith and self-deception. 
Operating in a non-revolutionary context, Biko’s solution was a radical strategy of ‘blackening’ politics 
and civil society, and thus deconstructing and displacing Apartheid discourse and disarming white 
supremacy. The BCM’s strong black solidarity combined with and enhanced with dialectical 
conscientisation and Black Community Programmes led to what we may call pre-figurative 
constitution-making.  
In the late 1970s, the Apartheid regime finally came to the awareness to the fact that the BCM was a 
far more radical and dangerous proposition than Nelson Mandela’s ANC and its campaign of armed 
struggle. Biko was thirty years old when the Apartheid regime had him killed in custody. However, 
Biko’s ideas about the (re)constitution of the social world and the total liberation of black people 
continued to reverberate well after his death. In particular, his praxis of community action and self-
pride inspired social movements that emerged in the 1980s. In the next chapter, we will see that 
contemporary social movements borrow from the action repertoires and discourses of the latter 
movements and those of anti-colonial thinkers including Biko and Fanon.  
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CHAPTER 5: ABAHLALISM AND THE (RE)CONSTITUTION OF THE MATERIAL 
WORLD 
 
 
In South Africa everyone will say that life is not fair for the poor. Even the 
rich will say . . . this when they are just finding more and more excuses to 
give more of the country’s money to themselves to build all these very 
expensive things . . . They want to have those things here so that they can 
feel themselves to be “world class”. Meanwhile our children, who, like the 
children in Haiti and Kenya and Zimbabwe are . . . burning in shack fires 
and dying from diarrhea... The poor have to make their choices from no 
choice… [S’bu Zikode, 2007. My emphasis]  
 
The Constitutional Court ruling in favour of Abahlali means that a people’s 
democracy will not be undermined at every turn…The Constitutional Court 
ruling also means that while party politics is trying to bring our democracy to 
the brink of catastrophe, the Court recognises our humanity and that the poor 
have the same right as everyone else to shape the future of the country [S’bu 
Zikode, 2009] 
 
Introduction  
 
I began this dissertation with an account of the 2009 ruling party-sponsored deadly attack on Abahlali 
baseMjondolo, its ejection from their headquarters in Kennedy Road Informal Settlement, and the 
Provincial Safety and Security Minister’s subsequent proclamations that this settlement has been 
“liberated”. The aim of that preface was to highlight the dearth of constitution and belonging in the 
‘new’ South Africa, the notion of neo-Apartheid constitutionalism, and one movement’s striving to 
constitute a new polity. In this final chapter, I return to Abahlali baseMjondolo to elucidate this 
movement’s counter-hegemonic vision and praxis of constitution and belonging. I aim to demonstrate 
that this movement’s praxis prefigures post-Apartheid being-becoming, being-belonging, being-
togetherness, and national consciousness from the syncretic and creolising locales that are shack-
settlements. I will also investigate the extent to which this movement’s vision and praxis cohere with, 
transcend, and deepen those of Mphahlele and Biko.  
 
The two epigraphs at the head of this chapter come from speeches given by S’bu Zikode, the president 
of Abahlali baseMjondolo. Read together, they point to the idea that this movement’s agenda begins 
with a focus on and a demand for the radical alteration of the material world, but of necessity reaches 
towards making prescriptions for the holistic de-constitution and (re)constitution of the “post-
Apartheid” world. These epigraphs also hint at the reality that people who still exists behind ‘the veils’ 
 162 
of class and race are impelled to ‘make choices from no choice,’ including tactically resorting to 
institutions and discourses associated with neo-Apartheid constitutionalism.  
 
If we recall the discussion in chapter one above, we would not be surprised that the vision of this shack-
dwellers’ movement will also encompass demands for the (re)constitution of the social and spiritual 
worlds. In that chapter, I discussed Solomon Tsekisho Plaatje’s seminal critique of the manner in which 
the Natives Land Act of 1913 portended the shattering of the worlds of indigenous people on the 
material, social, and spiritual planes. Plaatje’s investigative journalism showed that the impacts of the 
Act went beyond land dispossession and pauperisation. More significantly, the Act contributed to the 
entrenchment of a social world of apartness and to a sense of intra- and inter-spiritual estrangement. As 
will become obvious later, members of Abahlali baseMjondolo are descendants of victims of land 
dispossession, dispersion and racial proletarianisation. This is first link between that first chapter and 
this last chapter. The connection between these two chapters hints at the longue durée of conquest and 
colonisation as well as the on-going imperative to remake the ‘South African’ world on all three realms 
of belonging-in-the-world. The second link between the chapters that bookended this dissertation is 
more direct and points to the way in which “post-Apartheid” rulers institute neo-colonialism through 
their reiteration of colonialist discourse. In this regard, I will focus on the most high-profile campaign 
that this movement has to date embarked upon. This was a campaign against the KwaZulu-Natal 
Elimination and Prevention of Re-Emergence of Slums Act of 2007. The aims and title of this 
legislation (with its reference to shack-dwellers’ homes as “slums” and its intention to “eliminate” these 
dwellings through mass evictions) invoked and evoked colonialist discourse. This Act could also be 
regarded as an index of the new ruling class’ subliminal intentions to reestablish a form of life that 
Plaatje referred to as ‘Native Life in South Africa’.  
 
Abahlali and other social movements of the damned  associate the re-manifestation of a material world 
of apartness with the ANC’s imposition of an overwhelmingly neoliberal macro-economic policy. More 
pertinently, as the following member of Abahlali explains, impoverished people experience this re-
manifestation as a reiteration of colonialism and Apartheid: 
…neoliberalism… is a very modern kind of new apartheid. In this new form of apartheid we are still 
divided into those that count and those that do not, those who can live in the cities and those that cannot, 
those that are allowed to speak and those that are not, those that must burn and those that are safe 
(Mdlalose, 2012: n.p.).  
 
This assertion makes it clear that what is at stake is more than the problem of ‘class apartheid’ or the 
need to transform the material world of the ‘new’ South Africa. From the perspective of Abahlali, the 
business of decolonisation remains unfinished. Therefore, the imperative is still that of ‘totally 
overhauling’ South Africa as per Biko’s suggestion. The total overhaul/de-constitution of South Africa 
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would undo this country’s economic configurations as well as the social and spiritual worlds they 
constitute and are constituted by. I hope that the connection between Abahlali’s vision of constitution 
and belonging and that of Mphahlele and Biko will become clearer as we proceed along with the 
chapter.  
The main aim of this final chapter is to analyse Abahlalism. Abahlalism is this movement’s philo-praxis 
of constitution and belonging. My main argument is that Abahlalism transcends the immediate demand 
to (re)constitute the material world. Rather, this movement’s praxis extends towards a striving for an 
inclusive society based on the living philosophy of Afrikan humanness. In section one, I discuss 
Abahlali’s striving against what it mourns as the era of “unFreedom”. In section two, I show that 
Abahlali eschew liminal politics of homelessness-as-home for politics of contentious mobilisation that 
Abahlali has named ‘home-based politics’. In the final section, I discuss Abahlalism as pre-figurative 
constitution-making aimed at a creolising national consciousness and reclamation of belonging-in-the-
world. I will also discuss the way Abahlalism avoids the pitfalls of the Du Boisian manifesto of 
constitution and belonging.  
5.1 Abahlali’s Striving against “UnFreedom”  
 
5.1.2 The struggle against neo-colonialist time and evolutionary constitutionalism 
 
The origins of Abahlali can be traced to an event that happened on 19 March 2005. On this day, 
approximately 750 people from the Kennedy Road Informal Settlement (Kennedy Road) in the 
KwaZulu-Natal blockaded a major road. The stand-off between these shack-dwellers and the police 
lasted for more than four hours. The protest erupted after shack-dwellers learned that the council had 
reneged on a promise to allocate land for formal housing. The council had instead awarded this piece 
of land to a businessman. Following this protest, the residents of Kennedy Road declared 2005 a ‘year 
of action’ (Zikode interviewed by Pithouse, 2009: 35). Subsequently, Kennedy Road residents came 
together with residents from other settlements to establish Abahlali baseMjondolo. The aim of this 
introductory section is to demonstrate that Abahlalism is impelled by shack-dwellers’ perception that 
post-1994 constitutional re-arrangements inaugurated a time of neo-Apartheid.  
 
Abahlali began its commemoration of “UnFreedom Day” on 27 April 2006. On that day, Abahlali 
released a press statement entitled “UnFreedom Day! No Freedom for the Poor! Why we mourn on 
April 27th, 2006”. 35 The movement put forward the following reasons:  
                                                        
35 This mourning echoes Frederick Douglass’s 1852 mourning entitled “The Meaning of July Fourth for the 
Negro”. Douglass explained his mourning as follows: “The blessings in which you, this day, rejoice, are not 
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The first democratic elections were held in South Africa on 27 April 1994. The promise of that day was 
equality, a vision that all South Africans might be able to share the country's wealth, that all would be 
equal under the law, that all would have inalienable rights. That day is commemorated as “Freedom 
Day”, and its memory celebrated in a national holiday each April 27th. As years have gone by, the hope 
has turned to bitter irony. Twelve years after the first democratic elections, the gap has increased between 
the rich and the poor (Abahlali, 2006: n.p.). 
 
Abahlali’s designation of this time as a time of ‘unFreedom’ is meant to convey the idea that this time 
is neither a time of Apartheid nor a time of freedom. Rather, bahlali (members of Abahlali) contend 
that the post-1990 period is an interregnum in which the majority of black people find themselves 
interned in a space that the former secretary-general of Abahlali designates as “the democratic prison” 
(B. Mdlalose, 2012: n.p.). If we substitute “democratic” with “civilisation” and we might realise that 
what we are dealing with here is the longue durée of settler colonialism: as in the seemingly benign 
prison of western modernity, the historically conquered are deemed not to be co-present with the rest 
of the modern/new society because they are still considered uncivilised beings with defective humanity. 
Impoverished black people thus feel that they have been imprisoned in a liminal zone that Santos (2014: 
10), in a different context, designates as a zone, “between No Longer and the Not Yet” (Santos, 2014: 
10).  
Time and constructions of temporality emerged as important sub-themes in Part I of this dissertation. 
This was the case when I discussed settler-invaders’ attempt to “kill” the world of indigenous people 
and freeze the being-becoming of the conquered. To be more specific, colonisation of time emerged as 
a fundamental aspect of colonialist discourse. By way of reminder: in chapter one above, I demonstrated 
that in the beginning was not only the word (John 1:1, The Bible); it was (in the installation of the Line 
globally and in settler colonies) word about time and temporality with regards to who sets time (the 
[western] modern man); who is not on/in time (the pre-modern being, the primitive humanoid, ‘the 
savage’); who imposes time (the slave owner, the colonialist); who exists on borrowed time (the woman, 
the slave, the indentured labourer, the colonised); and who can be on/in time (the white woman, the 
assimilado, the notable evolue, the New African). Coloniality of time was, therefore, central, not 
exhaustive, of coloniality of power and coloniality of being. The imposers of time could on this basis, 
therefore, dispense with the humanity of those not yet converted to Christianity, not yet modern, and/or 
not yet civilised - in a phrase, not-yet beings could be wasted. Colonisers of time working together with 
Eurocentric cartographers established the (Euro-centered) world and relegated ‘the rest’ to a zone of 
non-beings.  
                                                        
enjoyed in common… The sunlight that brought light and healing to you, has brought stripes and death to me. 
This Fourth July is yours, not mine. You may rejoice, I must mourn” (Douglass, 2009: 8).  
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Coming to the territory that colonialists constituted as ‘South Africa,’ we have seen that colonialist time 
and its perpetuation were, and are, indispensable to the projects of white supremacy and anti-black 
racism because they license racial trusteeship, white privilege, and white hegemony. The hegemony of 
colonialist time seduces its victims, the not-yet-fully human, to aspire for teleological whiteness. Thus 
for New Africans, the struggle for emancipation revolved around proving that they are as mature, 
rational, and, thus, in the same history and temporality as the colonists. These transcultural elites, thus, 
campaigned for constitutional amendments or a new constitution that would recognise their humanity 
and enable their inclusion into the extant, but de-racialised, polity.  
 
In 1994, a transformative constitutionalism paradigm triumphed over a paradigm of decolonisation. Put 
differently, an evolutionary contra revolutionary scheme of constitution-making and belonging 
triumphed: evolution from four rival settler colonies to a Union of South Africa (1910) to the Republic 
of South Africa (1961) to the 1983 constitution that made provision for “Indian” and “Coloured” 
representation to the integrationist 1993 Interim Constitution. It is from this perspective that we should 
understand Mogobe Ramose’s thesis that the current Constitution (“Final Constitution”) has resulted in 
‘conquest by consent’ because it, de facto, transmuted stolen land into lawful property. Ramose’s (2002: 
572) contention is that this Constitution shows a bias towards Eurocentric legal doctrine, and the 
putative right of conquest, because, among other things, it aligns itself with the doctrine of extinctive 
prescription in terms of which after a passage of sometime illegally obtained property becomes lawful. 
This principle conflicts with the fundamental legal doctrine of Ubuntu (Afrikan humanness) law which 
commands that molato ga o bole – meaning that an injustice remains an injustice until it is rectified 
(ibid.). From a decolonising perspective, an evolutionary scheme of constitution and belonging, 
therefore, accords with (neo)colonialist time. The current constitutional dispensation is congruent with 
neocolonialist time because it does not significantly rupture with, “the new time [that was] inaugurated 
by the conquest, which [was] a colonialist time because occupied by colonialist values,” to recast Fanon 
(1970: 168).  
 
The aforementioned ‘right of conquest’ is an explicit application of colonialist discourse and the 
colonisation of reason in the terms I have been elucidating throughout this dissertation. This putative 
right originated in the long fifteenth century when Europe expanded and violently imposed 
Eurocentrism and western modernity on other parts of the world. Ramose explains that European 
expansion/colonisation was based on the lines westerners drew between reason and unreason. 
Colonisers relegated “non-western” people to the unreason side of the line. In chapter one above, I 
showed that colonisers drew amity lines that ran along the equator or the Tropic of Cancer in the South 
to buttress this philosophy of Enlightenment. European colonisers considered territories beyond the 
Line to be zones were unreason, barbarism, and lack of morality reigned (Ramose, 2002: 584). The 
application of this epistemological dichotomising scheme, therefore, proceeded as follows: “I think, 
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therefore, I conquer and enslave….” (Ramose, 2002: 544). Ramose asserts that conquest confirmed and 
established the idea that ‘right of conquest’ in a way that meant permanent and irreversible loss of titles 
to territories and sovereignties over them.  
 
In the terms of this dissertation, therefore, this ‘right’ sanctioned the ‘killing of the land’ and the 
subsequent de-homing, unhoming, and cosmic dislocation of “natives”. The Natives Act of 1913 and 
the constitutional order that enabled its enactment were practical realisation of this right.36 The argument 
was that the ‘right of conquest’ acquired the status of juristic fact during post-1990 constitutional re-
arrangements. This is because these re-arrangements led to a situation where, “…formal equal 
constitutional status to both successors in title to the ‘right of conquest’ and the conquered people was 
granted such that injustice came to be constitutionalised” (Ramose, 2002: 551). This assimilationist 
scheme dis-member the memory of offense relating to conquest and the imposition of colonialist time. 
It is Ramose’s contention that the ‘right of conquest’ and its ongoing consequences can only be 
dislodged by epistemological decolonisation because this ‘right’ is a product of colonialist discourse. 
In this chapter, I contend that Abahlali’s disobedient acts of “squatting” in cities, its demand for land 
redistribution, and most importantly, its valorisation of epistemologies borne in struggles against 
pariahdom are direct challenges to the ‘right of conquest,’ colonialist discourse, and colonialist time.  
Any attempt to understand Abahlali’s counter-hegemonic praxis of constitution and belonging must 
begin with an understanding that Abahlalism is grounded on a radical refusal of colonialist time and the 
concomitant idea that this is the time of post-Apartheid. Indeed, it is from the above perspective that 
we can understand Abahlali’s (2011: n.p.) lamentation that those trapped in the liminal zone of the 
“democratic prison” are “the forgotten”. ‘The forgotten’ suffer from what we may call the enduring 
colonisation of time. This is because they suffer from historical omission because they feel excluded 
from the “miracle of the transition” and putative processes of nation-building; temporal ossification by 
deliberate processes that re-enact colonial and Apartheid processes of primitive accumulation, 
impoverishment, “retribalisation”, enforced racialisation and social invisibility; and an imposed 
conceptualisation of time and temporality via a cluster of post-1994 keywords (transitional justice, final 
constitution, a new united nation) that perpetuates the monoculture of western modernity in terms of 
which time unfolds in a linear, evolutionary, and homogenous manner. This conception ‘invisibilises’ 
                                                        
36 The ‘right of conquest’ forms the basis for settler colonisation and calibrates future constitutional re-
arrangements in a way that ensures that settler hegemony and permanent “native” loss of land and sovereignties 
are guaranteed. Thus, Harry Smith, a lieutenant-general of the British Army and later governor of the Cape 
Colony, invoked this ‘right’ in 1836 to justify the permanent expulsion of Xhosa groups from their ancient lands 
and the establishment of a settler colony in present day Eastern Cape, South Africa. Smith (ibid.) charged that the 
right of conquest is a right, “…by which the British dominions have been extended to their present magnitude, by 
which they are extending at this moment in Australia, that right which has ejected the Aborigines form the vast 
territory of America, the West Indies, the ancient Oriental World… Are the Kafirs...not to be ejected by the same 
right?” (cited in Mostert, 1992: 784). 
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groups of people that exist according to the temporalities of “non-western” cosmologies, epistemologies 
and legalities. 
 
What does time and temporality have to do with contestations around constitution and belonging? 
Firstly, from the perspective of constitutionalism (constitutionalism understood both as a legal concept 
dealing with allocation of rights and responsibilities and a politico-ethical theory prescribing how to 
(re)constitute the polity) to be ‘forgotten’ is to be as if one is outside the walls constituting the new 
political society. To be interpellated as outside the wall of the new polity, is to be cast as the Other and 
to be produced as, “invisible, unintelligible, or irreversibly discardable” (Santos, 2006: 165). To be 
‘forgotten’, Abahlali implies then, is to still suffer from pariahdom and worldlessness. Secondly, if we 
bear in mind Santos’s (2004: 158) reminder that, “the understanding of the world and the way it creates 
and legitimates social power has a lot to do with the conceptions of time and temporality”, colonisation 
of time in the terms I have sketched above and the hegemonic signifier of post-Apartheid serve to mask 
disguise on-going damnation and “native” pariahdom.  
 
The discourse of post-Apartheid permit beneficiaries of South Africa’s “elite transition” (see generally, 
Bond, 2005) to manufacture the consent that 1994 presaged both emancipation and liberation. From a 
Foucauldian perspective, this hegemonic discourse is meant to mould the political subjectivities of 
contemporary pariahs in a way that induces them to internalise the idea that they are not casualties of 
historical structural problems; but rather,  because “the past is in the past” ‘the forgotten’ are themselves 
the problem.  I have, in previous chapters, argued that the discourse of assigning the status of 
problemacy to certain sectors of society is a condition of possibility for producing those sectors as 
pariahs. As we shall see, the premise of the contemporary South African discourse of “poverty 
management” is that “the poor” are problematic people.  
 
To recap: from the perspectives of victims of systemic social exclusion and racial subjugation, post-
1994 constitutional re-arrangements were decidedly not constituent moments of decolonisation and 
liberation. I have proposed that neo-Apartheid time and its invisibilising world could only be terminated 
when time itself is decolonised and its conception radically altered from the standpoint of ‘the 
forgotten’. At the most fundamental level, then, from the standpoint of those ensnared in “a zone of 
stasis” (Fanon, 1963: 51, 122), quests for constitution and belonging begin when this present time is 
accurately named as a time of ‘UnFreedom,’ is dislodged, and the never-ending time of decolonisation 
is inaugurated. A decolonised time substitutes the monoculture of western temporality for an ecology 
of temporalities to enable Freedom-Time understood as a ceaseless pursuit of pluralist co-existence.37  
                                                        
37 Following my discussion of Biko’s constitution vision above, by pluralist co-existence I mean a co-presence 
and an end to a world where some people exist and Others are produced as anachronistic, as non-existing.  
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Herein lies a crucial insight. Abahlali’s insistence that this is a time of ‘unFreedom’ is meant to achieve 
precisely the aforementioned de-constitution and (re)constitution objectives. This invocation is meant 
to convey the notion that ‘the forgotten’ are victims of what Santos (2007: 60) defines as “pre-
contractualism” in the sense that they are excluded from the social contract of the “new nation”. In the 
case of post-1994 South Africa, pre-contractualism is an outcome of the fact that in 1996, the state 
substituted a social democratic programme (the Reconstruction and Development Programme) with a 
neoliberal macro-economic programme known as the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution 
Programme (“GEAR”). The enduring consequences of this austerity programme (a ‘reverse Gear’ as 
leftist activists called it) is that the majority of black people continue to suffer from social dislocation, 
‘invisibilisation,’ and racialised oppression due to high rates of racialised impoverishment, structural 
unemployment, miseducation, ill-health, and precarious existence in “squatter camps” and other “black 
locations”. Post-1994 pre-contractualism has thus banished victims of the constitutive racial contract 
further into the ‘other side’ of a reconfigured Line. The result of this is a pervasive sense of on-going 
social and spiritual death. Abahlali confirm this generalised state of unhomeliness and pariahdom in the 
following words: “to be poor means to live with death as a constant presence” (Abahlali, 2016: n.p.).  
 
To put matters squarely: Looked at from the lived experiences of ‘the forgotten,’ there is a need to posit 
a concept of time of “a present which is not a transition, but in which time stands still and has come to 
a stop” (Benjamin cited in Agamben, 1993: 102). Therefore, although the time of the postcolony is a 
‘time of entanglement’ in which the past, the present, and the future intermingle (Mbembe, 2001: 17), 
the struggle against the racialised present-past predominate for bahlali and Others. The existence of the 
racialised present-past indicates that the ‘Final Constitution’ did not vanquish the ‘totality’ of the white 
power structure. Similarly, post-1994 elites’ violent interpellation of impoverished black people as out-
of-sync beings implies that spiritual dislocation and cosmic exile are on-going tribulations. The link 
between this chapter and the other chapters in this Part of this dissertation should now be clear.  
 
It is this perpetuation of social and spiritual deaths that impel Abahlali to mourn UnFreedom.  On 27 
April of every year, Abahlali and its allies stage a “mourn UnFreedom Day” rally. This mourning is for 
those Others who continue to exist in what Abahlali (2016: n.p.) explain as an existence, “in the shadow 
of death”. Abahlali’s mourning calls attention to the fact that the failure to (re)constitute the material 
world has buttressed a state of pariahdom for majority of black ‘South Aficans’. Abahlali explains:  
In our movement we have often said that we are not free because we are forced to live without toilets, 
electricity, lighting, refuse removal, enough water or proper policing and, therefore, with fires, sickness, 
violence and rape. We have often said that we are not free because our children are chased out of good 
schools and because we are being chased out of good areas and therefore away from education, work, 
clinics, sports fields and libraries. We have often said that we are not free because the politics of the poor 
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is treated like a criminal offence by the Municipalities while real criminals are treated like business 
partners (Abahlali, 2008a: n.p.). 
 
The persistence of racialised impoverishment reconfirm Mbeki’s 1999 thesis (in chapter two above) 
that South Africa continues to be a country comprised of ‘two nations’. Abahlali and other movements 
of ‘the forgotten’ struggle against this dearth of constitution and belonging. ‘UnFreedom’ time is thus 
a time of systemic inequality, structural invisibility, homelessness, and unhomeliness in the terms I 
sketched out in chapter one above.  
 
To sum up: drawing on insights from Part 1 of this dissertation, I have suggested that black elites have 
elaborated a vision of constitution and belonging that was not incongruent with colonialist time and 
evolutionary constitutionalism. Agreeing with Ramose, I showed that post-1990 constitutional re-
arrangements did not dislodge the ‘right of conquest’ and its logic of everlasting land deprivation and 
black subjugation. On the other hand/side, Abahlali’s counter-hegemonic discourse of ‘UnFreedom’ 
seeks to highlight the fact that the de-worlding consequences of the Native Land Act of 1913 linger on 
and are actually being buttressed by the present constitutional dispensation. Accordingly, Abahlali’s 
strategies of disregarding property rights seek to challenge the consequences that flow from the ‘right 
of conquest’. Indeed, Abahlali’s grammatically disobedient discourse of ‘unFreedom’ is not only a 
disavowal of the discourse of post-Apartheid. This counter-hegemonic discourse is also a call for the 
de-constitution of South Africa and the constitution of a new humane polity. Social movements of 
impoverished people have been making similar calls since the late 1990s. In this sense, Abahlali is not 
unique. In the next sub-section, I will discuss the post-1994 reemergence of social movements of the 
damned. My aim here is to distinguish Abahlali from these movements in order to justify my selection 
of Abahlalism for inclusion into my holistic framework of decolonising constitutionness.   
5.1.2 The “post-Apartheid” (re)emergence of the damned of the earth   
 
Two main aspects of the post-1994 political context have stimulated the (re)emergence of counter-
hegemonic social movements: (i) material privations entrenched by austere macroeconomic policies, 
and (iii) the truncated nature of local democracy. The state’s 1996 implementation of a largely 
neoliberal macroeconomic policy resulted in steady cutbacks in central government’s allocations to 
local authorities. Municipalities were thus left with little choice but to introduce cost-recovery and cost-
cutting measures. These measures resulted in water and electricity cut-offs, evictions from council 
houses, and retrenchments from privatised providers of social services. The second aspect of the 
political context that triggered contemporary social movement activism is the lack of democracy at the 
local government level. The constitution mandates the restructuring of the sphere of local government 
to reflect this sphere’s new role as the engine of redistribution and development, and the main locus of 
participatory democracy. However, local governments are not meaningfully engaging local 
 170 
communities when drafting development plans, annual budgets, and other priorities of municipalities. 
The most influential stakeholders in local government affairs are politically-connected business people, 
business organisations, and ANC local branch leaders. Faced with homelessness and lack of basic 
necessities and having exhausted all avenues for dialogue, township residents began employing 
collective action repertoire from the anti-Apartheid struggle. Various communities eventually started 
organising regular meetings and forming ‘concerned citizens’ forums,’ ‘anti-evictions committees,’ and 
‘crisis committees’. These forums and committees marked the beginnings of many post-1994 social 
movements. 
 
State and non-state elites have responded to the struggles of these movements through a mixture of 
vilification, counter-movements, co-optation, and criminalisation. It is important to emphasise that state 
officials and non-state elites employ legal tactics as their principal response to social movement 
struggles. These tactics include court interdicts against protest marches and others forms of direct 
action, the imposition of onerous bail conditions against activists charged with ‘public violence,’ 
infiltration of movements by intelligence agents, and court-issued orders for evictions and termination 
of services. The result of this is that activists exhibit a negative attitude towards the post-1994 legal 
order. The legal consciousness of counter-hegemonic activists is also shaped by the fact that state 
officials often ignore or intentionally violate constitutional provisions in their encounters with 
impoverished people’s movements. The following account by a shack-dweller from a settlement 
affiliated with Abahlali succinctly captures the challenges that impoverished township groups face 
when confronted by agents of state intent on acting illegally:  
When the evictions happened…the South African law and the constitution didn’t work for us.  They were 
pointing guns at us, threatening us, meantime we were fighting for our rights [as enshrined in the 
constitution]. One comrade came asking them ‘What about section 26?’ but they didn’t say 
anything…When our chairperson came to ask. ‘By what right and by what law can you do this?’ Teargas 
just got thrown in his face (cited in Pithouse and Butler, 2006: 1). 
 
Many impoverished black people thus regard the post-1994 legal order as ‘the law of the ruling class’ 
(Madlingozi, 2014: 113). More importantly, impoverished people often perceive the law to be a central 
apparatus in the perpetuation of “native” pariahdom.  It is from this perspective that the president of 
Abahlali asserts that the state treats impoverished black people as if they are, “beneath the law – as if 
you don’t count to the law” (Zikode, 2011a: n.p). It is of no small significance that the quote above 
comes from a 2006 study sub-titled “Pariahs Hold their Ground against a State that is both Criminal 
and Democratic”. The clearest indication that impoverished people do not have faith in institutions of 
liberal democracy is the fact that groupings of impoverished black people incessantly embark on what 
mainstream media and commentators misrecognise as “service delivery” protests. For purposes of this 
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dissertation, these perennial protests should be understood as pariahs’ rejection of the historicism aspect 
of colonialist time which holds as follows: “first in Europe [‘first world’/‘world-class’ part of South 
Africa], and then elsewhere [‘third world’ part of South Africa]” (Chakrabarty, 2000: 22). The post-
1994 (re)emergence of these groups of impoverished people, therefore, signifies an unwillingness by 
‘the forgotten’ to continue to be trapped on the underside of the ‘new South Africa’.38  
Let us now finally turn our attention to Abahlali baseMjondolo. However, before we do so I first need 
to outline my reasons for selecting Abahlalism for inclusion into my proposed framework for 
‘resurrecting the land’ and the holistic (re)constitution of a new polity. Abahlali is unique from the 
aforementioned movements and groups of impoverished people in four ways. Firstly, formed in 2005, 
Abahlali is a comparatively newcomer to the scene. Secondly, whereas state repression and strategic 
mistakes have resulted in the death of most, if not all, of these movements, Abahlali continues to not 
only exist but to expand to other provinces. Thirdly, the groupings that are currently staging the 
perennial “service delivery” protests I mentioned earlier are ‘spontaneous’ groupings and not social 
movements as defined in traditional social movement scholarship (see for e.g. Tarrow, 1998: 2). This 
is because these groupings do not develop a collective identity, do not put forward change-oriented 
goals, do not possess a degree of organisation and embark on sustained collective action. Their vision 
and praxis of constitution and belonging are, therefore, vaguely articulated, if at all. Fourthly, Abahlali 
is distinguishable from most of these movements and groupings in that the latter movements and 
groupings seem to demand an end to their marginalisation and for their integration into hegemonic 
society. Arguably, a form of subaltern melancholia can, therefore, be discerned in the visions of these 
movements. The mission that Abahlali has set for itself, as I will show below, differs from the missions 
of these groupings because it is a mission aimed at totally overhauling the whole edifice of South Africa.  
 
5.2 From fugitivity to ‘home-based politics’ 
 
Where so many homes have been demolished, people moved to 
strange new places, home temporarily becomes the shared 
experience of homelessness... [Njabulo Ndebele, 1996] 
As I have previously mentioned, the headquarters of Abahlali are situated in Kennedy Road Informal 
Settlement (Kennedy Road). This shack settlement can be found in Clare Estate in the city of Durban. 
Under Apartheid, Clare Estate was reserved for people of Indian ancestry. This Estate is located on the 
margins of the city – a buffer zone between the historically white suburb and historically, and presently, 
                                                        
38 Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000: 2) might as well be referring to post-1999 South African popular movements when 
he wrote that, “historicism has not disappeared from the world, but its ‘not yet’ exists today in tension with this 
global insistence on the “now” that marks all popular movements toward democracy”. Indeed, writing in 2006, 
one leader of Abahlali indicated a refusal of historicism via this rhetorical question: “Why are we expected to 
have unlimited patience while we are being attacked because ‘service delivery is coming’?” (Zungu, 2006: n.p.). 
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blacks-only townships. A fifth aspect that, therefore, distinguishes Abahlali from most “post-
Apartheid” movements and groupings is that its origins and location are not in a historically black 
township. In other words, Abahlali refuses the “black location” (as black ghettoes were officially called 
during Apartheid). In this sense, Abahlali’s situatedness is similar to Ellison’s Invisible Man who lives 
in a manhole near the white part of New York City. Invisible Man’s location enables him to live rent-
free and to access electricity and other amenities without any payment. As I have discussed in chapter 
two above, this is one advantage of ‘not being seen’ that the eponymous narrator embraces. In the South 
African literary context, one ancestor of Abahlali is the main protagonist in Sylvester Stein’s Second-
class Taxi (1958). This is how the narrator describes this protagonist’s disobedient location:  
Staffnurse Phofolo was a vagrant...In terms of the law he was Idle and Undesirable, liable to instant arrest 
for having no Pass. If the law had known about his dug-out it would have become quite choleric, on the 
turn. For the rubble dump was situated within what was known as a European Area (though this was 
Africa). His very presence there was threat to the delicate plant of European civilisation… ([1958]1983: 
11. My emphasis). 
 
It will soon become obvious why I have highlighted sentence above. My discussion of Abahlali’s 
rebellious location brings us back to the argument that has been running throughout this dissertation. I 
introduced this theme in Part I above. This leitmotif has to do with the possibilities available to a person 
or group of people that hegemonic society has exiled or that society treats as if they are outside the 
walls of the polity. I have suggested that there are three main routes available for such pariahs. The first 
option is to accept the reality of subjugation and seek to be an immigrant of the world that the oppressor 
claims to have created. The second option is to refuse subordination and engage in tactics of 
appearances and disappearances aimed at appropriating the fruits of this world. I have suggested that 
this is a stance of a fugitive. The third option is that of the pariah physically exiling him or herself from 
the occupied homeland. In this case, the pariah leaves the unhomely world to formulate an 
insurrectionary vision in a place of exile, and later stages a return intent on de-constituting and 
(re)constituting the world.  
The location and the mission of the social movement that I am currently discussing suggest that there 
is at least one other option. This option combines the second and third options of my typology. Kennedy 
Road’s location tells us that it is an interstitial place of fugitives who, similar to Staffnurse Phofolo and 
Invisible Man, live on the borders and in the shadows of the dominant world to be able to appropriate 
socio-economic resources historically and currently out of reach of the majority of black people. At the 
same time, bahlali’s and other city-based “squatters’” exploits of taking leave of “Native Reserves” or 
former Bantustans as well as ancestral villages are acts of exile. Both these acts of internal exile and 
border-living, therefore, combine exilic and fugitive subjectivities. To refuse the spaces that may be 
figured as places of historical belongingness is to opt for ‘homelessness-as-home’ as JanMohamed 
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frames it in chapter two above.  
This kind of ‘voluntary exile’ is a process and not an event. In the urban spaces of the settler-dominated 
polity the exile-fugitive comes into contact with exile-fugitives of other ethnicities. Their common 
situation of enforced racialisation, homelessness, lives of precarity, and a shared vision to escape 
oppression impel them to band together and form a multi-ethnic political community. We may call this 
imagined community a community of the internal diaspora. The main objective of these exiles-
fugitives-cum-internal diaspora is, therefore, neither to retreat to “tribal” enclaves nor to recreate their 
pre-colonial homes. For these exile-fugitives, as Ndebele in the epigraph to this section might put it, 
homelessness is embraced as temporary home. However, if we recall that JanMohamed elaborated the 
concept of ‘homelessness-as-home’ to affirm the existential location of certain black American 
intellectuals; and furthermore, if we also recall my argument that these ‘specular intellectuals’ were 
ultimately assailed by racial melancholia, the following question arises: could Abahlali’s shunning of 
‘black locations’ be an indication that exile-fugitivity is a transitory positionality whose telos is not the 
ending of the bifurcated world but assimilation into historically hegemonic spaces?  
 
My answer is that Abahlali’s own vision of ‘the right to the city’ is one where both the black township 
and the white suburb cease to exist. In this vision of post-colonial constitution and belonging, black 
townships are not regarded as places of conviviality based on a vibrant trans-ethnic and creolising 
culture that could provide a blueprint for a non-(Euro-American) modern and humane post-colonial 
city. This non-nostalgic view of the black township is compatible with the two decolonising visions I 
have discussed in this Part of the dissertation. We will recall that Mphahlele described the relationship 
between township residents and their surrounding environment as one of uncanniness, marked as it was 
by ‘ambivalence and disharmony’. Upon his return from physical exile, Mphahlele noticed that 
although ‘township culture’ was comprised of an admixture of western culture and sediments of 
indigenous culture, it was, however, not a hybrid culture that edifies the spirit.  Mphahlele further 
observed that although there were positive elements to the ‘survivalist culture’ that had emerged in 
these spaces, this culture was, ultimately, a culture very much shaped by the struggles for survival and 
thus denuded of Afrikan humanness. For Mphahlele, township residents were still unhomed people 
‘caged’ in spaces to which they had been forced into. Biko’s lamentation about having lived his whole 
life in the context of “separate development” is proof that he shared Mphahlele’s argument that 
township dwellers were, ultimately, interned people deprived of freedom of movement and the right to 
control their destiny. Indeed, Biko listed township-living as one of the factors that contributed to self-
alienation and bad faith existence. Biko posited that high levels of crime, pervasive violence, and 
general disregard for human life found in townships were caused by the fact that there was an, “absence 
of abundant life for the people who live there” (Biko, 2004: 122). This common experience of living in 
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the shadow of death instilled, “the sense of insecurity which is part of a feeling of incompleteness; you 
are not a complete human being” (Biko, 2004: 124).  
 
My point here is that any vision of constitution and belonging that seeks to spiritually, socially, and 
materially (re)constitute the South African world ought to disavow the black township. It is this vision 
that motivates Pastor Xola Skosana’s “Welcome to Hell” annual campaign. On every Easter Weekend, 
Skosana and his fellow Black Theology supporters embark on a pilgrimage through Cape Town to 
highlight their crusade against the continuing existence of black townships. This is Skosana’s rationale:  
Townships are nothing but glorified refugee camps, rat infested hellholes that must be exposed for what 
they really are. In many parts of South Africa, townships exist as readily available hubs of cheap labour 
to keep labour intensive industries going for the benefit of the few. Let it be known across the breath and 
length of this country that the continuation of separate development and integration, based on 
affordability, is the perpetuation of the notorious Group Areas Act of yesteryear” (Skosana, 2012: n.p.).  
 
 
My first submission in this section is that Abahlali’s location and politics are motivated by a similar 
long-term vision against ghettoes. My second suggestion is that Abahlali’s decision to set up their 
shacks in this interstitial space and to reject the government’s offer of formal housing in black townships 
and peri-rural areas is a resolve to challenge colonialist discourse. Fanon reminded us in chapter four 
above that the colonised world is a compartmentalised world. The Manichean nature of the colonial city 
is, therefore, a manifestation of this world and a physical realisation of colonialist discourse. In the 
terms of this discourse, conquered people must be ‘caged’ and physically delimited in over-crowded, 
dirty, and politically and spiritually oppressive zones because they are “non-beings”. That is, “the 
native” must know his or her place. Under colonialism and Apartheid, the place of “the native” was the 
“black location”. Fanon suggests that a vision motivated by a disavowal of colonialist discourse is one 
in which the bifurcated city has been destroyed and both zones are superseded: “To break up the colonial 
world does not mean that after frontiers have been abolished lines of communication will be set up 
between the two zones. The destruction of the colonial world is no more and no less than the abolition 
of one zone, its burial in the depths of the earth or its expulsion from the country” (Fanon, 1963: 31). 
An indispensable historical point I wish to make is that victims of the original sin in the constitution of 
South Africa have always adopted this Fanonian approach. It is from this perspective that we can 
apprehend the decision of the “squatters” who first occupied a portion of Clare Estate in the late 1970s 
as a decision to refuse the place assigned to them by colonialist discourse. Abahlali’s ‘homelessness-
as-home’ can thus be seen as a continuation of this particular struggle against colonialist discourse and 
its tendency to expel the colonised to the ‘other side’ of the ‘abyssal line’. This embodied resistance 
against colonialist discourse is present in the history of city-based “squatter” movements throughout 
the history of South Africa. It is to this that I will now turn to.  
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Dislocated members of the Zulu Kingdom established the first shack settlements in Durban in the early 
1880s (COHRE, 2008: 1-2). This followed the defeat that the Zulu nation had suffered at the hands of 
the British military. Consequent land loss and the system of hut tax forced many conquered people to 
pour into Durban City in search of wage labour. The regime did not manage to stem the flow of these 
economic migrants. In 1913, as I discussed earlier, the colonial state promulgated the Natives Land Act 
to prohibit Africans from owning land or renting outside of ‘scheduled areas’. The regime’s ensuing 
expropriation of the land still held by “natives” pushed Africans into further poverty and thus increased 
migration into the main cities. The state then introduced the Native Urban Areas Act of 1923 with a 
requirement that Africans males should carry “passes” showing that they had permission to be present 
in urban areas. This Act also declared cities to be white areas and made provision for the establishment 
of “black locations”. Local state authorities tightly regulated these locations and implemented influx 
control measures to control the inflow of Africans. However, the economic boom of the 1930s led to 
massive immigration of Africans into the urban areas. Most immigrants lived on the margins of cities.  
 
This period marked the beginnings of organised “squatter movements”. These movements mobilised 
scattered people to invade land owned by municipalities (Bonner, 1990: 92-93). The “invaders” were 
usually people who had little experience of black urban culture. They thus introduced a new political 
and cultural dynamic. Focusing on the dynamic introduced by newcomers to the Rand, Peter Bonner 
(1990: 93) reports that for the first time since the establishment of the Rand; “people characterised by 
a very transitional migrant culture were concentrated together and not immediately assimilable to the 
urban culture which older townships had helped form”. Inevitably, the “squatters” way of life clashed 
with that of missionary-trained ANC elites. These “invaders” destabilised the ANC’s discourse and 
narrative of civilisation and social norms of respectability. As we saw in the first chapter above, this 
discourse and narrative were aimed at proving to colonists that urban-based and western-educated 
Africans were as civilised and respectable as white people, and that they thus deserved to be integrated 
into the polity. As I will show below, bahlali’s political and social culture also challenges and 
destabilises the ruling elites’ neo-colonialist culture and associated “world-class” discourse.  
 
In 1934, and in response to widespread white anxiety about the presence of Africans in the city, the 
colonial state passed the Slums Clearance Act with the view of making, ‘comprehensive provision for 
the elimination of slums’. “Squatters” responded to this threat by establishing even more powerful 
movements. The most well-known of these movements of “squatters” is James Mpanza’s Sofazonke 
which was set up in 1944. “Squatters” regarded Mpanza as a “Moses” coming to deliver them to the 
“Promised Land” (Bonner, 1990: 102). Similar to early twentieth century “wanderers,” “exiles,” and 
“pariahs” that Plaatje described in chapter one above, these “squatters,” had spent years searching for 
home and a sense of belongingness. Mpanza, a larger-than-life Garvey-like figure, duly presented 
himself as a prophet-in-wilderness coming to heal the social, material, psychological, and spiritual 
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ailments of these pariahs and fugitives (ibid.). An important point to highlight for purposes of my main 
thesis is that rather than embarking on a quest to reconquer and “resurrect” ancestral lands, Sofazonke 
(“we shall all die”) promised to take these multi-ethnic communities to a Promised Land in a sense of 
an entity that never existed before. The Promised Land in this instance were urban spaces that these 
exiles could constitute and home themselves in.  Most significant for my later discussion of Abahlali’s 
tactical engagement with neo-Apartheid constitutionalism is the fact that Sofazonke successfully 
mobilised colonial laws to defend illegal occupations and unauthorised settlements (Bonner, 1990: 100-
101).  
 
In 1950 and 1951 respectively, the Apartheid government promulgated the Group Areas Act and the 
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act in an effort to appease unceasing white anger at the presence of 
unemployed Africans and economic competition posed by Indian traders in Durban. The Group Areas 
Act made provision for the segregation of residential areas into four race groups. This Act mandated 
local authorities to remove “black spots” (black and multi-racial residential areas adjacent to or in 
between ‘white residential areas’). This led to unprecedented mass removals of Africans to newly 
established townships on the periphery of cities. For its part, the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 
placed an obligation on land owners to evict ‘illegal squatters’ and to build ‘transit camps’ to which 
evictees could be relocated. However, by the late 1970s, the rigid control over the movement and 
settlement of Africans in the city weakened and shack settlements mushroomed again. This process 
gathered pace after the 1976 Soweto Uprising and the political upheavals generated by the 
‘ungovernable’ strategies of ‘people’s power’ uprisings of the 1980s (COHRE 2008: 37).  
 
Today, the Apartheid laws that sanctioned segregation and the mass removal of “surplus people” are no 
longer on the statute books. Historically white suburbs are now also officially de-racialised. However, 
as Abahlali point out above, the “post-Apartheid” state has replaced these laws with neo-Apartheid laws 
that are propelled by a discourse that is recognisable for being neo-colonialist. This discourse finds 
expression in laws and policies that obey the dictates of neoliberal globalisation. This is what informs 
state officials’ preoccupation with creating “world-class” cities. This obsession is a reiteration of the 
European city ideal that Apartheid planners tried to simulate. Under the rule of neoliberal/neocolonial 
globalisation, cities are expected to compete with each other to attract foreign investment. City officials 
respond to this drive by ‘sanitisiting’ urban spaces in the form of eradicating the presence of street 
traders, homeless people, shack-dwellers, and other unassimilable persons who, like Staffnurse Phofolo, 
authorities consider ‘Idle’ and ‘Undesirable’. Furthermore, processes of gentrification remove working-
class people from central business districts to make room for a rapidly mobile black and white middle 
class. Finally, historical dwellers of “this side” of the Line and arrivestes to “this side” of the Line (the 
black middle and upper classes) have built gated estates to migrate to. The intention here is to 
reconfigure the Line and to avoid social, economic, and cultural mixture with historical dwellers of the 
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“other side” of the Line. These gated communities thus reproduce the vision and culture of the colonial 
city in their drive towards supposed homogeneity and security in uncanny Africa. In this regard, Lindsay 
Bremmer makes the following observation: 
the walled enclosure became an effective means of restoring a sense of order and control, keeping the 
stranger out and preventing the overlapping of identities and the clashing of cultures…[This walled 
enclaves] hollow out parts of the city and, on the basis of idealised images, construct urban places 
appealing to the desire, nostalgia, or paranoia of people who can pay to be there (Bremmer, 2002: 159-
160).  
 
However, the above attempts (‘sanitation’ of cities, gentrification processes, and the establishment of 
gated communities) have not stopped, or rather have actually stimulated, the emergence of  “other-city” 
in-between sanitised cities and gated communes (Bremmer, 2002: 166). The ‘other-city’ is a place of 
unemployed, unemployable, precariously employed, “informal” traders, and undocumented non-
nationals. These unassimilables have appropriated these interstitial spaces to carve out livelihoods and 
to constitute alternatives spaces of belonging. These spaces are characterised by a creolising culture and 
an alternative political economy that pose a challenge to the aforementioned neo-colonialist culture. 
The ‘other-city’ is a harbinger of a postcolonial urban imagination in that it,  
…wittingly or unwittingly…overwrite the hard-edged colonial formalist distinctions that established an 
epistemological division between urban and rural, tradition and modernity, formal and informal, village 
and city, authentic and inauthentic, chaotic and disorderly…. (Enwezor et al. 2002: 13). 
 
 
My earlier historical discussion of the movements and cultures of urban-based “squatters” and 
“invaders” makes it clear that the ‘other city’ is not new phenomenon. Achille Mbembe and Sarah 
Nuttall’s work on Johannesburg as an “elusive metropolis” also confirms that the “other-city” has 
always been a feature of the colonial city. Mbembe and Nuttall (2008: 21-22) observe that African 
metropolises were and are constituted both by what lies on their surface and in ‘the underground’. In 
‘the underground,’ one finds people who are alienated from and sometimes prohibited from the city. 
‘The underground,’ or the ‘other city’, is a space of great suffering but also a space of possibilities, 
hope, and invention (ibid.). This description of ‘the underground’ immediately takes us back to Invisible 
Man and his embracing of his invisibility. In this regard, AbdouMaliq Simone (2002: 27-31) has shown 
that ‘other-city’ people embrace and invest in “politics of invisibility”. Ghostly and spectral 
appearances enable underground people to eke out a life of survival in these anti-poor “world-class” 
cities (Simone, 2002: 28). 
  
I have discussed the history of city-based “squatters” and the presence of ‘other cities’ to make two 
points that are germane to a contextual understanding of Abahlalism. Firstly, the location of Kennedy 
Road Informal Settlement - in the liminal zone between the city and black townships – qualifies it as 
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an ‘other-city’. Mbembe and Nuttall’s description of ‘the underground’ supports my assertion that, 
slightly stretched, the definition of ‘other-city’ could apply to this settlement of these ‘invisibilised’ 
wretched of the earth: “the world below (the underworld) is…made up lower classes, the trash heap of 
the world above, and subterranean utopias” (Mbembe and Nuttall, 2008: 21-22). My second point is 
that ‘other-city’ people, similar to Nakasa’s fellow “Fringe World” dwellers (chapter three), are exile-
fugitives in my typology.  
 
Seen against this background, it would seem that Abahlali embrace the idea of ‘homelessness-as-home’. 
As I mentioned earlier, the concept of ‘homelessness-as-home’ is JanMohamed’s concept to describe 
exiled people who live on the boundary of the nation-state. These self-conscious pariahs (Arendt’s term) 
do not hanker after recognition, acceptance, and integration. In chapter two above, I drew a homology 
between JanMohamed’s concept of ‘homelessness-as-home’ and that of ‘fugitivity’ as framed by 
Moten. Moten deploys this concept to refer to blackness’s refusal of hegemonic belonging and homing. 
Rather, ‘blackness’ is, Moten argues (2008: 756) a, “sharing of life in homelessness” because it refuses 
that which has been refused. Similarly, city-based shack-dwellers and other ‘underground’ people 
appear to refuse that which has been refused; namely, assimilation into hegemonic society. Although 
not to the same extent as dwellers of the inner-city ‘underground world,’ it would seem that city-based 
shack settlements evince a similar sense of ephemeral and spectral presence. This is how Ross (2010: 
54) describes one such settlement: “Although perfectly visible from the road, the settlement had a 
curious air of seeming somehow slightly secretive and impermeable to non-residents. To those driving 
past, the settlement whipped by in a blur of zinc, plastic and cardboard, an occasional glimpse of a 
person, an impression of dirt and squalor”.  
 
Following Moten’s description of blackness, I would like to suggest that city-based ‘shackness,’ is also 
a fugitivity that cannot be captured by the frame of (neo)colonialist discourse: “What’s at stake is 
fugitive movement in and out of the frame, bar, or whatever externally imposed social logic,” writes 
Moten (2008: 179), “this fugitive movement is stolen life…”. In this understanding, city-based shack-
dwellers are similar to marooned slaves who dis-locate themselves to be more at home with each other 
as part of constitution and belonging processes of “becoming otherwise” (Motha, 2010: 287). The 
ensuing “social life otherwise” (da Silva, 2013: n.p.) forged by shack-dwellers ensures that these 
fugitives escape relegation into colonialist discourse-prescribed “zone of non-beings”. Rather, they 
transcend the Manichean neo-colonial world to locate themselves in a transversal “zone of 
unattainability” (Moten, 2008: 179); a “zone of indistinction” (Farred, 2004: 604). In this zone, we find 
what Richard Pithouse (2006: 45), in reference to Abahlali’s settlement, calls “the home of exile”. It is 
in this sense that I refer to bahlali as fugitive-exiles.  
 
The mere mention of exile, however, recalls Mphahlele and Said’s insistence that exile-living is not to 
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be romantised. Such a romanticism can be found in Pithouse’s narrative of Abahlalism. Similar to Said, 
JanMohamed and Rushdie’s reflections in chapter two above, Pithouse (2006: 24) invokes Alain 
Badiou’s assertion that political courage, and thus counter-hegemonic discourse, arise from “exile 
without return”. Pithouse invokes this idea to propose that Abahlali’s disruptive politics is potentiated 
by the movement’s decision to embrace exile. On the other hand, Said, Achebe, Mphahlele together 
with several exiled poets highlighted the fact that the romantic idea of the exile figure leading an 
independent life free of any moorings and exploitation does not apply to an overwhelming majority of 
physically exiled people. The reality is that an overwhelming majority of exiles and displaced people 
from the Global South as well as internally-displaced people within the South find themselves 
disjunctively included in and exploited by host societies. In this regard, Ross’s reference to Janice 
Perlman’s The Myth of Marginality is a very important intervention. Following Perlman, Ross shows 
that shack-dwellers are not marginal, let alone autonomous, of the dominant society and political 
economy. Rather, “…residents of shanty settlements enabled those economies, providing a source of 
cheap, surplus, endlessly exploitable and renewable labour” (Ross, 2010: 207-208). Peri-urban 
“squatter-life” and/as ‘other-city’ life is thus a precarious form of life imbricated in circuits of 
exploitation and discardability. It is, therefore, unequivocally not the ideal of “otherwise living” typified 
by the Brazilian quilombos of yesteryears (da Silva, 2013: n.p.). Rather, as Mike Davis puts it in Planet 
of Slums (2006: 184), shack-dwellers are “radically homeless” vis-à-vis the mainstream society and 
economy in relation to which they exist in a “semi-feudal” manner. At the same time, increased 
competition for low-skill labour diminishes bonds of togetherness and social capital and many shack 
dwellers are pushed into a situation of “marginality within marginality” (Davis, 2006: 201).  
 
The first reason I am putting forward for my contention that Abahlali does not, and indeed cannot, 
embrace the idea of liminality inherent in ‘homelessness-as-home’ is that bahlali are not marginal and 
outside of society. Instead, bahlali find themselves on the exploited underside of the hegemonic house. 
“The underworld” can never be home; it is never homely. This is to say that underside habituation could 
never constitute a reclamation of belongingness-in-the-world. Zikode explains the reasons for this: 
Most of us are not working and have to spend all day struggling for small money. AIDS is worse in the 
shack settlements than anywhere else. Without proper houses, water, electricity, refuse removal and 
toilets all kinds of diseases breed. The causes are clearly visible and every Dick, Tom and Harry can 
understand. Our bodies itch every day because of the insects. If it is raining everything is wet – blankets 
and floors. If it is hot the mosquitoes and flies are always there. There is no holiday in the shacks. When 
the evening comes – it is always a challenge. The night is supposed to be for relaxing and getting rest. 
But it doesn’t happen like that in the jondolos [shack settlements]. People stay awake worrying about 
their lives. You must see how big the rats are that will run across the small babies in the night…But 
poverty is not just suffering. It threatens us with death every day (Zikode, 2006: 186). 
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The second reason why a valorisation of shackness-as-liminal living is unsustainable is that fugitive-
exile positionality and subjectivity are made possible by tactics of stealth and circumvention - “little 
tactics of survival” (Bremmer, 2002: 170). In the long run, however, these tactics become unsustainable, 
exhausting, bewildering, and thus re-enforcing of a sense of being worldless. In her ethnographic study 
of a city-based shack settlement situated in the city of Cape Town, Ross (2010: 124) found that residents 
experience a deep and pervasive sense of being cut adrift from the world. This is because continuous 
tactical living thwarts shack-dwellers ability to create or to adhere to “strategic action in the world” 
(ibid.). Additionally, crime and squalor, grinding poverty, and the ever-present fear of eviction result in 
a condition of “existential insecurity” (Manganyi, 1973: 13). All these factors make it difficult for 
shack-dwellers to live strategically even if they wished to (Ross, 2010: 124).  
 
I am, therefore, suggesting, that fugitive-exile living can only be transitory if it is lead to an elaboration 
of a praxis that leads to the abolishment of the Manichean city and its worlds of apartness. Simone 
articulates this view in the following manner:  
The investment in a politics of invisibility – i.e.; of trying to navigate a difficult and often oppressive 
urban world with stealth, inversion and guile – may enable daily survival, but it does not get around the 
need to create new cities even if the old ones are being dismantled. And so the visibility of collective 
action remains critical (Simone, 2002: 31).  
 
It is for these two reasons (the myth of ‘homelessness-as-home’ and the fact that spectral and tactical 
existence is unsustainable) that I contend that politics of invisibility and liminality must eventually be 
replaced by politics of visibility and homemaking. This is because rather than avowing ‘homelessness-
as-home,’ and the existential insecurity that comes with it, disjunctively included people long for 
heimlich (the homely), for a home, and to be part of a humane city and society. The post-abyssal line 
challenge then is not to isolate oneself in the ‘community’ one has been forced into nor to seek 
acceptance and integration into mainstream society. The long-term challenge is to de-constitute the 
polity and constitute a humane city and world. Humanity’s ability to rise up to this challenge depends 
on whether the visions, epistemologies, and praxes of those who suffer from structural invisibility and 
systemic exploitation become universalised. It is on this note that Davis (2006: 202) concludes his 
important book: “the future of the world and human solidarity depends on the urban poor resisting 
terminal marginality”. Similarly, Fanon, and later Lefebvre, believed that spatial justice and new urban 
humanism could only emerge out of the praxes of victims of spatial injustice and denial of 
belongingness (Gibson, 2011: 24). In the case of neo-Apartheid South Africa, for purposes of the thesis 
I defend here, I am proposing that Abahlalism is a vision of constitution and belonging that could 
contribute to the remaking of the city and eventually to Mayibuye iAfrica (the re-membering and 
(re)constitution of Africa). 
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5.3 Abahlali’s Constitution Vision: ‘A Fair World where Everyone Matters’ 
 
In the rest of the chapter, I aim to show that Abahlali’s self-described “home-made politics” 
(Abahlalism) is a revolutionary politics that seek to remake the world on the material, social, and 
spiritual levels. As I did with Biko’s and Mphahlele’s philo-praxes of constitution and belonging, I will 
investigate the manner in which Abahlali engage with and transcend the Du Boisian manifesto. To 
recap, this manifesto is comprised of three pillars: (i) potentiation of double consciousness to attain 
self-conscious personhood, (ii) forging of group consciousness and eventually national consciousness, 
and (iii) organised activity to remake the world and end ‘global apartheid’. Before I apply each of these 
pillars in turn, I will first show that Abahlali refuses nativist politics of irredentism in favour of humane 
and creolising politics of ‘resurrecting the land’.   
 
5.3.1 Non-nativist ‘resurrection’ of the land 
 
I have thus far shown that Abahlali’s archival memory is comprised of the ‘otherwise-living’ history of 
city-based “squatters”. This explains why Abahlali’s vision of constitution and belonging is predicated 
on a refusal of permanent exile and ‘homelessness-as-home’. Furthermore, Abahlali’s politics of 
mourning contra politics impelled by melancholia also refuses assimilationist visions of constitution 
and belonging. Abahlali has set itself the mission of engaging in visible and robust collective action 
processes to end ‘UnFreedom’. This is because, for this social movement, “freedom means that South 
Africa belongs to all who live in” (Abahlali, 2014: n.p.). The fact that bahlali are engaged in sustained 
collective action is further proof that this movement is not interested in spectral or ephemeral 
appearances. This is to say that bahlali want to assert themselves as political actors. They would like to 
engage in political action in the sense that Arendt described political action as action which takes place 
in the intersubjective public world when free persons in their plurality, through word and deed, create 
a ‘space of appearance’ (Arendt, 1998, 198-199; Arendt, 1973: 110). In contrast to dwellers of ‘the 
underground,’ bahlali wish to co-create the ‘space of appearance’.  
 
More specifically, Abahlali’s self-identity, philosophy, action repertoire, self-narrative, and identity are 
indexical of the fact that this movement of historically “mummified” persons (Fanon, 1970: 93-94) sees 
its mission as that of refuting what I have referred to as the on-going process of de-worlding of black 
impoverished people. In Part I, I outlined four main consequences of colonialist attempts to expel 
colonised groups from the world of humans; namely, namelessness, unhomeliness, rootlessness, and 
homelessness. Abahlali’s dedicated attention to these consequences is seen, respectively, in the fact 
that: 
• this movement of historically anonymous and discardable people have attached a name to 
themselves and that this name is based on appropriating an identity (being shack-dwellers) that 
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is historically associated with shame, illegality, and pariahdom; 
• it has set up a day-care centre, food gardens, community safety forum, a choir, religious groups, 
and football teams;  
• it has forged loyal and durable trans-local and transnational alliances; and 
• it vigorously resists threats of evictions and displacements and it mobilises for land and 
housing.  
 
Following from the above outline, we can deduce that Abahlali is engaged in a struggle to reclaim 
belongingness-in-the-world on all three realms that I have been concerned with. Therefore, even though 
this movement’s constituency is made up mostly of shack-dwellers and thus of necessity most of the 
movement’s demands are focused on claims related to landless, homelessness, and deprivation of basic 
services this movement’s striving for freedom and co-existence transcends material claims. The 
movement made this clear in 2006 on the occasion of its first commemoration of UnFreedom Day: 
Freedom is a way of living not a list of demands to be met. Delivering houses will do away with the lack 
of houses but it won’t make us free on its own. Freedom is a way of living where everyone is important 
and where everyone’s experience and intelligence counts…We have often said that we are not free 
because even many of the people who say they are for the struggles of the poor refuse to accept that we 
can think for ourselves (Abahlali, 2006: n.p.).  
 
In Part I of this dissertation I have shown that the colonialist act of denying the colonised the power of 
rationality was one of the conditions of possibility for depriving them of humanity and denying them 
worldly belonging. In this chapter, I have shown how this neo-colonialist discourse continues in the era 
of “post-Apartheid”. The above extract makes it clear that this movement seeks to challenge neo-
colonialist discourse’s claim that impoverished black people are not endowed with the capacity to think 
and, in Arendtian terms, that they are not co-makers of the post-1994 world. By connecting systemic 
denial of material goods to a philosophy and a discourse that de-humanises and de-worlds, bahlali are 
suggesting that they experience the post-1994 dispensation as another form of ‘death of land’.  
 
Therefore, the first key to understanding Abahlali’s vision of constitution and belonging is to understand 
that this movement regards its struggle as a continuation of the struggle against ‘right of conquest’ and 
the ‘death of the land’. I would like to advance two reasons as proof that the themes of ‘resurrection’ 
and redemptive returns are also present in Abahlali’s discourse and narrative. Firstly, leaders of 
Abahlali often speak of bahlali and other impoverished people as their Moses - in popular South African 
lexicon, as ‘their Mandela’. One member of Abahlali conveyed the idea as follows: “The first Nelson 
Mandela was Jesus Christ. The second was Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela. The third Nelson Mandela are 
the poor people of the world” (cited in Byrant, n.d.:n.p.). Secondly, Abahlali is one of a handful, if not 
the only active, urban-based movement that has made the demand for land an explicit demand. For 
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bahlali, this demand is not simply economic. This demand is linked to a memory of offence relating to 
historical land dispossession. This is to say that the movement draws a connection between the current 
impoverished state of its members and the on-going consequences of the so-called ‘right of conquest’. 
M’du Hlongwa, a member of Abahlali, expressed this connection in an article he titled “I am the 
Professor of My Suffering”: 
The land of our ancestors was taken for the farms and the forests. Our grandparents and parents worked 
on those farms and in the mines and factories and houses. Now we are either trying to make a living 
selling to other poor people or we are the servants who come quietly into the nice places with our heads 
always down to keep them nice and to keep them working for the rich (Hlongwa, 2007: n.p.).  
 
Zikode expresses the same idea as follows: 
But we are not poor because we are less than the rich. We are poor because we were made poor...If 
your ancestors had the land you will go to university and get a nice job and look after your family well. 
If your ancestors lost the land you will be lucky to find a dangerous job that you hate so that your family 
can just survive…. The system we suffer under now keeps the land in the hands of the descendants of 
those who had stolen it through the barrel of colonial guns (Zikode, 2008: n.p. Original emphasis)  
I am, therefore, making the argument that this movement’s strategy of occupying land in urban areas is 
a strategy that is aimed at defying ‘the right of conquest,’ the Natives Land Act of 1913 and other laws 
and policies that deprived Africans of their land.  However, and this is an important distinction, unlike 
the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania and anti-colonial movements of the late ninetieth and early 
twentieth century, in Abahlali’s version of Mayibuye iAfrika land redistribution is not confined to the 
land bahlali’s direct ancestors have lost. Rather, the movement demands land in the cities and all over 
South Africa. Abahlali’s land politics are, therefore, similar to that of Sofazonke and other movements 
of “squatters” that imagined the Promised Land to be in urban areas. The point that I am making is that 
Abahlali’s politics of constitution and belonging eschew the politics of autochthony. This eschewal is 
motivated by the understanding that politics of autochthony fly too closely to the colonial constitution-
making scheme. Under the latter scheme, the territory that became South Africa was violently 
balkanised and specified “native” “tribes” where assigned specific areas. Therefore, a land 
redistribution scheme based on ancestral claims could lead to a new form of balkanisation and apartness.  
 
Abahlali’s eschew this scheme with this humanist proclamation: “land, cities, wealth and power are [to 
be] shared fairly” (Abahlali, 2014: n.p.). In other words, Abahlali’s does not base its notion of land and 
economic redistribution on autochthony and nativism. Instead, this movement’s vision of 
(re)constituting the material world is based on a strong rejection of ‘tribalism’ and racialism. To be 
sure, people who originate from the rural parts of KwaZulu-Natal (mostly AmaZulu), those coming 
from the former Transkei (mostly Xhosa people) and those who ascribe other ethnic identities to 
themselves co-exist and co-constitute the leadership of Abahlali. The membership and leadership of 
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this movement also include people of Indian ancestry. Lastly, Abahlali’s vision includes a Pan-African 
element in that Abahlali has made it clear that undocumented non-nationals ought to be regularised and 
afforded the right to a home. Thus in response to the 2008 Afrophobic pogroms, Abahlali defended 
non-nationals from attacks and issued a widely disseminated anti-xenophobia statement. In part, the 
statement read: “An action can be illegal. A person cannot be illegal. A person is a person where ever 
they may find themselves. If you live in a settlement you are from that settlement and you are a 
neighbour and a comrade in that settlement” (2008: n.p. My emphasis).  
 
Abahlali’s vision of a ‘resurrected Africa’ is, therefore, based on a vision of cities as multi-class, multi-
racial, multi-cultural, inter-cultural and perhaps plurinational spaces where multiple forms of belonging 
and ways of living are embraced and celebrated. 39  I now finally turn to an exploration of the Abahlalism 
in relation to the Du Boisian manifesto of constitution and belonging. 
 
5.3.2 ‘Our struggle is our school’: Abahlalism as potentiated double consciousness 
 
I have suggested that the first pillar of the Du Boisian manifesto is that of disalienation. The imperative 
here is for an oppressed person to cease seeing himself or herself through the lens of the oppressor. This 
transformation enables the oppressed person to overcome double consciousness and work towards 
deconstructing the world. Attainment of further western education emerged as a key factor in the 
spiritual striving and psychic reconstruction of Du Bois and New Africans. According to Du Bois, this 
attainment enables the oppressed person to potentiate the gifts of ‘second sight’. Such a potentiation 
enables the behind-the-veil person to realise that he or she is not ontologically a problematic being.  
 
I have sought to highlight two pitfalls with regard to this first pillar. The first pitfall is that an 
individualised psychic reconstruction and spiritual odyssey might end up being an internal process with 
no material and structural consequences. I demonstrated this pitfall with an account of Du Bois and his 
fellow Talented Tenth’s empyrean and elitist approach to civil rights. Relatedly, these well-educated 
elites exhibited a distrust of already-existing black civic organisations and churches. Furthermore, we 
saw that the route of further education might actually deepen spiritual unhomeliness and psychic 
dismemberment. Fanon and Cabral thus urged the coming-into-self-consciousness transcultural elite to 
engage in acts of critical returns to and dialectical conscientisation with the damned people.  
 
                                                        
39 It is important to note that Abahlali’s anti-nativist politics of constitution and belonging is a direct confrontation 
with colonialist and Apartheid discourse. A resident of Kennedy Road explained this confrontation in the 
following terms: “Apartheid told us we are Zulus or Xhosas...I grew up in the Eastern Cape, I speak isiZulu; my 
wife grew up in KwaZulu-Natal, she speaks isiXhosa...our children and us, we are South African, we are Black 
people, we are all living in this ghetto” (cited in Chance, 2010: 5).  
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Abahlali’s point of departure is that black political leaders are “black boers”[black colonialists] in the 
sense that they have internalised their historical oppressors’ mode of thinking and governance (B. 
Mdlalose, 2012: n.p.). Bahlali, therefore, regard most ‘uplifted’ people as alienated and alienating. 
Consequently, the process of disalienation and self-conscious personhood begins, for Abahlali, when 
impoverished people realise that the solution to their problems will not come from these ‘Talented 
Tenths’. Rather, impoverished people have to become ‘professors of their own suffering’ and, “build a 
spirit of political and economical consciousness through constant discussion and reflection on our 
situation…” (Zikode, 2011a: n.p.). Abahlali’s hope is that such collective and bottom-up learning and 
consciousness-raising processes will enable impoverished persons to overcome double consciousness 
and forge both a cognitive awareness and, “a spirit that recognises that we are poor because we were 
made poor and that we must work hard to unite the poor in order to resist this poverty imposed on us” 
(ibid.). “Abahlalism” (ibid.) is the name bahlali have given to this process, spirit, and way of life.  
 
 Abahlalism is, therefore, a consciousness and philo-praxis and consciousness that bahlali employ in 
order to cease apprehending themselves through the imposed lenses of racism and classism. A mindset 
based on Abahlalism enables bahlali and other damned people of the earth to reject the neo-Apartheid 
discourse that “the poor” are an “undifferentiated, unwilling carries of social diseases,” as Franco 
Barchiesi summarises the neo-Apartheid discourse on poverty (cited in Gibson, 2011: 150). Seen 
through the lens of Abahlalism, the post-1994 political and social dispensation is the problem that needs 
radical reconstruction. Abahlalism enables impoverished black people to resist neo-colonialist 
discourse, and to rather, “recognise our own humanity” (Zikode, 2010: n.p.). In this way, bahlali can 
begin deconstructing the myth of “post-Apartheid” and put this dispensation of UnFreedom on trial.  
 
By launching a frontal attack on neo-Apartheid discourse, Abahlalism also enters into confrontation 
with neo-Apartheid constitutionalism and the laws it sanctions. An example of this confrontation can 
be seen in the following extract from Abahlali’s opposition to the KwaZulu Natal Elimination and 
Prevention of Re-Emergence of Slums Bill of 2006. This Bill reiterated the underlying motivation of 
the Slums Clearance Act of 1934 which suggested that black people and their dwellings are an 
unhygienic nuisance that must be cleared away. Abahlali’s response to the 2006 reincarnation of this 
colonialist legislation was as follows:  
The Bill uses the word 'slum' in a way that makes it sound like the places where poor people live are a 
problem that must be cleared away because there is something wrong with poor people. But it does not 
admit that the poor have been made poor by the same history of theft and exploitation that made the rich 
to be rich and it does not admit that places where poor people live often lack infrastructure and toilets 
because of the failure of landlords or the government to provide these things. The solution to the fact that 
we often don’t have toilets in our communities is to provide toilets where we live and not to destroy our 
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communities and move us out of the city. In this Bill the word 'slum' is used to make it sound like the 
poor and the places where they live are the problem rather than the rich and the way in which they have 
made the poor to be poor and to be kept poor by a lack of development (Abahlali, 2007a: n.p.).  
Abahlali’s campaign to resist this Bill (2006-2010) is the movement’s most-prominent campaign to 
date. This campaign is a good example of Abahlalism in action. In this campaign, we come across a 
group of people who have overcome double consciousness in that they refuse to see their situation from 
the perspective of state and non-state elites. Rather, the movement considered this Bill as an attempt to, 
“mount a legal attack on the poor” and drive impoverished people, “out of our cities as if we were 
rubbish” (ibid.). As soon as the movement become aware of this Bill, it took part in every forum 
available to voice their opposition against the Bill and to demonstrate that bahlali are “…not passive 
recipients of government services or promises but active critics of non participatory models of 
governance” (Abahlali, 2007b: n.p.). The movement launched a constitutional challenge at the Durban 
High Court when this Bill became law. In 2010, the Constitutional Court agreed with Abahlali’s 
submission that the Act is unconstitutional.  This campaign is also an example of how this movement 
of marginalised people resisted city officials’ “world-class city” objectives.  
Critics charge, however, that Abahlali’s decision to rely on legal tactics and discourse has resulted in 
the lowering of the movement’s goals, its deradicalisation, and a displacement of the movement’s 
counter-hegemonic/socialist vision. One critic writes that,  
from around 2007 there was a definite turn to law, which seemed to juridify Abahlali’s public 
pronouncements. Their branding was reformulated to emphasise their being law-abiding, long-suffering 
protectors of the constitution.  Their mission to achieve “dignity” and “voice” came to be calibrated in 
terms of due process rights the state owed them.  The content of their demands and their methods of 
achieving them were cast within the boundaries of the law.  Becoming primarily a national, rights-bearing 
subject also affected their organisational form. In Durban, it hardened, narrowed and professionalised 
(Böhmke, 2010: 19 ft.17). 
This critique echoes the following critique made by another “radical” activist in 2006: “Initially 
involved in militant, direct action, Abahlali has now become bureaucratised, lacks a clear programme 
and is chiefly pursuing legal remedies for municipal delivery” (Setshedi, 2006: n.p.).  These criticisms 
repeat well-known leftist arguments against social movement’s mobilisation of legal tactics and 
strategies. The critique here is that the law is ideologically biased towards the preservation of the status 
quo; that the law’s constitutive power can function to reify on-going domination, transmute radical 
desires, lower expectations, and induce passivity; that legal tactics are detrimental to movement-
building because they deflect resources and attention from protest action and other forms of collective 
grassroots organising; and that, in any case courts are institutionally incapable of ushering in 
fundamental transformation (see Madlingozi, 2014: 93-95). To put this critique in the terms of this 
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dissertation, we can understand Heinrich Böhmke and Virginia Setshedi to be alleging that bahlali’s 
recourse to neo-Apartheid laws has enveloped them in a state of false consciousness and has thus 
deepened bahlali’s self-deception and self-alienation.  
However, this critique ignores the fact that Abahlali’s resort to legal tactics took place after extra-
institutional ‘radical’ collective tactics proved ineffective, arduous, and life threatening. In this context, 
the movement explained that, “we are going to court because we know that in court we will not be 
beaten, arrested, denied the right to speak or ignored” (Abahlali, 2008: n.p.). Furthermore, Abahlali 
continuously stresses that it engages in courtroom battles as a last resort because it is careful not to get 
demobilised and disempowered. Thus in “Poor People’s Movement and the Law,” (2011a: n.p.) Zikode 
emphasised that Abahlalism provides a lens through which to ‘make a choice out of no choice’ and 
engage in a cost-benefit analysis about using the law tactically - never as a strategy. To be sure, Abahlali 
is aware of the risk of being co-opted into hegemonic ideology via legal strategies. Abahlali has thus 
clarified that, “we are not a human rights organisation” (Zikode interviewed by Kate Tissington and 
Jackie Dugard, Durban, 25 April 2012).40 Rather, the movement has used the lens of Abahlalism to 
summon legal procedures and discourses tactically. The movement has thus won each and every single 
unlawful eviction lawsuit against the state. The movement is able to build on these defensive, and often 
temporary, victories to bolster their counter-hegemonic praxis of constitution and belonging. Anna 
Salmeczi (2011: 60) thus assesses that Abahlali’s tactical deployment of law is an instance of, “litigious 
disruption of the governing of global cities”.  
To recap, the movement deploys Abahlalism to enable bahlali to know “who” and “what” they are. 
This living philosophy also empowers bahlali to let it be known that bahlali are not problematic beings 
that need to be solved. Seen from the perspective of the first pillar of the Du Boisian manifesto, we can 
understand Abahlalism as a potentiated ‘second sight.’ Abahlalism facilitates an overcoming of double 
consciousness while sidestepping the pitfall that come with an individualistic disalienation exercise. 
This is because this potentiated double consciousness emerges out of the struggles of the most 
marginalised of actors. Hence, rather than the route of formal education, “our struggle is our school,” 
asserts Mzwakhe Mdlalose (2012: n.p.).  
 
                                                        
40 The following remarks by Bandile Mdlalose (2012: n.p.), Abahlali’s former general secretary, indicates that 
bahlali have not being duped by neo-Apartheid constitutionalism: “South Africa has the most beautiful 
Constitution amongst all countries. Its beauty is well documented and respected. But we are living in a Democratic 
Prison…It is clear that we do not have the rights and freedoms that are written in the Constitution in reality. Let’s 
not fool ourselves and say we are in a Democratic Country while we are in a Democratic Prison”. 
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5.3.3 Towards a creolising national consciousness  
 
Abahlali thus ground its inclusive and humane constitution vision in collective action/struggle and in 
collective processes of disalienation. This is the main lesson that the movement has learnt from the 
‘school of struggle’: “The main teaching that we have developed amongst our struggles by and for the 
poor is that we all count the same in our society” (Zokode, 2011a: n.p.). Following from this, Zikode 
(2011: viii) asserts that Abahlali’s ‘daily political practice’ seeks to continue the struggles of Biko and 
Fanon because both these activist-philosophers believed, “in individual freedom and collective 
liberation”. Such a view of total liberation is only possible in a situation where every member of society 
is treated as a thinking human being – where ‘everyone’s experience and intelligence counts’ as 
Abahlali put it above. From the foregoing, we can deduce that Abahlali’s idea of a national 
consciousness is based on what Jane Gordon, in the previous chapter, referred to as Rousseau’s’ notion 
of ‘general will’ as opposed to the ‘will of some’.  
The danger with such a majoritarian understanding of ‘general will’ is, however, that the post-colonial 
nation-becoming would base its national consciousness on the populist, and perhaps sometimes 
demagogic, sentiments of the majority. The pitfall here is that ‘general will’ could mean a desire that, 
“the last shall be the first and the first last,” as Fanon (1963: 37) suggested in his most apocalyptic 
moment. The paradox here is that colonialist discourse would then still structure the nation’s putatively 
post-colonial national consciousness. Such a national consciousness does not instantiate the posterity 
of the colonialist world because the epistemological–ontological praxis of apartness would still 
condition it. The problem here is two–fold. First, the anti–humanness economy of racial classification 
and hierarchical existences is seemingly inverted but remains current. It is in other words a nativist 
vision. Second, instead of being bifocal in the sense of being both backward–looking and forward–
looking such a national consciousness is entombed in an attitude that David Scott, in chapter three 
above, decries as an attitude of “anti–colonial longing”. Such emancipation then does not become a 
resumption of the self-determining history of the historically conquered and an enactment of liberation 
as a forward march. Fortunately, as Ato Sekyi–Otu brilliantly demonstrates in Fanon’s Dialectic of 
Experience (1996: 103-104), Fanon himself counseled against this kind of emancipation. Writing of 
“The Pitfalls of National Consciousness” Fanon (1963: 119-164) showed that the ‘last shall be the first’ 
is the reaction that immediately presents itself in reaction to settler colonialism’s Manichaeism. Fanon 
then goes on to show that this reaction is the nationalist bourgeoisie’s reaction which will simply leads 
to disaster moving from racialism, to xenophobia, to ethnic chauvinism, social injustice, and ultimately 
to full-blown neo-colonialism. In the closing passages of The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon (1963: 255) 
thus pleaded with the wretched of the earth to elaborate ‘a new humanism’.  
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Although Fanon directed his rebuke at neo-colonial elites’ constitution-making vision, we can formulate 
the same critique against majoritarian ‘general will’. I am, therefore, suggesting that it is not enough 
for the ‘general will’ to emerge from the visions and praxis of the damned. The ‘general will’ must also 
have humanistic content. I have already shown that Mphahlele’s and Biko’s visions also encompass 
Afrikan humanness as their means and ends. In this sub-section I aim to show that Abahlalism is also 
motored by a humanist vision. Firstly, in previous sections we discovered that this movement believes 
that the “new South Africa” is an anti-humanness polity because it is a polity based on political and 
social unfreedom; on the notion that the citizen is a homo economicus; on nativism; xenophobia; and 
the idea that the lives of impoverished black people are ungrievable. Following from this analysis, 
secondly, Abahlali (2008: n.p.) explains that, “our struggle and every real struggle is to put the human 
being at the centre of society, starting with the worst off”. It is on this basis that Abahlali basis its 
struggle on the living philosophy of Afrikan humanness. Zikode (2011: vii-viii) explains that this 
philosophy is based on an acceptance that, “a person can only be a complete person in relation to others 
and that all others are human and must therefore count…”. Therefore, Abahlali’s proposal is that 
Afrikan humanness ought to suffuse the second pillar of the Du Boisian manifesto (forging group 
consciousness as a precursor to crafting a creolising national consciousness). 
Yet, our discussion of Biko’s and Mphahlele’s homecoming and homemaking voyages taught us that 
before the oppressed group can articulate the ethical-ontological philosophy of humanness for the 
nation-becoming, it must first reclaim and recognise its humanity for itself first. This means that the 
oppressed must delink from the hegemonic world and its epistemological and normative assumptions, 
define itself, set humanness as the basis of its values and normative claims, and then struggle to impose 
its humanity on the rest of society. Speaking in the midst of the Total Strategy against ‘people’s power’ 
activists, Mphahlele expressed this route as follows: “I must reserve my humanism for my own kind 
and conserve the energy and strengthen my own first and see if we can stand on our own dignity and 
pride” (Interview with Manganyi, 2010: 483). Similarly, Biko and BCM philosophers understood that 
the route towards ‘bestowing the gift of true humanism’ to the future nation was via the steps I have 
articulated above. More specifically, Black Consciousness teaches that the oppressed must first come 
to a consciousness that they are ‘on their own;’ and from that place of metaphysical aloneness articulate 
a transitory identity of otherness. Such a positionality and subjectivity of alterity is a condition of 
possibility for hitherto non-existing inter-subjective relations.   
Similarly, Zikode explains that the shack-dwellers of Kennedy Road did not know that they were 
building a movement when they decided to block the road in that 2005 constitutive protest: “all we 
knew was that we had decided to make the break. To accept that we were on our own…that the new 
politics had to be led by poor people and to be for poor people (Interview with Pithouse, 2009: 35-36. 
My emphasis). Shack-dwellers followed this realisation (of being on their own) with a ritual in which 
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they symbolically buried the local councilor. This burial was a declaration of autonomy vis-à-vis the 
local government and a declaration of intent to delink from hegemonic political discourse and values. 
After several meetings and rallies various shack-settlements came together and decided to form a social 
movement. The name they choose was as self-explanatory as it was defiant: ‘those who resides in shack 
settlements’. As I mentioned in the first section above, this name selection (together with self-
identification as “the poor”) was an appropriation of a name and identity that was and is still associated 
with shame and pariahdom. This was the beginnings of a group consciousness known as Abahlalism. 
In this regard, Nigel Gibson (2011: 14-15) asserts that an analogy can be drawn between “shackness” 
and Black Consciousness ‘blackness’. In both cases, an oppressed group decides to engage in an 
epistemological and political break and from that position of self-estrangement engage in politics of 
radical alterity (ibid.). Understood in this way, ‘shackness’ is an “epistemology of exile” (Pithouse, 
2006: 46). Similar to Mphahlele’s spiritual odyssey and subsequent deconstruction of Africanity and 
the BCM’s rupture with liberalism and ensuing deconstruction of Black identity, it was in this place of 
exile that Abahlali was able to begin the process of potentiating their condition of  double 
consciousness. One of the leaders of Abahlali explains thus: “the first thing the movement did after it 
was formed was to define itself before someone else could define us” (M. Mdlalose, 2012: n.p.). In this 
way, the first and second pillars of the Du Boisian manifesto came together.  
How does Abahlali escape the pitfall associated with processes of forging of group consciousness? I 
have shown that the pitfall of Pan-Africanist and négritudist elaboration of this pillar is a salvationist, 
elite-driven fashioning of group consciousness and identity. I have argued that a critical return to ‘the 
source’ could help prevent this pitfall. Mphahlele sought to stage such a return by first immersing 
himself in the orature of non-modern people and by contributing to the collective fashioning of future 
national consciousness through literature and education programs. The BCM adopted two strategies to 
stage a ‘return’ and avoid this pitfall; namely, Freire’s dialectical conscientisation methodology and 
Black Community Programmes. I intend to demonstrate that Abahlali grounds its cultivation of group 
consciousness on similar initiatives.   
 
The first thing to mention is that Abahlali has attempted to come up with an extensive practice of 
internal democracy to avoid salvationism. According to Abahlali, settlements affiliated with the 
organisation hold weekly meetings and leaders of the various settlements (branches) meet at least once 
a week. At meetings, the chair is rotated and open robust discussions take place. Although Zikode holds 
the title of president he does not regard his role as that of educating bahlali. In fact, he explicitly refuses 
this role. “I want to make it clear that we have built a democratic politics and that our settlements are 
far too well organised to be controlled or thought by one man like Zikode,” asserts Zikode (2008: n.p.), 
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“Zikode does not educate the people who elected him to speak with them and then for them”. Zikode 
clarifies that Abahlalism, or more accurately Abahlaliness, is instead based on popular education to 
ensure, “a continual discussion of Abahlalism” (Zikode, 2011a: n.p.; 2011b: vii). This is what the 
movement means when it asserts that the ‘struggle is school’. This is also the reason why at the first 
authorised protest march of 2005 shack-dwellers from various settlements painted banners declaring 
that the settlements are universities. From these spontaneous and defiant articulations, the movement 
subsequently created the University of Abahlali.  Together with the other activities of the organisation, 
this University ensures further collective potentiation of double consciousness, participatory 
democracy, and prevents a top-down elaboration of group consciousness.  Mdlalose explains this 
bottom-up process of forging Abahlalism as follows:  
We believe that our struggle is our school. This is why we have created the University of Abahlali 
baseMjondolo. This is our own political school where we learn from one another. We learn from our 
meetings, at our all night camps that we hold on every quarter year. We learn from the streets during 
protests and we learn from the court rooms. But most importantly we have learnt from the old and young 
women and men. Our meetings are the center of our movement. This is where we discuss and think 
together (Madlalose, 2012: n.p.). 
Abahlali have called this democratic and anti-elitist process of forging group consciousness a process 
of “living learning” (see generally, Figlan et al. 2009). Abahlali explains that ‘living learning’ draws 
on Freire’s ‘pedagogy of the oppressed’ (Figlan et al. 2009: 34, 62). For Abahlali, ‘living learning’ 
serves both internal and external functions. Internally, ‘living learning’ means that the idea of leaders 
as philosopher-kings who come up with pre-packaged analyses and theories is rejected. Externally, the 
movement deploys Freire’s ideas to reject hegemonic society’s interpellation of impoverished black 
people as people who cannot think and to whom education should be delivered. Hence speaking about 
the tendency of academics and NGO officials to descend on settlements to ‘workshop’ and ‘capacitate’ 
shack-dwellers, a member of Abablali expressed the following Freireian thought:  
They assume we are empty enough and stupid enough for others to learn what they decide, and that they 
will come and think for those of us who are poor and cannot think. But now we are having our own living 
learning – and so there is a confrontation brewing about who’s teaching who (Figlan et al., 2009: 19. 
Original emphasis).  
We can, therefore, see that this university contributes to both the first and second pillars by ensuring 
that shack-settlements are homely spaces of thought, mutual learning, political subjectivisation, 
belonging and constitution-making/homemaking. It is in this sense that we can understand Zikode’s 
(2010: n.p.) assertion that this university is a “home-based” university. Applying this to my two-fold 
thesis we can argue that ‘living learning’ ensures that ‘the source’ is always dynamic, critical, and ready 
to challenge neo-colonialist discourse and other hegemonic reasoning that seek to reinstall a world of 
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apartness. Furthermore, ‘living learning’ seeks to overcome pariahdom and worldlessness because it is, 
of necessity, based on multiple pedagogies, epistemologies, and cultures. This is because ‘living 
learning’ does not reject the ‘traditional’ university and knowledge systems associated with hegemonic 
actors. Rather, the point of ‘living learning’ is to try and achieve a truly universal world. ‘Living 
learning’ seeks to do this by working towards the unification of various sites of knowledge production 
and theory-making. A member of Abahlali puts this point as follows: “People compare the two 
universities – the university of emijondolo [shack dwellings] and eplasini [villages] & the academic 
University of KwaZulu-Natal…Perhaps we can talk of achieving ‘the Universal University’” (Figlan et 
al. 2009: 8-9). A ‘Universal University’ can only lead to a creolising national consciousness.  
 
We thus arrive at an understanding that the aim of ‘living learning’ is to contribute to national 
consciousness because it takes seriously the epistemologies, knowledges, values, and norms emerging 
out of locale hegemonic reasoning usually cast as non-existing and thus having nothing to contribute to 
national consciousness. It is for this reason that Abahlali’s ‘living learning’ constitute and is constituted 
by what the movement refer to as ‘living politics’. ‘Living politics’ is both a tool for disalienation and 
a home for exiles and pariahs. Thus the movement explains that another name for Abahlalism’s ‘living 
politics’ is ‘home-made’ politics. Zikode explains the movement’s homemaking and homely politics as 
follows:  
Our politics is also not a politics of a few people who have learnt some fancy words and who expect 
everyone to follow them because they know these words. Our politics is a traditional home politics 
which is understood very well by all the old mamas and gogos [grandmothers] because it affects their 
lives and gives them a home. In this home everybody is important, everybody can speak and we look 
after each other and think about our situation and plan our fight together …(Zikode, 2008: 115. My 
emphasis). 
 
The above statement of ‘home-made’ politics is a comprehensive statement of Abahlali’s proposal as 
far as processes of forging national consciousness are concerned. The hope here is such processes would 
ensure that the nation-becoming would be inclusive and its consciousness humanist because all 
members of society will contribute to forging a ‘new humanism’. ‘Living politics’ is a living politics 
and life-affirming politics because it is dynamic and is not based on what Ramose calls ‘bounded 
reasoning’. This means that the image and form of the future nation is not predetermined. Rather, as 
Jean-Luc Nancy might propose, it is an inoperative community. This is because such politics and its 
telos arise from struggle, contestations, and being-togetherness.41 The only non-negotiable norm is that 
                                                        
41 To be sure, shack-dwellers of Kennedy Road did not have a vision of what a future movement will look like or 
what a state of Freedom will look like on that day when they decided to no longer accept the post-1994 state of 
‘unFreedom’ and to engage in protest action. Zikode explains: “The road blockade was the start. We didn’t know 
what would come next. After the blockade we discussed things and then we decided on a second step. That’s how 
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there must an agreement and a commitment to end conditions and power relations that have created a 
bifurcated society; and that everyone must be allowed to contribute to processes of nation-building.  
5.3.4 Towards cosmopolitan (re)constitution of home and world(s) 
 
The third and final pillar of the Du Boisian manifesto is the endeavor to de-constitute the current world 
and constitute a ‘world where everyone matters’ (Zikode, 2010: n.p.). The Du Boisian manifesto 
suggests that this unending striving becomes possible after pariahs of the world have, firstly, overcome 
double consciousness and reclaimed self-conscious personhood, and, secondly, when they have forged 
a group consciousness based on politics of alterity. In the case of Abahlali, we have seen that bahlali 
staged ‘a break’ with a discourse that insists that the problem of impoverishment is “the poor’s” fault 
and problem. Therefore, for Abahlali, the imperative to (re)constitute the world begins internally and 
in between bahlali. From this space, the movement has forged Abahlalism as a ‘collective action frame’ 
that provides tools for sense-making and construction of meanings in order to overcome self-alienation 
and self-deception and to activate and justify organised resistance.  
Therefore, and as I have argued above, Abahlalism jettisons politics of ‘homelessness-as-home’ and 
‘worldliness-without-world’. Rather, these historically homeless and unhomed people engage in 
sustained collective action to demand a home and a world.  The movement has thus set itself the mission 
of contributing to the (re)constituting of the world into a space where everyone counts, where no one is 
produced as a pariah, and where diverse forms of being-togetherness are crafted. Zikode articulates this 
vision of constitution and belonging as follows: 
We need to think about how we can create a new kind of communism, a new kind of togetherness. A 
living communism that recognises the equal humanity of every person wherever they were born, 
wherever their ancestors came from, whether they are poor or rich, women or men. This new togetherness 
must also understand that the world, what God has given to us all, must be shared by us all (Zikode, 
2008a: n.p.).  
As we can see, Abahlali’s vision of constitution and belonging aims to overcome domestic and global 
apartheid. Additionally, this vision is a vision that desires a world animated by a new spirit of 
togetherness (‘communism’/communalism). The struggles of the de-worlded to reclaim world 
belonging together with a new spirit of togetherness and thus Afrikan humanness will lead toward what 
I have called pluralistic co-existence. Against the colonialist discourse of de-worlding, this vision puts 
                                                        
it went, that’s how it grew. We learnt as we went. It is still like that now. We discuss things until we have decided 
on the next step and then we take it. Personally I have learnt a lot” (Zikode interview with Pithouse, 2009: 36). 
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forward the ideal that every group of persons can take part in the creation of the world. This vision 
accords with Nancy’s (2007: 54-55, 112) insistence that, “to create the world means: immediately, 
without delay, reopening each possible struggle for a world…[I]t is the movement, the agitation of the 
general diversity of the worlds which make the world”. In other words, as Biko and Fanon also insisted, 
an alternative to the current framework of centres and peripheries, of surfaces and underworlds, cities 
and ‘other-cities’, and of zones of beings versus zones of non-beings would only emerge out of the 
struggles of those who are disjunctively included in the current world order. Thus, “poor people 
themselves can and must come up with a new living, an autonomous life, a completely independent 
stance where a new order would be about alternative ways of living…,” is how Zikode (interviewed by 
Pithouse, 2009: 42) articulates this vision. It follows that alternative forms of being-becoming and 
being-belonging are made possible when pariahs of the world unite in translocal and transnational 
struggles that embody alternative organisational forms, values and discourses, and legalities to those 
that underline neocolonial/neoliberal globalisation. Such struggles may lead to world (re)constitution 
in a way that ensures that no group of persons is de-worlded.  Such an “insurgent cosmopolitanism” 
(Santos, 2008: 9) or “decolonial cosmopolitanism” (Mignolo, 2011: 270) depends on the damned of the 
earth making their humanist standpoint universal.  
As far as the South African world is concerned, similar to the manner in which the BCM sought to 
‘blacken’ the world as a precursor to world humanisation and creolisation, shack-dwellers must struggle 
to make Abahlalism hegemonic before they link up with others. At the heart of Abahlali’s approach to 
the second pillar (national consciousness) and the third pillar (the (re)making the world) is, therefore, 
the idea that everybody can think, and more specifically, that the national consciousness of the new 
society and world ought to be based on ‘shackness’. The univeralisation of this experience and 
consciousness is possible because, like blackness, ‘shackness’ is, firstly, a transitory anti-thesis; and 
secondly, it has no inherent class or racial content to it. 
First, ‘shackness’ is transitory because as I have argued bahlali do not regard their condition of exile-
living to be permanent. Rather, bahlali embrace the zone of exile of other-city (city-based shack-
settlements) as a zone to potentiate double consciousness and from there to elaborate ‘shackness’. The 
positionality of being a self-conscious shack-dweller (Arendt’s ‘self-conscious pariah’) enables an 
elaboration of a vision of constitution and belonging from the perspective of those who are ‘worse off’. 
However, the central demand of the movement is, “Land, Housing and Dignity;” and thus an end to 
shack-living. Understood in this way, the central task of shack-dwellers and other damned people is one 
and one alone: to liquidate themselves. In Miguel Mellino’s (2011: 69) succinct formulation: “les 
damnes have no identity to claim, they struggle under no flag, they are moved only by a desire to abolish 
themselves (their own colonial subjectivity) and to do so they must suppress the society that has created 
them”. In the meant time, shack-dwellers demand that society see and understand post-1994 Unfree 
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South Africa from the standpoint of shack-dwellers. Secondly, therefore, similar to Black 
Consciousness, anyone, including people who do not stay in shacks, can adopt a consciousness of 
Abahlalism. It is possible for anyone to adopt a consciousness of shackness because, similar to Biko’s 
blackness, being umhlali (a shack-dweller) is not a matter of class. Rather, it is matter of taking a 
decision to recognise the situation of UnFreedom and damnation and engaging in organised activity to 
end it. We would recall in this regard that in the previous chapter, Biko presented an ultimatum to white 
people and non-white people. He asked them to choose to remain in and perpetuate an inhumane world 
(white world) or to ‘accede and become part of the black man’ thereby creating a new humane world. 
Similarly, Mzwakhe Mdlalose (2012: n.p. My emphasis) explains that, bahlali “draw a clear line 
between those who are willing to struggle with the poor, to become part of us, to think with us” and 
those who choose to oppress and ‘invisibilise’ impoverished people. 
The penultimate point I wish to discuss is Abahlali’s desire to contribute to the (re)making of the world 
in creolising way. This manner of (re)making the world avoids the pitfall I have associated with this 
last pillar of the Du Boisian manifesto. This is the pitfall of an integrationist vision under the guise of a 
‘distinct but equal’ discourse. Four interrelated points are important here. First, my discussion of 
Abahlali’s approach to the first and second pillars is confirmation that bahlali do not support the 
‘distinct but equal’ discourse. This is because bahlali consider themselves to be of equal worth to the 
rest of society and thus reject any suggestion that there is something ontologically distinct about 
impoverished people. Second, therefore, bahlali believe that impoverished people can think and can 
contribute to the (re)making of the world. Third, bahlali value principles of syncretism and inter-
culturality. We can discern this from the fact that shack-settlements affiliated with Abahlali actively 
embrace people who self-identify with various ethnicities, ‘races’, nationalities, and even political 
parties. Fourth, we have also discovered that this movement deploys a wide variety of tactics, symbols 
and ideas in pursuance of their struggle. ‘Living learning’ and ‘living politics’ are, therefore, constituted 
by and constitute a creolising sensibility. Movement leaders often insist on this creolising outlook. In a 
speech before the Diakonia Council of Churches, Zikode expressed this view as follows:  
what I am going to suggest right now is that, since we are coming from different backgrounds, from 
different spectra of life and we have grown up in different environments, and from different walks of 
life, we should put all of those experiences and skills together (Zikode, 2008a: n.p.).  
Such a coming together (‘constitution’) enables the creolisation of national consciousness and the 
world. I am using creolising in the sense used by Jane Gordon. To repeat, Gordon explains that, “…in 
political terms, we could understand creolisation as the generalising of a shared, public will forged by 
individuals as they articulate what they seek in an through collectives that comprise a polity…” (J. 
Gordon, 2014: 4). By appropriating and defending space, democratising settlements, articulating a 
humane vision of being-belonging, and seeking to engage in translocal alliances with like-minded 
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organisations Abahlali is seeking to contribute to the building of a constituent power that will (re)make 
the city and the world. Such constituent power would only be creolising if, on the one hand, multiple 
collectives and communities build it; and if on the other hand, such communities are themselves 
comprised in such a way that they make multiple ways of being-in-the-world possible. Such a 
constituent power is, therefore, not an abstraction but it emerges from and is made possible by what 
Zikode calls “complete communities” (interviewed by Pithouse, 2009: 40). Complete because they are 
‘living communities’ in the sense that they are able to sustain themselves, fashion edifying affective 
relations, and are based on inter-culturality and principles of syncretism. Zikode (ibid) describes 
“complete communities” as follows: “It does not mean a community is complete because everyone in 
it thinks the same or because one kind of division has been overcome. It means a complete community 
that is complete because no one is excluded – a community that is open to all. It means a very active 
and proactive community – a community that thinks and debates and demands”.  
My final point relates to Mphahlele’s unavoidable ‘tyranny of place’. Creolising processes of 
reclaiming belongingness-in-the-world and of (re)constituting the world will only emerge from a 
particular space and place. In otherwise, Abahlali counsel that ‘disembodied universalism’ ought to be 
avoided. Zikode elaborates: 
It is interesting that we send comrades to this WSF [World Social Forum] with a clear message that 
another world is necessary, necessary as a matter of urgency. We hear that everyone agrees that another 
world is possible. This is good but no one has ever asked when this will happen, when will we all take a 
collective step towards this change…we must start from where we are, with what we have, from our 
families, by teaching our children, and then to our schools, to our little neighbourhoods and communities 
before we say anything at the world level like the WSF. We must not fool ourselves and produce ideas 
that are not grounded in any soil (Zikode, interviewed by Pithouse, 2009: 41- 42). 
 
Conclusion 
My main objective in with this closing chapter was to turn the spotlight onto the contemporary period 
and to decenter the perspectives of both sets of transcultural elites (ANC elites and counter-hegemonic 
elites). My analysis of the history of “squatter” movements shows that non-elite and autonomous 
movements have a long and consistent history of counter-hegemonic visions of constitution and 
belonging. I have shown that this vision starts from demands to de-constitute and (re)constitute the 
material world before elaborating theories and practices that touch on all three realms of belonging-in-
the-world. Secondly, it became clear that these autonomous movements of historically ‘invisibilised’ 
people prefigure praxes of constitution and belonging that radically pose a challenge to the ‘right of 
conquest’ and, concomitantly, to the original sin in the constitution of South Africa. Finally, by building 
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a movement made up of people from various ethnic groups and claiming land in urban areas, these 
movements bequeathed to Abahlali the idea that the imperative of ‘resurrecting’ of the land ought to 
avoid nativist politics and ‘re-tribalisation’.  
Turning to Abahlali, I showed this movement’s insurgent politics of mourning disavow the ANC’s 
melancholic politics of integration.  The main impulse behind Abahlalism is the refusal of the current 
dispensation of ‘unFreedom’. The counter-discourse of ‘unFreedom’ seeks to challenge the hegemonic 
signifier that this is the time of ‘post-Apartheid’. By demanding the immediate redistribution of land, 
of the economy and of power relations in society, Abahlali evince a refusal of historicism and 
evolutionary constitutionalism. Rejecting disjunctive inclusion, this movement embraced exile. From 
that space of self-estrangement, these pariahs were able to overcome double consciousness and forge a 
unique group consciousness in the form of Abahlalism. I have also argued that Abahlali’s ‘shackness’ 
is a route towards a creolising national consciousness. I showed that Abahlali’s vision of the 
consciousness of the post-Apartheid nation is that such a consciousness ought to:  
• emerge from struggles, be based on contestations, and thus a rejection of bounded reasoning;  
• be vigilant of reiterating colonialist discourse;  
• be geared towards individual freedom and collective liberation;  
• inspire collective processes of non-nativist ‘resurrection’ of land; and 
• sanction transnational decolonising struggles for the creation of the world, a world where 
everyone counts.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
We do have to start.  
Start what?  
The only thing in the world worth starting:  
The End of the world, for Heaven’s sake  
                 [Aimé Césaire, (1947)1995] 
 
 
 
This dissertation moved from the premise that black people’s strivings for constitution and belonging 
continue in the ‘new’ South Africa. I advanced the thesis that these strivings are impelled by the fact 
that post-1994 constitutional re-arrangements did not meet the decolonisation exigency of re-
membering the world and (re)constituting a post-segregationist polity. In chapter 1, I defended this 
decolonisation exigency by showing that settler-constitution making ‘killed the land’. By this I meant 
that colonists endeavored to shatter the socio-cultural worlds of indigenous peoples and in their wake, 
impose their own world. The outcomes of this were being-belonging and being-becoming for colonists 
and pariahdom and worldlessness for the “natives”. Flowing from this I demonstrated that South 
Africa’s constitutive sin full belongingness for minority citizens and liminal inclusions of the majority 
of the population. A slippage in this scheme is the creation of transcultural “natives” who end up 
mobilising against their status of social invisibility and legal liminality. The first key insight of this 
dissertation was that the constitution and belonging visions of these transcultural elites were conditioned 
by frustrated promises of assimilation. Their emancipatory visions were thus shaped by condition of 
racial melancholia and thus an attitude of ambivalence towards the extant world. Following from Freud 
and Fanon I argued that these melancholic leaders were thus disinclined to de-constitute the white-
dominated world and re-constitute a post-segregationist world in which everyone has a full sense of 
affective and material belonging.   
 
This discussion took us to an exploration of dominant black traditions of emancipation and vision for 
re-making the world. Here I focused on the Pan-Africanist legacy of constitution and belonging as 
exemplified in the towering work and life of W.E.B. Du Bois. I distilled three pillars of the Du Boisian 
legacy; namely, the imperative to overcome double consciousness and achieve self-conscious 
personhood; the need to forge self-defined group consciousness as route towards national 
consciousness; and lastly, organised activity aimed achieving political emancipation and 
(re)constituting the world spiritually, socially and materially. In the process of unpacking the Du 
Boisian manifesto I showed that this manifesto has three main pitfalls: (i) a top-down salvationist praxis 
of constitution and belonging that therefore miscarries the continuous project of forging a national 
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consciousness; (ii) an essentialist apprehension of the culture(s) and identity of the subjugated that thus 
denies the lived reality of creolisation amongst the subjugated; and (iii) an unconscious perpetuation of 
the world of apartness. Ultimately, then, I argued that hegemonic black quests for constitution and 
belonging evinced ‘aggressive dependency’ upon colonialist discourse. This discourse emerged as a 
pivotal instrument for the de-worlding of “non-western” peoples. The pitfalls of the Du Boisian 
manifesto are caused by a failure to delink from this discourse. I thus concluded that this very influential 
manifesto led to elite nationalism, dearth of national consciousness and ultimately it perpetuated 
worldliness.  
 
Turning to South Africa, it was my contention that the Du Boisian manifesto cast a long shadow over 
post-1994 constitutional re-arrangements. I showed a homology between Thabo Mbeki’s rebirth agenda 
and the three pillars of the Du Boisian manifesto. Mbeki proposed that the ‘final constitution’ of South 
Africa had to be undergirded by a Pan-Africanist agenda if it was to terminate the non-belongingness 
of historically colonised people. I also showed that Mbeki twin projects of constitution-making and 
African Renaissance were attempts to reimagine the Pan-Africanist ideology by moving it away from 
some of its fundamental assumptions. To be more specific, Mbeki sought to respond to the third 
criticisms I advanced against the Du Boisian manifesto by reconfiguring Africanness as capacious, 
hybrid and all-inclusive. Mbeki believed that in this way the more than three hundred years of black 
strivings South Africa could be brought to an exultant end. Mbeki did not succeed in this endeavour. 
This failure was mainly due to the fact that Mbeki was a ‘philosopher-king’ in the Du Boisian mould 
and his quest to deconstruct Africanity was based on an agenda of hybridisation as opposed to that of 
creolisation. Ultimately, Mbeki’s constitution praxis led to a re-manifestation of the world of apartness 
with the majority of black people still disjunctively included in the new constitutional polity. This is 
what impels perennial “social protests” currently bedevil South Africa.  
 
I devoted Part II of the dissertation to excavating counter-hegemonic visions of constitution and 
belonging. I began with E’skia Mphahlele’s odyssey of exile, disalienation, homecoming and thus 
homemaking. Mphahlele provided three insights for my main thesis. First, that transcultural elites must 
first overcome ‘first exile’ (spiritual alienation and cosmic disharmony) by re-suturing with the non-
modern majority if they wished to contribute to collective liberation and processes of world-
(re)creation. Second, that the collective process of (re)constituting the spiritual world is a precondition 
for the thoroughgoing reconstruction of social and material worlds. Finally, that constitutionalists ought 
to place Afrikan humanness at the heart their post-colonial reconstruction agendas if wish to avoid neo-
colonial outcomes. 
 
Turning to the social realm I focused on Steve Biko and the Black Consciousness Movements praxis 
for (re)making the social world. Biko posited that the South African social world is framed by a ‘totality’ 
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of white power structure that oppresses physically, psychically, politically, and culturally; that 
conditions and constrains black people’s responses to it; and, crucially, that divided the world into the 
dominant white world and the dominated black world. Biko and his Black Consciousness comrades 
rejected the oppressor’s world and conceived of a different world. This was a world where black people 
did not have to move around feeling that they have a defective humanity. According to Biko, good faith 
living (a life of responsibility and freedom) and radical displacement of colonialist discourse would 
enable post-apartheid subjectivisation even under conditions of Apartheid and vicious subjugation. If 
Apartheid and white people sought to push black people into a ‘zone of non-beings;’ the BCM urged 
black people to realise that there was no common political community between the two worlds. Biko 
urged black people to forge a black constituent power that would de-constitute South Africa and 
constitute Azania. In this regard, the BCM proposed Freireian dialectical conscientisation and Black 
Community Programmes to counter political apathy, an internalised sense of inferiority and to avoid 
the pitfalls of the Du Boisian manifesto.  
 
Finally, I turned to the contemporary period and focused on the constitution vision and praxis of 
Abahlali base Mjondolo. This shack-dwellers movement begins with a focus on the material world but 
of necessity make prescriptions for the fundamental (re)construction of the South African polity and for 
reclamation of world belongingness. Abahlalism is thus a vision to (re)constitute the triadic world. The 
connection between this focus on the material world and Biko’s and Mphahlele’s constitution visions 
is as follows: From a Bikoen perspective, unless the ‘totality’ of the white power structure is dismantled, 
emancipation would be calibrated to democratisation and integration while the majority of black people 
remain impoverished “underdogs”. Biko predicted that white domination will transmute into white 
hegemony under the guise of “a capitalist black society”. From a Mphahlelian perspective, economic 
exploitation and material subjugation are symptoms of a society that has not remembered Afrikan 
humanness. Landlessness, homelessness, lack of gainful employment and precarious existence are, 
therefore, indexes of on-going ‘death of the land’ and spiritual dislocation. Indeed, Mphahlele’s and 
Biko’s perspectives find resonance in Abahlali’s organising campaign: “Land, Housing and Dignity”. 
Finally, Abahlali’s insistence that its members are philosophers of their struggle, its establishment of 
the University of Abahlali and the movement’s oft-repeated intention to assert “our place in the world 
as people that think…” (see for e.g., M. Mdlalose, 2012: n.p.) are indicative of this movement’s direct 
intention to confront and challenge (neo)colonialist discourse and praxis.  
I used the chapter on Abahlali to apply the main themes of this dissertation; namely, ongoing black 
people’s strivings for constitution and belonging; my typology of options available to people produced 
as pariahs and non-elite application of the Du Boisian manifesto. I showed that Abahlali’s striving is 
against what they refer as “UnFreedom” – a constitution dispensation that freezes the black majority in 
an interregnum. Abahlali dealt with this reality by exiling themselves in order to potentiate double 
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consciousness and to forge Abahlalism. Ultimately, the case study of Abahlali demonstrates that the 
struggle against pariahdom and worldlessness can only be won by collective struggles waged by people 
who are still banished to the underside of the South African world.   
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